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	<?rfc comments="yes"?>	<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" number="9788" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-25" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" obsoletes="" updates="8551" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="tr ue" symRefs="true" version="3" xml:lang="en">


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	<front>	<front>

	<title abbrev="Cryptographic MIME Header Protection">Header Protection for C	<title abbrev="Cryptographic MIME Header Protection">Header Protection for C
	ryptographically Protected E-mail</title>	ryptographically Protected Email</title>
		<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9788"/>
	<author initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor" fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor">	<author initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor" fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor">
	<organization>American Civil Liberties Union</organization>	<organization>American Civil Liberties Union</organization>
	<address>	<address>
	<postal>	<postal>
	<street>125 Broad St.</street>	<street>125 Broad St.</street>

	<city>New York, NY</city>	<city>New York</city>
		<region>NY</region>
	<code>10004</code>	<code>10004</code>

	<country>USA</country>	<country>United States of America</country>
	</postal>	</postal>
	<email>dkg@fifthhorseman.net</email>	<email>dkg@fifthhorseman.net</email>
	</address>	</address>
	</author>	</author>
	<author initials="B." surname="Hoeneisen" fullname="Bernie Hoeneisen">	<author initials="B." surname="Hoeneisen" fullname="Bernie Hoeneisen">
	<organization>pEp Project</organization>	<organization>pEp Project</organization>
	<address>	<address>
	<postal>	<postal>
	<street>Oberer Graben 4</street>	<street>Oberer Graben 4</street>
	<city>8400 Winterthur</city>	<city>8400 Winterthur</city>

	skipping to change at line 50 ¶	skipping to change at line 47 ¶
	<uri>https://pep-project.org/</uri>	<uri>https://pep-project.org/</uri>
	</address>	</address>
	</author>	</author>
	<author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="Alexey Melnikov">	<author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="Alexey Melnikov">
	<organization>Isode Ltd</organization>	<organization>Isode Ltd</organization>
	<address>	<address>
	<postal>	<postal>
	<street>14 Castle Mews</street>	<street>14 Castle Mews</street>
	<city>Hampton, Middlesex</city>	<city>Hampton, Middlesex</city>
	<code>TW12 2NP</code>	<code>TW12 2NP</code>

	<country>UK</country>	<country>United Kingdom</country>
	</postal>	</postal>
	<email>alexey.melnikov@isode.com</email>	<email>alexey.melnikov@isode.com</email>
	</address>	</address>
	</author>	</author>

		<date year="2025" month="May"/>
		<area>SEC</area>
		<workgroup>lamps</workgroup>


	<date year="2025" month="January" day="06"/>	<!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in
		the title) for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search. -->
	<area>Security</area>
	<workgroup>LAMPS Working Group</workgroup>
	<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>

	<abstract>	<abstract>

		<t>S/MIME version 3.1 introduced a mechanism to provide end-to-end cryptographic
	<?line 88?>	protection of email message headers.

	<t>S/MIME version 3.1 introduced a mechanism to provide end-to-end cryptographic
	protection of e-mail message headers.
	However, few implementations generate messages using this mechanism, and several legacy implementations have revealed rendering or security issues when handling such a message.</t>	However, few implementations generate messages using this mechanism, and several legacy implementations have revealed rendering or security issues when handling such a message.</t>

		<t>This document updates the S/MIME specification (RFC 8551) to offer a di
	<t>This document updates the S/MIME specification (RFC8551) to offer a different	fferent mechanism that provides the same cryptographic protections but with fewe
	mechanism that provides the same cryptographic protections but with fewer downs	r downsides when handled by legacy clients.
	ides when handled by legacy clients.	Furthermore, it offers more explicit usability, privacy, and security guidance f
	Furthermore, it offers more explicit usability, privacy, and security guidance f	or clients when generating or handling email messages with cryptographic protect
	or clients when generating or handling e-mail messages with cryptographic protec	ion of message headers.</t>
	tion of message headers.</t>	<t>The Header Protection scheme defined here is also applicable to message
		s with PGP/MIME (Pretty Good Privacy with MIME) cryptographic protections.</t>
	<t>The Header Protection scheme defined here is also applicable to messages with
	PGP/MIME cryptographic protections.</t>

	</abstract>	</abstract>


	<note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
	<t>
	The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://
	dkg.gitlab.io/lamps-header-protection/"/>.
	Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https
	://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection/"/>.
	</t>
	<t>
	Discussion of this document takes place on the
	LAMPS Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:spasm@ietf.org"/>
	),
	which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/bro
	wse/spasm/"/>.
	Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm/"
	/>.
	</t>
	<t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
	<eref target="https://gitlab.com/dkg/lamps-header-protection"/>.</t>
	</note>

	</front>	</front>


	<middle>	<middle>

		<!-- <?line 98?>-->


	<?line 98?>	<section anchor="introduction">
		<name>Introduction</name>
	<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>	<t>Privacy and security issues regarding email Header Protection in S/MIME
		and PGP/MIME have been identified for some time.
	<t>Privacy and security issues regarding e-mail Header Protection in S/MIME and	Most current implementations of cryptographically protected email protect only t
	PGP/MIME have been identified for some time.	he body of the message, which leaves significant room for attacks against otherw
	Most current implementations of cryptographically protected electronic mail prot	ise-protected messages.
	ect only the body of the message, which leaves significant room for attacks agai
	nst otherwise-protected messages.
	For example, lack of Header Protection allows an attacker to substitute the mess age subject and/or author.</t>	For example, lack of Header Protection allows an attacker to substitute the mess age subject and/or author.</t>

		<t>This document describes how to cryptographically protect message header
	<t>This document describes how to cryptographically protect message headers, and	s and provides guidance for the implementer of a Mail User Agent (MUA) that gene
	provides guidance for the implementer of a Mail User Agent (MUA) that generates	rates, interprets, and replies to such a message.
	, interprets, and replies to such a message.
	It uses the term "Legacy MUA" to refer to an MUA that does not implement this sp ecification.	It uses the term "Legacy MUA" to refer to an MUA that does not implement this sp ecification.
	This document takes particular care to ensure that messages interact reasonably well with Legacy MUAs.</t>	This document takes particular care to ensure that messages interact reasonably well with Legacy MUAs.</t>

		<section anchor="update-to-rfc-8551">
	<section anchor="update-to-rfc-8551"><name>Update to RFC 8551</name>	<name>Update to RFC 8551</name>
		<t>An older scheme for Header Protection was specified in S/MIME 3.1 <xr
	<t>An older scheme for Header Protection was specified in S/MIME 3.1 (<xref targ	ef target="RFC8551"/>, which involves wrapping a <tt>message/rfc822</tt> MIME ob
	et="RFC8551"/>), which involves wrapping a <spanx style="verb">message/rfc822</s	ject with a Cryptographic Envelope around the message to protect it.
	panx> MIME object with a Cryptographic Envelope around the message to protect.	This document refers to that scheme as "RFC 8551 Header Protection", or "<iref i
	This document refers to that scheme as RFC 8551 Header Protection, or "<iref ite	tem="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>".
	m="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>".
	Substantial testing has shown that <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551 HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> does not interact well with some Legacy MUAs (see <xref target="rfc8551-problems"/>).</t>	Substantial testing has shown that <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551 HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> does not interact well with some Legacy MUAs (see <xref target="rfc8551-problems"/>).</t>

		<t>This specification supersedes <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="R
	<t>This specification supersedes <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP	FC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>, effectively replacing the final two pa
	" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>, effectively replacing the final two paragraphs	ragraphs of <xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8551"/>.</t>
	of <xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8551"/>.</t>	<t>In this specification, all Header Fields gain end-to-end cryptographi
		c integrity and authenticity by being copied directly into the Cryptographic Pay
	<t>In this specification, all Header Fields gain end-to-end cryptographic integr	load without using an intervening <tt>message/rfc822</tt> MIME object.
	ity and authenticity by being copied directly into the Cryptographic Payload wit
	hout using an intervening <spanx style="verb">message/rfc822</spanx> MIME object
	.
	In an encrypted message, some Header Fields can also be made confidential by rem oving or obscuring them from the outer Header Section.</t>	In an encrypted message, some Header Fields can also be made confidential by rem oving or obscuring them from the outer Header Section.</t>

		<t>This specification also offers substantial security, privacy, and usa
		bility guidance for sending and receiving MUAs that was not considered in <xref
		target="RFC8551"/>.</t>
		<section anchor="rfc8551-problems">
		<name>Problems with RFC 8551 Header Protection</name>
		<t>Several Legacy MUAs have difficulty rendering a message that uses <
		iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>.
		These problems can appear on signed-only messages, as well as signed-an
		d-encrypted messages.</t>


	<t>This specification also offers substantial security, privacy, and usability g	<!--[rfced] FYI - In the following sentence, we have updated "page 5"
	uidance for sending and receiving MUAs that was not considered in RFC 8551.</t>	to "Section 2". Please review and let us know of any objections.


	<section anchor="rfc8551-problems"><name>Problems with RFC 8551 Header Protectio	Original:
	n</name>	In some cases, some mail user agents cannot render message/rfc822
		message subparts at all, in violation of baseline MIME requirements
		as defined on page 5 of [RFC2049].


	<t>Several Legacy MUAs have difficulty rendering a message that uses <iref item=	Current:
	"RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>.	In some cases, some mail user agents cannot render message/rfc822
	These problems can appear on signed-only messages, as well as signed-and-encrypt	message subparts at all, which is in violation of baseline MIME
	ed messages.</t>	requirements as defined in Section 2 of [RFC2049].
		-->


	<t>In some cases, some mail user agents cannot render <spanx style="verb">messag e/rfc822</spanx> message subparts at all, in violation of baseline MIME requirem ents as defined on page 5 of <xref target="RFC2049"/>.	<t>In some cases, some mail user agents cannot render <tt>message/rfc8 22</tt> message subparts at all, which is in violation of baseline MIME requirem ents as defined in <xref section="2" target="RFC2049"/>.
	A message using <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">R FC8551HP</xref> is unreadable by any recipient using such an MUA.</t>	A message using <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">R FC8551HP</xref> is unreadable by any recipient using such an MUA.</t>

		<t>In other cases, the user sees an attachment suggesting a forwarded
	<t>In other cases, the user sees an attachment suggesting a forwarded e-mail mes	email message that -- in fact -- contains the protected email message that shoul
	sage, which -- in fact -- contains the protected e-mail message that should be r	d be rendered directly.
	endered directly.
	In most of these cases, the user can click on the attachment to view the protect ed message.</t>	In most of these cases, the user can click on the attachment to view the protect ed message.</t>

		<t>However, viewing the protected message as an attachment in isolatio
	<t>However, viewing the protected message as an attachment in isolation may stri	n may strip it of any security indications, leaving the user unable to assess th
	p it of any security indications, leaving the user unable to assess the cryptogr	e cryptographic properties of the message.
	aphic properties of the message.
	Worse, for encrypted messages, interacting with the protected message in isolati on may leak contents of the cleartext, for example, if the reply is not also enc rypted.</t>	Worse, for encrypted messages, interacting with the protected message in isolati on may leak contents of the cleartext, for example, if the reply is not also enc rypted.</t>

		<t>Furthermore, <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" forma
	<t>Furthermore, <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">R	t="none">RFC8551HP</xref> lacks any discussion of the following points, all of w
	FC8551HP</xref> lacks any discussion of the following points, all of which are p	hich are provided in this specification:</t>
	rovided in this specification:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>Which Header Fields should be given end-to-end cryptographic in
	<t>Which Header Fields should be given end-to-end cryptographic integrity and	tegrity and authenticity protections (this specification mandates protection of
	authenticity protections (this specification mandates protection of all Header F	all Header Fields that the sending MUA knows about).</t>
	ields that the sending MUA knows about).</t>	</li>
	<t>How to securely indicate the sender's intent to offer Header Protection and	<li>
	encryption, which lets a receiving MUA detect messages whose cryptographic prop	<t>How to securely indicate the sender's intent to offer Header Pr
	erties may have been modified in transit (see <xref target="hp-parameter"/>).</t	otection and encryption, which lets a receiving MUA detect messages whose crypto
	>	graphic properties may have been modified in transit (see <xref target="hp-param
	<t>Which Header Fields should be given end-to-end cryptographic confidentialit	eter"/>).</t>
	y protections in an encrypted message, and how (see <xref target="header-confide	</li>
	ntiality-policy"/>).</t>	<li>
	<t>How to securely indicate the sender's choices about which Header Fields wer	<t>Which Header Fields should be given end-to-end cryptographic co
	e made confidential, which lets a receiving MUA reply or forward an encrypted me	nfidentiality protections in an encrypted message and how (see <xref target="hea
	ssage safely without accidentally leaking confidential material (see <xref targe	der-confidentiality-policy"/>).</t>
	t="hp-outer"/>).</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
		<t>How to securely indicate the sender's choices about which Heade
	<t>These stumbling blocks with Legacy MUAs, missing mechanisms, and missing guid	r Fields were made confidential, which lets a receiving MUA reply or forward an
	ance create a strong disincentive for existing MUAs to generate messages using <	encrypted message safely without accidentally leaking confidential material (see
	iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>.	<xref target="hp-outer"/>).</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>These stumbling blocks with Legacy MUAs, missing mechanisms, and mi
		ssing guidance create a strong disincentive for existing MUAs to generate messag
		es using <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551H
		P</xref>.
	Because few messages have been produced, there has been little incentive for tho se MUAs capable of upgrading to bother interpreting them better.</t>	Because few messages have been produced, there has been little incentive for tho se MUAs capable of upgrading to bother interpreting them better.</t>

		<t>In contrast, the mechanisms defined here are safe to adopt and prod
	<t>In contrast, the mechanisms defined here are safe to adopt and produce messag	uce messages with very few problems for Legacy MUAs.
	es with very few problems for Legacy MUAs.	And <xref target="RFC8551HP"/> provides useful guidance for rendering and replyi
	And, <xref target="RFC8551HP"/> provides useful guidance for rendering and reply	ng to <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</
	ing to <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP<	xref> messages.</t>
	/xref> messages.</t>	</section>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="legacy-mua-risks">
	</section>	<name>Risks of Header Protection for Legacy MUA Recipients</name>
	<section anchor="legacy-mua-risks"><name>Risks of Header Protection for Legacy M	<t>Producing a signed-only message using this specification is risk free
	UA Recipients</name>	.

	<t>Producing a signed-only message using this specification is risk-free.
	Such a message will render in the same way on any Legacy MUA as a Legacy Signed Message (that is, a signed message without Header Protection).	Such a message will render in the same way on any Legacy MUA as a Legacy Signed Message (that is, a signed message without Header Protection).
	An MUA conformant to this specification that encounters such a message will be a ble to gain the benefits of end-to-end cryptographic integrity and authenticity for all Header Fields.</t>	An MUA conformant to this specification that encounters such a message will be a ble to gain the benefits of end-to-end cryptographic integrity and authenticity for all Header Fields.</t>

		<t>An encrypted message produced according to this specification that ha
	<t>An encrypted message produced according to this specification that has some u	s some user-facing Header Fields removed or obscured may not render as desired i
	ser-facing Header Fields removed or obscured may not render as desired in a Lega	n a Legacy MUA.
	cy MUA.
	In particular, those Header Fields that were made confidential will not be visib le to the user of a Legacy MUA.	In particular, those Header Fields that were made confidential will not be visib le to the user of a Legacy MUA.

	For example, if the <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header Field outside the Cryptographic Envelope is replaced with <spanx style="verb">[...]</spanx>, a Le gacy MUA will render the <spanx style="verb">[...]</spanx> anywhere the <spanx s tyle="verb">Subject</spanx> is normally seen.	For example, if the <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field outside the Cryptographic Enve lope is replaced with <tt>[...]</tt>, a Legacy MUA will render the <tt>[...]</tt > anywhere the <tt>Subject</tt> is normally seen.
	This is the only risk of producing an encrypted message according to this specif ication.</t>	This is the only risk of producing an encrypted message according to this specif ication.</t>

		<t>A workaround "Legacy Display" mechanism is provided in this specifica
	<t>A workaround "Legacy Display" mechanism is provided in this specification (se	tion (see <xref target="hp-legacy-display"/>).
	e <xref target="hp-legacy-display"/>).
	Legacy MUAs will render "Legacy Display Elements" to the user, albeit not in the same location that the Header Fields would normally be rendered.</t>	Legacy MUAs will render "Legacy Display Elements" to the user, albeit not in the same location that the Header Fields would normally be rendered.</t>

		<t>Alternately, if the sender of an encrypted message is particularly co
	<t>Alternately, if the sender of an encrypted message is particularly concerned	ncerned about the experience of a recipient using a Legacy MUA, and they are wil
	about the experience of a recipient using a Legacy MUA, and they are willing to	ling to accept leaking the user-facing Header Fields, they can simply adopt the
	accept leaking the user-facing Header Fields, they can simply adopt the No <iref	No <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidential
	item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-poli	ity-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> (see <xref target
	cy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> (see <xref target="no-con	="no-confidentiality-hcp"/>).
	fidentiality-hcp"/>).	A signed-and-encrypted message composed using the No <iref item="Header Confiden
	A signed and encrypted message composed using the No <iref item="Header Confiden	tiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Head
	tiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Head	er Confidentiality Policy</xref> offers no usability risk for a reader using a L
	er Confidentiality Policy</xref> offers no usability risk for a reader using a L	egacy MUA and retains end-to-end cryptographic integrity and authenticity proper
	egacy MUA, and retains end-to-end cryptographic integrity and authenticity prope	ties for all Header Fields for any reader using a conformant MUA.
	rties for all Header Fields for any reader using a conformant MUA.
	Of course, such a message has the same (non-existent) confidentiality properties for all Header Fields as a Legacy Encrypted Message (that is, an encrypted mess age made without Header Protection).</t>	Of course, such a message has the same (non-existent) confidentiality properties for all Header Fields as a Legacy Encrypted Message (that is, an encrypted mess age made without Header Protection).</t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="motivation">
	<section anchor="motivation"><name>Motivation</name>	<name>Motivation</name>
		<t>Users generally do not understand the distinction between message bod
	<t>Users generally do not understand the distinction between message body and me	y and message header.
	ssage header.	When an email message has cryptographic protections that cover the message body
	When an e-mail message has cryptographic protections that cover the message body	but not the Header Fields, several attacks become possible.</t>
	, but not the Header Fields, several attacks become possible.</t>	<t>For example, a Legacy Signed Message has a signature that covers the
		body but not the Header Fields.
	<t>For example, a Legacy Signed Message has a signature that covers the body but	An attacker can therefore modify the Header Fields (including Subject) without i
	not the Header Fields.	nvalidating the signature.
	An attacker can therefore modify the Header Fields (including the Subject header	Since most readers consider a message body in the context of the message's Subje
	) without invalidating the signature.	ct, the meaning of the message itself could change drastically (under the attack
	Since most readers consider a message body in the context of the message's Subje	er's control) while still retaining the same cryptographic indicators of integri
	ct header, the meaning of the message itself could change drastically (under the	ty and authenticity.</t>
	attacker's control) while still retaining the same cryptographic indicators of	<t>In another example, a Legacy Encrypted Message has its body effective
	integrity and authenticity.</t>	ly hidden from an adversary that snoops on the message.

	<t>In another example, a Legacy Encrypted Message has its body effectively hidde
	n from an adversary that snoops on the message.
	But if the Header Fields are not also encrypted, significant information about t he message (such as the message Subject) will leak to the inspecting adversary.< /t>	But if the Header Fields are not also encrypted, significant information about t he message (such as the message Subject) will leak to the inspecting adversary.< /t>

		<t>However, if the sending and receiving MUAs ensure that cryptographic
		protections cover the message Header Section as well as the message body, these
		attacks are defeated.</t>
		<section anchor="backward-compatibility">
		<name>Backward Compatibility</name>
		<t>If the sending MUA is unwilling to generate such a fully protected
		message due to the potential for rendering, usability, deliverability, or securi
		ty issues, these defenses cannot be realized.</t>
		<t>The sender cannot know what MUA (or MUAs) the recipient will use to
		handle the message. Thus, an outbound message format that is backward compatibl
		e with as many legacy implementations as possible is a more effective vehicle fo
		r providing the whole-message cryptographic protections described above.</t>


	<t>However, if the sending and receiving MUAs ensure that cryptographic protecti	<!--[rfced] Should "highest" be added to this sentence to describe the
	ons cover the message Header Section as well as the message body, these attacks	"extent possible"?
	are defeated.</t>

	<section anchor="backward-compatibility"><name>Backward Compatibility</name>


	<t>If the sending MUA is unwilling to generate such a fully protected message du	Original:
	e to the potential for rendering, usability, deliverability, or security issues,	This document aims for backward compatibility with Legacy MUAs to the
	these defenses cannot be realized.</t>	extent possible.


	<t>The sender cannot know what MUA (or MUAs) the recipient will use to handle th	Perhaps:
	e message.	This document aims for backward compatibility with Legacy MUAs to the
	Thus, an outbound message format that is backward compatible with as many legacy	highest extent possible.
	implementations as possible is a more effective vehicle for providing the whole	-->
	-message cryptographic protections described above.</t>


	<t>This document aims for backward compatibility with Legacy MUAs to the extent possible.	<t>This document aims for backward compatibility with Legacy MUAs to t he extent possible.
	In some cases, like when a user-visible header like the Subject is cryptographic ally hidden, a Legacy MUA will not be able to render or reply to the message exa ctly the same way as a conformant MUA would.	In some cases, like when a user-visible header like the Subject is cryptographic ally hidden, a Legacy MUA will not be able to render or reply to the message exa ctly the same way as a conformant MUA would.

	But accommodations are described here that ensure a rough semantic equivalence f	But accommodations are described here that ensure a rough semantic equivalence f
	or Legacy MUA even in these cases.</t>	or a Legacy MUA even in these cases.</t>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="deliverability">
	<section anchor="deliverability"><name>Deliverability</name>	<name>Deliverability</name>
		<t>A message with perfect cryptographic protections that cannot be del
	<t>A message with perfect cryptographic protections that cannot be delivered is	ivered is less useful than a message with imperfect cryptographic protections th
	less useful than a message with imperfect cryptographic protections that can be	at can be delivered.
	delivered.
	Senders want their messages to reach the intended recipients.</t>	Senders want their messages to reach the intended recipients.</t>

		<t>Given the current state of the Internet mail ecosystem, encrypted m
	<t>Given the current state of the Internet mail ecosystem, encrypted messages in	essages in particular cannot shield all of their Header Fields from visibility a
	particular cannot shield all of their Header Fields from visibility and still b	nd still be guaranteed delivery to their intended recipient.</t>
	e guaranteed delivery to their intended recipient.</t>	<t>This document accounts for this concern by providing a mechanism (<
		xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"/>) that prioritizes initial delivera
	<t>This document accounts for this concern by providing a mechanism (<xref targe	bility (at the cost of some header leakage) while facilitating future message va
	t="header-confidentiality-policy"/>) that prioritizes initial deliverability (at	riants that shield more header metadata from casual inspection.</t>
	the cost of some header leakage) while facilitating future message variants tha	</section>
	t shield more header metadata from casual inspection.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="other-protocols-to-protect-e-mail-header-fields">
	</section>	<name>Other Protocols to Protect Email Header Fields</name>
	</section>	<t>A separate pair of protocols also provides some cryptographic protect
	<section anchor="other-protocols-to-protect-e-mail-header-fields"><name>Other Pr	ion for the email message header integrity: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) <x
	otocols to Protect E-Mail Header Fields</name>	ref target="RFC6376"/>, as used in combination with Domain-based Message Authent
		ication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) <xref target="RFC7489"/>.
	<t>A separate pair of protocols also provides some cryptographic protection for	This pair of protocols provides a domain-based reputation mechanism that can be
	the e-mail message header integrity: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) <xref tar	used to mitigate some forms of unsolicited email (spam).</t>
	get="RFC6376"/>, as used in combination with Domain-based Message Authentication	<t>However, the DKIM+DMARC suite provides cryptographic protection at a
	, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) <xref target="RFC7489"/>.	different scope, as it is usually applied by and evaluated by a mail transport a
	This pair of protocols provides a domain-based reputation mechanism that can be	gent (MTA).
	used to mitigate some forms of unsolicited e-mail (spam).</t>

	<t>However, the DKIM+DMARC suite provides cryptographic protection at a differen
	t scope, as it is usually applied by and evaluated by a mail transport agent (MT
	A).
	DKIM+DMARC typically provide MTA-to-MTA protection, whereas this specification p rovides MUA-to-MUA protection.	DKIM+DMARC typically provide MTA-to-MTA protection, whereas this specification p rovides MUA-to-MUA protection.
	This is because DKIM+DMARC are typically applied to messages by (and interpreted by) MTAs, whereas the mechanisms in this document are typically applied and int erpreted by MUAs.</t>	This is because DKIM+DMARC are typically applied to messages by (and interpreted by) MTAs, whereas the mechanisms in this document are typically applied and int erpreted by MUAs.</t>

		<t>A receiving MUA that relies on DKIM+DMARC for sender authenticity sho
	<t>A receiving MUA that relies on DKIM+DMARC for sender authenticity should note	uld note <xref target="from-addr-spoofing"/>.</t>
	<xref target="from-addr-spoofing"/>.</t>	<t>Furthermore, the DKIM+DMARC suite only provides cryptographic integri
		ty and authentication, not encryption.
	<t>Furthermore, the DKIM+DMARC suite only provides cryptographic integrity and a
	uthentication, not encryption.
	So cryptographic confidentiality is not available from that suite.</t>	So cryptographic confidentiality is not available from that suite.</t>

		<t>The DKIM+DMARC suite can be used on any message, including messages f
	<t>The DKIM+DMARC suite can be used on any message, including messages formed as	ormed as defined in this document.
	defined in this document.
	There should be no conflict between DKIM+DMARC and the specification here.</t>	There should be no conflict between DKIM+DMARC and the specification here.</t>

		<t>Though not strictly email, similar protections have been in use on Us
	<t>Though not strictly e-mail, similar protections have been in use on Usenet fo	enet for the signing and verification of message headers for years.
	r signing and verification of message headers for years.
	See <xref target="PGPCONTROL"/> and <xref target="PGPVERIFY-FORMAT"/> for more d etails.	See <xref target="PGPCONTROL"/> and <xref target="PGPVERIFY-FORMAT"/> for more d etails.
	Like DKIM, these Usenet control protections offer only integrity and authenticat ion, not confidentiality.</t>	Like DKIM, these Usenet control protections offer only integrity and authenticat ion, not confidentiality.</t>

		</section>
		<section anchor="applicability-to-pgpmime">
		<name>Applicability to PGP/MIME</name>
		<t>This document specifies end-to-end cryptographic protections for emai
		l messages in reference to S/MIME <xref target="RFC8551"/>.</t>
		<t>Comparable end-to-end cryptographic protections can also be provided
		by PGP/MIME <xref target="RFC3156"/>.</t>
		<t>The mechanisms in this document should be applicable in the PGP/MIME
		protections as well as S/MIME protections, but analysis and implementation in th
		is document focuses on S/MIME.</t>
		<t>To the extent that any divergence from the mechanism defined here is
		necessary for PGP/MIME, that divergence is out of scope for this document.</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="requirements-language">
		<name>Requirements Language</name>
		<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
		"<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
		NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
		"<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
		"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document
		are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref
		target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
		appear in all capitals, as shown here.
		</t>


	</section>	<!--[rfced] To reflect how their usage is described in RFC 8126, we
	<section anchor="applicability-to-pgpmime"><name>Applicability to PGP/MIME</name	have updated "key words" to "policies" and "SPECIFICATION
	>	REQUIRED" and "IETF REVIEW" to "Specification Required" and "IETF
		Review", respectively (i.e., we capitalized only the first letter
	<t>This document specifies end-to-end cryptographic protections for e-mail messa	of each word and removed <bcp14> tags around "REQUIRED" in the
	ges in reference to S/MIME (<xref target="RFC8551"/>).</t>	XML). Note that all occurrences of these terms have been made
		lowercase.


	<t>Comparable end-to-end cryptographic protections can also be provided by PGP/M	Additionally, may we move this text from the "Requirements Language"
	IME (<xref target="RFC3156"/>).</t>	section to the "Terms" section as the first paragraph since these
		terms are not key words?


	<t>The mechanisms in this document should be applicable in the PGP/MIME protecti ons as well as S/MIME protections, but analysis and implementation in this docum ent focuses on S/MIME.</t>	One example


	<t>To the extent that any divergence from the mechanism defined here is necessar	Original:
	y for PGP/MIME, that divergence is out of scope for this document.</t>	The key words "SPECIFICATION REQUIRED" and "IETF REVIEW" that appear
		in this document when used to describe namespace allocation are to be
		interpreted as described in [RFC8126].


	</section>	Current:
	<section anchor="requirements-language"><name>Requirements Language</name>	The policies "Specification Required" and "IETF Review" that appear
		in this document when used to describe namespace allocation are to be
		interpreted as described in [RFC8126].
		-->


	<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUI	<t>The policies "Specification Required" and "IETF
	RED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL	Review" that appear in this document when used to describe namespace
	NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECO	allocation are to be interpreted as described in <xref
	MMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",	target="RFC8126"/>.</t>
	"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be i	</section>
	nterpreted as	<section anchor="terms">
	described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and	<name>Terms</name>
	only when, they	<t>The following terms are defined for the scope of this document:</t>
	appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>	<dl spacing="normal" newline="false">
		<dt>S/MIME:</dt><dd>Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (see
		<xref target="RFC8551"/>)</dd>


	<?line -18?>	<!--[rfced] To match use in RFC 3156 and the companion document, we
		updated the expansion of "PGP/MIME" in the Abstract and Terms
		section as follows. Please let us know of any objections.


	<t>The key words "SPECIFICATION <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>" and "IETF REVIEW" that	Original (Abstract):
	appear in this document when used to describe namespace allocation are to be int	The Header Protection scheme defined here is also applicable to
	erpreted as described in <xref target="RFC8126"/>.</t>	messages with PGP/MIME cryptographic protections.


	</section>	Current:
	<section anchor="terms"><name>Terms</name>	The Header Protection scheme defined here is also applicable to
		messages with PGP/MIME (Pretty Good Privacy with MIME) cryptographic
		protections.


	<t>The following terms are defined for the scope of this document:</t>	...
		Original (Section 1.7):
		* PGP/MIME: MIME Security with OpenPGP (see [RFC3156])


	<t><list style="symbols">	Current:
	<t>S/MIME: Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (see <xref target="RFC	* PGP/MIME: Pretty Good Privacy with MIME (see [RFC3156])
	8551"/>)</t>	-->
	<t>PGP/MIME: MIME Security with OpenPGP (see <xref target="RFC3156"/>)</t>
	<t>Message: An E-Mail Message consisting of Header Fields (collectively called
	"the Header Section of the message") followed, optionally, by a Body; see <xref
	target="RFC5322"/>. <vspace blankLines='1'/>
	Note: To avoid ambiguity, this document avoids using the terms "Header" or "Head
	ers" in isolation, but instead always uses "Header Field" to refer to the indivi
	dual field and "Header Section" to refer to the entire collection.</t>
	<t>Header Field: A Header Field includes a field name, followed by a colon (":
	"), followed by a field body (value), and terminated by CRLF; see <xref section=
	"2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5322"/> for more details.</t>
	<t>Header Section: The Header Section is a sequence of lines of characters wit
	h special syntax as defined in <xref target="RFC5322"/>.
	The Header Section of a Message contains the Header Fields associated with the M
	essage itself.
	The Header Section of a MIME part (that is, a subpart of a message) typically co
	ntains Header Fields associated with that particular MIME part.</t>
	<t>Body: The Body is the part of a Message that follows the Header Section and
	is separated from the Header Section by an empty line (that is, a line with not
	hing preceding the CRLF); see <xref target="RFC5322"/>.
	It is the (bottom) section of a Message containing the payload of a Message.
	Typically, the Body consists of a (possibly multipart) MIME <xref target="RFC204
	5"/> construct.</t>
	<t>Header Protection (HP): cryptographic protection of e-mail Header Sections
	(or parts of it) by means of signatures and/or encryption.</t>
	<t>Cryptographic Layer, Cryptographic Payload, Cryptographic Envelope, Cryptog
	raphic Summary, Structural Header Fields, Main Body Part, User-Facing Header Fie
	lds, and MUA are all used as defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-gu
	idance"/></t>
	<t>Legacy MUA: an MUA that does not understand Header Protection as defined in
	this document.
	A Legacy Non-Crypto MUA is incapable of doing any end-to-end cryptographic opera
	tions.
	A Legacy Crypto MUA is capable of doing cryptographic operations, but does not u
	nderstand or generate messages with Header Protection.</t>
	<t>Legacy Signed Message: an e-mail message that was signed by a Legacy MUA, a
	nd therefore has no cryptographic authenticity or integrity protections on its H
	eader Fields.</t>
	<t>Legacy Encrypted Message: an e-mail message that was signed and encrypted b
	y a Legacy MUA, and therefore has no cryptographic authenticity, integrity, or c
	onfidentiality protections on any of its Header Fields.</t>
	<t><iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidenti
	ality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> (<iref item="HC
	P"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>): a fu
	nctional specification of which Header Fields should be removed or obscured when
	composing an encrypted message with Header Protection.
	An <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">
	HCP</xref> is considered more "conservative" when it removes or obscures fewer H
	eader Fields.
	When it removes or obscures more Header fields, it is more "ambitious".
	See <xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"/>.</t>
	<t>Ordinary User: a user of an MUA who follows a simple and minimal experience
	, focused on sending and receiving e-mails.
	A user who opts into advanced configuration, expert mode, or the like is not an
	"Ordinary User".</t>
	</list></t>


	</section>	<dt>PGP/MIME:</dt><dd>Pretty Good Privacy with MIME (see <xref targe
	<section anchor="document-scope"><name>Document Scope</name>	t="RFC3156"/>)</dd>
		<dt>Message:</dt><dd><t>An email message consisting of Header
		Fields (collectively called "the Header Section of the message")
		optionally followed by a message body; see <xref target="RFC5322"/>.
		</t>
		<t>Note: To avoid ambiguity, this document avoids using the terms
		"Header" or "Headers" in isolation, but instead always uses
		"Header Field" to refer to the individual field and "Header
		Section" to refer to the entire collection.</t></dd>
		<dt>Header Field:</dt><dd>A Header Field includes a field name,
		followed by a colon (":"), followed by a field body (value), and
		is terminated by CRLF; see <xref section="2.2" sectionFormat="of"
		target="RFC5322"/> for more details.</dd>
		<dt>Header Section:</dt><dd>The Header Section is a sequence of
		lines of characters with special syntax as defined in <xref
		target="RFC5322"/>. The Header Section of a message contains the
		Header Fields associated with the message itself. The Header
		Section of a MIME part (that is, a subpart of a message) typically
		contains Header Fields associated with that particular MIME
		part.</dd>
		<dt>Body:</dt><dd>The body is the part of a message that follows
		the Header Section and is separated from the Header Section by an
		empty line (that is, a line with nothing preceding the CRLF); see
		<xref target="RFC5322"/>. It is the (bottom) section of a message
		containing the payload of a message. Typically, the body consists
		of a (possibly multipart) MIME <xref target="RFC2045"/>
		construct.</dd>
		<dt>Header Protection (HP):</dt><dd>The cryptographic protection of
		email Header Sections (or parts of it) by means of signatures
		and/or encryption.</dd>
		<dt>Legacy MUA:</dt><dd>An MUA that does not understand Header
		Protection as defined in this document. A Legacy Non-Crypto MUA
		is incapable of doing any end-to-end cryptographic operations. A
		Legacy Crypto MUA is capable of doing cryptographic operations
		but does not understand or generate messages with Header
		Protection.</dd>
		<dt>Legacy Signed Message:</dt><dd>An email message that was
		signed by a Legacy MUA and therefore has no cryptographic
		authenticity or integrity protections on its Header Fields.</dd>
		<dt>Legacy Encrypted Message:</dt><dd>An email message that was
		signed and encrypted by a Legacy MUA and therefore has no
		cryptographic authenticity, integrity, or confidentiality
		protections on any of its Header Fields.</dd>
		<dt><iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref
		target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header
		Confidentiality Policy</xref> (<iref item="HCP"/><xref
		target="header-confidentiality-policy"
		format="none">HCP</xref>):</dt><dd>A functional specification of
		which Header Fields should be removed or obscured when composing
		an encrypted message with Header Protection. An <iref
		item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"
		format="none">HCP</xref> is considered more "conservative" when it
		removes or obscures fewer Header Fields. When it removes or
		obscures more Header Fields, it is more "ambitious". See <xref
		target="header-confidentiality-policy"/>.</dd>
		<dt>Ordinary User:</dt><dd>A user of an MUA who follows a simple
		and minimal experience, focused on sending and receiving emails.
		A user who opts into advanced configuration, expert mode, or the
		like is not an "Ordinary User".</dd>
		</dl>


	<t>This document describes sensible, simple behavior for a program that generate	<!--[rfced] FYI - We have moved this text to the end of the Terms section since
	s an e-mail message with standard end-to-end cryptographic protections, followin	it does not match the definition list formatting of the other terms listed.
	g the guidance in <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>.	Please let us know of any objections.
	An implementation conformant to this document will produce messages that have cr
	yptographic protection that covers the message's Header Fields as well as its bo
	dy.</t>


	<section anchor="in-scope"><name>In Scope</name>	Original:
		* Cryptographic Layer, Cryptographic Payload, Cryptographic
		Envelope, Cryptographic Summary, Structural Header Fields, Main
		Body Part, User-Facing Header Fields, and MUA are all used as
		defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance]


	<t>This document also describes sensible, simple behavior for a program that int	Current:
	erprets such a message, in a way that can take advantage of these protections co	Additionally, Cryptographic Layer, Cryptographic Payload, Cryptographic
	vering the Header Fields as well as the body.</t>	Envelope, Cryptographic Summary, Structural Header Fields, Main
		Body Part, User-Facing Header Fields, and MUA are all used as
		defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance]
		-->
		<t>Additionally, Cryptographic Layer, Cryptographic Payload, Cryptog
		raphic
		Envelope, Cryptographic Summary, Structural Header Fields, Main
		Body Part, User-Facing Header Fields, and MUA are all used
		as defined in <xref
		target="RFC9787"/>.</t>


	<t>The message generation guidance aims to minimize negative interactions with a	</section>
	ny Legacy receiving MUA while providing actionable cryptographic properties for	<section anchor="document-scope">
	modern receiving clients.</t>	<name>Document Scope</name>
		<t>This document describes sensible, simple behavior for a program that
		generates an email message with standard end-to-end cryptographic protections, f
		ollowing the guidance in <xref target="RFC9787"/>.
		An implementation conformant to this document will produce messages that have cr
		yptographic protection that covers the message's Header Fields as well as its bo
		dy.</t>
		<section anchor="in-scope">
		<name>In Scope</name>
		<t>This document also describes sensible, simple behavior for a progra
		m that interprets such a message in a way that can take advantage of these prote
		ctions covering the Header Fields as well as the body.</t>


	<t>In particular, this document focuses on two standard types of cryptographic p	<!--[rfced] For clarity and consistency, may we update the phrasing of
	rotection that cover the entire message:</t>	"Legacy receiving MUA" and "modern receiving clients" as follows?


	<t><list style="symbols">	Original:
	<t>A cleartext message with a single signature, and</t>	The message generation guidance aims to minimize negative
	<t>An encrypted message that contains a single cryptographic signature.</t>	interactions with any Legacy receiving MUA while providing
	</list></t>	actionable cryptographic properties for modern receiving
		clients.


	</section>	Perhaps:
	<section anchor="out-of-scope"><name>Out of Scope</name>	The message generation guidance aims to minimize negative
		interactions with any Legacy MUA recipient while providing
		actionable cryptographic properties for modern client
		recipients.
		-->


	<t>The message composition guidance in this document (in <xref target="compose"/	<t>The message generation guidance aims to minimize negative interacti
	>) aims to provide minimal disruption for any Legacy MUA that receives such a me	ons with any Legacy receiving MUA while providing actionable cryptographic prope
	ssage.	rties for modern receiving clients.</t>
	However, a Legacy MUA by definition does not implement any of the guidance here.	<t>In particular, this document focuses on two standard types of crypt
		ographic protection that cover the entire message:</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>a cleartext message with a single signature and</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>an encrypted message that contains a single cryptographic signa
		ture.</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		</section>
		<section anchor="out-of-scope">
		<name>Out of Scope</name>
		<t>The message composition guidance in this document (in <xref target=
		"compose"/>) aims to provide minimal disruption for any Legacy MUA that receives
		such a message.
		However, by definition, a Legacy MUA does not implement any of the guidance here
		.
	Therefore, the document does not attempt to provide guidance for Legacy MUAs dir ectly.</t>	Therefore, the document does not attempt to provide guidance for Legacy MUAs dir ectly.</t>

		<t>Furthermore, this document does not explicitly contemplate other va
	<t>Furthermore, this document does not explicitly contemplate other variants of	riants of cryptographic message protections, including any of these:</t>
	cryptographic message protections, including any of these:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>encrypted-only message (without a cryptographic signature; see
	<t>Encrypted-only message (Without a cryptographic signature. See <xref sectio	<xref section="5.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>)</t>
	n="5.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>.)</t>	</li>
	<t>Triple-wrapped message</t>	<li>
	<t>Signed message with multiple signatures</t>	<t>triple-wrapped message</t>
	<t>Encrypted message with a cryptographic signature outside the encryption.</t	</li>
	>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>signed message with multiple signatures</t>
		</li>
	<t>All such messages are out of scope of this document.</t>	<li>
		<t>encrypted message with a cryptographic signature outside the en
	</section>	cryption</t>
	</section>	</li>
	<section anchor="example"><name>Example</name>	</ul>
		<t>All such messages are out of scope of this document.</t>
	<t>This section gives an overview by providing an example of how MIME messages w	</section>
	ith Header Protection look like.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="example">
	<t>Consider the following MIME message:</t>	<name>Example</name>
		<t>This section gives an overview by providing an example of how MIME me
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	ssages with Header Protection look.</t>
		<t>Consider the following MIME message:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	A └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"	A └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	B └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"	B └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	C └┬╴multipart/alternative; hp="cipher"	C └┬╴multipart/alternative; hp="cipher"
	D ├─╴text/plain; hp-legacy-display="1"	D ├─╴text/plain; hp-legacy-display="1"
	E └─╴text/html; hp-legacy-display="1"	E └─╴text/html; hp-legacy-display="1"

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Observe that:</t>
	<t>Observe that:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>Nodes A and B are collectively called the Cryptographic Envelope.
	<t>Node A and B are collectively called the Cryptographic Envelope.	Node C (including its subnodes D and E) is called the Cryptographic Payload <xre
	Node C (including its sub-nodes D and E) is called the Cryptographic Payload (<x	f target="RFC9787"/>.</t>
	ref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>).</t>	</li>
	<t>Node A contains the traditional unprotected ("outer") Header Fields.	<li>
		<t>Node A contains the traditional unprotected ("outer") Header Fiel
		ds.
	Node C contains the protected ("inner") Header Fields.</t>	Node C contains the protected ("inner") Header Fields.</t>

	<t>The presence of the <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> attribute (see <xref tar	</li>
	get="hp-parameter"/>) on the <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> of node C	<li>
	allows the receiver to know that the sender applied Header Protection.	<t>The presence of the <tt>hp</tt> attribute (see <xref target="hp-p
	Its value allows the receiver to distinguish whether the sender intended for the	arameter"/>) on the <tt>Content-Type</tt> of node C allows the receiver to know
	message to be confidential (<spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx>) or not (<s	that the sender applied Header Protection.
	panx style="verb">hp="clear"</spanx>), since encryption may have been added in t	Its value allows the receiver to distinguish whether the sender intended for the
	ransit (see <xref target="avoid-summary-confusion"/>).</t>	message to be confidential (<tt>hp="cipher"</tt>) or not (<tt>hp="clear"</tt>),
	</list></t>	since encryption may have been added in transit (see <xref target="avoid-summar
		y-confusion"/>).</t>
	<t>The "outer" Header Section on node A looks as follows:</t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	<t>The "outer" Header Section on node A looks as follows:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500
	From: Bob <bob@example.net>	From: Bob <bob@example.net>
	To: Alice <alice@example.net>	To: Alice <alice@example.net>
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>The "inner" Header Section on node C looks as follows:</t>
	<t>The "inner" Header Section on node C looks as follows:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500
	From: Bob <bob@example.net>	From: Bob <bob@example.net>
	To: Alice <alice@example.net>	To: Alice <alice@example.net>
	Subject: Handling the Jones contract	Subject: Handling the Jones contract
	Keywords: Contract, Urgent	Keywords: Contract, Urgent
	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Type: multipart/alternative; hp="cipher"	Content-Type: multipart/alternative; hp="cipher"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	HP-Outer: Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500	HP-Outer: Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500
	HP-Outer: From: Bob <bob@example.net>	HP-Outer: From: Bob <bob@example.net>
	HP-Outer: To: Alice <alice@example.net>	HP-Outer: To: Alice <alice@example.net>
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Observe that:</t>
	<t>Observe that:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>Between node C and node A, some Header Fields are copied as is (<
	<t>Between node C and node A, some Header Fields are copied as-is (<spanx styl	tt>Date</tt>, <tt>From</tt>, <tt>To</tt>, <tt>Message-ID</tt>), some are obscure
	e="verb">Date</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">To<	d (<tt>Subject</tt>), and some are removed (<tt>Keywords</tt>).</t>
	/spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Message-ID</spanx>), some are obscured (<spanx styl	</li>
	e="verb">Subject</spanx>), and some are removed (<spanx style="verb">Keywords</s	<li>
	panx>).</t>	<t>The <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields (see <xref target="hp-outer"/
	<t>The <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Fields (see <xref target="h	>) of node C contain a protected copy of the Header Fields in node A.
	p-outer"/>) of node C contain a protected copy of the Header Fields in node A.
	The copy allows the receiver to recompute for which Header Fields the sender pro vided confidentiality by removing or obscuring them.</t>	The copy allows the receiver to recompute for which Header Fields the sender pro vided confidentiality by removing or obscuring them.</t>

	<t>The copying/removing/obscuring and the <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx>	</li>
	only apply to Non-Structural Header Fields, not to Structural Header Fields lik	<li>
	e <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">MIME-Version</	<t>The copying/removing/obscuring and the <tt>HP-Outer</tt> only app
	spanx> (see <xref section="1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-ma	ly to Non-Structural Header Fields, not to Structural Header Fields like <tt>Con
	il-guidance"/>).</t>	tent-Type</tt> or <tt>MIME-Version</tt> (see <xref section="1.1" sectionFormat="
	<t>If the sender intends no confidentiality and doesn't encrypt the message, i	of" target="RFC9787"/>).</t>
	t doesn't remove or obscure Header Fields.	</li>
	All Non-Structural Header Fields are copied as-is.	<li>
	No <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Fields are present.</t>	<t>If the sender intends no confidentiality and doesn't encrypt the
	</list></t>	message, it doesn't remove or obscure Header Fields.
		All Non-Structural Header Fields are copied as is.
	<t>Node D looks as follows:</t>	No <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields are present.</t>
		</li>
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	</ul>
		<t>Node D looks as follows:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";

	Subject: Handling the Jones contract	Subject: Handling the Jones contract
	Keywords: Contract, Urgent	Keywords: Contract, Urgent

	Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's critical!	Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's critical!

	Thanks,	Thanks,
	Bob	Bob

	--	--
	Bob Gonzalez	Bob Gonzalez
	ACME, Inc.	ACME, Inc.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Observe that:</t>
	<t>Observe that:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>The sender adds the removed and obscured User-Facing Header Field
	<t>The sender adds the removed and obscured User-Facing Header Fields (see <xr	s (see <xref section="1.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>) to the main
	ef section="1.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/	body (note the empty line after the Content-Type).
	>) to the main body (note the empty line after the Content-Type).
	This is called the Legacy Display Element.	This is called the Legacy Display Element.

	It allows a user with a Legacy MUA which doesn't implement this document to unde	It allows a user with a Legacy MUA that doesn't implement this document to unde
	rstand the message, since the Header Fields will be shown as part of the main bo	rstand the message, since the Header Fields will be shown as part of the main bo
	dy.</t>	dy.</t>
	<t>The <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"</spanx> attribute (see <xref	</li>
	target="hp-legacy-display"/>) indicates that the sender added a Legacy Display E	<li>
	lement.	<t>The <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> attribute (see <xref target="h
	This allows receivers that implement this document to recognise the Legacy Displ	p-legacy-display"/>) indicates that the sender added a Legacy Display Element.
	ay Element and distinguish it from user-added content.	This allows receivers that implement this document to recognize the Legacy Displ
		ay Element and distinguish it from user-added content.
	The receiver then hides the Legacy Display Element and doesn't display it to the user.</t>	The receiver then hides the Legacy Display Element and doesn't display it to the user.</t>

	<t>The <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display</spanx> is added to the node to w	</li>
	hich it applies, not on any outer nodes (e.g., not to node C).</t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t><tt>hp-legacy-display</tt> is added to the node to which it appli
		es, not on any outer nodes (e.g., not to node C).</t>
	<t>For more examples, see <xref target="compose-examples"/> and <xref target="re	</li>
	ndering-examples"/>.</t>	</ul>
		<t>For more examples, see Appendices <xref target="compose-examples" for
	</section>	mat="counter"/> and <xref target="rendering-examples" format="counter"/>.</t>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="specification"><name>Internet Message Format Extensions</name>	</section>
		<section anchor="specification">
	<t>This section describes relevant, backward-compatible extensions to the Intern	<name>Internet Message Format Extensions</name>
	et Message Format (<xref target="RFC5322"/>).	<t>This section describes relevant, backward-compatible extensions to the
		Internet Message Format <xref target="RFC5322"/>.
	Subsequent sections offer concrete guidance for an MUA to make use of these mech anisms, including policy decisions and recommended pseudocode.</t>	Subsequent sections offer concrete guidance for an MUA to make use of these mech anisms, including policy decisions and recommended pseudocode.</t>

		<section anchor="content-type-parameters">
	<section anchor="content-type-parameters"><name>Content-Type parameters</name>	<name>Content-Type Parameters</name>
		<t>This document introduces two parameters for the <tt>Content-Type</tt>
	<t>This document introduces two parameters for the <spanx style="verb">Content-T	Header Field, which have distinct semantics and use cases.</t>
	ype</spanx> Header Field, which have distinct semantics and use cases.</t>	<section anchor="hp-parameter">
		<name>Content-Type Parameter: hp</name>
	<section anchor="hp-parameter"><name>Content-Type parameter: hp</name>	<t>This specification defines a parameter for the <tt>Content-Type</tt
		> Header Field named <tt>hp</tt> (for Header Protection).
	<t>This specification defines a parameter for the <spanx style="verb">Content-Ty	This parameter is only relevant on the <tt>Content-Type</tt> Header Field at the
	pe</spanx> Header Field named <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> (for Header Protect	root of the Cryptographic Payload.
	ion).
	This parameter is only relevant on the <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx>
	Header Field at the root of the Cryptographic Payload.
	The presence of this parameter at the root of the Cryptographic Payload indicate s that the sender intends for this message to have end-to-end cryptographic prot ections for the Header Fields.</t>	The presence of this parameter at the root of the Cryptographic Payload indicate s that the sender intends for this message to have end-to-end cryptographic prot ections for the Header Fields.</t>

		<t>The parameter's defined values describe the sender's cryptographic
		intent when producing the message:</t>
		<table>
		<name>hp Parameter for Content-Type Header Field</name>
		<thead>
		<tr>
		<th align="left">hp Value</th>
		<th align="left">Authenticity</th>
		<th align="left">Integrity</th>
		<th align="left">Confidentiality</th>
		<th align="left">Description</th>
		</tr>
		</thead>
		<tbody>
		<tr>
		<td align="left">
		<tt>"clear"</tt></td>
		<td align="left">yes</td>
		<td align="left">yes</td>
		<td align="left">no</td>
		<td align="left">This message has been signed by the sender, wit
		h Header Protection.</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
		<td align="left">
		<tt>"cipher"</tt></td>
		<td align="left">yes</td>
		<td align="left">yes</td>
		<td align="left">yes</td>
		<td align="left">This message has been signed by the sender, wit
		h Header Protection, and is encrypted to the recipients.</td>
		</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>


	<t>The parameter's defined values describe the sender's cryptographic intent whe n producing the message:</t>	<!--[rfced] May we update "non-encrypted" to "unencrypted"?


	<texttable title="hp parameter for Content-Type Header Field">	Original:
	<ttcol align='left'>hp Value</ttcol>	A sending implementation MUST NOT produce a Cryptographic Payload
	<ttcol align='left'>Authenticity</ttcol>	with parameter hp="cipher" for a non-encrypted message (that is,
	<ttcol align='left'>Integrity</ttcol>	where none of the Cryptographic Layers in the Cryptographic Envelope
	<ttcol align='left'>Confidentiality</ttcol>	of the message provide encryption).
	<ttcol align='left'>Description</ttcol>
	<c><spanx style="verb">"clear"</spanx></c>
	<c>yes</c>
	<c>yes</c>
	<c>no</c>
	<c>This message has been signed by the sender with Header Protection</c>
	<c><spanx style="verb">"cipher"</spanx></c>
	<c>yes</c>
	<c>yes</c>
	<c>yes</c>
	<c>This message has been signed by the sender, with Header Protection, and
	is encrypted to the recipients</c>
	</texttable>


	<t>A sending implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> produce a Cryptographic Payl	Perhaps:
	oad with parameter <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx> for a non-encrypted m	A sending implementation MUST NOT produce a Cryptographic Payload
	essage (that is, where none of the Cryptographic Layers in the Cryptographic Env	with parameter hp="cipher" for an unencrypted message (that is,
	elope of the message provide encryption).	where none of the Cryptographic Layers in the Cryptographic Envelope
	Likewise, if a sending implementation is sending an encrypted message with Heade	of the message provide encryption).
	r Protection, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> emit an <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</sp	-->
	anx> parameter, regardless of which Header Fields were made confidential.</t>


	<t>Note that <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx> indicates that the message	<t>A sending implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> produce a Cryptogr
	itself has been encrypted by the sender to the recipients, but makes no assertio	aphic Payload with parameter <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> for a non-encrypted message (t
	ns about which Header Fields have been removed or obscured.	hat is, where none of the Cryptographic Layers in the Cryptographic Envelope of
		the message provide encryption).
		Likewise, if a sending implementation is sending an encrypted message with Heade
		r Protection, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> emit an <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> parameter, reg
		ardless of which Header Fields were made confidential.</t>
		<t>Note that <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> indicates that the message itself ha
		s been encrypted by the sender to the recipients but makes no assertions about w
		hich Header Fields have been removed or obscured.
	This can be derived from the Cryptographic Payload itself (see <xref target="ext racting-headers"/>).</t>	This can be derived from the Cryptographic Payload itself (see <xref target="ext racting-headers"/>).</t>

		<t>A receiving implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> mistake the pres
	<t>A receiving implementation <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> mistake the presence of an	ence of an <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> parameter in the Cryptographic Payload for the a
	<spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx> parameter in the Cryptographic Payload	ctual presence of a Cryptographic Layer that provides encryption.</t>
	for the actual presence of a Cryptographic Layer that provides encryption.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="hp-legacy-display">
	</section>	<name>Content-Type Parameter: hp-legacy-display</name>
	<section anchor="hp-legacy-display"><name>Content-Type parameter: hp-legacy-disp	<t>This specification also defines an <tt>hp-legacy-display</tt> param
	lay</name>	eter for the <tt>Content-Type</tt> Header Field.
		The only defined value for this parameter is <tt>1</tt>.</t>
	<t>This specification also defines an <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display</spa	<t>This parameter is only relevant on a leaf MIME node of <tt>Content-
	nx> parameter for the <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> Header Field.	Type</tt> <tt>text/html</tt> or <tt>text/plain</tt> within a well-formed message
	The only defined value for this parameter is <spanx style="verb">1</spanx>.</t>	with end-to-end cryptographic protections.

	<t>This parameter is only relevant on a leaf MIME node of <spanx style="verb">Co
	ntent-Type</spanx> <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">
	text/plain</spanx> within a well-formed message with end-to-end cryptographic pr
	otections.
	Its presence indicates that the MIME node it is attached to contains a decorativ e "Legacy Display Element".	Its presence indicates that the MIME node it is attached to contains a decorativ e "Legacy Display Element".
	The Legacy Display Element itself is used for backward-compatible visibility of any removed or obscured User-Facing Header Field in a Legacy MUA.</t>	The Legacy Display Element itself is used for backward-compatible visibility of any removed or obscured User-Facing Header Field in a Legacy MUA.</t>

		<t>Such a Legacy Display Element need not be rendered to the user of a
	<t>Such a Legacy Display Element need not be rendered to the user of an MUA that	n MUA that implements this specification, because the MUA already knows the corr
	implements this specification, because the MUA already knows the correct Header	ect Header Field information and can render it to the user in the appropriate pa
	Field information, and can render it to the user in the appropriate part of the	rt of the MUA's user interface rather than in the body of the message.</t>
	MUA's user interface rather than in the body of the message.</t>	<t>See <xref target="ld-text-plain"/> for how to insert a Legacy Displ
		ay Element into a <tt>text/plain</tt> Main Body Part.
	<t>See <xref target="ld-text-plain"/> for how to insert a Legacy Display Element	See <xref target="ld-text-html"/> for how to insert a Legacy Display Element int
	into a <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> Main Body Part.	o a <tt>text/html</tt> Main Body Part.
	See <xref target="ld-text-html"/> for how to insert a Legacy Display Element int
	o a <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> Main Body Part.
	See <xref target="dont-render-legacy-display"/> for how to avoid rendering a Leg acy Display Element.</t>	See <xref target="dont-render-legacy-display"/> for how to avoid rendering a Leg acy Display Element.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="hp-outer">
	<section anchor="hp-outer"><name>The HP-Outer Header Field</name>	<name>HP-Outer Header Field</name>
		<t>This document also specifies a new Header Field: <tt>HP-Outer</tt>.</
	<t>This document also specifies a new Header Field: <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer	t>
	</spanx>.</t>	<t>This Header Field is used only in the Header Section of the Cryptogra
		phic Payload of an encrypted message.
	<t>This Header Field is used only in the Header Section of the Cryptographic Pay
	load of an encrypted message.
	It is not relevant for signed-only messages.	It is not relevant for signed-only messages.
	It documents, with the same cryptographic guarantees shared by the rest of the m essage, the sender's choices about Header Field confidentiality.	It documents, with the same cryptographic guarantees shared by the rest of the m essage, the sender's choices about Header Field confidentiality.
	It does so by embedding a copy within the Cryptographic Envelope of every non-st ructural Header Field that the sender put outside the Cryptographic Envelope.	It does so by embedding a copy within the Cryptographic Envelope of every non-st ructural Header Field that the sender put outside the Cryptographic Envelope.
	This Header Field enables the MUA receiving the encrypted message to reliably id entify whether the sending MUA intended to make a Header Field confidential (see <xref target="status-overestimation"/>).</t>	This Header Field enables the MUA receiving the encrypted message to reliably id entify whether the sending MUA intended to make a Header Field confidential (see <xref target="status-overestimation"/>).</t>

		<t>The <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields in a message's Cryptographic Payl
	<t>The <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Fields in a message's Cryptog	oad are useful for ensuring that any confidential Header Field will not be autom
	raphic Payload are useful for ensuring that any confidential Header Field will n	atically leaked in the clear if the user replies to or forwards the message.
	ot be automatically leaked in the clear if the user replies to or forwards the m
	essage.
	They may also be useful for an MUA that indicates the confidentiality status of any given Header Field to the user.</t>	They may also be useful for an MUA that indicates the confidentiality status of any given Header Field to the user.</t>

		<t>An implementation that composes encrypted email <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> i
	<t>An implementation that composes encrypted e-mail <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include	nclude a copy of all non-structural Header Fields deliberately exposed to the ou
	a copy of all non-structural Header Fields deliberately exposed to the outside o	tside of the Cryptographic Envelope using a series of <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header F
	f the Cryptographic Envelope using a series of <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spa	ields within the Cryptographic Payload.
	nx> Header Fields within the Cryptographic Payload.	These <tt>HP-Outer</tt> MIME Header Fields should only ever appear directly with
	These <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> MIME Header Fields should only ever a	in the Header Section of the Cryptographic Payload of a Cryptographic Envelope o
	ppear directly within the Header Section of the Cryptographic Payload of a Crypt	ffering confidentiality.
	ographic Envelope offering confidentiality.
	They <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored for the purposes of evaluating the message's Header Protection if they appear in other places.</t>	They <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored for the purposes of evaluating the message's Header Protection if they appear in other places.</t>

		<t>Each instance of <tt>HP-Outer</tt> contains a non-structural Header F
	<t>Each instance of <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> contains a non-structur	ield name and the value that this Header Field was set in within the outer (unpr
	al Header Field name and the value that this Header Field was set in the outer (	otected) Header Section.
	unprotected) Header Section.	The <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field can appear multiple times in the Header Secti
	The <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field can appear multiple times	on of a Cryptographic Payload.</t>
	in the Header Section of a Cryptographic Payload.</t>	<t>If a non-structural Header Field named <tt>Z</tt> is present in Heade
		r Section of the Cryptographic Payload but doesn't appear in an <tt>HP-Outer</tt
	<t>If a non-structural Header Field name <spanx style="verb">Z</spanx> is presen	> Header Field value at all, then the sender is effectively asserting that every
	t in Header Section of the Cryptographic Payload, but doesn't appear in an <span	instance of <tt>Z</tt> was made confidential by removal from the Outer Header S
	x style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field value at all, then the sender is ef	ection.
	fectively asserting that every instance of <spanx style="verb">Z</spanx> was mad	Specifically, it means that no Header Field <tt>Z</tt> was included on the outsi
	e confidential by removal from the Outer Header Section.	de of the message's Cryptographic Envelope by the sender at the time the message
	Specifically, it means that no Header Field <spanx style="verb">Z</spanx> was in	was injected into the mail system.</t>
	cluded on the outside of the message's Cryptographic Envelope by the sender at t	<t>See <xref target="compose"/> for how to insert <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Head
	he time the message was injected into the mail system.</t>	er Fields into an encrypted message.
		See <xref target="crypto-summary-update"/> for how to determine the end-to-end c
	<t>See <xref target="compose"/> for how to insert <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</	onfidentiality of a given Header Field from an encrypted message with Header Pro
	spanx> Header Fields into an encrypted message.	tection using <tt>HP-Outer</tt>.
	See <xref target="crypto-summary-update"/> for how to determine the end-to-end c
	onfidentiality of a given Header Field from an encrypted message with Header Pro
	tection using <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx>.
	See <xref target="avoid-leak"/> for how an MUA can safely reply to (or forward) an encrypted message without leaking confidential Header Fields by default.</t>	See <xref target="avoid-leak"/> for how an MUA can safely reply to (or forward) an encrypted message without leaking confidential Header Fields by default.</t>

		<section anchor="new-header-field">
	<section anchor="new-header-field"><name>HP-Outer Header Field Definition</name>	<name>HP-Outer Header Field Definition</name>
		<t>The syntax of this Header Field is defined using the following ABNF
	<t>The syntax of this Header Field is defined using the following ABNF <xref tar	<xref target="RFC5234"/>, where <tt>field-name</tt>, <tt>WSP</tt>, <tt>VCHAR</t
	get="RFC5234"/>, where <spanx style="verb">field-name</spanx>, <spanx style="ver	t>, and <tt>FWS</tt> are defined in <xref target="RFC5322"/>:</t>
	b">WSP</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">VCHAR</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">FWS</	<sourcecode type="abnf"><![CDATA[
	spanx> are defined in <xref target="RFC5322"/>:</t>

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	hp-outer = "HP-Outer:" [FWS] field-name ": "	hp-outer = "HP-Outer:" [FWS] field-name ": "
	hp-outer-value CRLF	hp-outer-value CRLF

	hp-outer-value = (([FWS] VCHAR) WSP)	hp-outer-value = (([FWS] VCHAR) WSP)

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<t>Note that <tt>hp-outer-value</tt> is the same as <tt>unstructured</
	<t>Note that <spanx style="verb">hp-outer-value</spanx> is the same as <spanx st	tt> from <xref section="3.2.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5322"/> but without
	yle="verb">unstructured</spanx> from <xref section="3.2.5" sectionFormat="of" ta	the obsolete <tt>obs-unstruct</tt> option.</t>
	rget="RFC5322"/>, but without the obsolete <spanx style="verb">obs-unstruct</spa	</section>
	nx> option.</t>	</section>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="header-confidentiality-policy">
	</section>	<name>Header Confidentiality Policy</name>
	</section>	<t>An MUA composing an encrypted message according to this specification m
	<section anchor="header-confidentiality-policy"><name>Header Confidentiality Pol	ay make any given Header Field confidential by removing it from the Header Secti
	icy</name>	on outside the Cryptographic Envelope or by obscuring it by rewriting it to a di
		fferent value in that outer Header Section.
	<t>An MUA composing an encrypted message according to this specification may mak	The composing MUA faces a choice for any new message: Which Header Fields should
	e any given Header Field confidential by removing it from Header Section outside	be made confidential, and how?</t>
	the Cryptographic Envelope, or by obscuring it by rewriting it to a different v	<t>This section defines the "<iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><
	alue in that outer Header Section.	xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality
	The composing MUA faces a choice for any new message: which Header Fields should	Policy</xref>" (or <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-polic
	be made confidential, and how?</t>	y" format="none">HCP</xref>) as a well-defined abstraction to encourage MUA deve
		lopers to consider, document, and share reasonable policies across the community
	<t>This section defines the "<iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref t	.
	arget="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Polic
	y</xref>" (or <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" for
	mat="none">HCP</xref>) as a well-defined abstraction to encourage MUA developers
	to consider, document, and share reasonable policies across the community.
	It establishes a registry of known HCPs, defines a small number of simple HCPs i n that registry, and makes a recommendation for a reasonable default.</t>	It establishes a registry of known HCPs, defines a small number of simple HCPs i n that registry, and makes a recommendation for a reasonable default.</t>

		<t>Note that such a policy is only needed when the end-to-end protections
	<t>Note that such a policy is only needed when the end-to-end protections includ	include encryption (confidentiality).
	e encryption (confidentiality).
	No comparable policy is needed for other end-to-end cryptographic protections (i ntegrity and authenticity), as they are simply uniformly applied so that all Hea der Fields known by the sender have these protections.</t>	No comparable policy is needed for other end-to-end cryptographic protections (i ntegrity and authenticity), as they are simply uniformly applied so that all Hea der Fields known by the sender have these protections.</t>

		<t>This asymmetry is a consequence of complexities in existing message del
	<t>This asymmetry is a consequence of complexities in existing message delivery	ivery systems, some of which may reject, drop, or delay messages where all Heade
	systems, some of which may reject, drop, or delay messages where all Header Fiel	r Fields are removed from the top-level MIME object.</t>
	ds are removed from the top-level MIME object.</t>	<t>Note that no representation of the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="head
		er-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> itself ever appears "on the
	<t>Note that no representation of the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-con	wire".
	fidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> itself ever appears "on the wire".	However, the consumer of the encrypted message can see the decisions that were m
	However, the consumer of the encrypted message can see the decisions that were m	ade by the sender's <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-polic
	ade by the sender's <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-polic	y" format="none">HCP</xref> via the <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields (see <xref t
	y" format="none">HCP</xref> via the <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header	arget="hp-outer"/>).</t>
	Fields (see <xref target="hp-outer"/>).</t>	<section anchor="hcp-definition">
		<name>HCP Definition</name>
	<section anchor="hcp-definition"><name>HCP Definition</name>	<t>In this document, we represent that <iref item="Header Confidentialit
		y Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Con
	<t>In this document, we represent that <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy	fidentiality Policy</xref> as a function <tt>hcp</tt>:</t>
	"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentia	<ul spacing="normal">
	lity Policy</xref> as a function <spanx style="verb">hcp</spanx>:</t>	<li>
		<t><tt>hcp(name, val_in) -> val_out</tt>: This function takes a n
	<t><list style="symbols">	on-structural Header Field identified by <tt>name</tt> with the initial value <t
	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp(name, val_in) → val_out</spanx>: this function take	t>val_in</tt> as arguments and returns a replacement header value <tt>val_out</t
	s a non-structural Header Field identified by <spanx style="verb">name</spanx> w	t>.
	ith initial value <spanx style="verb">val_in</spanx> as arguments, and returns a	If <tt>val_out</tt> is the special value <tt>null</tt>, it means that the Header
	replacement header value <spanx style="verb">val_out</spanx>.	Field in question should be removed from the set of Header Fields visible outsi
	If <spanx style="verb">val_out</spanx> is the special value <spanx style="verb">	de the Cryptographic Envelope.</t>
	null</spanx>, it means that the Header Field in question should be removed from	</li>
	the set of Header Fields visible outside the Cryptographic Envelope.</t>	</ul>
	</list></t>	<t>In the pseudocode descriptions of various choices of <iref item="HCP"
		/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> in this
	<t>In the pseudocode descriptions of various choices of <iref item="HCP"/><xref	document, any comparison with the <tt>name</tt> input is done case-insensitively
	target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> in this document	.
	, any comparison with the <spanx style="verb">name</spanx> input is done case-in
	sensitively.
	This is appropriate for Header Field names, as described in <xref target="RFC532 2"/>.</t>	This is appropriate for Header Field names, as described in <xref target="RFC532 2"/>.</t>

		<t>Note that <tt>hcp</tt> is only applied to non-structural Header Field
	<t>Note that <spanx style="verb">hcp</spanx> is only applied to non-structural H	s.
	eader Fields.
	When composing a message, Structural Header Fields are dealt with separately, as described in <xref target="compose"/>.</t>	When composing a message, Structural Header Fields are dealt with separately, as described in <xref target="compose"/>.</t>

		<t>As an example, an MUA that obscures the <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field
	<t>As an example, an MUA that obscures the <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> H	by replacing it with the literal string "<tt>[...]</tt>" hides all Cc'ed recipi
	eader Field by replacing it with the literal string "<spanx style="verb">[...]</	ents and does not offer confidentiality to any other Header Fields that would be
	spanx>", hides all Cc'ed recipients, and does not offer confidentiality to any o	represented as (in pseudocode):</t>
	ther Header Fields would be represented as (in pseudocode):</t>	<sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="example_hide_cc.hcp"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="example_hide_cc.hcp"><![CDATA[
	hcp_example_hide_cc(name, val_in) → val_out:	hcp_example_hide_cc(name, val_in) → val_out:
	if lower(name) is 'subject':	if lower(name) is 'subject':
	return '[...]'	return '[...]'
	else if lower(name) is 'cc':	else if lower(name) is 'cc':
	return null	return null
	else:	else:
	return val_in	return val_in

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<t>For alignment with common practice as well as the ABNF in <xref targe
	<t>For alignment with common practice as well as the ABNF in <xref target="new-h	t="new-header-field"/> for <tt>HP-Outer</tt>, <tt>val_out</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp1
	eader-field"/> for <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">val	4> be one of the following:</t>
	_out</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be one of the following:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>identical to <tt>val_in</tt>,</t>
	<t>identical to <spanx style="verb">val_in</spanx>, or</t>	</li>
	<t>the special value <spanx style="verb">null</spanx> (meaning that the Header	<li>
	Field will be removed from the outside of the message), or</t>	<t>the special value <tt>null</tt> (meaning that the Header Field wi
	<t>a sequence of printable and whitespace (that is, space or tab) 7-bit clean	ll be removed from the outside of the message), or</t>
	ASCII characters (of course, non-ASCII text can be encoded as ASCII using the <s	</li>
	panx style="verb">encoded-word</spanx> construct from <xref target="RFC2047"/>)<	<li>
	/t>	<t>a sequence of whitespace (that is, space or tab) and printable 7-
	</list></t>	bit, clean ASCII characters (of course, non-ASCII text can be encoded as ASCII u
		sing the <tt>encoded-word</tt> construct from <xref target="RFC2047"/>)</t>
	<t>The <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="no	</li>
	ne">HCP</xref> can compute <spanx style="verb">val_out</spanx> using any techniq	</ul>
	ue describable in pseudocode, such as copying a fixed string or invocations of o	<t>The <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" fo
	ther pseudocode functions.	rmat="none">HCP</xref> can compute <tt>val_out</tt> using any technique describa
	If it alters the value, it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include control or NUL charac	ble in pseudocode, such as copying a fixed string or invocations of other pseudo
	ters in <spanx style="verb">val_out</spanx>.	code functions.
	<spanx style="verb">val_out</spanx> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match the expected ABN	If it alters the value, it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include control or NUL charac
	F for the Header Field identified by <spanx style="verb">name</spanx>.</t>	ters in <tt>val_out</tt>.
		<tt>val_out</tt> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match the expected ABNF for the Header Fi
	<section anchor="hcp-from-addr-spec"><name>HCP Avoids Changing From addr-spec</n	eld identified by <tt>name</tt>.</t>
	ame>	<section anchor="hcp-from-addr-spec">
		<name>HCP Avoids Changing from addr-spec</name>
	<t>The <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field should also be treated spec	<t>The <tt>From</tt> Header Field should also be treated specially by
	ially by the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" form	the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none"
	at="none">HCP</xref>, to enable defense against possible e-mail address spoofing	>HCP</xref> to enable defense against possible email address spoofing (see <xref
	(see <xref target="from-addr-spoofing"/>).	target="from-addr-spoofing"/>).
	In particular, for <spanx style="verb">hcp("From", val_in)</spanx>, the <spanx s	In particular, for <tt>hcp("From", val_in)</tt>, the <tt>addr-spec</tt> of <tt>v
	tyle="verb">addr-spec</spanx> of <spanx style="verb">val_in</spanx> and the <spa	al_in</tt> and the <tt>addr-spec</tt> of <tt>val_out</tt> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
	nx style="verb">addr-spec</spanx> of <spanx style="verb">val_out</spanx> <bcp14>	match according to <xref target="matching-addr-specs"/>, unless the sending MUA
	SHOULD</bcp14> match according to <xref target="matching-addr-specs"/>, unless t	has additional knowledge coordinated with the receiving MUA about more subtle <t
	he sending MUA has additional knowledge coordinated with the receiving MUA about	t>addr-spec</tt> equivalence or certificate validity.</t>
	more subtle <spanx style="verb">addr-spec</spanx> equivalence or certificate va	</section>
	lidity.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="initial-registered-hcps">
	</section>	<name>Initial Registered HCPs</name>
	</section>	<t>This document formally defines three Header Confidentiality Policies
	<section anchor="initial-registered-hcps"><name>Initial Registered HCPs</name>	with known and reasonably well-understood characteristics as a way to compare an
		d contrast different possible behavioral choices for a composing MUA.
	<t>This document formally defines three Header Confidentiality Policies with kno
	wn and reasonably well-understood characteristics as a way to compare and contra
	st different possible behavioral choices for a composing MUA.
	These definitions are not meant to preclude the creation of other HCPs.</t>	These definitions are not meant to preclude the creation of other HCPs.</t>

		<t>The purpose of the registry of HCPs is to facilitate <iref item="HCP"
	<t>The purpose of the registry of HCPs is to facilitate <iref item="HCP"/><xref	/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> evolutio
	target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> evolution and in	n and interoperability discussion among MUA developers and MTA operators.</t>
	teroperability discussion among MUA developers and MTA operators.</t>	<t>(The example hypothetical <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-conf
		identiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>, <tt>hcp_example_hide_cc</tt>, desc
	<t>(The example hypothetical <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidential	ribed in <xref target="hcp-definition"/> above is deliberately not formally regi
	ity-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> described in <xref target="hcp-definition"/	stered, as it has not been evaluated in practice.)</t>
	> above, <spanx style="verb">hcp_example_hide_cc</spanx>, is deliberately not fo	<section anchor="baseline-hcp">
	rmally registered, as it has not been evaluated in practice.)</t>	<name>Baseline Header Confidentiality Policy</name>
		<t>The most conservative recommended <iref item="Header Confidentialit
	<section anchor="baseline-hcp"><name>Baseline Header Confidentiality Policy</nam	y Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Con
	e>	fidentiality Policy</xref> only provides confidentiality for Informational Field
		s, as defined in <xref section="3.6.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5322"/>.
	<t>The most conservative recommended <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/
	><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiali
	ty Policy</xref> only provides confidentiality for Informational Fields, as defi
	ned in <xref section="3.6.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5322"/>.
	These fields are "only human-readable content" and thus their content should not be relevant to transport agents.	These fields are "only human-readable content" and thus their content should not be relevant to transport agents.

	Since most Internet messages today do have a <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>	Since most Internet messages today do have a <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field, and
	Header Field, and some filtering engines might object to a message without a <s	some filtering engines might object to a message without a <tt>Subject</tt>, thi
	panx style="verb">Subject</spanx>, this policy is conservative and merely obscur	s policy is conservative and merely obscures that Header Field by replacing it w
	es that Header Field by replacing it with a fixed string <spanx style="verb">[..	ith a fixed string <tt>[...]</tt>.
	.]</spanx>.	By contrast, <tt>Comments</tt> and <tt>Keywords</tt> Header Fields are comparati
	By contrast, <spanx style="verb">Comments</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Keywor	vely rare, so these fields are removed entirely from the Outer Header Section.</
	ds</spanx> are comparatively rare, so these fields are removed entirely from the	t>
	Outer Header Section.</t>	<sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="baseline.hcp"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="baseline.hcp"><![CDATA[
	hcp_baseline(name, val_in) → val_out:	hcp_baseline(name, val_in) → val_out:
	if lower(name) is 'subject':	if lower(name) is 'subject':
	return '[...]'	return '[...]'
	else if lower(name) is in ['comments', 'keywords']:	else if lower(name) is in ['comments', 'keywords']:
	return null	return null
	else:	else:
	return val_in	return val_in

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<t><tt>hcp_baseline</tt> is the recommended default <iref item="HCP"/>
	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx> is the recommended default <iref ite	<xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> for a new
	m="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> f	implementation, as it provides meaningful confidentiality protections and is unl
	or a new implementation, as it provides meaningful confidentiality protections a	ikely to cause deliverability or usability problems.</t>
	nd is unlikely to cause deliverability or usability problems.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="shy-hcp">
	</section>	<name>Shy Header Confidentiality Policy</name>
	<section anchor="shy-hcp"><name>Shy Header Confidentiality Policy</name>	<t>Alternately, a slightly more ambitious (and therefore more privacy-
		preserving) <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-con
	<t>Alternately, a slightly more ambitious (and therefore more privacy-preserving	fidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> might av
	) <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiali	oid leaking human-interpretable data that MTAs generally don't care about.
	ty-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> might avoid leakin	The additional protected data isn't related to message routing or transport but
	g human-interpretable data that MTAs generally don't care about.	might reveal sensitive information about the sender or their relationship to the
	The additional protected data isn't related to message routing or transport, but	recipients.
	but might reveal sensitive information about the sender or their relationship t	This "shy" <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format
	o the recipients.	="none">HCP</xref> builds on <tt>hcp_baseline</tt> but also:</t>
	This "shy" <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format	<ul spacing="normal">
	="none">HCP</xref> builds on <spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>, but also:	<li>
	</t>	<t>avoids revealing the <tt>display-name</tt> of each identified e
		mail address and</t>
	<t><list style="symbols">	</li>
	<t>avoids revealing the <spanx style="verb">display-name</spanx> of each ident	<li>
	ified e-mail address, and</t>	<t>avoids leaking the sender's locally configured time zone in the
	<t>avoids leaking the sender's locally-configured time zone in the <spanx styl	<tt>Date</tt> Header Field.</t>
	e="verb">Date</spanx> Header Field.</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	</ul>
		<sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="shy.hcp"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="shy.hcp"><![CDATA[
	hcp_shy(name, val_in) → val_out:	hcp_shy(name, val_in) → val_out:
	if lower(name) is 'from':	if lower(name) is 'from':
	if val_in is an RFC 5322 mailbox:	if val_in is an RFC 5322 mailbox:
	return the RFC 5322 addr-spec part of val_in	return the RFC 5322 addr-spec part of val_in
	if lower(name) in ['to', 'cc']:	if lower(name) in ['to', 'cc']:
	if val_in is an RFC 5322 mailbox-list:	if val_in is an RFC 5322 mailbox-list:
	let val_out be an empty mailbox-list	let val_out be an empty mailbox-list
	for each mailbox in val_in:	for each mailbox in val_in:
	append the RFC 5322 addr-spec part of mailbox to val_out	append the RFC 5322 addr-spec part of mailbox to val_out
	return val_out	return val_out
	if lower(name) is 'date':	if lower(name) is 'date':
	if val_in is an RFC 5322 date-time:	if val_in is an RFC 5322 date-time:
	return the UTC form of val_in	return the UTC form of val_in
	else if lower(name) is 'subject':	else if lower(name) is 'subject':
	return '[...]'	return '[...]'
	else if lower(name) is in ['comments', 'keywords']:	else if lower(name) is in ['comments', 'keywords']:
	return null	return null
	return val_in	return val_in

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<t><tt>hcp_shy</tt> requires more sophisticated parsing and Header Fie
	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp_shy</spanx> requires more sophisticated parsing and H	ld manipulation and is not recommended as a default <iref item="HCP"/><xref targ
	eader Field manipulation, and is not recommended as a default <iref item="HCP"/>	et="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> for new implementati
	<xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> for new im	ons.</t>
	plementations.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="no-confidentiality-hcp">
	</section>	<name>No Header Confidentiality Policy</name>
	<section anchor="no-confidentiality-hcp"><name>No Header Confidentiality Policy<	<t>Legacy MUAs can be conceptualized as offering a "No Header Confiden
	/name>	tiality" Policy, which offers no confidentiality protection to any Header Field:
		</t>
	<t>Legacy MUAs can be conceptualized as offering a "No Header Confidentiality" P	<sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="no_confidentiality.hcp"><![CDATA[
	olicy, which offers no confidentiality protection to any Header Field:</t>

	<figure><sourcecode type="text/x-hcp" name="no_confidentiality.hcp"><![CDATA[
	hcp_no_confidentiality(name, val_in) → val_out:	hcp_no_confidentiality(name, val_in) → val_out:
	return val_in	return val_in

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<t>A conformant MUA that is not modified by local policy or configurat
	<t>A conformant MUA that is not modified by local policy or configuration <bcp14	ion <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use <tt>hcp_no_confidentiality</tt> by default.</t>
	>MUST NOT</bcp14> use <spanx style="verb">hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx> by defa	</section>
	ult.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="default-hcp">
	</section>	<name>Default Header Confidentiality Policy</name>
	</section>	<t>An MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have a default <iref item="Header Confiden
	<section anchor="default-hcp"><name>Default Header Confidentiality Policy</name>	tiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Head
		er Confidentiality Policy</xref> that offers confidentiality for the <tt>Subject
	<t>An MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have a default <iref item="Header Confidentiality	</tt> Header Field at least.
	Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confi
	dentiality Policy</xref> that offers confidentiality for the <spanx style="verb"
	>Subject</spanx> Header Field at least.
	Local policy and configuration may alter this default, but the MUA <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> require the user to select an <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="heade r-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.</t>	Local policy and configuration may alter this default, but the MUA <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> require the user to select an <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="heade r-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.</t>

		<t><tt>hcp_baseline</tt> provides confidentiality for the <tt>Subject</t
	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx> provides confidentiality for the <sp	t> Header Field by replacing it with the literal string "<tt>[...]</tt>".
	anx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header Field by replacing it with the literal s	It also provides confidentiality for the other less common Informational Header
	tring "<spanx style="verb">[...]</spanx>".	Fields (<tt>Comments</tt> and <tt>Keywords</tt>) by removing them entirely from
	It also provides confidentiality for the other less common Informational Header	the outer Header Section.
	Fields (<spanx style="verb">Comments</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Keywords</s
	panx>) by removing them entirely from the outer Header Section.
	This is a sensible default because most users treat the Informational Fields of a message (particularly the Subject) the same way that they treat the body, and they are surprised to find that the Subject of an encrypted message is visible.< /t>	This is a sensible default because most users treat the Informational Fields of a message (particularly the Subject) the same way that they treat the body, and they are surprised to find that the Subject of an encrypted message is visible.< /t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="hcp-evolution">
	<section anchor="hcp-evolution"><name>HCP Evolution</name>	<name>HCP Evolution</name>
		<t>This document does not mandate any particular <iref item="Header Conf
	<t>This document does not mandate any particular <iref item="Header Confidential	identiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">
	ity Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header C	Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>, though it offers guidance for MUA implemen
	onfidentiality Policy</xref>, though it offers guidance for MUA implementers in	ters in selecting one in <xref target="default-hcp"/>.
	selecting one in <xref target="default-hcp"/>.
	Future documents may recommend or mandate such a policy for an MUA with specific needs.	Future documents may recommend or mandate such a policy for an MUA with specific needs.

	Such a recommendation might be motivated by descriptions of metadata-derived att	Such a recommendation might be motivated by descriptions of metadata-derived att
	acks, or stem from research about message deliverability, or describe new signal	acks, stem from research about message deliverability, or describe new signaling
	ling mechanisms, but these topics are out of scope for this document.</t>	mechanisms, but these topics are out of scope for this document.</t>
		<section anchor="offering-more-ambitious-header-confidentiality">
	<section anchor="offering-more-ambitious-header-confidentiality"><name>Offering	<name>Offering More Ambitious Header Confidentiality</name>
	More Ambitious Header Confidentiality</name>	<t>An MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> offer even more ambitious confidentiality
		for Header Fields of an encrypted message than defined in <xref target="shy-hcp
	<t>An MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> offer even more ambitious confidentiality for Heade	"/>.
	r Fields of an encrypted message than defined in <xref target="shy-hcp"/>.	For example, it might implement an <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confid
	For example, it might implement an <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confid	entiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> that removes the <tt>To</tt> and <tt>
	entiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> that removes the <spanx style="verb">	Cc</tt> Header Fields entirely, relying on the SMTP envelope to ensure proper ro
	To</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx> Header Fields entirely, relying on	uting.
	the SMTP envelope to ensure proper routing.	Or it might remove <tt>References</tt> and <tt>In-Reply-To</tt> so that message
	Or it might remove <spanx style="verb">References</spanx> and <spanx style="verb	threading is not visible to any MTA.
	">In-Reply-To</spanx> so that message threading is not visible to any MTA.
	Any more ambitious choice might result in deliverability, rendering, or usabilit y issues for the relevant messages, so testing and documentation will be valuabl e to get this right.</t>	Any more ambitious choice might result in deliverability, rendering, or usabilit y issues for the relevant messages, so testing and documentation will be valuabl e to get this right.</t>

		<t>The authors of this document hope that implementers with deployment
	<t>The authors of this document hope that implementers with deployment experienc	experience will document their chosen <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy
	e will document their chosen <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref t	"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentia
	arget="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Polic	lity Policy</xref> and the rationale behind their choice.</t>
	y</xref> and the rationale behind their choice.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="hcp-expert-guidance">
	</section>	<name>Expert Guidance for Registering Header Confidentiality Policies<
	<section anchor="hcp-expert-guidance"><name>Expert Guidance for Registering Head	/name>
	er Confidentiality Policies</name>	<t>There is no formal syntax specified for the <iref item="Header Conf
		identiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">
	<t>There is no formal syntax specified for the <iref item="Header Confidentialit	Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>, but any attempt to specify an <iref item="
	y Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Con	HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> for
	fidentiality Policy</xref>, but any attempt to specify an <iref item="HCP"/><xre	inclusion in the registry needs to provide:</t>
	f target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> for inclusion	<ul spacing="normal">
	in the registry needs to provide:</t>	<li>
		<t>a stable reference document clearly indicating the distinct nam
	<t><list style="symbols">	e for the proposed <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy
	<t>a stable reference document clearly indicating the distinct name for the pr	" format="none">HCP</xref>,</t>
	oposed <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="no	</li>
	ne">HCP</xref></t>	<li>
	<t>pseudocode that other implementers can clearly and unambiguously interpret<	<t>pseudocode that other implementers can clearly and unambiguousl
	/t>	y interpret,</t>
	<t>a clear explanation of why this <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-conf	</li>
	identiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> is different from all other registe	<li>
	red HCPs</t>	<t>a clear explanation of why this <iref item="HCP"/><xref target=
	<t>any relevant considerations related to deployment of the <iref item="HCP"/>	"header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> is different from all o
	<xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> (for examp	ther registered HCPs, and</t>
	le, known or expected deliverability, rendering, or privacy challenges and possi	</li>
	ble mitigations)</t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>any relevant considerations related to deployment of the <iref
		item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref
	<t>When the proposed <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-poli	> (for example, known or expected deliverability, rendering, or privacy challeng
	cy" format="none">HCP</xref> produces any non-<spanx style="verb">null</spanx> o	es and possible mitigations).</t>
	utput for a given Header Field name, <spanx style="verb">val_out</spanx> <bcp14>	</li>
	SHOULD</bcp14> match the expected ABNF for that Header Field.	</ul>
	If the proposed <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" f	<t>When the proposed <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidenti
	ormat="none">HCP</xref> does not match the expected ABNF for that Header Field,	ality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> produces any non-<tt>null</tt> output for
	the documentation should explicitly identify the relevant circumstances and prov	a given Header Field name, <tt>val_out</tt> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> match the exp
	ide a justification for the deviation.</t>	ected ABNF for that Header Field.
		If the proposed <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-
	<t>An entry should not be marked as "Recommended" unless it has been shown to of	policy" format="none">HCP</xref> does not match the expected ABNF for that Heade
	fer confidentiality or privacy improvements over the status quo and have minimal	r Field, the documentation should explicitly identify the relevant circumstances
	or mitigatable negative impact on messages to which it is applied, considering	and provide a justification for the deviation.</t>
	factors such as message deliverability and security.	<t>An entry should not be marked as "Recommended" unless it has been s
	Only one entry in the table (<spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>) is initia	hown to offer confidentiality or privacy improvements over the status quo and ha
	lly marked as "Recommended".	ve minimal or mitigatory negative impact on messages to which it is applied, con
		sidering factors such as message deliverability and security.
		Only one entry in the table (<tt>hcp_baseline</tt>) is initially marked as "Reco
		mmended".
	In the future, more than one entry may be marked as "Recommended".</t>	In the future, more than one entry may be marked as "Recommended".</t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="receiving-side">
	<section anchor="receiving-side"><name>Receiving Guidance</name>	<name>Receiving Guidance</name>
		<t>An MUA that receives a cryptographically protected email will render it
	<t>An MUA that receives a cryptographically protected e-mail will render it for	for the user.</t>
	the user.</t>	<t>The receiving MUA will render the message body, render a selected subse
		t of Header Fields, and provide a summary of the cryptographic properties of the
	<t>The receiving MUA will render the message body, a selected subset of Header F	message (as described in <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/
	ields, and (as described in <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.iet	>).</t>
	f-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>) provide a summary of the cryptographic properties	<t>Most MUAs only render a subset of Header Fields by default.
	of the message.</t>	For example, most MUAs render the <tt>From</tt>, <tt>To</tt>, <tt>Cc</tt>, <tt>D
		ate</tt>, and <tt>Subject</tt> Header Fields to the user, but few render <tt>Mes
	<t>Most MUAs only render a subset of Header Fields by default.	sage-Id</tt> or <tt>Received</tt>.</t>
	For example, most MUAs render <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, <spanx style="ve	<t>An MUA that knows how to handle a message with Header Protection makes
	rb">To</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Date</spanx>	the following four changes to its behavior when rendering a message:</t>
	, and <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header Fields to the user, but few ren	<ul spacing="normal">
	der <spanx style="verb">Message-Id</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">Received</span	<li>
	x>.</t>	<t>If the MUA detects that an incoming message has protected Header Fi
		elds:
	<t>An MUA that knows how to handle a message with Header Protection makes the fo	</t>
	llowing four changes to its behavior when rendering a message:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>For a Header Field that is present in the protected Header Sect
	<t>If the MUA detects that an incoming message has protected Header Fields:	ion, the MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> render the protected value and ignore any unp
	<list style="symbols">	rotected counterparts that may be present (with a special exception for the <tt>
	<t>For a Header Field that is present in the protected Header Section, the	From</tt> Header Field (see <xref target="handling-mismatch-of-from-hfs"/>)).</t
	MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> render the protected value, and ignore any unprotecte	>
	d counterparts that may be present (with a special exception for the <spanx styl	</li>
	e="verb">From</spanx> Header Field (see <xref target="handling-mismatch-of-from-	<li>
	hfs"/>).</t>	<t>For a Header Field that is present only in the unprotected Head
	<t>For a Header Field that is present only in the unprotected Header Secti	er Section, the MUA <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> render that value.
	on, the MUA <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> render that value.	If it does render the value, the MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> indicate that the ren
	If it does render the value, the MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> indicate that the ren	dered value is <tt>unprotected</tt>.
	dered value is <spanx style="verb">unprotected</spanx>.	For an exception to this, see <xref target="fields-added-in-transit"/> for a dis
	For an exception to this, see <xref target="fields-added-in-transit"/> for a dis	cussion of some specific Header Fields that are known to be added in transit and
	cussion of some specific Header Fields that are known to be added in transit, an	therefore are not expected to have end-to-end cryptographic protections.</t>
	d therefore are not expected to have end-to-end cryptographic protections.</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	</ul>
	<t>The MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include information in the message's Cryptogr	</li>
	aphic Summary to indicate the types of protection that applied to each rendered	<li>
	Header Field (if any).</t>	<t>The MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include information in the message's
	<t>If any Legacy Display Elements are present in the body of the message, it d	Cryptographic Summary to indicate the types of protection that applied to each r
	oes not render them.</t>	endered Header Field (if any).</t>
	<t>When replying to a message with confidential Header Fields, the replying MU	</li>
	A avoids leaking into the cleartext of the reply any Header Fields which were co	<li>
	nfidential in the original.	<t>If any Legacy Display Elements are present in the body of the messa
		ge, it does not render them.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>When replying to a message with confidential Header Fields, the rep
		lying MUA avoids leaking any Header Fields that were confidential in the origina
		l into the cleartext of the reply.
	It does this even if its own <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref t arget="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Polic y</xref> would not have treated those Header Fields as confidential.	It does this even if its own <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref t arget="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Polic y</xref> would not have treated those Header Fields as confidential.
	See <xref target="replying"/> for more details.</t>	See <xref target="replying"/> for more details.</t>

	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>Note that an MUA that handles a message with Header Protection does <em>not</	<t>Note that an MUA that handles a message with Header Protection does <em
	em> need to render any new Header Fields that it did not render before.</t>	>not</em> need to render any new Header Fields that it did not render before.</t
		>
	<section anchor="identifying-header-protection"><name>Identifying that a Message	<section anchor="identifying-header-protection">
	has Header Protection</name>	<name>Identifying That a Message Has Header Protection</name>
		<t>An incoming message can be identified as having Header Protection usi
	<t>An incoming message can be identified as having Header Protection using the f	ng the following test:</t>
	ollowing test:</t>	<ul><li>The Cryptographic Payload has parameter <tt>hp</tt> set to <tt>"
		clear"</tt> or <tt>"cipher"</tt>. See <xref target="rendering"/> for rendering g
	<t><list style="symbols">	uidance.</li>
	<t>The Cryptographic Payload has parameter <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> set	</ul>
	to <spanx style="verb">"clear"</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">"cipher"</spanx>.	<t>When consuming a message, an MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore the <tt>h
	See <xref target="rendering"/> for rendering guidance.</t>	p</tt> parameter to <tt>Content-Type</tt> when it encounters it anywhere other t
	</list></t>	han the root of the message's Cryptographic Payload.</t>
		</section>
	<t>When consuming a message, an MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore the <spanx style=	<section anchor="extracting-headers">
	"verb">hp</spanx> parameter to <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> when it	<name>Extracting Protected and Unprotected ("Outer") Header Fields</name
	encounters it anywhere other than the root of the message's Cryptographic Payloa	>
	d.</t>	<t>When a message is encrypted and uses Header Protection, an MUA extrac
		ts a list of protected Header Fields (names and values), as well as a list of He
	</section>	ader Fields that were added by the original message sender in unprotected form t
	<section anchor="extracting-headers"><name>Extracting Protected and Unprotected	o the outside of the message's Cryptographic Envelope.</t>
	("Outer") Header Fields</name>	<t>The following algorithm takes reference message <tt>refmsg</tt> as in
		put, which is encrypted with Header Protection as described in this document (th
	<t>When a message is encrypted and it uses Header Protection, an MUA extracts a	at is, the Cryptographic Envelope includes a Cryptographic Layer that provides e
	list of protected Header Fields (names and values), as well as a list of Header	ncryption, and the <tt>hp</tt> parameter for the <tt>Content-Type</tt> Header Fi
	Fields that were added by the original message sender in unprotected form to the	eld of the Cryptographic Payload is <tt>cipher</tt>).
	outside of the message's Cryptographic Envelope.</t>	It outputs a pair of lists of <tt>(h,v)</tt> Header Fields.</t>
		<section anchor="headersetsfrommessage">
	<t>The following algorithm takes a reference message <spanx style="verb">refmsg<	<name>HeaderSetsFromMessage</name>
	/spanx> as input, which is encrypted with Header Protection as described in this	<t>Method Signature:</t>
	document (that is, the Cryptographic Envelope includes a Cryptographic Layer th	<t><tt>
	at provides encryption, and the <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> parameter for the	HeaderSetsFromMessage(refmsg) -> (refouter, refprotected)
	<spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> Header Field of the Cryptographic Payl	</tt></t>
	oad is <spanx style="verb">cipher</spanx>).	<t>Procedure:</t>
	It produces as output a pair of lists of <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> Heade	<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
	r Fields.</t>	<t>Let <tt>refheaders</tt> be the list of <tt>(h,v)</tt> protected
		Header Fields found in the root of the Cryptographic Payload.</t>
	<section anchor="headersetsfrommessage"><name>HeaderSetsFromMessage</name>	</li>
		<li>
	<t>Method Signature:</t>	<t>Let <tt>refouter</tt> be an empty list of Header Field names an
		d values.</t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">	</li>
	HeaderSetsFromMessage(refmsg) → (refouter, refprotected)	<li>
	</spanx></t>	<t>Let <tt>refprotected</tt> be an empty list of Header Field name
		s and values.</t>
	<t>Procedure:</t>	</li>
		<li>
	<t><list style="numbers" type="1">	<t>For each <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>refheaders</tt>:
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">refheaders</spanx> be the list of <spanx style="ver	</t>
	b">(h,v)</spanx> protected Header Fields found in the root of the Cryptographic	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	Payload</t>	<t>If <tt>h</tt> is <tt>HP-Outer</tt>:
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">refouter</spanx> be an empty list of Header Field n	</t>
	ames and values</t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">refprotected</spanx> be an empty list of Header Fie	<t>Split <tt>v</tt> into <tt>(h1,v1)</tt> on the first col
	ld names and values</t>	on (:), followed by any amount of whitespace.</t>
	<t>For each <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> in <spanx style="verb">refheader	</li>
	s</spanx>:	<li>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<t>Append <tt>(h1,v1)</tt> to <tt>refouter</tt>.</t>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">h</spanx> is <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx	</li>
	>:	</ol>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	</li>
	<t>Split <spanx style="verb">v</spanx> into <spanx style="verb">(h1,v1	<li>
	)</spanx> on the first colon (:) followed by any amount of whitespace.</t>	<t>Else:
	<t>Append <spanx style="verb">(h1,v1)</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">r	</t>
	efouter</spanx></t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	</list></t>	<t>Append <tt>(h,v)</tt> to <tt>refprotected</tt>.</t>
	<t>Else:	</li>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	</ol>
	<t>Append <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">ref	</li>
	protected</spanx></t>	</ol>
	</list></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
	<t>Return <spanx style="verb">refouter</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">refprotect	<t>Return <tt>refouter</tt>, <tt>refprotected</tt>.</t>
	ed</spanx></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	</ol>
		<t>Note that this algorithm is independent of the unprotected Header F
	<t>Note that this algorithm is independent of the unprotected Header Fields.	ields.
	It derives its output only from the normal Header Fields and the <spanx style="v	It derives its output only from the normal Header Fields and the <tt>HP-Outer</t
	erb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Fields, both contained inside the Cryptographic Pay	t> Header Fields, both contained inside the Cryptographic Payload.</t>
	load.</t>	</section>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="crypto-summary-update">
	</section>	<name>Updating the Cryptographic Summary</name>
	<section anchor="crypto-summary-update"><name>Updating the Cryptographic Summary	<t>Regardless of whether a cryptographically protected message has prote
	</name>	cted Header Fields, the Cryptographic Summary of the message should be modified
		to indicate what protections the Header Fields have.
	<t>Regardless of whether a cryptographically protected message has protected Hea
	der Fields, the Cryptographic Summary of the message should be modified to indic
	ate what protections the Header Fields have.
	This field-by-field status is complex and isn't necessarily intended to be prese nted in full to the user.	This field-by-field status is complex and isn't necessarily intended to be prese nted in full to the user.

	Rather, it represents the state of the message internally within the MUA, and ma	Rather, it represents the state of the message internally within the MUA and may
	y be used to influence behavior like replying to the message (see <xref target="	be used to influence behavior like replying to the message (see <xref target="a
	avoid-leak"/>).</t>	void-leak"/>).</t>
		<t>Each Header Field individually has exactly one of the following prote
	<t>Each Header Field individually has exactly one of the following protection st	ction states:</t>
	ates:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t><tt>unprotected</tt> (has no Header Protection)</t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">unprotected</spanx> (has no Header Protection)</t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">signed-only</spanx> (bound into the same validated sign	<li>
	ature as the enclosing message, but also visible in transit)</t>	<t><tt>signed-only</tt> (bound into the same validated signature as
	<t><spanx style="verb">encrypted-only</spanx> (only appears within the Cryptog	the enclosing message, but also visible in transit)</t>
	raphic Payload; the corresponding external Header Field was either removed or ob	</li>
	scured)</t>	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx> (same as encrypted-only, b	<t><tt>encrypted-only</tt> (only appears within the Cryptographic Pa
	ut additionally is under a validated signature)</t>	yload; the corresponding external Header Field was either removed or obscured)</
	</list></t>	t>
		</li>
	<t>If the message does not have Header Protection (as determined by <xref target	<li>
	="identifying-header-protection"/>), then all of the Header Fields are by defini	<t><tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> (same as encrypted-only, but additi
	tion <spanx style="verb">unprotected</spanx>.</t>	onally is under a validated signature)</t>
		</li>
	<t>If the message has Header Protection, an MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use the fo	</ul>
	llowing algorithm to compute the protection state of a protected Header Field <s	<t>If the message does not have Header Protection (as determined by <xre
	panx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> (that is, an element of <spanx style="verb">refp	f target="identifying-header-protection"/>), then all of the Header Fields are b
	rotected</spanx> from <xref target="extracting-headers"/>):</t>	y definition <tt>unprotected</tt>.</t>
		<t>If the message has Header Protection, an MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> us
	<section anchor="headerfieldprotection"><name>HeaderFieldProtection</name>	e the following algorithm to compute the protection state of a protected Header
		Field <tt>(h,v)</tt> (that is, an element of <tt>refprotected</tt> from <xref ta
	<t>Method signature:</t>	rget="extracting-headers"/>):</t>
		<section anchor="headerfieldprotection">
	<t><spanx style="verb">	<name>HeaderFieldProtection</name>
	HeaderFieldProtection(msg, h, v) → protection_state	<t>Method signature:</t>
	</spanx></t>	<t><tt>
		HeaderFieldProtection(msg, h, v) -> protection_state
	<t>Procedure:</t>	</tt></t>
		<t>Procedure:</t>
	<t><list style="numbers" type="1">	<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">ct</spanx> be the <spanx style="verb">Content-Type<	<t>Let <tt>ct</tt> be the <tt>Content-Type</tt> of the root of the
	/spanx> of the root of the Cryptographic Payload of <spanx style="verb">msg</spa	Cryptographic Payload of <tt>msg</tt>.</t>
	nx>.</t>	</li>
	<t>Compute (<spanx style="verb">refouter</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">refprote	<li>
	cted</spanx>) from <iref item="HeaderSetsFromMessage"/><xref target="headersetsf	<t>Compute (<tt>refouter</tt>, <tt>refprotected</tt>) from <iref i
	rommessage" format="none">HeaderSetsFromMessage</xref>(<spanx style="verb">msg</	tem="HeaderSetsFromMessage"/><xref target="headersetsfrommessage" format="none">
	spanx>).</t>	HeaderSetsFromMessage</xref>(<tt>msg</tt>).</t>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">(h, v)</spanx> is not in <spanx style="verb">refprot	</li>
	ected</spanx>):	<li>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<t>If <tt>(h, v)</tt> is not in <tt>refprotected</tt>:
	<t>Abort, <spanx style="verb">v</spanx> is not a valid value for header <s	</t>
	panx style="verb">h</spanx></t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	</list></t>	<t>Abort, <tt>v</tt> is not a valid value for header <tt>h</tt
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">is_sig_valid</spanx> be <spanx style="verb">false</	>.</t>
	spanx></t>	</li>
	<t>If the message is signed:	</ol>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	</li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">is_sig_valid</spanx> be the result of validatin	<li>
	g the signature</t>	<t>Let <tt>is_sig_valid</tt> be <tt>false</tt>.</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
	<t>If the message is encrypted, and if <spanx style="verb">ct</spanx> has a pa	<li>
	rameter <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx>, and if <spanx style="verb">(h,v	<t>If the message is signed:
	)</spanx> is not in <spanx style="verb">refouter</spanx>:	</t>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	<t>Return <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx> if <spanx style	<t>Let <tt>is_sig_valid</tt> be the result of validating the s
	="verb">is_sig_valid</spanx> otherwise <spanx style="verb">encrypted-only</spanx	ignature.</t>
	></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	</ol>
	<t>Return <spanx style="verb">signed-only</spanx> if <spanx style="verb">is_si	</li>
	g_valid</spanx> otherwise <spanx style="verb">unprotected</spanx></t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>If the message is encrypted, <tt>ct</tt> has a parameter <tt>hp
		="cipher"</tt>, and <tt>(h,v)</tt> is not in <tt>refouter</tt>:
	<t>Note that:</t>	</t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>Return <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> if <tt>is_sig_valid</t
	<t>This algorithm is independent of the unprotected Header Fields.	t> is otherwise <tt>encrypted-only</tt>.</t>
	It derives the protection state only from <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> and	</li>
	the set of <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Fields, both of which are	</ol>
	inside the Cryptographic Envelope.</t>	</li>
	<t>If the signature fails validation, the MUA lowers the affected state to <sp	<li>
	anx style="verb">unprotected</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">encrypted-only</span	<t>Return <tt>signed-only</tt> if <tt>is_sig_valid</tt> is otherwi
	x> without any additional warning to the user, as specified by <xref section="3.	se <tt>unprotected</tt>.</t>
	1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>.</t>	</li>
	<t>Data from <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx> and <spanx style	</ol>
	="verb">encrypted-only</spanx> Header Fields may still not be fully private (see	<t>Note that:</t>
	<xref target="encryption-vs-privacy"/>).</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
	<t>Encryption may have been added in transit to an originally signed-only mess	<li>
	age. Thus only consider Header Fields to be confidential if the sender indicates	<t>This algorithm is independent of the unprotected Header Fields.
	it with the <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx> parameter.</t>	It derives the protection state only from <tt>(h,v)</tt> and the set of <tt>HP-O
	<t>The protection state of a Header Field may be weaker than that of the messa	uter</tt> Header Fields, both of which are inside the Cryptographic Envelope.</t
	ge body.	>
	For example, a message body can be <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spa	</li>
	nx>, but a Header Field that is copied unmodified to the unprotected Header Sect	<li>
	ion is <spanx style="verb">signed-only</spanx>.</t>	<t>If the signature fails validation, the MUA lowers the affected
	</list></t>	state to <tt>unprotected</tt> or <tt>encrypted-only</tt> without any additional
		warning to the user, as specified by <xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" targ
	<t>If the message has Header Protection, Header Fields that are not in <spanx st	et="RFC9787"/>.</t>
	yle="verb">refprotected</spanx> (e.g., because they were added in transit), are	</li>
	<spanx style="verb">unprotected</spanx>.</t>	<li>
		<t>Data from <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> and <tt>encrypted-only<
	<t>Rendering the cryptographic status of each Header Field is likely to be compl	/tt> Header Fields may still not be fully private (see <xref target="encryption-
	ex and messy --- users may not understand it.	vs-privacy"/>).</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Encryption may have been added in transit to an originally sign
		ed-only message. Thus, only consider Header Fields to be confidential if the sen
		der indicates it with the <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> parameter.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>The protection state of a Header Field may be weaker than that
		of the message body.
		For example, a message body can be <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt>, but a Header F
		ield that is copied unmodified to the unprotected Header Section is <tt>signed-o
		nly</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>If the message has Header Protection, Header Fields that are not in
		<tt>refprotected</tt> (e.g., because they were added in transit) are <tt>unprot
		ected</tt>.</t>
		<t>Rendering the cryptographic status of each Header Field is likely t
		o be complex and messy -- users may not understand it.
	It is beyond the scope of this document to suggest any specific graphical afford ances or user experience.	It is beyond the scope of this document to suggest any specific graphical afford ances or user experience.
	Future work should include examples of successful rendering of this information. </t>	Future work should include examples of successful rendering of this information. </t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="handling-mismatch-of-from-hfs">
	<section anchor="handling-mismatch-of-from-hfs"><name>Handling Mismatch of From	<name>Handling Mismatch of From Header Fields</name>
	Header Fields</name>	<t>End-to-end (MUA-to-MUA) Header Protection is good for authenticity, i
		ntegrity, and confidentiality, but it potentially introduces new issues when an
	<t>End-to-end (MUA-to-MUA) Header Protection is good for authenticity, integrity	MUA depends on its MTA to authenticate parts of the Header Section.
	, and confidentiality, but it potentially introduces new issues when an MUA depe	The latter is typically the case in modern email systems.</t>
	nds on its MTA to authenticate parts of the Header Section.	<t>In particular, when an MUA depends on its MTA to ensure that the emai
	The latter is typically the case in modern e-mail systems.</t>	l address in the (unprotected) <tt>From</tt> Header Field is authentic, but the
		MUA renders the email address of the protected <tt>From</tt> Header Field that d
	<t>In particular, when an MUA depends on its MTA to ensure that the e-mail addre	iffers from the address visible to the MTA, this could create a risk of sender a
	ss in the (unprotected) <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field is authent	ddress spoofing (see <xref target="from-addr-spoofing"/>).
	ic, but the MUA renders the e-mail address of the protected <spanx style="verb">
	From</spanx> Header Field that differs from the address visible to the MTA, this
	could create a risk of sender address spoofing (see <xref target="from-addr-spo
	ofing"/>).
	This potential risk applies to signed-only messages as well as signed-and-encryp ted messages.</t>	This potential risk applies to signed-only messages as well as signed-and-encryp ted messages.</t>

		<section anchor="definitions">
	<section anchor="definitions"><name>Definitions</name>	<name>Definitions</name>
		<section anchor="def-from-hf-mismatch">
	<section anchor="def-from-hf-mismatch"><name>From Header Field Mismatch</name>	<name>From Header Field Mismatch</name>
		<t>"<tt>From</tt> Header Field Mismatch" is defined as follows:</t>
	<t>"<spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field Mismatch" is defined as follow	<t>The <tt>addr-spec</tt> of the inner <tt>From</tt> Header Field do
	s:</t>	esn't match the <tt>addr-spec</tt> of the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field (see
		<xref target="matching-addr-specs"/>).</t>
	<t>The <spanx style="verb">addr-spec</spanx> of the inner <spanx style="verb">Fr	<t>Note: The unprotected <tt>From</tt> Header Field used in this com
	om</spanx> Header Field doesn't match the <spanx style="verb">addr-spec</spanx>	parison is the actual outer Header Field (as seen by the MTA), not the value ind
	of the outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field (see <xref target="ma	icated by any potential inner <tt>HP-Outer</tt>.</t>
	tching-addr-specs"/>).</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="def-no-valid-and-correctly-bound-signature">
	<t>Note: The unprotected <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field used in t	<name>No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature</name>
	his comparison is the actual outer Header Field (as seen by the MTA), not the va	<t>"No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature" is defined as follows:</
	lue indicated by any potential inner <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx>.</t>	t>
		<t>There is no valid signature made by a certificate for which the M
	</section>	UA has a valid binding to the protected <tt>From</tt> address.
	<section anchor="def-no-valid-and-correctly-bound-signature"><name>No Valid and
	Correctly Bound Signature</name>

	<t>"No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature" is defined as follows:</t>

	<t>There is no valid signature made by a certificate for which the MUA has a val
	id binding to the protected <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> address.
	This includes:</t>	This includes:</t>

		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>the message has no signature, or</t>	<t>the message has no signature,</t>
	<t>the message has a broken signature, or</t>	</li>
	<t>the message has a valid signature, but the receiving MUA does not see any v	<li>
	alid binding between the signing certificate and the <spanx style="verb">addr-sp	<t>the message has a broken signature, or</t>
	ec</spanx> of the inner <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field.</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
		<t>the message has a valid signature, but the receiving MUA does
	<t>Note: There are many possible ways that an MUA could choose to validate a cer	not see any valid binding between the signing certificate and the <tt>addr-spec
	tificate-to-address binding.	</tt> of the inner <tt>From</tt> Header Field.</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>Note: There are many possible ways that an MUA could choose to va
		lidate a certificate-to-address binding.
	For example, the MUA could ensure the certificate is issued by one of a set of t rusted certification authorities, it could rely on the user to do a manual out-o f-band comparison, it could rely on a DNSSEC signal (<xref target="RFC7929"/> or <xref target="RFC8162"/>), and so on.	For example, the MUA could ensure the certificate is issued by one of a set of t rusted certification authorities, it could rely on the user to do a manual out-o f-band comparison, it could rely on a DNSSEC signal (<xref target="RFC7929"/> or <xref target="RFC8162"/>), and so on.

	It is beyond the scope of this document to describe all possible ways an MUA mig	It is beyond the scope of this document to describe all possible ways an MUA mig
	ht validate the certificate-to-address binding, or to choose among them.</t>	ht validate the certificate-to-address binding or to choose among them.</t>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="warning-from-mismatch">
	<section anchor="warning-from-mismatch"><name>Warning for From Header Field Mism	<name>Warning for From Header Field Mismatch</name>
	atch</name>	<t>To mitigate the above described risk of sender address spoofing, an
		MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> warn the user whenever both of the following conditio
	<t>To mitigate the above described risk of sender address spoofing, an MUA <bcp1	ns are met:</t>
	4>SHOULD</bcp14> warn the user whenever both of the following conditions are met	<ul spacing="normal">
	:</t>	<li>
		<t><tt>From</tt> Header Field Mismatch (as defined in <xref target
	<t><list style="symbols">	="def-from-hf-mismatch"/>)</t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field Mismatch (as defined in <xref	</li>
	target="def-from-hf-mismatch"/>), and</t>	<li>
	<t>No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature (as defined in <xref target="def-no-	<t>No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature (as defined in <xref tar
	valid-and-correctly-bound-signature"/>)</t>	get="def-no-valid-and-correctly-bound-signature"/>)</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>This warning should be comparable to the MUA's warning about messages that ar	<t>This warning should be comparable to the MUA's warning about messag
	e likely spam or phishing, and it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> show both of the non-mat	es that are likely spam or phishing, and it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> show both of t
	ching <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Fields.</t>	he non-matching <tt>From</tt> Header Fields.</t>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="from-header-field-rendering">
	<section anchor="from-header-field-rendering"><name>From Header Field Rendering<	<name>From Header Field Rendering</name>
	/name>	<t>Furthermore, a receiving MUA that depends on its MTA to authenticat
		e the unprotected (outer) <tt>From</tt> Header Field <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> rende
	<t>Furthermore, a receiving MUA that depends on its MTA to authenticate the unpr	r the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field (as an exception to the guidance in the b
	otected (outer) <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp	eginning of <xref target="receiving-side"/>) if both of the following conditions
	14> render the outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field (as an except	are met:</t>
	ion to the guidance in the beginning of <xref target="receiving-side"/>), if bot	<ul spacing="normal">
	h of the following conditions are met:</t>	<li>
		<t><tt>From</tt> Header Field Mismatch (as defined in <xref target
	<t><list style="symbols">	="def-from-hf-mismatch"/>)</t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field Mismatch (as defined in <xref	</li>
	target="def-from-hf-mismatch"/>), and</t>	<li>
	<t>No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature (as defined in <xref target="def-no-	<t>No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature (as defined in <xref tar
	valid-and-correctly-bound-signature"/>)</t>	get="def-no-valid-and-correctly-bound-signature"/>)</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>An MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> apply a local preference to render a different disp	<t>An MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> apply a local preference to render a diff
	lay name (e.g., from an address book).</t>	erent display name (e.g., from an address book).</t>
		<t>See <xref target="from-rendering-reasoning"/> for a detailed explan
	<t>See <xref target="from-rendering-reasoning"/> for an detailed explanation of	ation of this rendering guidance.</t>
	this rendering guidance.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="handling-protected-from-header-field-when-responding">
	</section>	<name>Handling the Protected From Header Field When Responding</name>
	<section anchor="handling-protected-from-header-field-when-responding"><name>Han	<t>When responding to a message, an MUA has different ways to populate
	dling Protected From Header Field when Responding</name>	the recipients of the new message.
		Depending on whether it is a Reply, a Reply All, or a Forward, an MUA may popula
	<t>When responding to a message, an MUA has different ways to populate the recip	te the composer view using a combination of the referenced message's <tt>From</t
	ients of the new message.	t>, <tt>To</tt>, <tt>Cc</tt>, <tt>Reply-To</tt>, or <tt>Mail-Followup-To</tt> He
	Depending on whether it is a Reply, a Reply-All, or a Forward, an MUA may popula	ader Fields or any other signals.</t>
	te the composer view using a combination of the referenced message's <spanx styl	<t>When responding to a message with Header Protection, an MUA <bcp14>
	e="verb">From</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">To</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Cc</s	MUST</bcp14> only use the protected Header Fields when populating the recipients
	panx>, <spanx style="verb">Reply-To</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Mail-Followup-T	of the new message.</t>
	o</spanx> Header Fields, or any other signals.</t>	<t>This avoids compromise of message confidentiality when a man-in-the
		-middle (MITM) attacker modifies the unprotected <tt>From</tt> address of an enc
	<t>When responding to a message with Header Protection, an MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp1	rypted message, attempting to learn the contents through a misdirected reply.
	4> only use the protected Header Fields when populating the recipients of the ne	Note that with the rendering guidance above, a MITM attacker can cause the unpro
	w message.</t>	tected <tt>From</tt> Header Field to be displayed.
		Thus, when responding, the populated <tt>To</tt> address may differ from the ren
	<t>This avoids compromise of message confidentiality when a MITM attacker modifi	dered <tt>From</tt> address.
	es the unprotected <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> address of an encrypted mess	However, this change in addresses should not cause more user confusion than the
	age, attempting to learn the contents through a misdirected reply.	address change caused by a <tt>Reply-To</tt> in a Legacy Message does.</t>
	Note that with the rendering guidance above, a MITM attacker can cause the unpro	</section>
	tected <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field to be displayed.	<section anchor="matching-addr-specs">
	Thus when responding, the populated <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> address may d	<name>Matching addr-specs</name>
	iffer from the rendered <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> address.	<t>When generating (<xref target="hcp-from-addr-spec"/>) or consuming
	However, this change in addresses should not cause more user confusion than the	(<xref target="handling-mismatch-of-from-hfs"/>) a protected <tt>From</tt> Heade
	address change caused by a <spanx style="verb">Reply-To</spanx> in a Legacy Mess	r Field, the MUA considers the equivalence of two different <tt>addr-spec</tt> v
	age does.</t>	alues.</t>
		<t>First, the MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check whether the <tt>domain</tt
	</section>	> part of an <tt>addr-spec</tt> being compared contains a U-label <xref target="
	<section anchor="matching-addr-specs"><name>Matching addr-specs</name>	RFC5890"/>.
		If it does, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be converted to the A-label form, which is de
	<t>When generating (<xref target="hcp-from-addr-spec"/>) or consuming (<xref tar	scribed in <xref target="RFC5891"/>.
	get="handling-mismatch-of-from-hfs"/>) a protected <spanx style="verb">From</spa	We call a domain converted in this way (or the original domain if it didn't cont
	nx> Header Field, the MUA considers the equivalence of two different <spanx styl	ain any U-label) "the ASCII version of the <tt>domain</tt> part".
	e="verb">addr-spec</spanx> values.</t>	Second, the MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compare the ASCII version of the <tt>domain<
		/tt> part of the two <tt>addr-spec</tt>s by standard DNS comparison: Assume ASCI
	<t>First, the MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> check whether the <spanx style="verb">doma	I text and compare alphabetic characters case-insensitively, as described in <xr
	in</spanx> part of an <spanx style="verb">addr-spec</spanx> being compared conta	ef section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC1035"/>.
	ins any U-label <xref target="RFC5890"/>.	If the <tt>domain</tt> parts match, then the two <tt>local-part</tt>s are matche
	If it does, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be converted to the A-label form is described	d against each other.
	in <xref target="RFC5891"/>.	The simplest and most common comparison for the <tt>local-part</tt> is also an A
	We call a domain converted in this way (or the original domain, if it didn't con	SCII-based, case-insensitive match.
	tain any U-label) "the ASCII version of the <spanx style="verb">domain</spanx> p	If the MUA has special knowledge about the <tt>domain</tt> and, when composing,
	art".	it can reasonably expect the receiving MUAs to have the same information, it <bc
	Second, the MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compare the ASCII version of the <spanx styl	p14>MAY</bcp14> match the <tt>local-part</tt> using a more sophisticated and inc
	e="verb">domain</spanx> part of the two <spanx style="verb">addr-spec</spanx>s b	lusive matching algorithm.</t>
	y standard DNS comparison: assume ASCII text, and compare alphabetic characters	<t>It is beyond the scope of this document to recommend a more sophist
	case-insensitively, as described in <xref section="3.1" sectionFormat="of" targe	icated and inclusive matching algorithm.</t>
	t="RFC1035"/>.	</section>
	If the <spanx style="verb">domain</spanx> parts match, then the two <spanx style	</section>
	="verb">local-part</spanx>s are matched against each other.	<section anchor="rendering">
	The simplest and most common comparison for the <spanx style="verb">local-part</	<name>Rendering a Message with Header Protection</name>
	spanx> is also an ASCII-based, case-insensitive match.	<t>When the Cryptographic Payload's <tt>Content-Type</tt> has the parame
	If the MUA has special knowledge about the <spanx style="verb">domain</spanx> an	ter <tt>hp</tt> set to <tt>"clear"</tt> or <tt>"cipher"</tt>, the values of the
	d, when composing, it can reasonably expect the receiving MUAs to have the same	protected Header Fields are drawn from the Header Fields of the Cryptographic Pa
	information, it <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> match the <spanx style="verb">local-part</spa	yload, and the body that is rendered is the Cryptographic Payload itself.</t>
	nx> using a more sophisticated and inclusive matching algorithm.</t>	<section anchor="example-signed-only-message">
		<name>Example Signed-Only Message</name>
	<t>It is beyond the scope of this document to recommend a more sophisticated and	<t>Consider a message with this structure, where the MUA is able to va
	inclusive matching algorithm.</t>	lidate the cryptographic signature:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	</section>
	</section>
	<section anchor="rendering"><name>Rendering a Message with Header Protection</na
	me>

	<t>When the Cryptographic Payload's <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> has
	the parameter <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> set to <spanx style="verb">"clear"
	</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">"cipher"</spanx>, the values of the protected He
	ader Fields are drawn from the Header Fields of the Cryptographic Payload, and t
	he body that is rendered is the Cryptographic Payload itself.</t>

	<section anchor="example-signed-only-message"><name>Example Signed-only Message<
	/name>

	<t>Consider a message with this structure, where the MUA is able to validate the
	cryptographic signature:</t>

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	A └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"	A └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	B └┬╴multipart/alternative [Cryptographic Payload + Rendered Body]	B └┬╴multipart/alternative [Cryptographic Payload + Rendered Body]
	C ├─╴text/plain	C ├─╴text/plain
	D └─╴text/html	D └─╴text/html

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>The message body should be rendered the same way as this message:</
	<t>The message body should be rendered the same way as this message:</t>	t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	B └┬╴multipart/alternative	B └┬╴multipart/alternative
	C ├─╴text/plain	C ├─╴text/plain
	D └─╴text/html	D └─╴text/html

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>The MUA should render Header Fields taken from part <tt>B</tt>.</t>
	<t>The MUA should render Header Fields taken from part <spanx style="verb">B</sp	<t>Its Cryptographic Summary should indicate that the message was sign
	anx>.</t>	ed and all rendered Header Fields were included in the signature.</t>
		<t>Because this message is signed-only, none of its parts will have a
	<t>Its Cryptographic Summary should indicate that the message was signed and all	Legacy Display Element.</t>
	rendered Header Fields were included in the signature.</t>	<t>The MUA should ignore Header Fields from part <tt>A</tt> for the pu
		rposes of rendering.</t>
	<t>Because this message is signed-only, none of its parts will have a Legacy Dis	</section>
	play Element.</t>	<section anchor="example-signed-and-encrypted">
		<name>Example Signed-and-Encrypted Message</name>
	<t>The MUA should ignore Header Fields from part <spanx style="verb">A</spanx> f	<t>Consider a message with this structure, where the MUA is able to va
	or the purposes of rendering.</t>	lidate the cryptographic signature:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	</section>
	<section anchor="example-signed-and-encrypted"><name>Example Signed-and-Encrypte
	d Message</name>

	<t>Consider a message with this structure, where the MUA is able to validate the
	cryptographic signature:</t>

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	E └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"	E └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	F └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"	F └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	G └┬╴multipart/alternative [Cryptographic Payload + Rendered Body]	G └┬╴multipart/alternative [Cryptographic Payload + Rendered Body]
	H ├─╴text/plain	H ├─╴text/plain
	I └─╴text/html	I └─╴text/html

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>The message body should be rendered the same way as this message:</
	<t>The message body should be rendered the same way as this message:</t>	t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	G └┬╴multipart/alternative	G └┬╴multipart/alternative
	H ├─╴text/plain	H ├─╴text/plain
	I └─╴text/html	I └─╴text/html

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>It should render Header Fields taken from part <tt>G</tt>.</t>
	<t>It should render Header Fields taken from part <spanx style="verb">G</spanx>.	<t>Its Cryptographic Summary should indicate that the message is <tt>s
	</t>	igned-and-encrypted</tt>.</t>
		<t>When rendering the Cryptographic Status of a Header Field and when
	<t>Its Cryptographic Summary should indicate that the message is <spanx style="v	composing a reply, each Header Field found in <tt>G</tt> should be considered ag
	erb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx>.</t>	ainst all <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields found in <tt>G</tt>.
		If an <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field that matches both the name and value is fou
	<t>When rendering the Cryptographic Status of a Header Field and when composing	nd, the Header Field's Cryptographic Status is just <tt>signed-only</tt>, even t
	a reply, each Header Field found in <spanx style="verb">G</spanx> should be cons	hough the message itself is <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt>.
	idered against all <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Fields found in <	If no matching <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field is found, the Header Field's Crypt
	spanx style="verb">G</spanx>.	ographic Status is <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt>, like the rest of the message.<
	If an <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field is found that matches bo	/t>
	th the name and value, the Header Field's Cryptographic Status is just <spanx st	<t>If any of the User-Facing Header Fields are removed or obscured, th
	yle="verb">signed-only</spanx>, even though the message itself is <spanx style="	e composer of this message may have placed Legacy Display Elements in parts H an
	verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx>.	d I.</t>
	If no matching <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field is found, the H	<t>The MUA should ignore Header Fields from part <tt>E</tt> for the pu
	eader Field's Cryptographic Status is <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</	rposes of rendering.</t>
	spanx>, like the rest of the message.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="dont-render-legacy-display">
	<t>If any of the User-Facing Header Fields are removed or obscured, the composer	<name>Do Not Render Legacy Display Elements</name>
	of this message may have placed Legacy Display Elements in parts H and I.</t>	<t>As described in <xref target="hp-legacy-display"/>, a message with
		cryptographic confidentiality protection <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include Legacy Displ
	<t>The MUA should ignore Header Fields from part <spanx style="verb">E</spanx> f	ay Elements for backward compatibility with Legacy MUAs.
	or the purposes of rendering.</t>	These Legacy Display Elements are strictly decorative and unambiguously
		identifiable and will be discarded by compliant implementations.</t>


	</section>	<!--[rfced] To improve readability, we have updated "at all" to "completely"
	<section anchor="dont-render-legacy-display"><name>Do Not Render Legacy Display	and reworded the sentence below. Please review and let us know of any objections
	Elements</name>	.


	<t>As described in <xref target="hp-legacy-display"/>, a message with cryptograp	Original:
	hic confidentiality protection <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include Legacy Display Element	The receiving MUA MUST avoid rendering the identified Legacy Display
	s for backward-compatibility with Legacy MUAs.	Elements to the user at all, since it is aware of Header Protection
	These Legacy Display Elements are strictly decorative, unambiguously identifiabl	and can render the actual protected Header Fields.
	e, and will be discarded by compliant implementations.</t>


	<t>The receiving MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> avoid rendering the identified Legacy D	Current:
	isplay Elements to the user at all, since it is aware of Header Protection and c	The receiving MUA MUST completely avoid rendering the identified Legacy
	an render the actual protected Header Fields.</t>	Display Elements to the user, since it is aware of Header Protection
		and can render the actual protected Header Fields.
		-->


	<t>If a <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">text/plain<	<t>The receiving MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> completely avoid rendering th
	/spanx> part within the Cryptographic Envelope is identified as containing Legac	e identified Legacy Display Elements to the user, since it is aware of Header Pr
	y Display Elements, those elements <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be hidden when rendering	otection and can render the actual protected Header Fields.</t>
	and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be dropped when generating a draft reply or inline forwa	<t>If a <tt>text/html</tt> or <tt>text/plain</tt> part within the Cryp
	rded message.	tographic Envelope is identified as containing Legacy Display Elements, those el
		ements <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be hidden when rendering and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be d
		ropped when generating a draft reply or inline forwarded message.
	Whenever a Message or MIME subtree is exported, downloaded, or otherwise further processed, if there is no need to retain a valid cryptographic signature, the i mplementer <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> drop the Legacy Display Elements.</t>	Whenever a Message or MIME subtree is exported, downloaded, or otherwise further processed, if there is no need to retain a valid cryptographic signature, the i mplementer <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> drop the Legacy Display Elements.</t>

		<section anchor="identify-legacy-display">
	<section anchor="identify-legacy-display"><name>Identifying a Part with Legacy D	<name>Identifying a Part with Legacy Display Elements</name>
	isplay Elements</name>	<t>A receiving MUA acting on a message that contains an encrypting C
		ryptographic Layer identifies a MIME subpart within the Cryptographic Payload as
	<t>A receiving MUA acting on a message that contains an encrypting Cryptographic	containing Legacy Display Elements based on the Content-Type of the subpart.
	Layer identifies a MIME subpart within the Cryptographic Payload as containing
	Legacy Display Elements based on the Content-Type of the subpart.
	The subpart's Content-Type:</t>	The subpart's Content-Type:</t>

		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>contains a parameter <tt>hp-legacy-display</tt> with value se
		t to <tt>1</tt> and</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>is either <tt>text/html</tt> (see <xref target="omit-html-leg
		acy-display"/>) or <tt>text/plain</tt> (see <xref target="omit-plain-legacy-disp
		lay"/>).</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>Note that the term "subpart" above is used in the general sense:
		If the Cryptographic Payload is a single part, that part itself may contain a Le
		gacy Display Element if it is marked with the <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> par
		ameter.</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="omit-plain-legacy-display">
		<name>Omitting Legacy Display Elements from text/plain</name>
		<t>If a <tt>text/plain</tt> part within the Cryptographic Payload ha
		s the Content-Type parameter <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt>, it should be proces
		sed before rendering in the following fashion:</t>


	<t><list style="symbols">	<!--[rfced] To make this sentence more concise, may we remove "of the part"?
	<t>contains a parameter <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display</spanx> with val
	ue set to <spanx style="verb">1</spanx>, and</t>
	<t>is either <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> (see <xref target="omit-htm
	l-legacy-display"/>) or <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> (see <xref target
	="omit-plain-legacy-display"/>).</t>
	</list></t>

	<t>Note that the term "subpart" above is used in the general sense: if the Crypt
	ographic Payload is a single part, that part itself may contain a Legacy Display
	Element if it is marked with the <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display=1</spanx
	> parameter.</t>

	</section>
	<section anchor="omit-plain-legacy-display"><name>Omitting Legacy Display Elemen
	ts from text/plain</name>

	<t>If a <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> part within the Cryptographic Pay
	load has the Content-Type parameter <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"</s
	panx>, it should be processed before rendering in the following fashion:</t>

	<t><list style="symbols">
	<t>Discard the leading lines of the body of the part up to and including the f
	irst entirely blank line.</t>
	</list></t>

	<t>Note that implementing this strategy is dependent on the charset used by the
	MIME part.</t>

	<t>See <xref target="example-legacy-display-plain"/> for an example.</t>

	</section>
	<section anchor="omit-html-legacy-display"><name>Omitting Legacy Display Element
	s from text/html</name>

	<t>If a <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> part within the Cryptographic Payl
	oad has the Content-Type parameter <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"</sp
	anx>, it should be processed before rendering in the following fashion:</t>


	<t><list style="symbols">	Original:
	<t>If any element of the HTML <spanx style="verb"><body></spanx> is a <s	* Discard the leading lines of the body of the part up to and
	panx style="verb"><div></spanx> with <spanx style="verb">class</spanx> att	including the first entirely blank line.
	ribute <spanx style="verb">header-protection-legacy-display</spanx>, that entire
	element should be omitted.</t>
	</list></t>


	<t>This cleanup could be done, for example, as a custom rule in the MUA's HTML s	Perhaps:
	anitizer, if one exists.	* Discard the leading lines of the body up to and including the
	Another implementation strategy for an HTML-capable MUA would be to add an entry	first entirely blank line.
	to the <xref target="CSS"/> stylesheet for such a part:</t>	-->


	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>Discard the leading lines of the body of the part up to and i
		ncluding the first entirely blank line.</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>Note that implementing this strategy is dependent on the charset
		used by the MIME part.</t>
		<t>See <xref target="example-legacy-display-plain"/> for an example.
		</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="omit-html-legacy-display">
		<name>Omitting Legacy Display Elements from text/html</name>
		<t>If a <tt>text/html</tt> part within the Cryptographic Payload has
		the Content-Type parameter <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt>, it should be process
		ed before rendering in the following fashion:</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>If any element of the HTML <tt><body></tt> is a <tt>&lt
		;div></tt> with <tt>class</tt> attribute <tt>header-protection-legacy-display
		</tt>, that entire element should be omitted.</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>This cleanup could be done, for example, as a custom rule in the
		MUA's HTML sanitizer, if one exists.
		Another implementation strategy for an HTML-capable MUA would be to add an entry
		to the <xref target="CSS"/> style sheet for such a part:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	body div.header-protection-legacy-display { display: none; }	body div.header-protection-legacy-display { display: none; }

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="implicitly-rendered">
	<section anchor="implicitly-rendered"><name>Implicitly rendered Header Fields</n	<name>Implicitly Rendered Header Fields</name>
	ame>	<t>While the <tt>From</tt>, <tt>To</tt>, <tt>Cc</tt>, <tt>Subject</tt>,
		and <tt>Date</tt> Header Fields are often explicitly rendered to the user, some
	<t>While <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">To</spanx>, <span	Header Fields do affect message display without being explicitly rendered.</t>
	x style="verb">Cc</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>, and <spanx style	<t>For example, the <tt>Message-Id</tt>, <tt>References</tt>, and <tt>In
	="verb">Date</spanx> Header Fields are often explicitly rendered to the user, so	-Reply-To</tt> Header Fields may collectively be used to place a message in a "t
	me Header Fields do affect message display, without being explicitly rendered.</	hread" or series of messages.</t>
	t>	<t>In another example, <xref target="avoid-misdirected-replies"/> notes
		that the value of the <tt>Reply-To</tt> field can influence the draft reply mess
	<t>For example, <spanx style="verb">Message-Id</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Refe	age.
	rences</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">In-Reply-To</spanx> Header Fields may co	So while the user may never see the <tt>Reply-To</tt> Header Field directly, it
	llectively be used to place a message in a "thread" or series of messages.</t>	is implicitly "rendered" when the user interacts with the message by replying to
		it.</t>
	<t>In another example, <xref target="avoid-misdirected-replies"/> observes that	<t>An MUA that depends on any implicitly rendered Header Field in a mess
	the value of the <spanx style="verb">Reply-To</spanx> field can influence the dr	age with Header Protection <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the value from the protected
	aft reply message.	Header Field and <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use any value found outside the crypt
	So while the user may never see the <spanx style="verb">Reply-To</spanx> Header	ographic protection unless it is known to be a Header Field added in transit, as
	Field directly, it is implicitly "rendered" when the user interacts with the mes	specified in <xref target="fields-added-in-transit"/>.</t>
	sage by replying to it.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="handling-undecryptable-messages">
	<t>An MUA that depends on any implicitly rendered Header Field in a message with	<name>Handling Undecryptable Messages</name>
	Header Protection <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the value from the protected Header F	<t>An MUA might receive an apparently encrypted message that it cannot c
	ield, and <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> use any value found outside the cryptographi	urrently decrypt.
	c protection unless it is known to be a Header Field added in transit, as specif
	ied in <xref target="fields-added-in-transit"/>.</t>

	</section>
	<section anchor="handling-undecryptable-messages"><name>Handling Undecryptable M
	essages</name>

	<t>An MUA might receive an apparently encrypted message that it cannot currently
	decrypt.
	For example, when an MUA does not have regular access to the secret key material needed for decryption, it cannot know the cryptographically protected Header Fi elds or even whether the message has any cryptographically protected Header Fiel ds.</t>	For example, when an MUA does not have regular access to the secret key material needed for decryption, it cannot know the cryptographically protected Header Fi elds or even whether the message has any cryptographically protected Header Fiel ds.</t>

		<t>Such an undecrypted message will be rendered by the MUA as a message
	<t>Such an undecrypted message will be rendered by the MUA as a message without	without any Header Protection.
	any Header Protection.
	This means that the message summary may well change how it is rendered when the user is finally able to supply the secret key.</t>	This means that the message summary may well change how it is rendered when the user is finally able to supply the secret key.</t>

		<t>For example, the rendering of the <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field in a
	<t>For example, the rendering of the <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header	mailbox summary might change from <tt>[...]</tt> to the real message subject whe
	Field in a mailbox summary might change from <spanx style="verb">[...]</spanx> t	n the message is decrypted.
	o the real message subject when the message is decrypted.	Or the message's placement in a message thread might change if, say, <tt>Referen
	Or the message's placement in a message thread might change if, say, <spanx styl	ces</tt> or <tt>In-Reply-To</tt> have been removed or obscured (see <xref target
	e="verb">References</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">In-Reply-To</spanx> have been	="implicitly-rendered"/>).</t>
	removed or obscured (see <xref target="implicitly-rendered"/>).</t>	<t>Additionally, if the MUA does not retain access to the decrypting sec
		ret key, and it drops the decrypted form of a message, the message's rendering m
	<t>Additionally, if the MUA does not retain access to the decrypting secret key,	ay revert to the encrypted form.
	and it drops the decrypted form of a message, the message's rendering may rever	For example, if an MUA follows this behavior, the <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field
	t to the encrypted form.	in a mailbox summary might change from the real message subject back to <tt>[...
	For example, if an MUA follows this behavior, the <spanx style="verb">Subject</s	]</tt>.
	panx> Header Field in a mailbox summary might change from the real message subje	Or the message might be displayed outside of its current thread if the MUA loses
	ct back to <spanx style="verb">[...]</spanx>.	access to a removed <tt>References</tt> or <tt>In-Reply-To</tt> header.</t>
	Or the message might be displayed outside of its current thread if the MUA loses	<t>These behaviors are likely to surprise the user.
	access to a removed <spanx style="verb">References</spanx> or <spanx style="ver
	b">In-Reply-To</spanx> header.</t>

	<t>These behaviors are likely to surprise the user.
	However, an MUA has several possible ways of reducing or avoiding all of these s urprises, including:</t>	However, an MUA has several possible ways of reducing or avoiding all of these s urprises, including:</t>

		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>Ensuring that the MUA always has access to decryption-capable secret key ma	<t>Ensuring that the MUA always has access to decryption-capable sec
	terial.</t>	ret key material.</t>
	<t>Rendering undecrypted messages in a special quarantine view until the decry	</li>
	ption-capable secret key material is available.</t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>Rendering undecrypted messages in a special quarantine view until
		the decryption-capable secret key material is available.</t>
	<t>To reduce or avoid the surprises associated with a decrypted message with rem	</li>
	oved or obscured Header Fields becoming undecryptable, the MUA could also:</t>	</ul>
		<t>To reduce or avoid the surprises associated with a decrypted message
	<t><list style="symbols">	with removed or obscured Header Fields becoming undecryptable, the MUA could als
	<t>Securely cache metadata from a decrypted message's protected Header Fields	o:</t>
	so that its rendering doesn't change after the first decryption.</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
	<t>Securely store the session key associated with a decrypted message, so that	<li>
	attempts to read the message when the long-term secret key are unavailable can	<t>Securely cache metadata from a decrypted message's protected Head
	proceed using only the session key itself.	er Fields so that its rendering doesn't change after the first decryption.</t>
	See, for example, the discussion about stashing session keys in <xref section="9	</li>
	.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>.</t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>Securely store the session key associated with a decrypted messag
		e so that attempts to read the message when the long-term secret key is unavaila
	</section>	ble can proceed using only the session key itself. For example, see the discussi
	<section anchor="automated-message-handling"><name>Guidance for Automated Messag	on about stashing session keys in <xref section="9.1" sectionFormat="of" target=
	e Handling</name>	"RFC9787"/>.</t>
		</li>
	<t>Some automated systems have a control channel that is operated by e-mail.	</ul>
	For example, an incoming e-mail message could subscribe someone to a mailing lis	</section>
	t, initiate the purchase of a specific product, approve another message for redi	<section anchor="automated-message-handling">
	stribution, or adjust the state of some shared object.</t>	<name>Guidance for Automated Message Handling</name>
		<t>Some automated systems have a control channel that is operated by ema
	<t>To the extent that such a system depends on end-to-end cryptographic guarante	il.
	es about the e-mail control message, Header Protection as defined in this docume	For example, an incoming email message could subscribe someone to a mailing list
	nt should improve the system's security.	, initiate the purchase of a specific product, approve another message for redis
	This section provides some specific guidance for systems that use e-mail message	tribution, or adjust the state of some shared object.</t>
	s as a control channel that want to benefit from these security improvements.</t	<t>To the extent that such a system depends on end-to-end cryptographic
	>	guarantees about the email control message, Header Protection as defined in this
		document should improve the system's security.
	<section anchor="interpret-only-protected-header-fields"><name>Interpret Only Pr	This section provides some specific guidance for systems that use email messages
	otected Header Fields</name>	as a control channel that want to benefit from these security improvements.</t>
		<section anchor="interpret-only-protected-header-fields">
	<t>Consider the situation where an e-mail-based control channel depends on the m	<name>Only Interpret Protected Header Fields</name>
	essage's cryptographic signature and the action taken depends on some Header Fie	<t>Consider the situation where an email-based control channel depends
	ld of the message.</t>	on the message's cryptographic signature and the action taken depends on some H
		eader Field of the message.</t>
	<t>In this case, the automated system <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> rely on information fr	<t>In this case, the automated system <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> rely on info
	om the Header Field that is protected by the mechanism defined in this document.	rmation from the Header Field that is protected by the mechanism defined in this
		document.
	It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> rely on any Header Field found outside the Cryptograp hic Payload.</t>	It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> rely on any Header Field found outside the Cryptograp hic Payload.</t>

		<t>For example, consider an administrative interface for a mailing lis
	<t>For example, consider an administrative interface for a mailing list manager	t manager that only accepts control messages that are signed by one of its admin
	that only accepts control messages that are signed by one of its administrators.	istrators.
	When an inbound message for the list arrives, it is queued (waiting for administ	When an inbound message for the list arrives, it is queued (waiting for administ
	rative approval) and the system generates and listens for two distinct e-mail ad	rative approval) and the system generates and listens for two distinct email add
	dresses related to the queued message -- one that approves the message, and one	resses related to the queued message -- one that approves the message and one th
	that rejects it.	at rejects it.
	If an administrator sends a signed control message to the approval address, the	If an administrator sends a signed control message to the approval address, the
	mailing list verifies that the protected <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> Header F	mailing list verifies that the protected <tt>To</tt> Header Field of the signed
	ield of the signed control message contains the approval address before approvin	control message contains the approval address before approving the queued messag
	g the queued message for redistribution.	e for redistribution.
	If the protected <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> Header Field does not contain th	If the protected <tt>To</tt> Header Field does not contain that address, or ther
	at address, or there is no protected <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> Header Field	e is no protected <tt>To</tt> Header Field, then the mailing list logs or report
	, then the mailing list logs or reports the error and does not act on that contr	s the error and does not act on that control message.</t>
	ol message.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="ignore-legacy-display-elements">
	</section>	<name>Ignore Legacy Display Elements</name>
	<section anchor="ignore-legacy-display-elements"><name>Ignore Legacy Display Ele	<t>Consider the situation where an email-based control channel expects
	ments</name>	to receive an end-to-end encrypted message -- for example, where the control me
		ssages need confidentiality guarantees -- and where the action taken depends on
	<t>Consider the situation where an e-mail-based control channel expects to recei	the contents of some MIME part within the message body.</t>
	ve an end-to-end encrypted message -- for example, where the control messages ne	<t>In this case, the automated system that decrypts the incoming messa
	ed confidentiality guarantees -- and where the action taken depends on the conte	ges and scans the relevant MIME part <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify when the MIME
	nts of some MIME part within the message body.</t>	part contains a Legacy Display Element (see <xref target="identify-legacy-displa
		y"/>), and it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> parse the relevant MIME part with the Legacy D
	<t>In this case, the automated system that decrypts the incoming messages and sc	isplay Element removed.</t>
	ans the relevant MIME part <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify when the MIME part conta	<t>For example, consider an administrative interface of a confidential
	ins a Legacy Display Element (see <xref target="identify-legacy-display"/>), and	issue tracking software.
	it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> parse the relevant MIME part with the Legacy Display Ele	An authorized user can confidentially adjust the status of a tracked issue by a
	ment removed.</t>	specially formatted first line of the message body (for example, <tt>severity #1
		83 serious</tt>).
	<t>For example, consider an administrative interface of a confidential issue tra	When the user's MUA encrypts a plaintext control message to this issue tracker,
	cking software.	depending on the MUA's <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-po
	An authorized user can confidentially adjust the status of a tracked issue by a	licy" format="none">HCP</xref> and its choice of <tt>legacy</tt> value, it may a
	specially formatted first line of the message body (for example, <spanx style="v	dd a Legacy Display Element.
	erb">severity #183 serious</spanx>).	If it does so, then the first line of the message body will contain a decorative
	When the user's MUA encrypts a plain text control message to this issue tracker,	copy of the confidential <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field.
	depending on the MUA's <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-p
	olicy" format="none">HCP</xref> and its choice of <spanx style="verb">legacy</sp
	anx> value, it may add a Legacy Display Element.
	If it does so, then the first line of the message body will contain a decorative
	copy of the confidential <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header Field.
	The issue tracking software decrypts the incoming control message, identifies th at there is a Legacy Display Element in the part (see <xref target="identify-leg acy-display"/>), strips the lines comprising the Legacy Display Element (includi ng the first blank line), and only then parses the remaining top line to look fo r the expected special formatting.</t>	The issue tracking software decrypts the incoming control message, identifies th at there is a Legacy Display Element in the part (see <xref target="identify-leg acy-display"/>), strips the lines comprising the Legacy Display Element (includi ng the first blank line), and only then parses the remaining top line to look fo r the expected special formatting.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="debugging-and-troubleshooting">
	<section anchor="debugging-and-troubleshooting"><name>Affordances for Debugging	<name>Affordances for Debugging and Troubleshooting</name>
	and Troubleshooting</name>	<t>Note that advanced users of an MUA may need access to the original me
		ssage, for example, to troubleshoot problems with the rendering MUA itself or pr
	<t>Note that advanced users of an MUA may need access to the original message, f	oblems with the SMTP transport path taken by the message.</t>
	or example to troubleshoot problems with the rendering MUA itself, or problems w	<t>An MUA that applies these rendering guidelines <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
	ith the SMTP transport path taken by the message.</t>	ensure that the full original source of the message as it was received remains a
		vailable to such a user for debugging and troubleshooting.</t>
	<t>An MUA that applies these rendering guidelines <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ensure t	<t>If a troubleshooting scenario demands information about the cryptogra
	hat the full original source of the message as it was received remains available	phically protected values of Header Fields, and the message is encrypted, the de
	to such a user for debugging and troubleshooting.</t>	bugging interface <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also provide a "source" view of the Cryp
		tographic Payload itself, alongside the full original source of the message as r
	<t>If a troubleshooting scenario demands information about the cryptographically	eceived.</t>
	protected values of Header Fields, and the message is encrypted, the debugging	</section>
	interface <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also provide a "source" view of the Cryptographi	<section anchor="RFC8551HP">
	c Payload itself, alongside the full original source of the message as received.	<name>Handling RFC8551HP Messages (Backward Compatibility)</name>
	</t>	<t><xref target="rfc8551-problems"/> describes some drawbacks to the Hea
		der Protection scheme defined in <xref target="RFC8551"/>, referred to here as <
	</section>	iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>.
	<section anchor="RFC8551HP"><name>Handling RFC8551HP Messages (Backward Compatib
	ility)</name>

	<t><xref target="rfc8551-problems"/> describes some drawbacks to the Header Prot
	ection scheme defined in <xref target="RFC8551"/>, referred to here as <iref ite
	m="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>.
	An MUA <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> generate an <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target= "RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message.	An MUA <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> generate an <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target= "RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message.

	However, for backward compatibility an MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> try to render or r	However, for backward compatibility, an MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> try to render or
	espond to such a message as though the message has standard Header Protection.</	respond to such a message as though the message has standard Header Protection.<
	t>	/t>
		<t>The following two sections contain guidance for identifying, renderin
	<t>The following two sections contain guidance for identifying, rendering and re	g, and replying to <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none
	plying to <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551	">RFC8551HP</xref> messages.
	HP</xref> messages.	Corresponding test vectors are provided in Appendices <xref target="smime-one-pa
	Corresponding test vectors are provided in <xref target="smime-one-part-complex-	rt-complex-rfc8551hp" format="counter"/>, <xref target="smime-multipart-complex-
	rfc8551hp"/>, <xref target="smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551hp"/>, and <xref targ	rfc8551hp" format="counter"/>, and <xref target="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc855
	et="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline"/>.</t>	1hp-baseline" format="counter"/>.</t>
		<section anchor="identifying-rfc8551hp">
	<section anchor="identifying-rfc8551hp"><name>Identifying an RFC8551HP Message</	<name>Identifying an RFC8551HP Message</name>
	name>	<t>An <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">R
		FC8551HP</xref> message can be identified by its MIME structure, given that all
	<t>An <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</	of the following conditions are met:</t>
	xref> Message can be identified by its MIME structure, given that all of the fol	<ul spacing="normal">
	lowing conditions are met:</t>	<li>
		<t>It has a well-formed Cryptographic Envelope consisting of at le
	<t><list style="symbols">	ast one Cryptographic Layer as the outermost MIME object.</t>
	<t>It has a well-formed Cryptographic Envelope consisting of at least one Cryp	</li>
	tographic Layer as the outermost MIME object.</t>	<li>
	<t>The Cryptographic Payload is a single <spanx style="verb">message/rfc822</s	<t>The Cryptographic Payload is a single <tt>message/rfc822</tt> o
	panx> object</t>	bject.</t>
	<t>The message that constitutes the Cryptographic Payload does not itself have	</li>
	a well-formed Cryptographic Envelope; that is, its outermost MIME object is not	<li>
	a Cryptographic Layer.</t>	<t>The message that constitutes the Cryptographic Payload does not
	<t>No <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> parameter of <spanx style="verb	itself have a well-formed Cryptographic Envelope; that is, its outermost MIME o
	">hp=</spanx> is set on either the Cryptographic Payload, or its immediate MIME	bject is not a Cryptographic Layer.</t>
	child.</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
		<t>No <tt>Content-Type</tt> parameter of <tt>hp=</tt> is set on ei
	<t>Here is the MIME structure of an example signed-and-encrypted <iref item="RFC	ther the Cryptographic Payload or its immediate MIME child.</t>
	8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message:</t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	<t>Here is the MIME structure of an example signed-and-encrypted <iref
		item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> messa
		ge:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	A └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"	A └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	B └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"	B └─╴application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	C └┬╴message/rfc822 [Cryptographic Payload]	C └┬╴message/rfc822 [Cryptographic Payload]
	D └┬╴multipart/alternative [Rendered Body]	D └┬╴multipart/alternative [Rendered Body]
	E ├─╴text/plain	E ├─╴text/plain
	F └─╴text/html	F └─╴text/html

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>This meets the definition of an <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref targe
	<t>This meets the definition of an <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551	t="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message because:</t>
	HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message because:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>Cryptographic Layers <tt>A</tt> and <tt>B</tt> form the Cryptog
	<t>Cryptographic Layers <spanx style="verb">A</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">	raphic Envelope.</t>
	B</spanx> form the Cryptographic Envelope.</t>	</li>
	<t>The Cryptographic Payload, rooted in part <spanx style="verb">C</spanx> has	<li>
	<spanx style="verb">Content-Type: message/rfc822</spanx>.</t>	<t>The Cryptographic Payload, rooted in part <tt>C</tt>, has <tt>C
	<t>Part <spanx style="verb">D</spanx> (the MIME root of the message at <spanx	ontent-Type: message/rfc822</tt>.</t>
	style="verb">C</spanx>) is itself not a Cryptographic Layer.</t>	</li>
	<t>Neither part <spanx style="verb">C</spanx> nor part <spanx style="verb">D</	<li>
	spanx> have any <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> parameter set on their <spanx sty	<t>Part <tt>D</tt> (the MIME root of the message at <tt>C</tt>) is
	le="verb">Content-Type</spanx>.</t>	itself not a Cryptographic Layer.</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
		<li>
	</section>	<t>Neither part <tt>C</tt> nor part <tt>D</tt> have any <tt>hp</tt
	<section anchor="rendering-responding-rfc8551hp"><name>Rendering or Responding t	> parameters set on their <tt>Content-Type</tt>.</t>
	o an RFC8551HP message</name>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>When it has precisely identified a message as an <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xre	</section>
	f target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message, an MUA <bcp14>MAY</	<section anchor="rendering-responding-rfc8551hp">
	bcp14> render or respond to that message as though it were a message with Header	<name>Rendering or Responding to an RFC8551HP Message</name>
	Protection as defined in this document by making the following adjustments:</t>	<t>When an MUA has precisely identified a message as an <iref item="RF
		C8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message, the M
	<t><list style="symbols">	UA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> render or respond to that message as though it were a mess
	<t>Rather than rendering the message body as the Cryptographic Payload itself	age with Header Protection as defined in this document by making the following a
	(part <spanx style="verb">C</spanx> in the example above), render the <iref item	djustments:</t>
	="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message's	<ul spacing="normal">
	body as the MIME subtree that is the Cryptographic Payload's immediate child (pa	<li>
	rt <spanx style="verb">D</spanx>).</t>	<t>Rather than rendering the message body as the Cryptographic Pay
	<t>Make a comparable modification to <iref item="HeaderSetsFromMessage"/><xref	load itself (part <tt>C</tt> in the example above), render the <iref item="RFC85
	target="headersetsfrommessage" format="none">HeaderSetsFromMessage</xref> (<xre	51HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> message's body as
	f target="headersetsfrommessage"/>) and <iref item="HeaderFieldProtection"/><xre	the MIME subtree that is the Cryptographic Payload's immediate child (part <tt>
	f target="headerfieldprotection" format="none">HeaderFieldProtection</xref> (<xr	D</tt>).</t>
	ef target="headerfieldprotection"/>): both algorithms currently look for the pro	</li>
	tected Header Fields on the Cryptographic Payload (part <spanx style="verb">C</s	<li>
	panx>), but they should instead look at the Cryptographic Payload's immediate ch	<t>Make a comparable modification to <iref item="HeaderSetsFromMes
	ild (part <spanx style="verb">D</spanx>).	sage"/><xref target="headersetsfrommessage" format="none">HeaderSetsFromMessage<
	<!--RFC Editor: the section references in the above bullet point are for the sak	/xref> (<xref target="headersetsfrommessage"/>) and <iref item="HeaderFieldProte
	e of the text/plain version. The text/html version doesn't need them because it	ction"/><xref target="headerfieldprotection" format="none">HeaderFieldProtection
	has automatic internal hyperlinks. Is there some way that we can keep them, bu	</xref> (<xref target="headerfieldprotection"/>): Both algorithms currently look
	t only for the text/plain version? --></t>	for the protected Header Fields on the Cryptographic Payload (part <tt>C</tt>),
	<t>If the Cryptographic Envelope is signed-only, behave as though there is an	but they should instead look at the Cryptographic Payload's immediate child (pa
	<spanx style="verb">hp="clear"</spanx> parameter for the Cryptographic Payload;	rt <tt>D</tt>).
	if the Envelope contains encryption, behave as though there is an <spanx style="	</t>
	verb">hp="cipher"</spanx> parameter.	</li>
		<li>
		<t>If the Cryptographic Envelope is signed-only, behave as though
		there is an <tt>hp="clear"</tt> parameter for the Cryptographic Payload; if the
		Envelope contains encryption, behave as though there is an <tt>hp="cipher"</tt>
		parameter.
	That is, infer the sender's cryptographic intent from the structure of the messa ge.</t>	That is, infer the sender's cryptographic intent from the structure of the messa ge.</t>

	<t>If the Cryptographic Envelope contains encryption, further modify <iref ite	</li>
	m="HeaderSetsFromMessage"/><xref target="headersetsfrommessage" format="none">He	<li>
	aderSetsFromMessage</xref> to derive <spanx style="verb">refouter</spanx> from t	<t>If the Cryptographic Envelope contains encryption, further modi
	he actual outer message Header Fields (those found in part <spanx style="verb">A	fy <iref item="HeaderSetsFromMessage"/><xref target="headersetsfrommessage" form
	</spanx> in the example above), rather than looking for <spanx style="verb">HP-O	at="none">HeaderSetsFromMessage</xref> to derive <tt>refouter</tt> from the actu
	uter</spanx> Header Fields with the other protected Header Fields.	al outer message Header Fields (those found in part <tt>A</tt> in the example ab
		ove) rather than looking for <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields with the other prot
		ected Header Fields.
	That is, infer Header Field confidentiality based on the unprotected headers.</t >	That is, infer Header Field confidentiality based on the unprotected headers.</t >

	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>The inferences in the above modifications are not based on any strong end-to-	<t>The inferences in the above modifications are not based on any stro
	end guarantees.	ng end-to-end guarantees.
	An intervening MTA may tamper with the message's outer Header Section or wrap th e message in an encryption layer to undetectably change the recipient's understa nding of the confidentiality of the message's Header Fields or the message body itself.</t>	An intervening MTA may tamper with the message's outer Header Section or wrap th e message in an encryption layer to undetectably change the recipient's understa nding of the confidentiality of the message's Header Fields or the message body itself.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="rendering-other-schemes">
	<section anchor="rendering-other-schemes"><name>Rendering Other Schemes</name>	<name>Rendering Other Schemes</name>
		<t>Other MUAs may have generated different structures of messages that a
	<t>Other MUAs may have generated different structures of messages that aim to of	im to offer end-to-end cryptographic protections that include Header Protection.
	fer end-to-end cryptographic protections that include Header Protection.
	This document is not normative for those schemes, and it is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMEND ED</bcp14> to generate these other schemes, as they can either have structural f laws or simply render poorly on Legacy MUAs.	This document is not normative for those schemes, and it is <bcp14>NOT RECOMMEND ED</bcp14> to generate these other schemes, as they can either have structural f laws or simply render poorly on Legacy MUAs.
	A conformant MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> attempt to infer Header Protection when rend ering an existing message that appears to use some other scheme not documented h ere.	A conformant MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> attempt to infer Header Protection when rend ering an existing message that appears to use some other scheme not documented h ere.
	Pointers to some known other schemes can be found in <xref target="other-schemes "/>.</t>	Pointers to some known other schemes can be found in <xref target="other-schemes "/>.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="sending-guidance">
	<section anchor="sending-guidance"><name>Sending Guidance</name>	<name>Sending Guidance</name>
		<t>This section describes the process an MUA should use to apply cryptogra
	<t>This section describes the process an MUA should use to apply cryptographic p	phic protection to an email message with Header Protection.</t>
	rotection to an e-mail message with Header Protection.</t>	<t>When composing a message with end-to-end cryptographic protections, an
		MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> apply Header Protection.</t>
	<t>When composing a message with end-to-end cryptographic protections, an MUA <b	<t>When generating such a message, an MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> add the <tt>
	cp14>SHOULD</bcp14> apply Header Protection.</t>	hp</tt> parameter (see <xref target="hp-parameter"/>) only to the <tt>Content-Ty
		pe</tt> Header Field at the root of the message's Cryptographic Payload.
	<t>When generating such a message, an MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> add the <spanx sty
	le="verb">hp</spanx> parameter (see <xref target="hp-parameter"/>) only to the <
	spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> Header Field at the root of the message'
	s Cryptographic Payload.
	The value of the parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> indicate whether the Cryptographi c Envelope contains a layer that provides encryption.</t>	The value of the parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> indicate whether the Cryptographi c Envelope contains a layer that provides encryption.</t>

		<section anchor="compose-legacy">
	<section anchor="compose-legacy"><name>Composing a Cryptographically Protected M	<name>Composing a Cryptographically Protected Message Without Header Pro
	essage Without Header Protection</name>	tection</name>
		<t>For contrast, we first consider the typical message composition proce
	<t>For contrast, we first consider the typical message composition process of a	ss of a Legacy Crypto MUA, which does not provide any Header Protection.</t>
	Legacy Crypto MUA which does not provide any Header Protection.</t>	<t>This process is described in <xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" t
		arget="RFC9787"/>.
	<t>This process is described in <xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I
	-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>.
	We replicate it here for reference.	We replicate it here for reference.
	The inputs to the algorithm are:</t>	The inputs to the algorithm are:</t>

		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">origbody</spanx>: the traditional unprotected message b	<t><tt>origbody</tt>: The traditional unprotected message body as a
	ody as a well-formed MIME tree (possibly just a single MIME leaf part).	well-formed MIME tree (possibly just a single MIME leaf part).
	As a well-formed MIME tree, <spanx style="verb">origbody</spanx> already has str	As a well-formed MIME tree, <tt>origbody</tt> already has structural Header Fiel
	uctural Header Fields (<spanx style="verb">Content-*</spanx>) present.</t>	ds (<tt>Content-*</tt>) present.</t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">origheaders</spanx>: the intended non-structural Header	</li>
	Fields for the message, represented here as a list of <spanx style="verb">(h,v)	<li>
	</spanx> pairs, where <spanx style="verb">h</spanx> is a Header Field name and <	<t><tt>origheaders</tt>: The intended non-structural Header Fields f
	spanx style="verb">v</spanx> is the associated value.	or the message, represented here as a list of <tt>(h,v)</tt> pairs, where <tt>h<
		/tt> is a Header Field name and <tt>v</tt> is the associated value.
	Note that these are Header Fields that the MUA intends to be visible to the reci pient of the message.	Note that these are Header Fields that the MUA intends to be visible to the reci pient of the message.

	In particular, if the MUA uses the <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx> Header Field	In particular, if the MUA uses the <tt>Bcc</tt> Header Field during composition
	during composition, but plans to omit it from the message (see <xref section="3.	but plans to omit it from the message (see <xref section="3.6.3" sectionFormat="
	6.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5322"/>), it will not be in <spanx style="ver	of" target="RFC5322"/>), it will not be in <tt>origheaders</tt>.</t>
	b">origheaders</spanx>.</t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">crypto</spanx>: The series of cryptographic protections	<li>
	to apply (for example, "sign with the secret key corresponding to X.509 certifi	<t><tt>crypto</tt>: The series of cryptographic protections to apply
	cate X, then encrypt to X.509 certificates X and Y").	(for example, "sign with the secret key corresponding to X.509 certificate X, t
		hen encrypt to X.509 certificates X and Y").
	This is a routine that accepts a MIME tree as input (the Cryptographic Payload), wraps the input in the appropriate Cryptographic Envelope, and returns the resu ltant MIME tree as output.</t>	This is a routine that accepts a MIME tree as input (the Cryptographic Payload), wraps the input in the appropriate Cryptographic Envelope, and returns the resu ltant MIME tree as output.</t>

	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>The algorithm returns a MIME object that is ready to be injected into the mai
	l system.</t>

	<section anchor="composenoheaderprotection"><name>ComposeNoHeaderProtection</nam
	e>

	<t>Method Signature:</t>

	<t><spanx style="verb">
	ComposeNoHeaderProtection(origbody, origheaders, crypto) → mime_message
	</spanx></t>

	<t>Procedure:</t>

	<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
	<t>Apply <spanx style="verb">crypto</spanx> to MIME part <spanx style="verb">o
	rigbody</spanx>, producing MIME tree <spanx style="verb">output</spanx></t>
	<t>For each Header Field name and value <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> in <
	spanx style="verb">origheaders</spanx>:
	<list style="numbers" type="i">
	<t>Add Header Field <spanx style="verb">h</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">o
	utput</spanx> with value <spanx style="verb">v</spanx></t>
	</list></t>
	<t>Return <spanx style="verb">output</spanx></t>
	</list></t>

	</section>
	</section>
	<section anchor="compose"><name>Composing a Message with Header Protection</name
	>

	<t>To compose a message using Header Protection, the composing MUA uses the foll
	owing inputs:</t>

	<t><list style="symbols">
	<t>All the inputs described in <xref target="compose-legacy"/></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp</spanx>: a <iref item="Header Confidentiality Polic
	y"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidenti
	ality Policy</xref>, as defined in <xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"/
	></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">respond</spanx>: if the new message is a response to an
	other message (e.g., "Reply", "Reply All", "Forward", etc), the MUA function cor
	responding to the user's action (see <xref target="avoid-leak"/>), otherwise <sp
	anx style="verb">null</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">refmsg</spanx>: if the new message is a response to ano
	ther message, the message being responded to, otherwise <spanx style="verb">null
	</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">legacy</spanx>: a boolean value, indicating whether any
	recipient of the message is believed to have a Legacy MUA.
	If all recipients are known to implement this document, <spanx style="verb">lega
	cy</spanx> should be set to <spanx style="verb">false</spanx>.
	(How an MUA determines the value of <spanx style="verb">legacy</spanx> is out of
	scope for this document; an initial implementation can simply set it to <spanx
	style="verb">true</spanx>)</t>
	</list></t>


	<t>To enable visibility of User-Facing but now removed/obscured Header Fields fo	<t>The algorithm returns a MIME object that is ready to be injected into
	r decryption-capable Legacy MUAs, the Header Fields are included as a decorative	the mail system.</t>
	Legacy Display Element in specially marked parts of the message (see <xref targ	<section anchor="composenoheaderprotection">
	et="hp-legacy-display"/>).	<name>ComposeNoHeaderProtection</name>
	This document recommends two mechanisms for such a decorative adjustment: one fo	<t>Method Signature:</t>
	r a <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> Main Body Part of the e-mail message,	<t><tt>
	and one for a <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> Main Body Part.	ComposeNoHeaderProtection(origbody, origheaders, crypto) -> mime_message
		</tt></t>
		<t>Procedure:</t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
		<t>Apply <tt>crypto</tt> to MIME part <tt>origbody</tt>, producing
		MIME tree <tt>output</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>For each Header Field name and value <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>orig
		headers</tt>:
		</t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
		<t>Add Header Field <tt>h</tt> to <tt>output</tt> with value <
		tt>v</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Return <tt>output</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="compose">
		<name>Composing a Message with Header Protection</name>
		<t>To compose a message using Header Protection, the composing MUA uses
		the following inputs:</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>all the inputs described in <xref target="compose-legacy"/></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>hcp</tt>: a <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref
		target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Pol
		icy</xref>, as defined in <xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"/></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>respond</tt>: if the new message is a response to another mes
		sage (e.g., "Reply", "Reply All", "Forward", etc.), the MUA function correspondi
		ng to the user's action (see <xref target="avoid-leak"/>), otherwise <tt>null</t
		t></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>refmsg</tt>: if the new message is a response to another mess
		age, the message being responded to, otherwise <tt>null</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>legacy</tt>: a boolean value, indicating whether any recipien
		t of the message is believed to have a Legacy MUA.
		If all recipients are known to implement this document, <tt>legacy</tt> should b
		e set to <tt>false</tt>.
		(How an MUA determines the value of <tt>legacy</tt> is out of scope for this doc
		ument; an initial implementation can simply set it to <tt>true</tt>.)</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>To enable visibility of User-Facing but now removed/obscured Header F
		ields for decryption-capable Legacy MUAs, the Header Fields are included as a de
		corative Legacy Display Element in specially marked parts of the message (see <x
		ref target="hp-legacy-display"/>).
		This document recommends two mechanisms for such a decorative adjustment: one fo
		r a <tt>text/html</tt> Main Body Part of the email message and one for a <tt>tex
		t/plain</tt> Main Body Part.
	This document does not recommend adding a Legacy Display Element to any other pa rt.</t>	This document does not recommend adding a Legacy Display Element to any other pa rt.</t>

		<t>Please see <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>
	<t>Please see <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-	for guidance on identifying the parts of a message that are a Main Body Part.</t
	mail-guidance"/> for guidance on identifying the parts of a message that are a M	>
	ain Body Part.</t>	<section anchor="compose-algorithm">
		<name>Compose</name>
	<section anchor="compose-algorithm"><name>Compose</name>	<t>Method Signature:</t>
		<t><tt>
	<t>Method Signature:</t>

	<t><spanx style="verb">
	Compose(origbody, origheaders, crypto,	Compose(origbody, origheaders, crypto,
	hcp, respond, refmsg, legacy)	hcp, respond, refmsg, legacy)

	→ mime_message	-> mime_message
	</spanx></t>	</tt></t>
		<t>Procedure:</t>
	<t>Procedure:</t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
		<t>Let <tt>newbody</tt> be a copy of <tt>origbody</tt>.</t>
	<t><list style="numbers" type="1">	</li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">newbody</spanx> be a copy of <spanx style="verb">or	<li>
	igbody</spanx></t>	<t>If <tt>crypto</tt> contains encryption and <tt>legacy</tt> is <
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">crypto</spanx> contains encryption, and <spanx style	tt>true</tt>:
	="verb">legacy</spanx> is <spanx style="verb">true</spanx>:	</t>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	<t>Create <spanx style="verb">ldlist</spanx>, an empty list of <spanx styl	<t>Create <tt>ldlist</tt>, an empty list of <tt>(header, value
	e="verb">(header, value)</spanx> pairs</t>	)</tt> pairs.</t>
	<t>For each Header Field name and value <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx>	</li>
	in <spanx style="verb">origheaders</spanx>:	<li>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	<t>For each Header Field name and value <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">h</spanx> is User-Facing (see <xref section=	origheaders</tt>:
	"1.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>):	</t>
	<list style="numbers" type="I">	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">hcp(h,v)</spanx> is not <spanx style="ve	<t>If <tt>h</tt> is User-Facing (see <xref section="1.1.2"
	rb">v</spanx>:	sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>):
	<list style="numbers" type="A">	</t>
	<t>Add <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> to <spanx style="verb	<ol spacing="normal" type="I"><li>
	">ldlist</spanx></t>	<t>If <tt>hcp(h,v)</tt> is not <tt>v</tt>:
	</list></t>	</t>
	</list></t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="A"><li>
	</list></t>	<t>Add <tt>(h,v)</tt> to <tt>ldlist</tt>.</t>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">ldlist</spanx> is not empty:	</li>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	</ol>
	<t>Identify each leaf MIME part of <spanx style="verb">newbody</spanx>	</li>
	that represents the "main body" of the message.</t>	</ol>
	<t>For each "Main Body Part" <spanx style="verb">bodypart</spanx> of t	</li>
	ype <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">text/html</spa	</ol>
	nx>:	</li>
	<list style="numbers" type="I">	<li>
	<t>Adjust <spanx style="verb">bodypart</spanx> by inserting a Lega	<t>If <tt>ldlist</tt> is not empty:
	cy Display Element header list <spanx style="verb">ldlist</spanx> into its conte	</t>
	nt, and adding a <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> parameter <spanx style	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	="verb">hp-legacy-display</spanx> with value <spanx style="verb">1</spanx> (see	<t>Identify each leaf MIME part of <tt>newbody</tt> that r
	<xref target="ld-text-plain"/> for <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> and <x	epresents the "main body" of the message.</t>
	ref target="ld-text-html"/> for <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx>)</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>For each "Main Body Part" <tt>bodypart</tt> of type <tt
	</list></t>	>text/plain</tt> or <tt>text/html</tt>:
	<t>For each Header Field name and value <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> in <	</t>
	spanx style="verb">origheaders</spanx>:	<ol spacing="normal" type="I"><li>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<t>Adjust <tt>bodypart</tt> by inserting a Legacy Disp
	<t>Add Header Field <spanx style="verb">h</spanx> to MIME part <spanx styl	lay Element header list <tt>ldlist</tt> into its content and adding a <tt>Conten
	e="verb">newbody</spanx> with value <spanx style="verb">v</spanx></t>	t-Type</tt> parameter <tt>hp-legacy-display</tt> with value <tt>1</tt> (see <xre
	</list></t>	f target="ld-text-plain"/> for <tt>text/plain</tt> and <xref target="ld-text-htm
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">crypto</spanx> does not contain encryption:	l"/> for <tt>text/html</tt>).</t>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	</li>
	<t>Set the <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> parameter on the <spanx style="v	</ol>
	erb">Content-Type</spanx> of MIME part <spanx style="verb">newbody</spanx> to <s	</li>
	panx style="verb">clear</spanx></t>	</ol>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">newheaders</spanx> be a copy of <spanx style="v	</li>
	erb">origheaders</spanx></t>	</ol>
	</list></t>	</li>
	<t>Else (if <spanx style="verb">crypto</spanx> contains encryption):	<li>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<t>For each Header Field name and value <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>orig
	<t>Set the <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> parameter on the <spanx style="v	headers</tt>:
	erb">Content-Type</spanx> of MIME part <spanx style="verb">newbody</spanx> to <s	</t>
	panx style="verb">cipher</spanx></t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">refmsg</spanx> is not <spanx style="verb">null</	<t>Add Header Field <tt>h</tt> to MIME part <tt>newbody</tt> w
	spanx>, <spanx style="verb">respond</spanx> is not <spanx style="verb">null</spa	ith value <tt>v</tt>.</t>
	nx>, and <spanx style="verb">refmsg</spanx> itself is encrypted with header prot	</li>
	ection:	</ol>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	</li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">response_hcp</spanx> be a single-use <iref	<li>
	item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref	<t>If <tt>crypto</tt> does not contain encryption:
	> derived from <spanx style="verb">respond</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">refms	</t>
	g</spanx> (see <xref target="avoid-leak"/>)</t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	</list></t>	<t>Set the <tt>hp</tt> parameter on the <tt>Content-Type</tt>
	<t>Else (if this is not a response to an encrypted, header-protected messa	of MIME part <tt>newbody</tt> to <tt>clear</tt>.</t>
	ge):	</li>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	<li>
	<t>Set <spanx style="verb">response_hcp</spanx> to <spanx style="verb"	<t>Let <tt>newheaders</tt> be a copy of <tt>origheaders</tt>.<
	>hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx></t>	/t>
	</list></t>	</li>
	<t>Create new empty list of Header Field names and values <spanx style="ve	</ol>
	rb">newheaders</spanx></t>	</li>
	<t>For each Header Field name and value <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx>	<li>
	in <spanx style="verb">origheaders</spanx>:	<t>Else (if <tt>crypto</tt> contains encryption):
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	</t>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">newval</spanx> be <spanx style="verb">hcp(h	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	,v)</spanx></t>	<t>Set the <tt>hp</tt> parameter on the <tt>Content-Type</tt>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">newval</spanx> is <spanx style="verb">v</spa	of MIME part <tt>newbody</tt> to <tt>cipher</tt>.</t>
	nx>:	</li>
	<list style="numbers" type="I">	<li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">newval</spanx> be <spanx style="verb">r	<t>If <tt>refmsg</tt> is not <tt>null</tt>, <tt>respond</tt> i
	esponse_hcp(h,v)</spanx></t>	s not <tt>null</tt>, and <tt>refmsg</tt> itself is encrypted with header protect
	</list></t>	ion:
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">newval</spanx> is not <spanx style="verb">nu	</t>
	ll</spanx>):	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	<list style="numbers" type="I">	<t>Let <tt>response_hcp</tt> be a single-use <iref item="H
	<t>Add <spanx style="verb">(h,newval)</spanx> to <spanx style="ver	CP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> deriv
	b">newheaders</spanx></t>	ed from <tt>respond</tt> and <tt>refmsg</tt> (see <xref target="avoid-leak"/>).<
	</list></t>	/t>
	</list></t>	</li>
	<t>For each Header Field name and value <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx>	</ol>
	in <spanx style="verb">newheaders</spanx>:	</li>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	<li>
	<t>Let string <spanx style="verb">record</spanx> be the concatenation	<t>Else (if this is not a response to an encrypted, header-pro
	of <spanx style="verb">h</spanx>, a literal "<spanx style="verb">: </spanx>" (AS	tected message):
	CII colon (0x3A) followed by ASCII space (0x20)), and <spanx style="verb">v</spa	</t>
	nx></t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	<t>Add Header Field "<spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx>" to MIME par	<t>Set <tt>response_hcp</tt> to <tt>hcp_no_confidentiality
	t <spanx style="verb">newbody</spanx> with value <spanx style="verb">record</spa	</tt>.</t>
	nx></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	</ol>
	</list></t>	</li>
	<t>Apply <spanx style="verb">crypto</spanx> to MIME part <spanx style="verb">n	<li>
	ewbody</spanx>, producing MIME tree <spanx style="verb">output</spanx></t>	<t>Create a new empty list of Header Field names and values <t
	<t>For each Header Field name and value <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> in <	t>newheaders</tt>.</t>
	spanx style="verb">newheaders</spanx>:	</li>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<li>
	<t>Add Header Field <spanx style="verb">h</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">o	<t>For each Header Field name and value <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>
	utput</spanx> with value <spanx style="verb">v</spanx></t>	origheaders</tt>:
	</list></t>	</t>
	<t>Return <spanx style="verb">output</spanx></t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	</list></t>	<t>Let <tt>newval</tt> be <tt>hcp(h,v)</tt>.</t>
		</li>
	<t>Note that both new parameters (<spanx style="verb">hcp</spanx> and <spanx sty	<li>
	le="verb">legacy</spanx>) are effectively ignored if <spanx style="verb">crypto<	<t>If <tt>newval</tt> is <tt>v</tt>:
	/spanx> does not contain encryption.	</t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="I"><li>
		<t>Let <tt>newval</tt> be <tt>response_hcp(h,v)</tt>.<
		/t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>If <tt>newval</tt> is not <tt>null</tt>):
		</t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="I"><li>
		<t>Add <tt>(h,newval)</tt> to <tt>newheaders</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>For each Header Field name and value <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>
		newheaders</tt>:
		</t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
		<t>Let string <tt>record</tt> be the concatenation of <tt>
		h</tt>, a literal "<tt>: </tt>" (ASCII colon (0x3A) followed by ASCII space (0x2
		0)), and <tt>v</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Add Header Field "<tt>HP-Outer</tt>" to MIME part <tt>n
		ewbody</tt> with value <tt>record</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Apply <tt>crypto</tt> to MIME part <tt>newbody</tt>, producing
		MIME tree <tt>output</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>For each Header Field name and value <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>newh
		eaders</tt>:
		</t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
		<t>Add Header Field <tt>h</tt> to <tt>output</tt> with value <
		tt>v</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Return <tt>output</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		<t>Note that both new parameters (<tt>hcp</tt> and <tt>legacy</tt>) ar
		e effectively ignored if <tt>crypto</tt> does not contain encryption.
	This is by design, because they are irrelevant for signed-only cryptographic pro tections.</t>	This is by design, because they are irrelevant for signed-only cryptographic pro tections.</t>

		</section>
		<section anchor="ld-text-plain">
		<name>Adding a Legacy Display Element to a text/plain Part</name>
		<t>For a list of obscured and removed User-Facing Header Fields repres
		ented as <tt>(header, value)</tt> pairs, concatenate them as a set of lines, wit
		h one newline at the end of each pair.
		Add an additional trailing newline after the resultant text, and prepend the ent
		ire list to the body of the <tt>text/plain</tt> part.</t>
		<t>The MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also add a <tt>Content-Type</tt> parame
		ter of <tt>hp-legacy-display</tt> with value <tt>1</tt> to the MIME part to indi
		cate that a Legacy Display Element was added.</t>
		<t>For example, if the list of obscured Header Fields was <tt>[("Cc",
		"alice@example.net"), ("Subject", "Thursday's meeting")]</tt>, then a <tt>text/p
		lain</tt> Main Body Part that originally looked like this:</t>


	</section>	<!--[rfced] The <artwork> in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 includes the
	<section anchor="ld-text-plain"><name>Adding a Legacy Display Element to a text/	following attributes: charset=UTF-8 and hp-legacy-display=1.
	plain Part</name>


	<t>For a list of obscured and removed User-Facing Header Fields represented as <	Should quotes appear around the "UTF-8" and "1" values in these
	spanx style="verb">(header, value)</spanx> pairs, concatenate them as a set of l	instances per other use in the document? And should "UTF-8" be made
	ines, with one newline at the end of each pair.	lowercase for consistency, or are the lowercase instances different?
	Add an additional trailing newline after the resultant text, and prepend the ent
	ire list to the body of the <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> part.</t>


	<t>The MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also add a <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</span	Current:
	x> parameter of <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display</spanx> with value <spanx	Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 vs.
	style="verb">1</spanx> to the MIME part to indicate that a Legacy Display Elemen	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
	t was added.</t>


	<t>For example, if the list of obscured Header Fields was <spanx style="verb">[(	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1"; vs.
	"Cc", "alice@example.net"), ("Subject", "Thursday's meeting")]</spanx>, then a <	Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; hp-legacy-display=1
	spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> Main Body Part that originally looked like	-->
	this:</t>


	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	<artwork><![CDATA[
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8	Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

	I think we should skip the meeting.	I think we should skip the meeting.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>would become:</t>
	<t>Would become:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; hp-legacy-display=1	Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; hp-legacy-display=1

	Subject: Thursday's meeting	Subject: Thursday's meeting
	Cc: alice@example.net	Cc: alice@example.net

	I think we should skip the meeting.	I think we should skip the meeting.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Note that the Legacy Display Elements (the lines beginning with <tt
	<t>Note that the Legacy Display Element (the lines beginning with <spanx style="	>Subject:</tt> and <tt>Cc:</tt>) are part of the body of the MIME part in questi
	verb">Subject:</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Cc:</spanx>) are part of the body	on.</t>
	of the MIME part in question.</t>	<t>This example assumes that the Main Body Part in question is not the
		root of the Cryptographic Payload.
	<t>This example assumes that the Main Body Part in question is not the root of t	For instance, it could be a leaf of a <tt>multipart/alternative</tt> Cryptograph
	he Cryptographic Payload.	ic Payload.
	For instance, it could be a leaf of a <spanx style="verb">multipart/alternative<
	/spanx> Cryptographic Payload.
	This is why no additional Header Fields have been injected into the MIME part in this example.</t>	This is why no additional Header Fields have been injected into the MIME part in this example.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="ld-text-html">
	<section anchor="ld-text-html"><name>Adding a Legacy Display Element to a text/h	<name>Adding a Legacy Display Element to a text/html Part</name>
	tml Part</name>	<t>Adding a Legacy Display Element to a <tt>text/html</tt> part is sim
		ilar to how it is added to a <tt>text/plain</tt> part (see <xref target="ld-text
	<t>Adding a Legacy Display Element to a <spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> pa	-plain"/>).
	rt is similar to how it is added to a <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> par	Instead of adding the obscured or removed User-Facing Header Fields to a block o
	t (see <xref target="ld-text-plain"/>).	f text delimited by a blank line, the composing MUA injects them in an HTML <tt>
	Instead of adding the obscured or removed User-Facing Header Fields to a block o	<div></tt> element annotated with a <tt>class</tt> attribute of <tt>header
	f text delimited by a blank line, the composing MUA injects them in an HTML <spa	-protection-legacy-display</tt>.</t>
	nx style="verb"><div></spanx> element annotated with a <spanx style="verb"	<t>The content and formatting of this decorative <tt><div></tt>
	>class</spanx> attribute of <spanx style="verb">header-protection-legacy-display	have no strict requirements, but they <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent all the obsc
	</spanx>.</t>	ured and removed User-Facing Header Fields in a readable fashion.
		A simple approach is to assemble the text in the same way as <xref target="ld-te
	<t>The content and formatting of this decorative <spanx style="verb"><div>	xt-plain"/>, wrap it in a verbatim <tt><pre></tt> element, and put that el
	</spanx> have no strict requirements, but they <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> represent all	ement in the annotated <tt><div></tt>.</t>
	the obscured and removed User-Facing Header Fields in a readable fashion.	<t>The annotated <tt><div></tt> should be placed as close to the
	A simple approach is to assemble the text in the same way as <xref target="ld-te	start of the <tt><body></tt> as possible, where it will be visible when v
	xt-plain"/>, wrap it in a verbatim <spanx style="verb"><pre></spanx> eleme	iewed with a standard HTML renderer.</t>
	nt, and put that element in the annotated <spanx style="verb"><div></spanx	<t>The MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also add a <tt>Content-Type</tt> parame
	>.</t>	ter of <tt>hp-legacy-display</tt> with value <tt>1</tt> to the MIME part to indi
		cate that a Legacy Display Element was added.</t>
	<t>The annotated <spanx style="verb"><div></spanx> should be placed as clo	<t>For example, if the list of obscured Header Fields was <tt>[("Cc",
	se to the start of the <spanx style="verb"><body></spanx> as possible, whe	"alice@example.net"), ("Subject", "Thursday's meeting")]</tt>, then a <tt>text/h
	re it will be visible when viewed with a standard HTML renderer.</t>	tml</tt> Main Body Part that originally looked like this:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	<t>The MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also add a <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</span
	x> parameter of <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display</spanx> with value <spanx
	style="verb">1</spanx> to the MIME part to indicate that a Legacy Display Elemen
	t was added.</t>

	<t>For example, if the list of obscured Header Fields was <spanx style="verb">[(
	"Cc", "alice@example.net"), ("Subject", "Thursday's meeting")]</spanx>, then a <
	spanx style="verb">text/html</spanx> Main Body Part that originally looked like
	this:</t>

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8	Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

	<html><head><title></title></head><body>	<html><head><title></title></head><body>
	<p>I think we should skip the meeting.</p>	<p>I think we should skip the meeting.</p>
	</body></html>	</body></html>

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>would become:</t>
	<t>Would become:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8; hp-legacy-display=1	Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8; hp-legacy-display=1

	<html><head><title></title></head><body>	<html><head><title></title></head><body>
	<div class="header-protection-legacy-display">	<div class="header-protection-legacy-display">
	<pre>Subject: Thursday's meeting	<pre>Subject: Thursday's meeting
	Cc: alice@example.net</pre></div>	Cc: alice@example.net</pre></div>
	<p>I think we should skip the meeting.</p>	<p>I think we should skip the meeting.</p>
	</body></html>	</body></html>

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>This example assumes that the Main Body Part in question is not the
	<t>This example assumes that the Main Body Part in question is not the root of t	root of the Cryptographic Payload.
	he Cryptographic Payload.	For instance, it could be a leaf of a <tt>multipart/alternative</tt> Cryptograph
	For instance, it could be a leaf of a <spanx style="verb">multipart/alternative<	ic Payload.
	/spanx> Cryptographic Payload.
	This is why no additional Header Fields have been injected into the MIME part in this example.</t>	This is why no additional Header Fields have been injected into the MIME part in this example.</t>

		<section anchor="step-by-step-example-for-inserting-legacy-display-ele
	<section anchor="step-by-step-example-for-inserting-legacy-display-element-to-te	ment-to-texthtml">
	xthtml"><name>Step-by-step Example for Inserting Legacy Display Element to text/	<name>Step-by-Step Example for Inserting a Legacy Display Element in
	html</name>	to text/html</name>
		<t>A composing MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> insert the Legacy Display Elem
	<t>A composing MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> insert the Legacy Display Element anywhere	ent anywhere reasonable within the message as long as it prioritizes visibility
	reasonable within the message as long as it prioritizes visibility for the read	for the reader using a Legacy MUA that is capable of decryption.
	er using a Legacy decryption-capable MUA.
	This decision may take into account special message-specific HTML formatting exp ectations if the MUA is aware of them.	This decision may take into account special message-specific HTML formatting exp ectations if the MUA is aware of them.

	However, some MUAs may not have any special insight into the user's preferred HT ML formatting, and still want to insert a Legacy Display Element.	However, some MUAs may not have any special insight into the user's preferred HT ML formatting and still want to insert a Legacy Display Element.
	This section offers a non-normative, simple, and minimal step-by-step approach f or a composing MUA that has no other information or preferences to fall back on. </t>	This section offers a non-normative, simple, and minimal step-by-step approach f or a composing MUA that has no other information or preferences to fall back on. </t>

		<t>The process below assumes that the MUA already has the full HTML
	<t>The process below assumes that the MUA already has the full HTML object that	object that it intends to send, including all of the text supplied by the user.<
	it intends to send, including all of the text supplied by the user.</t>	/t>
		<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
	<t><list style="numbers" type="1">	<t>Assemble the text exactly as specified for <tt>text/plain</tt
	<t>Assemble the text exactly as specified for <spanx style="verb">text/plain</	> (see <xref target="ld-text-plain"/>).</t>
	spanx> (see <xref target="ld-text-plain"/>).</t>	</li>
	<t>Wrap that text in a verbatim <spanx style="verb"><pre></spanx> elemen	<li>
	t.</t>	<t>Wrap that text in a verbatim <tt><pre></tt> element.</t
	<t>Wrap that <spanx style="verb"><pre></spanx> element in a <spanx style	>
	="verb"><div></spanx> element annotated with the class <spanx style="verb"	</li>
	>header-protection-legacy-display</spanx>.</t>	<li>
	<t>Find the <spanx style="verb"><body></spanx> element of the full HTML	<t>Wrap that <tt><pre></tt> element in a <tt><div></
	object.</t>	tt> element annotated with the class <tt>header-protection-legacy-display</tt>.<
	<t>Insert the <spanx style="verb"><div></spanx> element as the first chi	/t>
	ld of the <spanx style="verb"><body></spanx> element.</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
		<t>Find the <tt><body></tt> element of the full HTML objec
	</section>	t.</t>
	</section>	</li>
	<section anchor="ld-main-body-only"><name>Only Add a Legacy Display Element to M	<li>
	ain Body Parts</name>	<t>Insert the <tt><div></tt> element as the first child of
		the <tt><body></tt> element.</t>
	<t>Some messages may contain a <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> or <spanx	</li>
	style="verb">text/html</spanx> subpart that is <em>not</em> a Main Body Part.	</ol>
	For example, an e-mail message might contain an attached text file or a download	</section>
	ed webpage.	</section>
		<section anchor="ld-main-body-only">
		<name>Only Add a Legacy Display Element to Main Body Parts</name>
		<t>Some messages may contain a <tt>text/plain</tt> or <tt>text/html</t
		t> subpart that is <em>not</em> a Main Body Part.
		For example, an email message might contain an attached text file or a downloade
		d web page.
	Attached documents need to be preserved as intended in the transmission, without modification.</t>	Attached documents need to be preserved as intended in the transmission, without modification.</t>

		<t>The composing MUA <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> add a Legacy Display Elem
		ent to any part of the message that is not a Main Body Part.
		In particular, if a part is annotated with <tt>Content-Disposition: attachment</
		tt>, or if it does not descend via the first child of any of its <tt>multipart/m
		ixed</tt> or <tt>multipart/related</tt> ancestors, it is not a Main Body Part an
		d <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be modified.</t>
		<t>See <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/> for m
		ore guidance about common ways to distinguish Main Body Parts from other MIME pa
		rts in a message.</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="ld-other-content-types">
		<name>Do Not Add a Legacy Display Element to Other Content-Types</name
		>


	<t>The composing MUA <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> add a Legacy Display Element to any	<!--[rfced] As "Main Body Part" is a term used throughout the document, may we
	part of the message that is not a Main Body Part.	update this sentence as shown below?
	In particular, if a part is annotated with <spanx style="verb">Content-Dispositi
	on: attachment</spanx>, or if it does not descend via the first child of any of
	its <spanx style="verb">multipart/mixed</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">multipart
	/related</spanx> ancestors, it is not a Main Body Part, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp
	14> be modified.</t>

	<t>See <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-gu
	idance"/> for more guidance about common ways to distinguish Main Body Parts fro
	m other MIME parts in a message.</t>

	</section>
	<section anchor="ld-other-content-types"><name>Do Not Add a Legacy Display Eleme
	nt to Other Content-Types</name>

	<t>The purpose of injecting a Legacy Display Element into each Main Body MIME pa
	rt is to enable rendering of otherwise obscured Header Fields in Legacy MUAs tha
	t are capable of message decryption, but don't know how to follow the rest of th
	e guidance in this document.</t>


	<t>The authors are unaware of any Legacy MUA that would render any MIME part typ	Original:
	e other than <spanx style="verb">text/plain</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">text	The purpose of injecting a Legacy Display Element into each Main Body
	/html</spanx> as the Main Body.	MIME part is to enable rendering of otherwise obscured Header Fields
	A generating MUA <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> add a Legacy Display Element to any M	in Legacy MUAs that are capable of message decryption...
	IME part with any other <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx>.</t>


	</section>	Perhaps:
	</section>	The purpose of injecting a Legacy Display Element into each MIME Main
	</section>	Body Part is to enable rendering of otherwise obscured Header Fields
	<section anchor="replying"><name>Replying and Forwarding Guidance</name>	in Legacy MUAs that are capable of message decryption...
		-->


	<t>An MUA might create a new message in response to another message, thus acting	<t>The purpose of injecting a Legacy Display Element into each Main Bo
	both as a receiving MUA and as a sending MUA.	dy MIME part is to enable rendering of otherwise obscured Header Fields in Legac
		y MUAs that are capable of message decryption but don't know how to follow the r
		est of the guidance in this document.</t>
		<t>The authors are unaware of any Legacy MUA that would render any MIM
		E part type other than <tt>text/plain</tt> and <tt>text/html</tt> as the Main Bo
		dy.
		A generating MUA <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> add a Legacy Display Element to any M
		IME part with any other <tt>Content-Type</tt>.</t>
		</section>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="replying">
		<name>Replying and Forwarding Guidance</name>
		<t>An MUA might create a new message in response to another message, thus
		acting both as a receiving MUA and as a sending MUA.
	For example, the user of an MUA viewing any given message might take an action l ike "Reply", "Reply All", "Forward", or some comparable action to start the comp osition of a new message.	For example, the user of an MUA viewing any given message might take an action l ike "Reply", "Reply All", "Forward", or some comparable action to start the comp osition of a new message.
	The new message created this way effectively references the original message tha t was viewed at the time.</t>	The new message created this way effectively references the original message tha t was viewed at the time.</t>

		<t>For encrypted messages, special guidance applies, because information c
	<t>For encrypted messages, special guidance applies, because information can lea	an leak in at least two ways: leaking previously confidential Header Fields and
	k in at least two ways: leaking previously confidential Header Fields, and leaki	leaking the entire message by sending the reply or forward to the wrong party.</
	ng the entire message by sending the reply or forward to the wrong party.</t>	t>
		<section anchor="avoid-leak">
	<section anchor="avoid-leak"><name>Avoid Leaking Encrypted Header Fields in Repl	<name>Avoid Leaking Encrypted Header Fields in Replies and Forwards</nam
	ies and Forwards</name>	e>
		<t>As noted in <xref section="5.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>
	<t>As noted in <xref section="5.4" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e	, an MUA in this position <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> leak previously encrypted cont
	-mail-guidance"/>, an MUA in this position <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> leak previous	ent in the clear in a follow-up message.
	ly encrypted content in the clear in a follow-up message.
	The same is true for protected Header Fields.</t>	The same is true for protected Header Fields.</t>

		<t>Values from any Header Field that was identified as either <tt>encryp
	<t>Values from any Header Field that was identified as either <spanx style="verb	ted-only</tt> or <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> based on the steps outlined above
	">encrypted-only</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx> bas	<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be placed in cleartext output when generating a message
	ed on the steps outlined above <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be placed in cleartext ou	.</t>
	tput when generating a message.</t>	<t>In particular, if <tt>Subject</tt> was encrypted, and it is copied in
		to the draft encrypted reply, the replying MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> obscure the u
	<t>In particular, if <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> was encrypted, and it i	nprotected (cleartext) <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field.</t>
	s copied into the draft encrypted reply, the replying MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ob	<t>When crafting the Header Fields for a reply or forwarded message, the
	scure the unprotected (cleartext) <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header Fie	composing MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> make use of the <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fi
	ld.</t>	elds from within the Cryptographic Envelope of the reference message to ensure t
		hat Header Fields derived from the reference message do not leak in the reply.</
	<t>When crafting the Header Fields for a reply or forwarded message, the composi	t>
	ng MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> make use of the <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx	<t>On a high level, this can be achieved as follows:
	> Header Fields from within the Cryptographic Envelope of the reference message
	to ensure that Header Fields derived from the reference message do not leak in t
	he reply.</t>

	<t>On a high-level, this can be achieved as follows:
	Consider a Header Field in a reply message that is generated by derivation from a Header Field in the reference message.	Consider a Header Field in a reply message that is generated by derivation from a Header Field in the reference message.

	For example, the <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> Header Field is typically derive d from the reference message's <spanx style="verb">Reply-To</spanx> or <spanx st yle="verb">From</spanx> Header Fields.	For example, the <tt>To</tt> Header Field is typically derived from the referenc e message's <tt>Reply-To</tt> or <tt>From</tt> Header Fields.
	When generating the outer copy of the Header Field, the composing MUA first appl ies its own <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-con fidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.	When generating the outer copy of the Header Field, the composing MUA first appl ies its own <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-con fidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.
	If the Header Field's value is changed by the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="he ader-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>, then it is applied to the outside header.	If the Header Field's value is changed by the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="he ader-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>, then it is applied to the outside header.

	If the Header Field's value is unchanged, the composing MUA re-generates the Hea	If the Header Field's value is unchanged, the composing MUA regenerates the Head
	der Field using the Header Fields that had been on the outside of the original m	er Field using the Header Fields that had been on the outside of the original me
	essage at sending time.	ssage at sending time.
	These can be inferred from the <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field	These can be inferred from the <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields located within th
	s located within the Cryptographic Payload of the referenced message.	e Cryptographic Payload of the referenced message.
	If that value is itself different than the protected value, then it is applied t o the outside header.	If that value is itself different than the protected value, then it is applied t o the outside header.
	If the value is the same as the protected value, then it is simply copied to the outside header directly.	If the value is the same as the protected value, then it is simply copied to the outside header directly.

	Whether it was changed or not, it is noted in the protected Header Section using	Whether it was changed or not, it is noted in the protected Header Section using
	<spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx>, as described in <xref target="new-header-	<tt>HP-Outer</tt>, as described in <xref target="new-header-field"/>.</t>
	field"/>.</t>	<t>See <xref target="reply-example"/> for a simple worked example of thi
		s process.</t>
	<t>See <xref target="reply-example"/> for a simple worked example of this proces	<t>Below we describe a supporting algorithm to handle this.
	s.</t>

	<t>Below we describe a supporting algorithm to handles this.
	It produces a list of Header Fields that should be obscured or removed in the ne w message even if the sender's choice of <iref item="Header Confidentiality Poli cy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confident iality Policy</xref> wouldn't normally remove or obscure the Header Field in que stion.	It produces a list of Header Fields that should be obscured or removed in the ne w message even if the sender's choice of <iref item="Header Confidentiality Poli cy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confident iality Policy</xref> wouldn't normally remove or obscure the Header Field in que stion.
	This is effectively a single-use <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confiden tiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.	This is effectively a single-use <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confiden tiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.
	The normal sending guidance in <xref target="compose"/> applies this single-use <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP </xref> to implement the high-level guidance above.</t>	The normal sending guidance in <xref target="compose"/> applies this single-use <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP </xref> to implement the high-level guidance above.</t>

		<section anchor="referencehcp">
	<section anchor="referencehcp"><name>ReferenceHCP</name>	<name>ReferenceHCP</name>
		<t>The algorithm takes two inputs:</t>
	<t>The algorithm takes two inputs:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>A single referenced message <tt>refmsg</tt></t>
	<t>A single referenced message <spanx style="verb">refmsg</spanx>, and</t>	</li>
	<t>A built-in MUA function <spanx style="verb">respond</spanx> associated with	<li>
	the user's action.	<t>A built-in MUA <tt>respond</tt> function associated with the us
	<spanx style="verb">respond</spanx> takes as input a list of headers from a refe	er's action.
	renced message and generates a list of initial candidate message Header Field na	The <tt>respond</tt> function takes a list of headers from a referenced message
	mes and values that are used to populate the message composition interface.	as input and generates a list of initial candidate message Header Field names an
		d values that are used to populate the message composition interface.
	Something like this function already exists in most MUAs, though it may differ a cross responsive actions.	Something like this function already exists in most MUAs, though it may differ a cross responsive actions.

	For example, the <spanx style="verb">respond</spanx> function that implements "R	For example, the <tt>respond</tt> function that implements "Reply All" is likely
	eply All" is likely to be a different from the <spanx style="verb">respond</span	to be a different from the <tt>respond</tt> that implements "Reply".</t>
	x> that implements "Reply".</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	</ul>
		<t>As an output, it produces an ephemeral single-use <iref item="Heade
	<t>As an output, it produces an ephemeral single-use <iref item="Header Confiden	r Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="
	tiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Head	none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>, specific to this kind of response to
	er Confidentiality Policy</xref>, specific to this kind of response to this spec	this specific message.</t>
	ific message.</t>	<t>Method signature:</t>
		<t><tt>
	<t>Method signature:</t>	ReferenceHCP(refmsg, respond) -> ephemeral_hcp
		</tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">	<t>Procedure:</t>
	ReferenceHCP(refmsg, respond) → ephemeral_hcp	<ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
	</spanx></t>	<t>If <tt>refmsg</tt> is not encrypted with Header Protection:
		</t>
	<t>Procedure:</t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
		<t>Return <tt>hcp_no_confidentiality</tt> (there is no header
	<t><list style="numbers" type="1">	confidentiality in the reference message that needs protection).</t>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">refmsg</spanx> is not encrypted with Header Protecti	</li>
	on:	</ol>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	</li>
	<t>Return <spanx style="verb">hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx> (there is no	<li>
	header confidentiality in the reference message that needs protection)</t>	<t>Extract <tt>refouter</tt>, <tt>refprotected</tt> from <tt>refms
	</list></t>	g</tt> as described in <xref target="extracting-headers"/>.</t>
	<t>Extract <spanx style="verb">refouter</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">refprotec	</li>
	ted</spanx> from <spanx style="verb">refmsg</spanx> as described in <xref target	<li>
	="extracting-headers"/></t>	<t>Let <tt>genprotected</tt> be a list of <tt>(h,v)</tt> pairs gen
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">genprotected</spanx> be a list of <spanx style="ver	erated by <tt>respond(refprotected)</tt>.</t>
	b">(h,v)</spanx> pairs generated by <spanx style="verb">respond(refprotected)</s	</li>
	panx></t>	<li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">genouter</spanx> be a list of <spanx style="verb">(	<t>Let <tt>genouter</tt> be a list of <tt>(h,v)</tt> pairs generat
	h,v)</spanx> pairs generated by <spanx style="verb">respond(refouter)</spanx></t	ed by <tt>respond(refouter)</tt>.</t>
	>	</li>
	<t>For each <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> in <spanx style="verb">genprotec	<li>
	ted</spanx>:	<t>For each <tt>(h,v)</tt> in <tt>genprotected</tt>:
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	</t>
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> is in <spanx style="verb">genouter	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	</spanx>:	<t>If <tt>(h,v)</tt> is in <tt>genouter</tt>:
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	</t>
	<t>Remove <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> from both <spanx style="ve	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	rb">genprotected</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">genouter</spanx> (this Header F	<t>Remove <tt>(h,v)</tt> from both <tt>genprotected</tt> a
	ield does not need additional confidentiality)</t>	nd <tt>genouter</tt> (this Header Field does not need additional confidentiality
	</list></t>	).</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
	<t>Let <spanx style="verb">confmap</spanx> be a mapping from a Header Field na	</ol>
	me and value <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> to either a string or the special	</li>
	value <spanx style="verb">null</spanx> (this mapping is initially empty)</t>	</ol>
	<t>For each <spanx style="verb">(h,v)</spanx> remaining in <spanx style="verb"	</li>
	>genprotected</spanx>:	<li>
	<list style="numbers" type="i">	<t>Let <tt>confmap</tt> be a mapping from a Header Field name and
	<t>Set <spanx style="verb">result</spanx> to the special value <spanx styl	value <tt>(h,v)</tt> to either a string or the special value <tt>null</tt> (this
	e="verb">null</spanx></t>	mapping is initially empty).</t>
	<t>For each <spanx style="verb">(h1,v1)</spanx> in <spanx style="verb">gen	</li>
	outer</spanx>:	<li>
	<list style="numbers" type="a">	<t>For each <tt>(h,v)</tt> remaining in <tt>genprotected</tt>:
	<t>If <spanx style="verb">h1</spanx> is <spanx style="verb">h</spanx>:	</t>
	<list style="numbers" type="I">	<ol spacing="normal" type="i"><li>
	<t>Set <spanx style="verb">result</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">v	<t>Set <tt>result</tt> to the special value <tt>null</tt>.</t>
	1</spanx></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>For each <tt>(h1,v1)</tt> in <tt>genouter</tt>:
	<t>Insert <spanx style="verb">(h,v) -> result</spanx> into <spanx style	</t>
	="verb">confmap</spanx></t>	<ol spacing="normal" type="a"><li>
	</list></t>	<t>If <tt>h1</tt> is <tt>h</tt>:
	<t>Return a new <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"	</t>
	format="none">HCP</xref> from <spanx style="verb">confmap</spanx> that tests wh	<ol spacing="normal" type="I"><li>
	ether <spanx style="verb">(name,val_in)</spanx> are in <spanx style="verb">confm	<t>Set <tt>result</tt> to <tt>v1</tt>.</t>
	ap</spanx>; if so, return <spanx style="verb">confmap[(name,val_in)]</spanx>; ot	</li>
	herwise, return <spanx style="verb">val_in</spanx></t>	</ol>
	</list></t>	</li>
		</ol>
	<t>Note that the key idea here is to reuse the MUA's existing <spanx style="verb	</li>
	">respond</spanx> function.	<li>
	The algorithm simulates how the MUA would pre-populate a reply to two traditiona	<t>Insert <tt>(h,v) -> result</tt> into <tt>confmap</tt>.</
	l messages whose Header Fields have the values <spanx style="verb">refouter</spa	t>
	nx> and <spanx style="verb">refprotected</spanx> respectively (independent of an	</li>
	y cryptographic protections).	</ol>
	Then it uses the difference to derive a one-time <iref item="HCP"/><xref target=	</li>
	"header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.	<li>
		<t>Return a new <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentia
		lity-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> from <tt>confmap</tt> that tests whether <
		tt>(name,val_in)</tt> is in <tt>confmap</tt>; if so, return <tt>confmap[(name,va
		l_in)]</tt>; otherwise, return <tt>val_in</tt>.</t>
		</li>
		</ol>
		<t>Note that the key idea here is to reuse the MUA's existing <tt>resp
		ond</tt> function.
		The algorithm simulates how the MUA would pre-populate a reply to two traditiona
		l messages whose Header Fields have the values <tt>refouter</tt> and <tt>refprot
		ected</tt>, respectively (independent of any cryptographic protections).
		Then, it uses the difference to derive a one-time <iref item="HCP"/><xref target
		="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.
	This <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none ">HCP</xref> takes into account both the referenced message's sender's preferenc es and the derivations that can happen to Header Field values when responding.	This <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none ">HCP</xref> takes into account both the referenced message's sender's preferenc es and the derivations that can happen to Header Field values when responding.

	Note that while some of these derivations are straight forward (e.g., <spanx sty	Note that while some of these derivations are straightforward (e.g., <tt>In-Repl
	le="verb">In-Reply-To</spanx> is usually derived from <spanx style="verb">Messag	y-To</tt> is usually derived from <tt>Message-ID</tt>), others are non-trivial.
	e-ID</spanx>), others are non-trivial.	For example, the <tt>From</tt> address may be derived from <tt>To</tt>, <tt>Cc</
	For example, the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> address may be derived from <s	tt>, or the MUA's local address preference (especially when the MUA received the
	panx style="verb">To</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx>, or from the MUA's	referenced message via <tt>Bcc</tt>).
	local address preference (especially when the MUA received the referenced messag	Similarly, <tt>To</tt> may be derived from <tt>To</tt>, <tt>From</tt>, and/or <t
	e via <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx>).	t>Cc</tt> Header Fields depending on the MUA implementation and depending on whe
	Similarly, <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> may be derived from <spanx style="verb	ther the user clicked "Reply", "Reply All", "Forward", or any other action that
	">To</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, and/or <spanx style="verb">Cc</s	generates a response to a message.
	panx> Header Fields depending on the MUA implementation and depending on whether	Reusing the MUA's existing <tt>respond</tt> function incorporates these nuances
	the user clicked "Reply", "Reply All", "Forward", or any other action that gene	without requiring any extra configuration choices or additional maintenance burd
	rates a response to a message.	en.</t>
	Reusing the MUA's existing <spanx style="verb">respond</spanx> function incorpor	</section>
	ates these nuances without requiring any extra configuration choices or addition	</section>
	al maintenance burden.</t>	<section anchor="avoid-misdirected-replies">
		<name>Avoid Misdirected Replies</name>
	</section>	<t>When replying to a message, the composing MUA typically decides who t
	</section>	o send the reply to based on:</t>
	<section anchor="avoid-misdirected-replies"><name>Avoid Misdirected Replies</nam	<ul spacing="normal">
	e>	<li>
		<t>the <tt>Reply-To</tt>, <tt>Mail-Followup-To</tt>, or <tt>From</tt
	<t>When replying to a message, the Composing MUA typically decides who to send t	> Header Fields</t>
	he reply to based on:</t>	</li>
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>optionally, the other <tt>To</tt> or <tt>Cc</tt> Header Fields (i
	<t>the <spanx style="verb">Reply-To</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Mail-Followup	f the user chose to "Reply All")</t>
	-To</spanx>, or <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Fields</t>	</li>
	<t>optionally, the other <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> or <spanx style="verb"	</ul>
	>Cc</spanx> Header Fields (if the user chose to "reply all")</t>	<t>When a message has Header Protection, the replying MUA <bcp14>MUST</b
	</list></t>	cp14> populate the destination fields of the draft message using the protected H
		eader Fields and ignore any unprotected Header Fields.</t>
	<t>When a message has Header Protection, the replying MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> po
	pulate the destination fields of the draft message using the protected Header Fi
	elds, and ignore any unprotected Header Fields.</t>

	<t>This mitigates against an attack where Mallory gets a copy of an encrypted me
	ssage from Alice to Bob, and then replays the message to Bob with an additional
	<spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx> to Mallory's own e-mail address in the message's
	outer (unprotected) Header Section.</t>

	<t>If Bob knows Mallory's certificate already, and he replies to such a message
	without following the guidance in this section, it's likely that his MUA will en
	crypt the cleartext of the message directly to Mallory.</t>

	</section>
	</section>
	<section anchor="fields-added-in-transit"><name>Unprotected Header Fields Added
	in Transit</name>

	<t>Some Header Fields are legitimately added in transit and could not have been
	known to the sender at message composition time.</t>

	<t>The most common of these Header Fields are <spanx style="verb">Received</span
	x> and <spanx style="verb">DKIM-Signature</spanx>, neither of which are typicall
	y rendered, either explicitly or implicitly.</t>

	<t>If a receiving MUA has specific knowledge about a given Header Field, includi
	ng that:</t>

	<t><list style="symbols">
	<t>the Header Field would not have been known to the original sender, and</t>
	<t>the Header Field might be rendered explicitly or implicitly,</t>
	</list></t>

	<t>then the MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> decide to operate on the value of that Header
	Field from the unprotected Header Section, even though the message has Header P
	rotection.</t>

	<t>The MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> prefer to verify that the Header Fields in questio
	n have additional transit-derived cryptographic protections before rendering or
	acting on them.
	For example, the MUA could verify whether these Header Fields are covered by an
	appropriate and valid <spanx style="verb">ARC-Authentication-Results</spanx> (se
	e <xref target="RFC8617"/>) or <spanx style="verb">DKIM-Signature</spanx> (see <
	xref target="RFC6376"/>) Header Field.</t>

	<t>Specific examples of user-meaningful Header Fields commonly added by transpor
	t agents appear below.</t>

	<section anchor="mailing-list-header-fields-list-and-archived-at"><name>Mailing
	list Header Fields: List-* and Archived-At</name>

	<t>If the message arrives through a mailing list, the list manager itself may in
	ject Header Fields (most have a <spanx style="verb">List-</spanx> prefix) in the
	message:</t>

	<t><list style="symbols">
	<t><spanx style="verb">List-Archive</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">List-Subscribe</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">List-Unsubscribe</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">List-Id</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">List-Help</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">List-Post</spanx></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">Archived-At</spanx></t>
	</list></t>

	<t>For some MUAs, these Header Fields are implicitly rendered, by providing butt
	ons for actions like "Subscribe", "View Archived Version", "Reply List", "List I
	nfo", etc.</t>

	<t>An MUA that receives a message with Header Protection that contains these Hea
	der Fields in the unprotected section, and that has reason to believe the messag
	e is coming through a mailing list <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> decide to render them to t
	he user (explicitly or implicitly) even though they are not protected.</t>

	</section>
	</section>
	<section anchor="e-mail-ecosystem-evolution"><name>E-mail Ecosystem Evolution</n
	ame>

	<t>The e-mail ecosystem is the set of client-side and server-side software and p
	olicies that are used in the creation, transmission, storage, rendering, and ind
	exing of electronic mail over the Internet.</t>

	<t>This document is intended to offer tooling needed to improve the state of the
	e-mail ecosystem in a way that can be deployed without significant disruption.
	Some elements of this specification are present for transitional purposes, but w
	ould not exist if the system were designed from scratch.</t>

	<t>This section describes these transitional mechanisms, as well as some suggest
	ions for how they might eventually be phased out.</t>

	<section anchor="dropping-legacy-display-elements"><name>Dropping Legacy Display
	Elements</name>

	<t>Any decorative Legacy Display Element added to an encrypted message that uses
	Header Protection is present strictly for enabling Header Field visibility (mos
	t importantly, the Subject Header Field) when the message is viewed with a decry
	ption-capable Legacy MUA.</t>


	<t>Eventually, the hope is that most decryption-capable MUAs will conform to thi	<t>This mitigates against an attack where Mallory gets a copy of an encr
	s specification, and there will be no need for injection of Legacy Display Eleme	ypted message from Alice to Bob and then relays the message to Bob with an addit
	nts in the message body.	ional <tt>Cc</tt> to Mallory's own email address in the message's outer (unprote
		cted) Header Section.</t>
		<t>If Bob knows Mallory's certificate already, and he replies to such a
		message without following the guidance in this section, it's likely that his MUA
		will encrypt the cleartext of the message directly to Mallory.</t>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="fields-added-in-transit">
		<name>Unprotected Header Fields Added in Transit</name>
		<t>Some Header Fields are legitimately added in transit and could not have
		been known to the sender at message composition time.</t>
		<t>The most common of these Header Fields are <tt>Received</tt> and <tt>DK
		IM-Signature</tt>, neither of which are typically rendered, either explicitly or
		implicitly.</t>
		<t>If a receiving MUA has specific knowledge about a given Header Field, i
		ncluding that:</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>the Header Field would not have been known to the original sender a
		nd</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>the Header Field might be rendered explicitly or implicitly,</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>then the MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> decide to operate on the value of that
		Header Field from the unprotected Header Section, even though the message has He
		ader Protection.</t>
		<t>The MUA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> prefer to verify that the Header Fields in q
		uestion have additional transit-derived cryptographic protections before renderi
		ng or acting on them.
		For example, the MUA could verify whether these Header Fields are covered by an
		appropriate and valid <tt>ARC-Authentication-Results</tt> (see <xref target="RFC
		8617"/>) or <tt>DKIM-Signature</tt> (see <xref target="RFC6376"/>) Header Field.
		</t>
		<t>Specific examples of Header Fields that are meaningful to the user are
		commonly added by the transport agents that appear below.</t>
		<section anchor="mailing-list-header-fields-list-and-archived-at">
		<name>Mailing List Header Fields: List-* and Archived-At</name>
		<t>If the message arrives through a mailing list, the list manager itsel
		f may inject Header Fields (most have a <tt>List-</tt> prefix) in the message:</
		t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t><tt>List-Archive</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>List-Subscribe</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>List-Unsubscribe</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>List-Id</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>List-Help</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>List-Post</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>Archived-At</tt></t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>For some MUAs, these Header Fields are implicitly rendered by providi
		ng buttons for actions like "Subscribe", "View Archived Version", "Reply List",
		"List Info", etc.</t>
		<t>An MUA that receives a message with Header Protection that contains t
		hese Header Fields in the unprotected section and that has reason to believe the
		message is coming through a mailing list <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> decide to render th
		em to the user (explicitly or implicitly) even though they are not protected.</t
		>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="e-mail-ecosystem-evolution">
		<name>Email Ecosystem Evolution</name>
		<t>The email ecosystem is the set of client-side and server-side software
		and policies that are used in the creation, transmission, storage, rendering, an
		d indexing of email over the Internet.</t>
		<t>This document is intended to offer tooling needed to improve the state
		of the email ecosystem in a way that can be deployed without significant disrupt
		ion.
		Some elements of this specification are present for transitional purposes but wo
		uld not exist if the system were designed from scratch.</t>
		<t>This section describes these transitional mechanisms, as well as some s
		uggestions for how they might eventually be phased out.</t>
		<section anchor="dropping-legacy-display-elements">
		<name>Dropping Legacy Display Elements</name>
		<t>Any decorative Legacy Display Element added to an encrypted message t
		hat uses Header Protection is present strictly for enabling Header Field visibil
		ity (most importantly, the Subject Header Field) when the message is viewed with
		a decryption-capable Legacy MUA.</t>
		<t>Eventually, the hope is that most decryption-capable MUAs will confor
		m to this specification and there will be no need for injection of Legacy Displa
		y Elements in the message body.
	A survey of widely used decryption-capable MUAs might be able to establish when most of them do support this specification.</t>	A survey of widely used decryption-capable MUAs might be able to establish when most of them do support this specification.</t>

		<t>At that point, a composing MUA could set the <tt>legacy</tt> paramete
	<t>At that point, a composing MUA could set the <spanx style="verb">legacy</span	r defined in <xref target="compose"/> to <tt>false</tt> by default or could even
	x> parameter defined in <xref target="compose"/> to <spanx style="verb">false</s	hard-code it to <tt>false</tt>, yielding a much simpler message construction se
	panx> by default or could even hard-code it to <spanx style="verb">false</spanx>	t.</t>
	, yielding a much simpler message construction set.</t>	<t>Until that point, an end user might want to signal that their receivi
		ng MUAs are conformant to this document so that a peer composing a message to th
	<t>Until that point, an end user might want to signal that their receiving MUAs	em can set <tt>legacy</tt> to <tt>false</tt>.
	are conformant to this document so that a peer composing a message to them can s	A signal indicating capability of handling messages with Header Protection might
	et <spanx style="verb">legacy</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">false</spanx>.	be placed in the user's cryptographic certificate or in outbound messages.</t>
	A signal indicating capability of handling messages with Header Protection might	<t>This document does not attempt to define the syntax or semantics of s
	be placed in the user's cryptographic certificate, or in outbound messages.</t>	uch a signal.</t>
		</section>
	<t>This document does not attempt to define the syntax or semantics of such a si	<section anchor="more-ambitious-default-header-confidentiality-policy">
	gnal.</t>	<name>More Ambitious Default Header Confidentiality Policy</name>
		<t>This document defines a few different forms of <iref item="Header Con
	</section>	fidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none"
	<section anchor="more-ambitious-default-header-confidentiality-policy"><name>Mor	>Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.
	e Ambitious Default Header Confidentiality Policy</name>	An MUA implementing an <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-po
		licy" format="none">HCP</xref> for the first time <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> deploy <
	<t>This document defines a few different forms of <iref item="Header Confidentia	tt>hcp_baseline</tt> as recommended in <xref target="default-hcp"/>.
	lity Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header
	Confidentiality Policy</xref>.
	An MUA implementing an <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-po
	licy" format="none">HCP</xref> for the first time <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> deploy <
	spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx> as recommended in <xref target="default-
	hcp"/>.
	This <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none ">HCP</xref> offers the most commonly expected protection (obscuring the Subject Header Field) without risking deliverability or rendering issues.</t>	This <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none ">HCP</xref> offers the most commonly expected protection (obscuring the Subject Header Field) without risking deliverability or rendering issues.</t>

		<t>The HCPs proposed in this document are relatively conservative and st
		ill leak a significant amount of metadata for encrypted messages.
		This is largely done to ensure deliverability (see <xref target="delivera
		bility"/>) and usability, as messages without some critical Header Fields are mo
		re likely to not reach their intended recipient.</t>


	<t>The HCPs proposed in this document are relatively conservative and still leak	<!--[rfced] Is a "mail transport system" the same thing as a "mail transport
	a significant amount of metadata for encrypted messages.	agent"? If so, may we update this sentence to use "mail transport agents"
	This is largely done to ensure deliverability (see <xref target="deliverability"	for consistency with the rest of the document?
	/>) and usability, as messages without some critical Header Fields are more like
	ly to not reach their intended recipient.</t>

	<t>In the future, some mail transport systems may accept and deliver messages wi
	th even less publicly visible metadata.
	Many MTA operators today would ask for additional guarantees about such a messag
	e to limit the risks associated with abusive or spammy mail.</t>

	<t>This specification offers the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confiden
	tiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> formalism itself as a way for MUA devel
	opers and MTA operators to describe their expectations around message deliverabi
	lity.
	MUA developers can propose a more ambitious default <iref item="HCP"/><xref targ
	et="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>, and ask MTA operato
	rs (or simply test) whether their MTAs would be likely to deliver or reject encr
	ypted mail with that <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-poli
	cy" format="none">HCP</xref> applied.
	Proponents of a more ambitious <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidenti
	ality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> should explicitly document the <iref item
	="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> an
	d name it clearly and unambiguously to facilitate this kind of interoperability
	discussion.</t>

	<t>Reaching widespread consensus around a more ambitious global default <iref it
	em="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>
	is a challenging problem of coordinating many different actors.
	A piecemeal approach might be more feasible, where some signalling mechanism all
	ows a message recipient, MTA operator, or third-party clearinghouse to announce
	what kinds of HCPs are likely to be deliverable for a given recipient.
	In such a situation, the default <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confiden
	tiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> for an MUA might involve consulting the
	signalled acceptable HCPs for all recipients, and combining them (along with a
	default for when no signal is present) in some way.</t>

	<t>If such a signal were to reach widespread use, it could also be used to guide
	reasonable statistical default <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confident
	iality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> choices for recipients with no signal.</
	t>

	<t>This document does not attempt to define the syntax or semantics of such a si
	gnal.</t>

	</section>
	<section anchor="deprecation-of-messages-without-header-protection"><name>Deprec
	ation of Messages Without Header Protection</name>

	<t>At some point, when the majority of MUA clients that can generate cryptograph
	ically protected messages with Header Protection, it should be possible to depre
	cate any cryptographically protected message that does not have Header Protectio
	n.</t>

	<t>For example, as noted in <xref target="mixed-protections"/>, it's possible fo
	r an MUA to render a <spanx style="verb">signed-only</spanx> message that has no
	Header Protection the same as an <spanx style="verb">unprotected</spanx> messag
	e.
	And a <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx> message without Header Pr
	otection could likewise be marked as not fully protected.</t>

	<t>These stricter rules could be adopted immediately for all messages.
	Or an MUA developer could roll them out immediately for any new message, but sti
	ll treat an old message (based on the Date Header Field and cryptographic signat
	ure timestamp) more leniently.</t>

	<t>A decision like this by any popular receiving MUA could drive adoption of thi
	s standard for sending MUAs.</t>

	</section>
	</section>
	<section anchor="usability-considerations"><name>Usability Considerations</name>

	<t>This section describes concerns for MUAs that are interested in easy adoption
	of Header Protection by normal users.</t>

	<t>While they are not protocol-level artifacts, these concerns motivate the prot
	ocol features described in this document.</t>


	<t>See also the Usability commentary in <xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" tar	Original:
	get="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>.</t>	In the future, some mail transport systems may accept and deliver
		messages with even less publicly visible metadata.


	<section anchor="mixed-protections"><name>Mixed Protections Within a Message Are	Perhaps:
	Hard To Understand</name>	In the future, some mail transport agents may accept and deliver
		messages with even less publicly visible metadata.
		-->


	<t>When rendering a message to the user, the ideal circumstance is to present a	<t>In the future, some mail transport systems may accept and deliver mes
	single cryptographic status for any given message.	sages with even less publicly visible metadata.
		Many MTA operators today would ask for additional guarantees about such a messag
		e to limit the risks associated with abusive or spam mail.</t>
		<t>This specification offers the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-
		confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> formalism itself as a way for M
		UA developers and MTA operators to describe their expectations around message de
		liverability.
		MUA developers can propose a more ambitious default <iref item="HCP"/><xref targ
		et="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> and ask MTA operator
		s (or simply test) whether their MTAs would be likely to deliver or reject encry
		pted mail with that <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-polic
		y" format="none">HCP</xref> applied.
		Proponents of a more ambitious <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidenti
		ality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> should explicitly document the <iref item
		="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> an
		d name it clearly and unambiguously to facilitate this kind of interoperability
		discussion.</t>
		<t>Reaching widespread consensus around a more ambitious global default
		<iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP
		</xref> is a challenging problem of coordinating many different actors.
		A piecemeal approach might be more feasible, where some signaling mechanism allo
		ws a message recipient, MTA operator, or third-party clearinghouse to announce w
		hat kinds of HCPs are likely to be deliverable for a given recipient.
		In such a situation, the default <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confiden
		tiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> for an MUA might involve consulting the
		signaled acceptable HCPs for all recipients and combining them (along with a de
		fault for when no signal is present) in some way.</t>
		<t>If such a signal were to reach widespread use, it could also be used
		to guide reasonable statistical default <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-c
		onfidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> choices for recipients with no s
		ignal.</t>
		<t>This document does not attempt to define the syntax or semantics of s
		uch a signal.</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="deprecation-of-messages-without-header-protection">
		<name>Deprecation of Messages Without Header Protection</name>
		<t>At some point, when the majority of MUA clients can generate cryptogr
		aphically protected messages with Header Protection, it should be possible to de
		precate any cryptographically protected message that does not have Header Protec
		tion.</t>
		<t>For example, as noted in <xref target="mixed-protections"/>, it's pos
		sible for an MUA to render a <tt>signed-only</tt> message that has no Header Pro
		tection the same as an <tt>unprotected</tt> message.
		And a <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> message without Header Protection could like
		wise be marked as not fully protected.</t>
		<t>These stricter rules could be adopted immediately for all messages.
		Or an MUA developer could roll them out immediately for any new message but stil
		l treat an old message (based on the Date Header Field and cryptographic signatu
		re timestamp) more leniently.</t>
		<t>A decision like this by any popular receiving MUA could drive adoptio
		n of this standard for sending MUAs.</t>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="usability-considerations">
		<name>Usability Considerations</name>
		<t>This section describes concerns for MUAs that are interested in easy ad
		option of Header Protection by normal users.</t>
		<t>While they are not protocol-level artifacts, these concerns motivate th
		e protocol features described in this document.</t>
		<t>See also the usability commentary in <xref section="2" sectionFormat="o
		f" target="RFC9787"/>.</t>
		<section anchor="mixed-protections">
		<name>Mixed Protections Within a Message Are Hard to Understand</name>
		<t>When rendering a message to the user, the ideal circumstance is to pr
		esent a single cryptographic status for any given message.
	However, when message Header Fields are present, some message Header Fields do n ot have the same cryptographic protections as the main message.</t>	However, when message Header Fields are present, some message Header Fields do n ot have the same cryptographic protections as the main message.</t>

		<t>Representing such a mixed set of protection statuses is very difficul
	<t>Representing such a mixed set of protection statuses is very difficult to do	t to do in a way that an Ordinary User can understand.
	in a way that a Ordinary User can understand.	There are at least three scenarios that are likely to be common and poorly under
	There are at least three scenarios that are likely to be common, and poorly unde	stood:</t>
	rstood:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>A signed message with no Header Protection.</t>
	<t>A signed message with no Header Protection.</t>	</li>
	<t>A signed-and-encrypted message with no Header Protection.</t>	<li>
	<t>A signed-and-encrypted message with Header Protection as defined in this do	<t>A signed-and-encrypted message with no Header Protection.</t>
	cument, where some User-Facing Header Fields have confidentiality but some do no	</li>
	t.</t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>A signed-and-encrypted message with Header Protection as defined
		in this document, where some User-Facing Header Fields have confidentiality but
	<t>An MUA should have a reasonable strategy for clearly communicating each of th	some do not.</t>
	ese scenarios to the user.	</li>
		</ul>
		<t>An MUA should have a reasonable strategy for clearly communicating ea
		ch of these scenarios to the user.
	For example, an MUA operating in an environment where it expects most cryptograp hically protected messages to have Header Protection could use the following ren dering strategy:</t>	For example, an MUA operating in an environment where it expects most cryptograp hically protected messages to have Header Protection could use the following ren dering strategy:</t>

		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>When rendering a message with <spanx style="verb">signed-only</spanx> crypt	<t>When rendering a message with a <tt>signed-only</tt> cryptographi
	ographic status but no Header Protection, an MUA may decline to indicate a posit	c status but no Header Protection, an MUA may decline to indicate a positive sec
	ive security status overall, and only indicate the cryptographic status to a use	urity status overall and only indicate the cryptographic status to a user in a m
	r in a message properties or diagnostic view.	essage properties or diagnostic view.
	That is, the message may appear identical to an unsigned message except if a use r verifies the properties through a menu option.</t>	That is, the message may appear identical to an unsigned message except if a use r verifies the properties through a menu option.</t>

	<t>When rendering a message with <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spa	</li>
	nx> or <spanx style="verb">encrypted-only</spanx> cryptographic status but no He	<li>
	ader Protection, overlay a warning flag on the typical cryptographic status indi	<t>When rendering a message with a <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> or
	cator.	<tt>encrypted-only</tt> cryptographic status but no Header Protection, overlay a
	That is, if a typical <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx> message d	warning flag on the typical cryptographic status indicator.
	isplays a lock icon, display a lock icon with a warning sign (e.g., an exclamati	That is, if a typical <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> message displays a lock icon
	on point in a triangle) overlaid.	, display a lock icon with a warning sign (e.g., an exclamation point in a trian
	See, for example, the graphics in <xref target="chrome-indicators"/>.</t>	gle) overlaid.
	<t>When rendering a message with <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spa	For example, see the graphics in <xref target="chrome-indicators"/>.</t>
	nx> or <spanx style="verb">encrypted-only</spanx> cryptographic status, with Hea	</li>
	der Protection, but where the Subject Header Field has not been removed or obscu	<li>
	red, place a warning sign on the Subject line.</t>	<t>When rendering a message with a <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> or
	</list></t>	<tt>encrypted-only</tt> cryptographic status with Header Protection but where th
		e Subject Header Field has not been removed or obscured, place a warning sign on
	<t>Other simple rendering strategies could also be reasonable.</t>	the Subject line.</t>
		</li>
	</section>	</ul>
	<section anchor="sensible-default-hcp"><name>Users Should Not Have To Choose a H	<t>Other simple rendering strategies could also be reasonable.</t>
	eader Confidentiality Policy</name>	</section>
		<section anchor="sensible-default-hcp">
	<t>This document defines the abstraction of a <iref item="Header Confidentiality	<name>Users Should Not Have to Choose a Header Confidentiality Policy</n
	Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Conf	ame>
	identiality Policy</xref> object for the sake of communication between implement	<t>This document defines the abstraction of a <iref item="Header Confide
	ers and deployments.</t>	ntiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Hea
		der Confidentiality Policy</xref> object for the sake of communication between i
	<t>Most e-mail users are unlikely to understand the tradeoffs between different	mplementers and deployments.</t>
	policies.	<t>Most email users are unlikely to understand the trade-offs between di
		fferent policies.
	In particular, the potential negative side effects (e.g., poor deliverability) m ay not be easily attributable by a normal user to a particular <iref item="HCP"/ ><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.</t>	In particular, the potential negative side effects (e.g., poor deliverability) m ay not be easily attributable by a normal user to a particular <iref item="HCP"/ ><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.</t>

		<t>Therefore, MUA implementers should be conservative in their choice of
	<t>Therefore, MUA implementers should be conservative in their choice of default	default <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="
	<iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HC	none">HCP</xref> and should not require the Ordinary User to make an incomprehen
	P</xref>, and should not require the Ordinary User to make an incomprehensible c	sible choice that could cause unfixable, undiagnosable problems.
	hoice that could cause unfixable, undiagnosable problems.	The safest option is for the MUA developer to select a known, stable <iref item=
	The safest option is for the MUA developer to select a known, stable <iref item=	"HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> (th
	"HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> (th	is document recommends <tt>hcp_baseline</tt> in <xref target="default-hcp"/>) on
	is document recommends <spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx> in <xref target=	the user's behalf.
	"default-hcp"/>) on the user's behalf.
	An MUA should not expose the Ordinary User to a configuration option where they are expected to manually select (let alone define) an <iref item="HCP"/><xref ta rget="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.</t>	An MUA should not expose the Ordinary User to a configuration option where they are expected to manually select (let alone define) an <iref item="HCP"/><xref ta rget="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="security-considerations">
	<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>	<name>Security Considerations</name>
		<t>Header Protection improves the security of cryptographically protected
	<t>Header Protection improves the security of cryptographically protected e-mail	email messages.
	messages.
	Following the guidance in this document improves security for users by more dire ctly aligning the underlying messages with user expectations about confidentiali ty, authenticity, and integrity.</t>	Following the guidance in this document improves security for users by more dire ctly aligning the underlying messages with user expectations about confidentiali ty, authenticity, and integrity.</t>

		<t>Nevertheless, helping the user distinguish between cryptographic protec
	<t>Nevertheless, helping the user distinguish between cryptographic protections	tions of various messages remains a security challenge for MUAs.
	of various messages remains a security challenge for MUAs.	This is exacerbated by the fact that many existing messages with cryptographic p
	This is exarcebated by the fact that many existing messages with cryptographic p	rotections do not employ Header Protection.
	rotections do not employ Header Protection.
	MUAs encountering these messages (e.g., in an archive) will need to handle older forms (without Header Protection) for quite some time, possibly forever.</t>	MUAs encountering these messages (e.g., in an archive) will need to handle older forms (without Header Protection) for quite some time, possibly forever.</t>

		<t>The security considerations from <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" t
	<t>The security considerations from <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target=	arget="RFC8551"/> continue to apply for any MUA that offers S/MIME cryptographic
	"RFC8551"/> continue to apply for any MUA that offers S/MIME cryptographic prote	protections, as well as <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5083"/>
	ctions, as well as <xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5083"/> (Auth	(Authenticated-Enveloped-Data in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)) and <xref
	enticated-Enveloped-Data in CMS) and <xref section="14" sectionFormat="of" targe	section="14" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5652"/> (CMS more broadly).
	t="RFC5652"/> (CMS more broadly).
	Likewise, the security considerations from <xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3156"/> continue to apply for any MUA that offers PGP/MIME cryptograp hic protections, as well as <xref section="13" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC958 0"/> (OpenPGP itself).	Likewise, the security considerations from <xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3156"/> continue to apply for any MUA that offers PGP/MIME cryptograp hic protections, as well as <xref section="13" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC958 0"/> (OpenPGP itself).
	In addition, these underlying security considerations are now also applicable to the contents of the message header, not just the message body.</t>	In addition, these underlying security considerations are now also applicable to the contents of the message header, not just the message body.</t>

		<section anchor="from-addr-spoofing">
	<section anchor="from-addr-spoofing"><name>From Address Spoofing</name>	<name>From Address Spoofing</name>
		<t>If the <tt>From</tt> Header Field was treated like any other protecte
	<t>If the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field were treated by the rece	d Header Field by the receiving MUA, this scheme would enable sender address spo
	iving MUA like any other protected Header Field, this scheme would enable sender	ofing.</t>
	address spoofing.</t>	<t>To prevent sender spoofing, many receiving MUAs implicitly rely on th
		eir receiving MTA to inspect the unprotected Header Section and verify that the
	<t>To prevent sender spoofing, many receiving MUAs implicitly rely on their rece	<tt>From</tt> Header Field is authentic.
	iving MTA to inspect the unprotected Header Section and verify that the <spanx s	If a receiving MUA displays a <tt>From</tt> address that doesn't match the <tt>F
	tyle="verb">From</spanx> Header Field is authentic.	rom</tt> address that the receiving and/or sending MTAs filtered on, the MUA may
	If a receiving MUA displays a <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> address that does	be vulnerable to spoofing.</t>
	n't match the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> address that the receiving and/or	<t>Consider a malicious MUA that sets the following Header Fields on an
	sending MTAs filtered on, the MUA may be vulnerable to spoofing.</t>	encrypted message with Header Protection:</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t>Consider a malicious MUA that sets the following Header Fields on an encrypte	<li>
	d message with Header Protection:</t>	<t>Outer: <tt>From: <alice@example.com></tt></t>
		</li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>Outer: <spanx style="verb">From: <alice@example.com></spanx></t>	<t>Inner: <tt>HP-Outer: From: <alice@example.com></tt></t>
	<t>Inner: <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer: From: <alice@example.com></spanx	</li>
	></t>	<li>
	<t>Inner: <spanx style="verb">From: <bob@example.org></spanx></t>	<t>Inner: <tt>From: <bob@example.org></tt></t>
	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>During sending, the MTA of <spanx style="verb">example.com</spanx> validates	<t>During sending, the MTA of <tt>example.com</tt> validates that the se
	that the sending MUA is authorized to send from <spanx style="verb">alice@exampl	nding MUA is authorized to send from <tt>alice@example.com</tt>.
	e.com</spanx>.
	Since the message is encrypted, the sending and receiving MTAs cannot see the pr otected Header Fields.	Since the message is encrypted, the sending and receiving MTAs cannot see the pr otected Header Fields.

	A naive receiving MUA might follow the algorithms in this document without speci	A naive receiving MUA might follow the algorithms in this document without speci
	al consideration for the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field.	al consideration for the <tt>From</tt> Header Field.
	Such an MUA might display the email as coming from <spanx style="verb">bob@examp	Such an MUA might display the email as coming from <tt>bob@example.org</tt> to t
	le.org</spanx> to the user, resulting in a spoofed address.</t>	he user, resulting in a spoofed address.</t>
		<t>This problem applies both between domains and within a domain.</t>
	<t>This problem applies both between domains and within a domain.</t>	<t>This problem always applies to signed-and-encrypted messages.
		This problem also applies to signed-only messages because MTAs typically do not
	<t>This problem always applies to signed-and-encrypted messages.	look at the protected Header Fields when confirming <tt>From</tt> address authen
	This problem also applies to signed-only messages because MTAs typically do not	ticity.</t>
	look at the protected Header Fields when confirming <spanx style="verb">From</sp	<t>Sender address spoofing is relevant for two distinct security propert
	anx> address authenticity.</t>	ies:</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t>Sender address spoofing is relevant for two distinct security properties:</t>	<li>
		<t>Sender authenticity: relevant for rendering the message (which ad
	<t><list style="symbols">	dress to show the user?)</t>
	<t>Sender authenticity: relevant for rendering the message (which address to s	</li>
	how the user?).</t>	<li>
	<t>Message confidentiality: relevant when replying to a message (a reply to th	<t>Message confidentiality: relevant when replying to a message (a r
	e wrong address can leak the message contents).</t>	eply to the wrong address can leak the message contents)</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<section anchor="from-rendering-reasoning"><name>From Rendering Reasoning</name>	<section anchor="from-rendering-reasoning">
		<name>From Rendering Reasoning</name>
	<t><xref target="from-header-field-rendering"/> provides guidance for rendering	<t><xref target="from-header-field-rendering"/> provides guidance for
	the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field.	rendering the <tt>From</tt> Header Field. It recommends a receiving MUA that dep
	It recommends a receiving MUA that depends on its MTA to authenticate the unprot	ends on its MTA to authenticate the unprotected (outer) <tt>From</tt> Header Fie
	ected (outer) <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field to render the outer	ld to render the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field if both of the following condi
	<spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field, if both of the following conditio	tions are met:</t>
	ns are met:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t><tt>From</tt> Header Field Mismatch (as defined in <xref target
	<t><spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field Mismatch (as defined in <xref	="def-from-hf-mismatch"/>)</t>
	target="def-from-hf-mismatch"/>)</t>	</li>
	<t>No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature (as defined in <xref target="def-no-	<li>
	valid-and-correctly-bound-signature"/>)</t>	<t>No Valid and Correctly Bound Signature (as defined in <xref tar
	</list></t>	get="def-no-valid-and-correctly-bound-signature"/>)</t>
		</li>
	<t>Note: The second condition effectively means that the inner (expected to be p	</ul>
	rotected) <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field appears to have insuffic	<t>Note: The second condition effectively means that the inner (expect
	ient protection.</t>	ed to be protected) <tt>From</tt> Header Field appears to have insufficient prot
		ection.</t>
	<t>This may seem surprising since it causes the MUA to render a mix of both prot	<t>This may seem surprising since it causes the MUA to render a mix of
	ected and unprotected values.	both protected and unprotected values.
	This section provides an argument as to why this guidance makes sense.</t>	This section provides an argument as to why this guidance makes sense.</t>

		<t>We proceed by case distinction:</t>
	<t>We proceed by case distinction:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>Case 1: Malicious sending MUA.
	<t>Case 1: Malicious sending MUA.	</t>
	<list style="symbols">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<t>Attack situation: the sending MUA puts a different inner <spanx style="	<li>
	verb">From</spanx> Header Field to spoof the sender address.</t>	<t>Attack situation: The sending MUA puts a different inner <t
	<t>In this case, it is "better" to fall back and render the outer <spanx s	t>From</tt> Header Field to spoof the sender address.</t>
	tyle="verb">From</spanx> Header Field because this is what the receiving MTA can	</li>
	validate.	<li>
	Otherwise this document would introduce a new way for senders to spoof the <span	<t>In this case, it is "better" to fall back and render the ou
	x style="verb">From</spanx> address of the message.</t>	ter <tt>From</tt> Header Field because this is what the receiving MTA can valida
	<t>This does not preclude a future document from updating this document to	te.
	specify a protocol for legitimate sender address hiding.</t>	Otherwise, this document would introduce a new way for senders to spoof the <tt>
	</list></t>	From</tt> address of the message.</t>
	<t>Case 2: Malicious sending/transiting/receiving MTA (or anyone meddling betw	</li>
	een MTAs).	<li>
	<list style="symbols">	<t>This does not preclude a future document from updating this
	<t>Attack situation: an on-path attacker changes the outer <spanx style="v	document to specify a protocol for legitimate sender address hiding.</t>
	erb">From</spanx> Header Field (possibly with other meddling to break the signat	</li>
	ure, see below).	</ul>
	Their goal is to get the receiving MUA to show a different <spanx style="verb">F	</li>
	rom</spanx> address than the sending MUA intended (breaking MUA-to-MUA sender au	<li>
	thenticity).</t>	<t>Case 2: Malicious sending/transiting/receiving MTA (or anyone m
	<t>Case 2.a: The sending MUA submitted an unsigned or encrypted-only messa	eddling between MTAs).
	ge to the email system.	</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>Attack situation: An on-path attacker changes the outer <tt
		>From</tt> Header Field (possibly with other meddling to break the signature; se
		e below).
		Their goal is to get the receiving MUA to show a different <tt>From</tt> address
		than the sending MUA intended (breaking MUA-to-MUA sender authenticity).</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Case 2.a: The sending MUA submitted an unsigned or encrypte
		d-only message to the email system.
	In this case, there can be no sender authenticity anyway.</t>	In this case, there can be no sender authenticity anyway.</t>

	<t>Case 2.b: The sending MUA submitted a signed-only message to the email	</li>
	system.	<li>
	<list style="symbols">	<t>Case 2.b: The sending MUA submitted a signed-only message t
	<t>Case 2.b.i: The attacker removes or breaks the signature.	o the email system.
	In this case, the attacker can also modify the inner <spanx style="verb">From</s	</t>
	panx> Header Field to their liking.</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
	<t>Case 2.b.ii: The signature is valid, but the receiving MUA does not	<li>
	see any valid binding between the signing certificate and the <spanx style="ver	<t>Case 2.b.i: The attacker removes or breaks the signatur
	b">addr-spec</spanx> of the inner <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field.	e.
		In this case, the attacker can also modify the inner <tt>From</tt> Header Field
		to their liking.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Case 2.b.ii: The signature is valid, but the receiving
		MUA does not see any valid binding between the signing certificate and the <tt>a
		ddr-spec</tt> of the inner <tt>From</tt> Header Field.
	In this case, there can be no sender authenticity anyways (the certificate could have been generated by the on-path attacker).	In this case, there can be no sender authenticity anyways (the certificate could have been generated by the on-path attacker).

	This case is indistinguishable from a malicious sending MUA, hence it is "better	This case is indistinguishable from a malicious sending MUA; hence, it is "bette
	" to fall back to the outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> that the MTA can va	r" to fall back to the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field that the MTA can validat
	lidate.	e.
	Note that once the binding is validated (e.g., after an out-of-band comparison),	Note that once the binding is validated (e.g., after an out-of-band comparison),
	the rendering may change from showing the outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx	the rendering may change from showing the outer <tt>From</tt> address (and a wa
	> address (and a warning) to showing the inner, now validated <spanx style="verb	rning) to showing the inner, now validated <tt>From</tt> address.
	">From</spanx> address.
	In some cases, the binding may be instantly validated even for previously unseen certificates (e.g., if the certificate is issued by a trusted certification aut hority).</t>	In some cases, the binding may be instantly validated even for previously unseen certificates (e.g., if the certificate is issued by a trusted certification aut hority).</t>

	</list></t>	</li>
	<t>Case 2.c: The sending MUA submitted a signed-and-encrypted message to t	</ul>
	he email system.	</li>
	<list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>Case 2.c.i: The attacker removes or breaks the signature.	<t>Case 2.c: The sending MUA submitted a signed-and-encrypted
	Note that the signature is inside the ciphertext (see <xref section="5.2" sectio	message to the email system.
	nFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>).	</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>Case 2.c.i: The attacker removes or breaks the signatur
		e.
		Note that the signature is inside the ciphertext (see <xref section="5.2" sectio
		nFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>).
	Thus, assuming the encryption is non-malleable, any on-path attacker cannot brea k the signature while ensuring that the message still decrypts successfully.</t>	Thus, assuming the encryption is non-malleable, any on-path attacker cannot brea k the signature while ensuring that the message still decrypts successfully.</t>

	<t>Case 2.c.ii: The signature is valid, but the receiving MUA does not	</li>
	see any valid binding between the signing certificate and the <spanx style="ver	<li>
	b">addr-spec</spanx> of the inner <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field.	<t>Case 2.c.ii: The signature is valid, but the receiving
		MUA does not see any valid binding between the signing certificate and the <tt>a
		ddr-spec</tt> of the inner <tt>From</tt> Header Field.
	See case 2.b.ii.</t>	See case 2.b.ii.</t>

	</list></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	</ul>
	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	<t>As the case distinction shows, the outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Hea	</li>
	der Field is either the preferred fallback (in particular, to avoid introducing	</ul>
	a new spoofing channel), or it is just as good (because just as modifiable) as t	<t>As the case distinction shows, the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field
	he inner <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field.</t>	is either the preferred fallback (in particular, to avoid introducing a new spo
		ofing channel) or just as good (because just as modifiable) as the inner <tt>Fro
	<t>Rendering the outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field does carry	m</tt> Header Field.</t>
	the risk of a "temporary downgrade attack" in cases 2.b.ii and 2.c.ii, where a m	<t>Rendering the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field does carry the risk
	alicious MTA keeps the signature intact but modifies the outer <spanx style="ver	of a "temporary downgrade attack" in cases 2.b.ii and 2.c.ii, where a malicious
	b">From</spanx> Header Field.	MTA keeps the signature intact but modifies the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field
	The MUA can resolve this temporary downgrade by validating the certificate-to-<s	.
	panx style="verb">addr-spec</spanx> binding.	The MUA can resolve this temporary downgrade by validating the certificate-to-<t
		t>addr-spec</tt> binding.
	If the MUA never does this validation, the entire message could be fake.</t>	If the MUA never does this validation, the entire message could be fake.</t>

		<t>If there were a signaling channel where the MTA can tell the MUA wh
	<t>If there were a signalling channel where the MTA can tell the MUA whether it	ether it authenticated the <tt>From</tt> Header Field, an MUA could use this in
	authenticated the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field, an MUA could us	its rendering decision.
	e this in its rendering decision.	In the absence of such a signal, and when end-to-end authenticity is unavailable
	In the absence of such a signal, and when end-to-end authenticity is unavailable	, this document prefers to fall back to the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field.
	, this document prefers to fall back to the outer <spanx style="verb">From</span	This default is based on the assumption that most MTAs apply some filtering base
	x> Header Field.	d on the outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field (whether the MTA can authenticate it o
	This default is based on the assumption that most MTAs apply some filtering base	r not).
	d on the outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field (whether the MTA ca	Rendering the unprotected outer <tt>From</tt> Header Field (instead of the prote
	n authenticate it or not).	cted inner one) in case of a mismatch retains this ability for MTAs.</t>
	Rendering the unprotected outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field (i	<t>If the MUA decides not to rely on the MTA to authenticate the outer
	nstead of the protected inner one) in case of a mismatch retains this ability fo	<tt>From</tt> Header Field, it may prefer the inner <tt>From</tt> Header Field.
	r MTAs.</t>	</t>
		</section>
	<t>If the MUA decides not to rely on the MTA to authenticate the outer <spanx st	</section>
	yle="verb">From</spanx> Header Field, it may prefer the inner <spanx style="verb	<section anchor="avoid-summary-confusion">
	">From</spanx> Header Field.</t>	<name>Avoid Cryptographic Summary Confusion from the hp Parameter</name>
		<t>When parsing a message, the recipient MUA infers the message's Crypto
	</section>	graphic Status from the Cryptographic Layers, as described in <xref section="4.6
	</section>	" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>.</t>
	<section anchor="avoid-summary-confusion"><name>Avoid Cryptographic Summary Conf	<t>The Cryptographic Layers that make up the Cryptographic Envelope desc
	usion from hp Parameter</name>	ribe an ordered list of cryptographic properties as present in the message after
		it has been delivered.
	<t>When parsing a message, the recipient MUA infers the message's Cryptographic	By contrast, the <tt>hp</tt> parameter to the <tt>Content-Type</tt> Header Field
	Status from the Cryptographic Layers, as described in <xref section="4.6" sectio	contains a simpler indication: whether the sender originally tried to encrypt t
	nFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>.</t>	he message or not.
		In particular, for a message with Header Protection, the Cryptographic Payload s
	<t>The Cryptographic Layers that make up the Cryptographic Envelope describe an	hould have a <tt>hp</tt> parameter of <tt>cipher</tt> if the message is encrypte
	ordered list of cryptographic properties as present in the message after it has	d (in addition to signed) and <tt>clear</tt> if no encryption is present (that i
	been delivered.	s, the message is <tt>signed-only</tt>).</t>
	By contrast, the <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> parameter to the <spanx style="v	<t>As noted in <xref target="hp-parameter"/>, the receiving implementati
	erb">Content-Type</spanx> Header Field contains a simpler indication: whether th	on should not inflate its estimation of the confidentiality of the message or it
	e sender originally tried to encrypt the message or not.	s Header Fields based on the sender's intent if it can see that the message was
	In particular, for a message with Header Protection, the Cryptographic Payload s	not actually encrypted.
	hould have a <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> parameter of <spanx style="verb">cip	A signed-only message that happens to have an <tt>hp</tt> parameter of <tt>ciphe
	her</spanx> if the message is encrypted (in addition to signed), and <spanx styl	r</tt> is still signed-only.</t>
	e="verb">clear</spanx> if no encryption is present (that is, the message is <spa	<t>Conversely, since the encrypting Cryptographic Layer is typically out
	nx style="verb">signed-only</spanx>).</t>	side the signature layer (see <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC
		9787"/>), an originally signed-only message could have been wrapped in an encryp
	<t>As noted in <xref target="hp-parameter"/>, the receiving implementation shoul	tion layer by an intervening party before receipt to appear encrypted.</t>
	d not inflate its estimation of the confidentiality of the message or its Header	<t>If a message appears to be wrapped in an encryption layer, and the <t
	Fields based on the sender's intent, if it can see that the message was not act	t>hp</tt> parameter is present but is not set to <tt>cipher</tt>, then it is lik
	ually encrypted.	ely that the encryption layer was not added by the original sender.
	A signed-only message that happens to have an <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> par	For such a message, the lack of any <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field in the Header
	ameter of <spanx style="verb">cipher</spanx> is still signed-only.</t>	Section of the Cryptographic Payload <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to infer t
		hat all Header Fields were removed from the message by the original sender.
	<t>Conversely, since the encrypting Cryptographic Layer is typically outside the
	signature layer (see <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-la
	mps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>), an originally signed-only message could have been wra
	pped in an encryption layer by an intervening party before receipt, to appear en
	crypted.</t>

	<t>If a message appears to be wrapped in an encryption layer, and the <spanx sty
	le="verb">hp</spanx> parameter is present but is not set to <spanx style="verb">
	cipher</spanx>, then it is likely that the encryption layer was not added by the
	original sender.
	For such a message, the lack of any <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header
	Field in the Header Section of the Cryptographic Payload <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
	be used to infer that all Header Fields were removed from the message by the or
	iginal sender.
	In such a case, the receiving MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat every Header Field as though it was not confidential.</t>	In such a case, the receiving MUA <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat every Header Field as though it was not confidential.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="caution-about-composing-with-legacy-display-elements">
	<section anchor="caution-about-composing-with-legacy-display-elements"><name>Cau	<name>Caution About Composing with Legacy Display Elements</name>
	tion about Composing with Legacy Display Elements</name>	<t>When composing a message, it's possible for a Legacy Display Element
		to contain risky data that could trigger errors in a rendering client.</t>
	<t>When composing a message, it's possible for a Legacy Display Element to conta	<t>For example, if the value for a Header Field to be included in a Lega
	in risky data that could trigger errors in a rendering client.</t>	cy Display Element within a given body part contains folding whitespace, it shou
		ld be "unfolded" before generating the Legacy Display Element: All contiguous fo
	<t>For example, if the value for a Header Field to be included in a Legacy Displ	lding whitespace should be replaced with a single space character.
	ay Element within a given body part contains folding whitespace, it should be "u	Likewise, if the header value was originally encoded per <xref target="RFC2047"/
	nfolded" before generating the Legacy Display Element: all contiguous folding wh	>, it should be decoded first to a standard string and re-encoded using the char
	itespace should be replaced with a single space character.	set appropriate to the target part.</t>
	Likewise, if the header value was originally encoded with <xref target="RFC2047"	<t>When including a Legacy Display Element in a <tt>text/plain</tt> part
	/>, it should be decoded first to a standard string and re-encoded using the cha	(see <xref target="ld-text-plain"/>), if the decoded Subject Header Field conta
	rset appropriate to the target part.</t>	ins a pair of newlines (e.g., if it is broken across multiple lines by encoded n
		ewlines), any newline <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be stripped from the Legacy Display El
	<t>When including a Legacy Display Element in a <spanx style="verb">text/plain</	ement.
	spanx> part (see <xref target="ld-text-plain"/>), if the decoded Subject Header
	Field contains a pair of newlines (e.g., if it is broken across multiple lines b
	y encoded newlines), any newline <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be stripped from the Legacy
	Display Element.
	If the pair of newlines is not stripped, a receiving MUA that follows the guidan ce in <xref target="omit-plain-legacy-display"/> might leave the later part of t he Legacy Display Element in the rendered message.</t>	If the pair of newlines is not stripped, a receiving MUA that follows the guidan ce in <xref target="omit-plain-legacy-display"/> might leave the later part of t he Legacy Display Element in the rendered message.</t>

		<t>When including a Legacy Display Element in a <tt>text/html</tt> part
	<t>When including a Legacy Display Element in a <spanx style="verb">text/html</s	(see <xref target="ld-text-html"/>), any material in the header values should be
	panx> part (see <xref target="ld-text-html"/>), any material in the header value	explicitly HTML escaped to avoid being rendered as part of the HTML.
	s should be explicitly HTML escaped to avoid being rendered as part of the HTML.	At a minimum, the characters <tt><</tt>, <tt>></tt>, and <tt>&</tt> sh
	At a minimum, the characters <spanx style="verb"><</spanx>, <spanx style="ver	ould be escaped to <tt>&lt;</tt>, <tt>&gt;</tt>, and <tt>&amp;</tt>,
	b">></spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">&</spanx> should be escaped to <spa	respectively (for example, see <xref target="HTML-ESCAPES"/>).
	nx style="verb">&lt;</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">&gt;</spanx>, and <spa	If unescaped characters from removed or obscured header values end up in the Leg
	nx style="verb">&amp;</spanx>, respectively (see for example <xref target="H	acy Display Element, a receiving MUA that follows the guidance in <xref target="
	TML-ESCAPES"/>).	omit-html-legacy-display"/> might fail to identify the boundaries of the Legacy
	If unescaped characters from removed or obscured header values end up in the Leg	Display Element, cutting out more than it should or leaving remnants visible.
	acy Display Element, a receiving MUA that follows the guidance in <xref target="
	omit-html-legacy-display"/> might fail to identify the boundaries of the Legacy
	Display Element, cutting out more than it should, or leaving remnants visible.
	And a Legacy MUA parsing such a message might misrender the entire HTML stream, depending on the content of the removed or obscured header values.</t>	And a Legacy MUA parsing such a message might misrender the entire HTML stream, depending on the content of the removed or obscured header values.</t>

		<t>The Legacy Display Element is a decorative addition solely to enable
	<t>The Legacy Display Element is a decorative addition solely to enable visibili	visibility of obscured or removed Header Fields in decryption-capable Legacy MUA
	ty of obscured or removed Header Fields in decryption-capable Legacy MUAs.	s.
	When it is produced, it should be generated minimally and strictly, as described above, to avoid damaging the rest of the message.</t>	When it is produced, it should be generated minimally and strictly, as described above, to avoid damaging the rest of the message.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="plaintext-attacks">
	<section anchor="plaintext-attacks"><name>Plaintext Attacks</name>	<name>Plaintext Attacks</name>
		<t>An encrypted email message using S/MIME or PGP/MIME tends to have som
	<t>An encrypted e-mail message using S/MIME or PGP/MIME tends to have some amoun	e amount of predictable plaintext.
	t of predictable plaintext.	For example, the standard MIME headers of the Cryptographic Payload of a message
	For example, the standard MIME headers of the Cryptographic Payload of a message	are often a predictable sequence of bytes, even without Header Protection, when
	are often a predictable sequence of bytes, even without Header Protection, when	they only include the Structural Header Fields <tt>MIME-Version</tt> and <tt>Co
	they only include the Structural Header Fields <spanx style="verb">MIME-Version	ntent-Type</tt>.
	</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx>.
	This is a potential risk for known-plaintext attacks.</t>	This is a potential risk for known-plaintext attacks.</t>

		<t>Including protected Header Fields as defined in this document increas
	<t>Including protected Header Fields as defined in this document increases the a	es the amount of known plaintext.
	mount of known plaintext.
	Since some of those headers in a reply will be derived from the message being re plied to, this also creates a potential risk for chosen-plaintext attacks, in ad dition to known-plaintext attacks.</t>	Since some of those headers in a reply will be derived from the message being re plied to, this also creates a potential risk for chosen-plaintext attacks, in ad dition to known-plaintext attacks.</t>

		<t>Modern message encryption mechanisms are expected to be secure agains
	<t>Modern message encryption mechanisms are expected to be secure against both k	t both known-plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks.
	nown-plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks.
	An MUA composing an encrypted message should ensure that it is using such a mech anism, regardless of whether it does Header Protection.</t>	An MUA composing an encrypted message should ensure that it is using such a mech anism, regardless of whether it does Header Protection.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="privacy-considerations">
	<section anchor="privacy-considerations"><name>Privacy Considerations</name>	<name>Privacy Considerations</name>
		<section anchor="leaks-when-replying">
	<section anchor="leaks-when-replying"><name>Leaks When Replying</name>	<name>Leaks When Replying</name>
		<t>The encrypted Header Fields of a message may accidentally leak when r
	<t>The encrypted Header Fields of a message may accidentally leak when replying	eplying to the message.
	to the message.
	See the guidance in <xref target="replying"/>.</t>	See the guidance in <xref target="replying"/>.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="encryption-vs-privacy">
	<section anchor="encryption-vs-privacy"><name>Encrypted Header Fields Are Not Al	<name>Encrypted Header Fields Are Not Always Private</name>
	ways Private</name>	<t>For encrypted messages, depending on the sender's <iref item="HCP"/><
		xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>, some Heade
	<t>For encrypted messages, depending on the sender's <iref item="HCP"/><xref tar	r Fields may appear both within the Cryptographic Envelope and on the outside of
	get="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>, some Header Fields	the message (e.g., <tt>Date</tt> might exist identically in both places).
	may appear both within the Cryptographic Envelope and on the outside of the mes	<xref target="crypto-summary-update"/> identifies such a Header Field as <tt>sig
	sage (e.g., <spanx style="verb">Date</spanx> might exist identically in both pla	ned-only</tt>.
	ces).
	<xref target="crypto-summary-update"/> identifies such a Header Field as <spanx
	style="verb">signed-only</spanx>.
	These Header Fields are clearly <em>not</em> private at all, despite a copy bein g inside the Cryptographic Envelope.</t>	These Header Fields are clearly <em>not</em> private at all, despite a copy bein g inside the Cryptographic Envelope.</t>

		<t>A Header Field whose name and value are not matched verbatim by any <
	<t>A Header Field whose name and value are not matched verbatim by any <spanx st	tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field from the same part will have an <tt>encrypted-only
	yle="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field from the same part will have <spanx sty	</tt> or <tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> status.
	le="verb">encrypted-only</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</sp
	anx> status.
	But even Header Fields with these stronger levels of cryptographic confidentiali ty protection might not be as private as the user would like.</t>	But even Header Fields with these stronger levels of cryptographic confidentiali ty protection might not be as private as the user would like.</t>

		<t>See the examples below.</t>
	<t>See the examples below.</t>	<t>This concern is true for any encrypted data, including the body of th
		e message, not just the Header Fields:
	<t>This concern is true for any encrypted data, including the body of the messag	If the sender isn't careful, the message contents or session keys can leak in ma
	e, not just the Header Fields:	ny ways that are beyond the scope of this document.
	if the sender isn't careful, the message contents or session keys can leak in ma
	ny ways that are beyond the scope of this document.
	The message recipient has no way in principle to tell whether the apparent confi dentiality of any given piece of encrypted content has been broken via channels that they cannot perceive.	The message recipient has no way in principle to tell whether the apparent confi dentiality of any given piece of encrypted content has been broken via channels that they cannot perceive.
	Additionally, an active intermediary aware of the recipient's public key can alw ays encrypt a cleartext message in transit to give the recipient a false sense o f security.</t>	Additionally, an active intermediary aware of the recipient's public key can alw ays encrypt a cleartext message in transit to give the recipient a false sense o f security.</t>

		<section anchor="encrypted-header-fields-can-leak-unwanted-information-t
		o-the-recipient">
		<name>Encrypted Header Fields Can Leak Unwanted Information to the Rec
		ipient</name>
		<t>For encrypted messages, even with an ambitious <iref item="HCP"/><x
		ref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> that success
		fully obscures most Header Fields from all transport agents, Header Fields will
		be ultimately visible to all intended recipients.


	<section anchor="encrypted-header-fields-can-leak-unwanted-information-to-the-re	<!--[rfced] To improve readability, may we update the phrasing of "may not
	cipient"><name>Encrypted Header Fields Can Leak Unwanted Information to the Reci	expect to be injected by their MUA" as follows?
	pient</name>

	<t>For encrypted messages, even with an ambitious <iref item="HCP"/><xref target
	="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> that successfully obsc
	ures most Header Fields from all transport agents, Header Fields will be ultimat
	ely visible to all intended recipients.
	This can be especially problematic for Header Fields that are not user-facing, w
	hich the sender may not expect to be injected by their MUA.
	Consider the three following examples:</t>

	<t><list style="symbols">
	<t>The MUA may inject a <spanx style="verb">User-Agent</spanx> Header Field th
	at describes itself to every recipient, even though the sender may not want the
	recipient to know the exact version of their OS, hardware platform, or MUA.</t>
	<t>The MUA may have an idiosyncratic way of generating a <spanx style="verb">M
	essage-ID</spanx> header, which could embed the choice of MUA, a time zone, a ho
	stname, or other subtle information to a knowledgeable recipient.</t>
	<t>The MUA may erroneously include a <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx> Header Fi
	eld in the <spanx style="verb">origheaders</spanx> of a copy of a message sent t
	o the named recipient, defeating the purpose of using <spanx style="verb">Bcc</s
	panx> instead of <spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx> (see <xref target="bcc"/> for mo
	re details about risks related to <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx>).</t>
	</list></t>

	<t>Clearly, no end-to-end cryptographic protection of any Header Field as define
	d in this document will hide such a sensitive field from the intended recipient.
	Instead, the composing MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> populate the <spanx style="verb">
	origheaders</spanx> list for any outbound message with only information the reci
	pient should have access to.
	This is true for messages without any cryptographic protection as well, of cours
	e, and it is even worse there: such a leak is exposed to the transport agents as
	well as the recipient.
	An encrypted message with Header Protection and a more ambitious <iref item="Hea
	der Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format
	="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> avoid these leaks exposing informat
	ion to the transport agents but cannot defend against such a leak to the recipie
	nt.</t>


	</section>	Original:
	<section anchor="encrypted-header-fields-can-be-inferred-from-external-or-intern	This can be
	al-metadata"><name>Encrypted Header Fields Can Be Inferred From External or Inte	especially problematic for Header Fields that are not user-facing,
	rnal Metadata</name>	which the sender may not expect to be injected by their MUA.


	<t>For example, if the <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Cc	Perhaps:
	</spanx> Header Fields are removed from the unprotected Header Section, the valu	This can be
	es in those fields might still be inferred with high probability by an adversary	especially problematic for Header Fields that are not user-facing;
	who looks at the message either in transit or at rest.	the sender may not expect these Header Fields to be injected by their MUA.
	If the message is found in, or being delivered to a mailbox for <spanx style="ve	-->
	rb">bob@example.org</spanx>, it's likely that Bob was in either <spanx style="ve
	rb">To</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx>.
	Furthermore, encrypted message ciphertext may hint at the recipients: for S/MIME
	messages, the <spanx style="verb">RecipientInfo</spanx>, and for PGP/MIME messa
	ges the key ID in the Public Key Encrypted Session Key (PKESK) packets will all
	hint at a specific set of recipients.
	Additionally, an MTA that handles the message may add a <spanx style="verb">Rece
	ived</spanx> Header Field (or some other custom Header Field) that leaks some in
	formation about the nature of the delivery.</t>


	</section>	This can be especially problematic for Header Fields that are not user-facing, w
	<section anchor="encrypted-header-fields-may-not-be-fully-masked-by-hcp"><name>E	hich the sender may not expect to be injected by their MUA.
	ncrypted Header Fields May Not Be Fully Masked by HCP</name>	Consider the three following examples:</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>The MUA may inject a <tt>User-Agent</tt> Header Field that desc
		ribes itself to every recipient, even though the sender may not want the recipie
		nt to know the exact version of their OS, hardware platform, or MUA.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>The MUA may have an idiosyncratic way of generating a <tt>Messa
		ge-ID</tt> header, which could embed the choice of MUA, time zone, hostname, or
		other subtle information to a knowledgeable recipient.</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>The MUA may erroneously include a <tt>Bcc</tt> Header Field in
		the <tt>origheaders</tt> of a copy of a message sent to the named recipient, def
		eating the purpose of using <tt>Bcc</tt> instead of <tt>Cc</tt> (see <xref targe
		t="bcc"/> for more details about risks related to <tt>Bcc</tt>).</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>Clearly, no end-to-end cryptographic protection of any Header Field
		as defined in this document will hide such a sensitive field from the intended
		recipient.
		Instead, the composing MUA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> populate the <tt>origheaders</tt>
		list for any outbound message with only information the recipient should have a
		ccess to.
		This is true for messages without any cryptographic protection as well, of cours
		e, and it is even worse there: Such a leak is exposed to the transport agents as
		well as the recipient.
		An encrypted message with Header Protection and a more ambitious <iref item="Hea
		der Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format
		="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> avoids these leaks that expose info
		rmation to the transport agents, but it cannot defend against such a leak to the
		recipient.</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="encrypted-header-fields-can-be-inferred-from-external-o
		r-internal-metadata">
		<name>Encrypted Header Fields Can Be Inferred from External or Interna
		l Metadata</name>
		<t>For example, if the <tt>To</tt> and <tt>Cc</tt> Header Fields are r
		emoved from the unprotected Header Section, the values in those fields might sti
		ll be inferred with high probability by an adversary who looks at the message ei
		ther in transit or at rest.
		If the message is found in a mailbox, or being delivered to a mailbox, for examp
		le, <tt>bob@example.org</tt>, it's likely that Bob was in either <tt>To</tt> or
		<tt>Cc</tt>.
		Furthermore, encrypted message ciphertext may hint at the recipients: For S/MIME
		messages, the <tt>RecipientInfo</tt>, and for PGP/MIME messages, the key ID in
		the Public Key Encrypted Session Key (PKESK) packets will all hint at a specific
		set of recipients.
		Additionally, an MTA that handles the message may add a <tt>Received</tt> Header
		Field (or some other custom Header Field) that leaks some information about the
		nature of the delivery.</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="encrypted-header-fields-may-not-be-fully-masked-by-hcp"
		>
		<name>Encrypted Header Fields May Not Be Fully Masked by HCP</name>
		<t>In another example, if the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-c
		onfidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> modifies the <tt>Date</tt> heade
		r to mask out high-resolution timestamps (e.g., rounding to the most recent hour
		), some information about the date of delivery will still be attached to the ema
		il.
		At the very least, the low-resolution, global version of the date will be presen
		t on the message.
		Additionally, Header Fields like <tt>Received</tt> that are added during message
		delivery might include higher-resolution timestamps.
		And if the message lands in a mailbox that is ordered by time of receipt, even i
		ts placement in the mailbox and the unobscured <tt>Date</tt> Header Fields of th
		e surrounding messages could leak this information.</t>
		<t>Some Header Fields like <tt>From</tt> may be impossible to fully obscure, as
		many modern message delivery systems depend on at least domain information in th
		e <tt>From</tt> Header Field for determining whether a message is coming from a
		domain with "good reputation" (that is, from a domain that is not known for leak
		ing spam).


	<t>In another example, if the <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentia	<!--[rfced] May we update "genericize" to "generalize"?
	lity-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> modifies the <spanx style="verb">Date</spa
	nx> header to mask out high-resolution time stamps (e.g., rounding to the most r
	ecent hour), some information about the date of delivery will still be attached
	to the e-mail.
	At the very least, the low resolution, global version of the date will be presen
	t on the message.
	Additionally, Header Fields like <spanx style="verb">Received</spanx> that are a
	dded during message delivery might include higher-resolution timestamps.
	And if the message lands in a mailbox that is ordered by time of receipt, even i
	ts placement in the mailbox and the non-obscured <spanx style="verb">Date</spanx
	> Header Fields of the surrounding messages could leak this information.</t>


	<t>Some Header Fields like <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> may be impossible to	Original:
	fully obscure, as many modern message delivery systems depend on at least domai	So even if an
	n information in the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field for determini	ambitious HCP opts to remove the human-readable part from any From
	ng whether a message is coming from a domain with "good reputation" (that is, fr	Header Field, and to standardize/genericize the local part of the
	om a domain that is not known for leaking spam).	From address, the domain will still leak.
	So even if an ambitious <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-p
	olicy" format="none">HCP</xref> opts to remove the human-readable part from any
	<spanx style="verb">From</spanx> Header Field, and to standardize/genericize the
	local part of the <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> address, the domain will sti
	ll leak.</t>


	</section>	Perhaps:
	</section>	So even if an
	<section anchor="status-overestimation"><name>A Naive Recipient May Overestimate	ambitious HCP opts to remove the human-readable part from any From
	the Cryptographic Status of a Header Field in an Encrypted Message</name>	Header Field, and to standardize/generalize the local part of the
		From address, the domain will still leak.
		-->


	<t>When an encrypted (or signed-and-encrypted) message is in transit, an active	So even if an ambitious <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-p
	intermediary can strip or tamper with any Header Field that appears outside the	olicy" format="none">HCP</xref> opts to remove the human-readable part from any
	Cryptographic Envelope.	<tt>From</tt> Header Field and to standardize/genericize the local part of the <
		tt>From</tt> address, the domain will still leak.</t>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="status-overestimation">
		<name>A Naive Recipient May Overestimate the Cryptographic Status of a H
		eader Field in an Encrypted Message</name>
		<t>When an encrypted (or signed-and-encrypted) message is in transit, an
		active intermediary can strip or tamper with any Header Field that appears outs
		ide the Cryptographic Envelope.
	A receiving MUA that naively infers cryptographic status from differences betwee n the external Header Fields and those found in the Cryptographic Envelope could be tricked into overestimating the protections afforded to some Header Fields.< /t>	A receiving MUA that naively infers cryptographic status from differences betwee n the external Header Fields and those found in the Cryptographic Envelope could be tricked into overestimating the protections afforded to some Header Fields.< /t>

		<t>For example, if the original sender's <iref item="HCP"/><xref target=
	<t>For example, if the original sender's <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-	"header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> passes through the <tt>
	confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> passes through the <spanx style	Cc</tt> Header Field unchanged, a cleanly delivered message would indicate that
	="verb">Cc</spanx> Header Field unchanged, a cleanly delivered message would ind	the <tt>Cc</tt> Header Field has a cryptographic status of <tt>signed</tt>.
	icate that the <spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx> Header Field has a cryptographic s	But if an intermediary attacker simply removes the Header Field from the unprote
	tatus of <spanx style="verb">signed</spanx>.	cted Header Section before forwarding the message, then the naive recipient migh
	But if an intermediary attacker simply removes the Header Field from the unprote	t believe that the field has a cryptographic status of <tt>signed-and-encrypted<
	cted Header Section before forwarding the message, then the naive recipient migh	/tt>.</t>
	t believe that the field has a cryptographic status of <spanx style="verb">signe	<t>This document offers protection against such an attack by way of the
	d-and-encrypted</spanx>.</t>	<tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Fields that can be found on the Cryptographic Payload.
		If a Header Field appears to have been obscured by inspection of the outer messa
	<t>This document offers protection against such an attack by way of the <spanx s	ge but an <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field matches it exactly, then the receiving
	tyle="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Fields that can be found on the Cryptographi	MUA can indicate to the user that the Header Field in question may not have been
	c Payload.	confidential.</t>
	If a Header Field appears to have been obscured by inspection of the outer messa	<t>In such a case, a cautious MUA may render the Header Field in questio
	ge, but an <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field matches it exactly,	n as <tt>signed</tt> (because the sender did not hide it) but still treat it as
	the receiving MUA can indicate to the user that the Header Field in question ma	<tt>signed-and-encrypted</tt> during reply to avoid accidental leakage of the cl
	y not have been confidential.</t>	eartext value in the reply message, as described in <xref target="avoid-leak"/>.
		</t>
	<t>In such a case, a cautious MUA may render the Header Field in question as <sp	</section>
	anx style="verb">signed</spanx> (because the sender did not hide it), but still	<section anchor="bcc">
	treat it as <spanx style="verb">signed-and-encrypted</spanx> during reply, to av	<name>Privacy and Deliverability Risks with Bcc and Encrypted Messages</
	oid accidental leakage of the cleartext value in the reply message, as described	name>
	in <xref target="avoid-leak"/>.</t>	<t>As noted in <xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9787"/>
		, handling Bcc when generating an encrypted email message can be particularly tr
	</section>	icky.
	<section anchor="bcc"><name>Privacy and Deliverability Risks with Bcc and Encryp
	ted Messages</name>

	<t>As noted in <xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e
	-mail-guidance"/>, handling Bcc when generating an encrypted e-mail message can
	be particularly tricky.
	With Header Protection, there is an additional wrinkle.	With Header Protection, there is an additional wrinkle.

	When an encrypted e-mail message with Header Protection has a Bcc'ed recipient,	When an encrypted email message with Header Protection has a Bcc'ed recipient, a
	and the composing MUA explicitly includes the Bcc'ed recipient's address in thei	nd the composing MUA explicitly includes the Bcc'ed recipient's address in their
	r copy of the message (see the "second method" in <xref section="3.6.3" sectionF	copy of the message (see the "second method" in <xref section="3.6.3" sectionFo
	ormat="of" target="RFC5322"/>), that <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx> Header Fiel	rmat="of" target="RFC5322"/>), that <tt>Bcc</tt> Header Field will always be vis
	d will always be visible to the Bcc'ed recipient.</t>	ible to the Bcc'ed recipient.</t>
		<t>In this scenario, though, the composing MUA has one additional choice
	<t>In this scenario, though, the composing MUA has one additional choice: whethe	: whether or not to hide the <tt>Bcc</tt> Header Field from intervening message
	r to hide the <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx> Header Field from intervening mess	transport agents by returning <tt>null</tt> when the <iref item="HCP"/><xref tar
	age transport agents, by returning <spanx style="verb">null</spanx> when the <ir	get="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> is invoked for <tt>
	ef item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</x	Bcc</tt>.
	ref> is invoked for <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx>.	If the composing MUA's rationale for including an explicit <tt>Bcc</tt> in the c
	If the composing MUA's rationale for including an explicit <spanx style="verb">B	opy of the message sent to the Bcc recipient is to ensure deliverability via a m
	cc</spanx> in the copy of the message sent to the Bcc recipient is to ensure del	essage transport agent that inspects message Header Fields, then stripping the <
	iverability via a message transport agent that inspects message Header Fields, t	tt>Bcc</tt> field during encryption may cause the intervening transport agent to
	hen stripping the <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx> field during encryption may ca	drop the message entirely.
	use the intervening transport agent to drop the message entirely.	This is why <tt>Bcc</tt> is not explicitly stripped in <tt>hcp_baseline</tt>.</t
	This is why <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx> is not explicitly stripped in <spanx	>
	style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>.</t>	<t>On the other hand, if deliverability to a <tt>Bcc</tt>'ed recipient i
		s not a concern, the most privacy-preserving option is to simply omit the <tt>Bc
	<t>If, on the other hand, deliverability to a <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx>'ed	c</tt> Header Field from the protected Header Section in the first place.
	recipient is not a concern, the most privacy-preserving option is to simply omi	An MUA that is capable of receiving and processing such a message can infer that
	t the <spanx style="verb">Bcc</spanx> Header Field from the protected Header Sec	since their user's address was not mentioned in any <tt>To</tt> or <tt>Cc</tt>
	tion in the first place.	Header Field, they were likely a <tt>Bcc</tt> recipient.</t>
	An MUA that is capable of receiving and processing such a message can infer that	<t>Please also see <xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC978
	since their user's address was not mentioned in any <spanx style="verb">To</spa	7"/> for more discussion about Bcc and encrypted messages.</t>
	nx> or <spanx style="verb">Cc</spanx> Header Field, they were likely a <spanx st	</section>
	yle="verb">Bcc</spanx> recipient.</t>	</section>
		<section anchor="iana-considerations">
	<t>Please also see <xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-lamps	<name>IANA Considerations</name>
	-e2e-mail-guidance"/> for more discussion about Bcc and encrypted messages.</t>

	</section>
	</section>
	<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

	<t>This document registers an e-mail Header Field, describes parameters for the
	<spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> Header Field, and establishes a registr
	y for Header Confidentiality Policies to facilitate <iref item="HCP"/><xref targ
	et="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> evolution.</t>

	<section anchor="register-the-hp-outer-header-field"><name>Register the HP-Outer
	Header Field</name>


	<t>This document requests IANA to register the following Header Field in the "Pe	<!--[rfced] We have included some specific questions about the IANA
	rmanent Message Header Field Names" registry within "Message Headers" in accorda	text below. In addition to responding to those questions, please
	nce with <xref target="RFC3864"/>.</t>	review all of the IANA-related updates carefully and let us know
		if any further updates are needed.


	<texttable title="Additions to 'Permanent Message Header Field Names' registry">	a) In Section 12.1, does the "Author/Change Controller" information
	<ttcol align='left'>Header Field Name</ttcol>	only apply to the "HP-Outer" registration? If so, may we update the
	<ttcol align='left'>Template</ttcol>	text below to reflect "this entry" (instead of "these two entries")
	<ttcol align='left'>Protocol</ttcol>	as shown in option A? Or if it also applies to the "Content-Type"
	<ttcol align='left'>Status</ttcol>	registration, may we move it to the end of Section 12.2 and update
	<ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>	the text as shown in option B?
	<c><spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx></c>
	<c> </c>
	<c>mail</c>
	<c>standard</c>
	<c><xref target="new-header-field"/> of RFCXXXX</c>
	</texttable>


	<t>The Author/Change Controller of these two entries (<xref section="4.5" sectio	Original:
	nFormat="of" target="RFC3864"/>) should be the IETF itself.</t>	The Author/Change Controller of these two entries (Section 4.5 of
		[RFC3864]) should be the IETF itself.


	</section>	Perhaps A:
	<section anchor="update-reference-for-content-type-header-field-due-to-hp-and-hp	The Author/Change Controller (Section 4.5 of [RFC3864]) for this
	-legacy-display-parameters"><name>Update Reference for Content-Type Header Field	entry is the IETF itself.
	due to hp and hp-legacy-display Parameters</name>


	<t>This document also defines the <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> param	Perhaps B:
	eters known as <spanx style="verb">hp</spanx> (in <xref target="hp-parameter"/>)	The Author/Change Controller (Section 4.5 of [RFC3864])
	and <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display</spanx> (in <xref target="hp-legacy-d	for the HP-Outer and Content-Type Header Field name
	isplay"/>).	registrations is the IETF itself.
	Consequently, the <spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx> row in the "Permanent
	Message Header Field Names" registry should add a reference to this RFC to its
	"References" column.</t>


	<t>That is, the current row:</t>	b) FYI - We removed the blank columns from Tables 2 and 3. We also
		removed Table 4 (in Section 12.2) as one table is sufficient to
		show the addition of this document as a reference to the
		"Permanent Message Header Field Names" registry (see Table 3).


	<texttable title="Existing row in 'Permanent Message Header Field Names' registr	c) We shortened the title of Section 12.2 as the hp and
	y">	hp-legacy-display parameters are mentioned in the introductory
	<ttcol align='left'>Header Field Name</ttcol>	sentence. Please let us know of any objections.
	<ttcol align='left'>Template</ttcol>
	<ttcol align='left'>Protocol</ttcol>
	<ttcol align='left'>Status</ttcol>
	<ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
	<c><spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx></c>
	<c> </c>
	<c>MIME</c>
	<c> </c>
	<c><xref target="RFC4021"/></c>
	</texttable>


	<t>Should be updated to have the following values:</t>	Original:
		12.2 Update Reference for Content-Type Header Field due to
		hp and hp-legacy-display Parameters


	<texttable title="Replacement row in 'Permanent Message Header Field Names' regi	Current:
	stry">	12.2 Reference Update for the Content-Type Header Field
	<ttcol align='left'>Header Field Name</ttcol>
	<ttcol align='left'>Template</ttcol>
	<ttcol align='left'>Protocol</ttcol>
	<ttcol align='left'>Status</ttcol>
	<ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
	<c><spanx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx></c>
	<c> </c>
	<c>MIME</c>
	<c> </c>
	<c><xref target="RFC4021"/> [RFCXXXX]</c>
	</texttable>


	</section>	d) FYI - In Section 12.3, we ordered the notes to match the order
	<section anchor="new-registry-mail-header-confidentiality-policies"><name>New Re	in the IANA registry <https://www.iana.org/assignments/mail-parameters/>;
	gistry: Mail Header Confidentiality Policies</name>	please let us know of any objections.
		-->


	<t>This document also requests IANA to create a new registry in the <eref target	<t>This document registers an email Header Field, describes parameters for
	="https://www.iana.org/assignments/mail-parameters/">"Mail Parameters" protocol	the <tt>Content-Type</tt> Header Field, and establishes a registry for Header C
	group</eref> titled <spanx style="verb">Mail Header Confidentiality Policies</sp	onfidentiality Policies to facilitate <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-con
	anx> with the following content:</t>	fidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> evolution.</t>
		<section anchor="register-the-hp-outer-header-field">
		<name>Registration of the HP-Outer Header Field</name>
		<t>IANA has registered the following Header Field in the "Permanent Mess
		age Header Field Names" registry within the "Message Headers" registry group <er
		ef target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers" brackets="angle"/>
		in accordance with <xref target="RFC3864"/>.</t>
		<table>
		<name>Addition to the Permanent Message Header Field Names Registry</n
		ame>
		<thead>
		<tr>
		<th align="left">Header Field Name</th>
		<th align="left">Protocol</th>
		<th align="left">Status</th>
		<th align="left">Reference</th>
		</tr>
		</thead>
		<tbody>
		<tr>
		<td align="left">
		<tt>HP-Outer</tt></td>
		<td align="left">mail</td>
		<td align="left">standard</td>
		<td align="left"> <xref target="new-header-field"/> of RFC 9788</t
		d>
		</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>


	<texttable title="Mail Header Confidentiality Policies registry">	<t>The Author/Change Controller of these two entries (<xref section="4.5
	<ttcol align='left'>Header Confidentiality Policy Name</ttcol>	" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3864"/>) should be the IETF itself.</t>
	<ttcol align='left'>Description</ttcol>	</section>
	<ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>	<section anchor="update-reference-for-content-type-header-field-due-to-hp-
	<ttcol align='left'>Recommended</ttcol>	and-hp-legacy-display-parameters">
	<c><spanx style="verb">hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx></c>	<name>Reference Update for the Content-Type Header Field</name>
	<c>No header confidentiality</c>	<t>This document defines the <tt>Content-Type</tt> parameters known as <
	<c><xref target="no-confidentiality-hcp"/> of RFCXXX (this document)</c>	tt>hp</tt> (in <xref target="hp-parameter"/>) and <tt>hp-legacy-display</tt> (in
	<c>N</c>	<xref target="hp-legacy-display"/>).
	<c><spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx></c>	Consequently, this document has been added as a reference for <tt>Content
	<c>Confidentiality for Informational Header Fields: <spanx style="verb">Su	-Type</tt> in the "Permanent Message Header Field Names" registry as shown below
	bject</spanx> Header Field is obscured, <spanx style="verb">Keywords</spanx> and	.</t>
	<spanx style="verb">Comments</spanx> are removed</c>	<table>
	<c><xref target="baseline-hcp"/> of RFCXXX (this document)</c>	<name>Permanent Message Header Field Names Registry</name>
	<c>Y</c>	<thead>
	<c><spanx style="verb">hcp_shy</spanx></c>	<tr>
	<c>Obscure <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>, remove <spanx style="verb"	<th align="left">Header Field Name</th>
	>Keywords</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Comments</spanx>, remove the time zone	<th align="left">Protocol</th>
	from <spanx style="verb">Date</spanx>, and obscure <spanx style="verb">display-	<th align="left">Reference</th>
	name</spanx>s</c>	</tr>
	<c><xref target="shy-hcp"/> of RFCXXX (this document)</c>	</thead>
	<c>N</c>	<tbody>
	</texttable>	<tr>
		<td align="left">
		<tt>Content-Type</tt></td>
		<td align="left">MIME</td>
		<td align="left"> <xref target="RFC4021"/> and RFC 9788</td>
		</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>
		</section>
		<section anchor="new-registry-mail-header-confidentiality-policies">
		<name>New Mail Header Confidentiality Policies Registry</name>
		<t>IANA has created a new registry titled "Mail Header Confidentiality P
		olicies" within the "MAIL Parameters" registry group <eref target="https://www.i
		ana.org/assignments/mail-parameters/" brackets="angle"/> with the following cont
		ent:</t>
		<table>
		<name>Mail Header Confidentiality Policies Registry</name>
		<thead>
		<tr>
		<th align="left">Header Confidentiality Policy Name</th>
		<th align="left">Description</th>
		<th align="left">Recommended</th>
		<th align="left">Reference</th>
		</tr>
		</thead>
		<tbody>
		<tr>
		<td align="left"><tt>hcp_no_confidentiality</tt></td>
		<td align="left">No header confidentiality</td>
		<td align="left">N</td>
		<td align="left"><xref target="no-confidentiality-hcp"/> of RFC 97
		88</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
		<td align="left"><tt>hcp_baseline</tt></td>
		<td align="left">Confidentiality for Informational Header Fields:
		<tt>Subject</tt> Header Field is obscured, <tt>Keywords</tt> and <tt>Comments</
		tt> are removed</td>
		<td align="left">Y</td>
		<td align="left"><xref target="baseline-hcp"/> of RFC 9788</td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
		<td align="left"><tt>hcp_shy</tt></td>
		<td align="left">Obscure <tt>Subject</tt>, remove <tt>Keywords</tt>
		and <tt>Comments</tt>, remove the time zone from <tt>Date</tt>, and obscure <tt
		>display-name</tt>s</td>
		<td align="left">N</td>
		<td align="left"><xref target="shy-hcp"/> of RFC 9788</td>
		</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>
		<t>Note that <tt>hcp_example_hide_cc</tt> is offered as an example in <x
		ref target="header-confidentiality-policy"/> but is not formally registered by t
		his document.</t>
		<t>The following textual note has been added to this registry:</t>


	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp_example_hide_cc</spanx> is offered as an example in <	<blockquote>Adding an entry to this registry with an <tt>N</tt> in the "
	xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"/> but is not formally registered by	Recommended" column follows the registration policy of Specification Required.
	this document.</t>	Adding an entry to this registry with a <tt>Y</tt> in the "Recommended" c
		olumn or changing the "Recommended" column in an existing entry (from <tt>N</tt>
		to <tt>Y</tt> or vice versa) requires IETF Review.</blockquote>


	<t>Please add the following textual note to this registry:</t>	<t>Note that during IETF Review, the designated expert must be consulted. Guidance for the designated expert can be found in <xref target="hcp-expert-gui dance"/>.</t>


	<ul empty="true"><li>	<t>Additionally, this textual note has been added to the registry:</t>
	<t>The <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confid	<blockquote>The <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target
	entiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> Name never	="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xr
	appears on the wire.	ef> Name never appears on the wire.
	This registry merely tracks stable references to implementable descriptions of d istinct policies.	This registry merely tracks stable references to implementable descriptions of d istinct policies.

	Any addition to this registry should be governed by guidance in <xref target="hc	Any addition to this registry should be governed by guidance in <xref target="hc
	p-expert-guidance"/> of RFC XXX (this document).</t>	p-expert-guidance"/> of RFC 9788.</blockquote>
	</li></ul>	</section>
		</section>
	<t>Adding an entry to this registry with an <spanx style="verb">N</spanx> in the
	"Recommended" column follows the registration policy of SPECIFICATION <bcp14>RE
	QUIRED</bcp14>.
	Adding an entry to this registry with a <spanx style="verb">Y</spanx> in the "Re
	commended" column or changing the "Recommended" column in an existing entry (fro
	m <spanx style="verb">N</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">Y</spanx> or vice versa)
	requires IETF REVIEW.
	During IETF REVIEW, the designated expert must also be consulted.
	Guidance for the designated expert can be found in <xref target="hcp-expert-guid
	ance"/>.</t>

	</section>
	</section>
	<section anchor="acknowledgments"><name>Acknowledgments</name>

	<t>Alexander Krotov identified the risk of <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> addr
	ess spoofing (see <xref target="from-addr-spoofing"/>) and helped provide guidan
	ce to MUAs.</t>

	<t>Thore Göbel identified significant gaps in earlier versions of this document,
	and proposed concrete and substantial improvements.
	Thanks to his contributions, the document is clearer, and the protocols describe
	d herein are more useful.</t>

	<t>Additionally, the authors would like to thank the following people who have p
	rovided helpful comments and suggestions for this document:
	Berna Alp,
	Bernhard E. Reiter,
	Bron Gondwana,
	Carl Wallace,
	Claudio Luck,
	Daniel Huigens,
	David Wilson,
	Éric Vyncke,
	Hernani Marques,
	juga,
	Krista Bennett,
	Kelly Bristol,
	Lars Rohwedder,
	Michael StJohns,
	Nicolas Lidzborski,
	Orie Steele,
	Paul Wouters,
	Peter Yee,
	Phillip Tao,
	Robert Williams,
	Rohan Mahy,
	Roman Danyliw,
	Russ Housley,
	Sofia Balicka,
	Steve Kille,
	Volker Birk,
	Warren Kumari, and
	Wei Chuang.</t>

	</section>

	</middle>	</middle>


	<back>	<back>


	<references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">	<displayreference target="I-D.pep-general" to="PEP-GENERAL"/>
		<displayreference target="I-D.pep-email" to="PEP-EMAIL"/>
	<reference anchor="RFC8551">	<displayreference target="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers" to="PROTECT
	<front>	ED-HEADERS"/>
	<title>Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0 Mes
	sage Specification</title>
	<author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
	<author fullname="B. Ramsdell" initials="B." surname="Ramsdell"/>
	<author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
	<date month="April" year="2019"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document defines Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/M
	IME) version 4.0. S/MIME provides a consistent way to send and receive secure MI
	ME data. Digital signatures provide authentication, message integrity, and non-r
	epudiation with proof of origin. Encryption provides data confidentiality. Compr
	ession can be used to reduce data size. This document obsoletes RFC 5751.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8551"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8551"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC2119">
	<front>
	<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
	<author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
	<date month="March" year="1997"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the
	requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This docu
	ment defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This d
	ocument specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community,
	and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC8174">
	<front>
	<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
	<author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
	<date month="May" year="2017"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specif
	ications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPP
	ERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC8126">	<references>
	<front>	<name>References</name>
	<title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>	<references anchor="sec-normative-references">
	<author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>	<name>Normative References</name>
	<author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
	<author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>	551.xml"/>
	<date month="June" year="2017"/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
	<abstract>	119.xml"/>
	<t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants t	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
	o identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these field	174.xml"/>
	s do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocation	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
	s are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that rol	126.xml"/>
	e is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
	<t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing	045.xml"/>
	the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and ho
	w modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines
	a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors,
	in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is cl
	ear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a regis
	try.</t>
	<t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC2045">	<!-- [RFC9787] draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-17 companion document RFC 9787
	<front>	; in EDIT as of 05/12/25. -->
	<title>Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Inte
	rnet Message Bodies</title>
	<author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
	<author fullname="N. Borenstein" initials="N." surname="Borenstein"/>
	<date month="November" year="1996"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This initial document specifies the various headers used to describe th
	e structure of MIME messages. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2045"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2045"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance">	<reference anchor="RFC9787" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9787">
	<front>	<front>

	<title>Guidance on End-to-End E-mail Security</title>	<title>Guidance on End-to-End Email Security</title>
	<author fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor" initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor">	<author initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor" fullname="Daniel Kahn
		Gillmor" role="editor">
	<organization>American Civil Liberties Union</organization>	<organization>American Civil Liberties Union</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<author fullname="Bernie Hoeneisen" initials="B." surname="Hoeneisen">	<author initials="B." surname="Hoeneisen" fullname="Bernie
		Hoeneisen" role="editor">
	<organization>pEp Project</organization>	<organization>pEp Project</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<author fullname="Alexey Melnikov" initials="A." surname="Melnikov">	<author initials="A." surname="Melnikov" fullname="Alexey
		Melnikov" role="editor">
	<organization>Isode Ltd</organization>	<organization>Isode Ltd</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date day="16" month="March" year="2024"/>	<date month="May" year="2025" />
	<abstract>
	<t> End-to-end cryptographic protections for e-mail messages can provi
	de
	useful security. However, the standards for providing cryptographic
	protection are extremely flexible. That flexibility can trap users
	and cause surprising failures. This document offers guidance for
	mail user agent implementers to help mitigate those risks, and to
	make end-to-end e-mail simple and secure for the end user. It
	provides a useful set of vocabulary as well as recommendations to
	avoid common failures. It also identifies a number of currently
	unsolved usability and interoperability problems.

	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>	</front>

	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance-1	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9787"/>
	6"/>	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9787"/>

	</reference>	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC5234">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
	<front>	234.xml"/>
	<title>Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
	<author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/	322.xml"/>
	>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
	<author fullname="P. Overell" initials="P." surname="Overell"/>	083.xml"/>
	<date month="January" year="2008"/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
	<abstract>	652.xml"/>
	<t>Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax.	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9
	Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented	580.xml"/>
	BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current spe	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3
	cification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonabl	864.xml"/>
	e representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve	</references>
	naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. Th	<references anchor="sec-informative-references">
	is specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a co	<name>Informative References</name>
	re lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STAN
	DARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5234"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC5322">	<reference anchor="chrome-indicators" target="https://blog.chromium.org/
	<front>	2018/05/evolving-chromes-security-indicators.html">
	<title>Internet Message Format</title>	<front>
	<author fullname="P. Resnick" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Resnick"/	<title>Evolving Chrome's security indicators</title>
	>	<author initials="E." surname="Schechter" fullname="Emily Schechter"
	<date month="October" year="2008"/>	>
	<abstract>	<organization/>
	<t>This document specifies the Internet Message Format (IMF), a syntax for	</author>
	text messages that are sent between computer users, within the framework of "el	<date year="2018" month="May"/>
	ectronic mail" messages. This specification is a revision of Request For Comment	</front>
	s (RFC) 2822, which itself superseded Request For Comments (RFC) 822, "Standard	<refcontent>Chromium Blog</refcontent>
	for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages", updating it to reflect current p	</reference>
	ractice and incorporating incremental changes that were specified in other RFCs.
	[STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5322"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5322"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC5083">	<reference anchor="CSS" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/WD-CSS22-2016
	<front>	0412/">
	<title>Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Conte	<front>
	nt Type</title>	<title>Cascading Style Sheets Level 2 Revision 2 (CSS 2.2) Specifica
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>	tion</title>
	<date month="November" year="2007"/>	<author initials="B." surname="Bos" fullname="Bert" role="editor"/>
	<abstract>	<date year="2016" month="April" day="12"/>
	<t>This document describes an additional content type for the Cryptographi	</front>
	c Message Syntax (CMS). The authenticated-enveloped-data content type is intende	<refcontent>W3C First Public Working Draft</refcontent>
	d for use with authenticated encryption modes. All of the various key management	<annotation>Latest version available at <eref target="https://www.w3.o
	techniques that are supported in the CMS enveloped-data content type are also s	rg/TR/CSS22/" brackets="angle"/>.</annotation>
	upported by the CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type. [STANDARDS-TRACK]	</reference>
	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5083"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5083"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC5652">	<reference anchor="PGPCONTROL" target="https://ftp.isc.org/pub/pgpcontro
	<front>	l/">
	<title>Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>	<front>
	<author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>	<title>Authentication of Usenet Group Changes</title>
	<date month="September" year="2009"/>	<author>
	<abstract>	<organization>UUNET Technologies, Inc.</organization>
	<t>This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This sy	</author>
	ntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary messa	<date year="2016" month="October" day="27"/>
	ge content. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>	</front>
	</abstract>	</reference>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="70"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5652"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5652"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC9580">	<reference anchor="PGPVERIFY-FORMAT" target="https://www.eyrie.org/~eagl
	<front>	e/usefor/other/pgpverify">
	<title>OpenPGP</title>	<front>
	<author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." role="editor" surname="Wouters"/	<title>Signing Control Messages, Verifying Control Messages</title>
	>	<author initials="D. C." surname="Lawrence" fullname="David C Lawren
	<author fullname="D. Huigens" initials="D." surname="Huigens"/>	ce">
	<author fullname="J. Winter" initials="J." surname="Winter"/>	<organization/>
	<author fullname="Y. Niibe" initials="Y." surname="Niibe"/>	</author>
	<date month="July" year="2024"/>	</front>
	<abstract>	</reference>
	<t>This document specifies the message formats used in OpenPGP. OpenPGP pr
	ovides encryption with public key or symmetric cryptographic algorithms, digital
	signatures, compression, and key management.</t>
	<t>This document is maintained in order to publish all necessary informati
	on needed to develop interoperable applications based on the OpenPGP format. It
	is not a step-by-step cookbook for writing an application. It describes only the
	format and methods needed to read, check, generate, and write conforming packet
	s crossing any network. It does not deal with storage and implementation questio
	ns. It does, however, discuss implementation issues necessary to avoid security
	flaws.</t>
	<t>This document obsoletes RFCs 4880 ("OpenPGP Message Format"), 5581 ("Th
	e Camellia Cipher in OpenPGP"), and 6637 ("Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in
	OpenPGP").</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9580"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9580"/>
	</reference>


	<reference anchor="RFC3864">	<reference anchor="HTML-ESCAPES" target="https://www.w3.org/Internationa
	<front>	l/questions/qa-escapes#use">
	<title>Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields</title>	<front>
	<author fullname="G. Klyne" initials="G." surname="Klyne"/>	<title>Using character escapes in markup and CSS</title>
	<author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>	<author>
	<author fullname="J. Mogul" initials="J." surname="Mogul"/>	<organization>W3C</organization>
	<date month="September" year="2004"/>	</author>
	<abstract>	<date day="12" month="August" year="2010"/>
	<t>This specification defines registration procedures for the message head	</front>
	er fields used by Internet mail, HTTP, Netnews and other applications. This docu	</reference>
	ment specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, an	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
	d requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>	049.xml"/>
	</abstract>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6
	</front>	376.xml"/>
	<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="90"/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3864"/>	489.xml"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3864"/>	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3
	</reference>	156.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2
		047.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7
		929.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
		162.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
		890.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
		891.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1
		035.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8
		617.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4
		021.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9
		216.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5
		751.xml"/>
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3
		851.xml"/>


	</references>	<!-- [I-D.pep-general; Expired as of 5/14/25] -->
		<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.
		pep-general.xml"/>


	<references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-reference	<!-- [I-D.pep-email; Expired as of 5/14/25] -->
	s">	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.
		pep-email.xml"/>


	<reference anchor="chrome-indicators" target="https://blog.chromium.org/2018/05/	<!--[I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers] draft-autocrypt-lamps-protected-head
	evolving-chromes-security-indicators.html">	ers-02 IESG State: I-D Expired as of 05/14/25.
	<front>	-->
	<title>Evolving Chrome's security indicators</title>	<reference anchor="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers" target="https://datatr
	<author initials="E." surname="Schechter" fullname="Emily Schechter">	acker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers-03">
	<organization></organization>
	</author>
	<date year="2018" month="May"/>
	</front>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="CSS" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/WD-CSS22-20160412/">
	<front>
	<title>Cascading Style Sheets Level 2 Revision 2 (CSS 2.2) Specification</ti
	tle>
	<author >
	<organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
	</author>
	<date year="2016" month="April" day="12"/>
	</front>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="PGPCONTROL" target="https://ftp.isc.org/pub/pgpcontrol/">
	<front>	<front>

	<title>Authentication of Usenet Group Changes</title>	<title>(Deprecated) Protected E-mail Headers</title>
	<author >	<author fullname="Bjarni Rúnar Einarsson" initials="B. R." surname="Einarsso
	<organization>UUNET Technologies, Inc.</organization>	n">
		<organization>Mailpile ehf</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="2016" month="October" day="27"/>	<author fullname="juga" initials="" surname="juga">
	</front>	<organization>Independent</organization>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="PGPVERIFY-FORMAT" target="https://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/usefor
	/other/pgpverify">
	<front>
	<title>Signing Control Messages, Verifying Control Messages</title>
	<author initials="D. C." surname="Lawrence" fullname="David C Lawrence">
	<organization></organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="n.d."/>	<author fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor" initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor">
	</front>	<organization>American Civil Liberties Union</organization>
	</reference>
	<reference anchor="HTML-ESCAPES" target="https://www.w3.org/International/questi
	ons/qa-escapes#use">
	<front>
	<title>Using character escapes in markup and CSS</title>
	<author >
	<organization>W3C</organization>
	</author>	</author>

	<date year="n.d."/>	<date day="16" month="April" year="2025"/>
	</front>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC2049">
	<front>
	<title>Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Five: Conformance C
	riteria and Examples</title>
	<author fullname="N. Freed" initials="N." surname="Freed"/>
	<author fullname="N. Borenstein" initials="N." surname="Borenstein"/>
	<date month="November" year="1996"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This set of documents, collectively called the Multipurpose Internet Ma
	il Extensions, or MIME, redefines the format of messages. This fifth and final d
	ocument describes MIME conformance criteria as well as providing some illustrati
	ve examples of MIME message formats, acknowledgements, and the bibliography. [ST
	ANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2049"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2049"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC6376">
	<front>
	<title>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures</title>
	<author fullname="D. Crocker" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Crocker"/
	>
	<author fullname="T. Hansen" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Hansen"/>
	<author fullname="M. Kucherawy" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Kuchera
	wy"/>
	<date month="September" year="2011"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) permits a person, role, or organizati
	on that owns the signing domain to claim some responsibility for a message by as
	sociating the domain with the message. This can be an author's organization, an
	operational relay, or one of their agents. DKIM separates the question of the id
	entity of the Signer of the message from the purported author of the message. As
	sertion of responsibility is validated through a cryptographic signature and by
	querying the Signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key. Me
	ssage transit from author to recipient is through relays that typically make no
	substantive change to the message content and thus preserve the DKIM signature.<
	/t>
	<t>This memo obsoletes RFC 4871 and RFC 5672. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="76"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6376"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6376"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC7489">
	<front>
	<title>Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMAR
	C)</title>
	<author fullname="M. Kucherawy" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Kuchera
	wy"/>
	<author fullname="E. Zwicky" initials="E." role="editor" surname="Zwicky"/>
	<date month="March" year="2015"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
	is a scalable mechanism by which a mail-originating organization can express do
	main-level policies and preferences for message validation, disposition, and rep
	orting, that a mail-receiving organization can use to improve mail handling.</t>
	<t>Originators of Internet Mail need to be able to associate reliable and
	authenticated domain identifiers with messages, communicate policies about messa
	ges that use those identifiers, and report about mail using those identifiers. T
	hese abilities have several benefits: Receivers can provide feedback to Domain O
	wners about the use of their domains; this feedback can provide valuable insight
	about the management of internal operations and the presence of external domain
	name abuse.</t>
	<t>DMARC does not produce or encourage elevated delivery privilege of auth
	enticated email. DMARC is a mechanism for policy distribution that enables incre
	asingly strict handling of messages that fail authentication checks, ranging fro
	m no action, through altered delivery, up to message rejection.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7489"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7489"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC3156">
	<front>
	<title>MIME Security with OpenPGP</title>
	<author fullname="M. Elkins" initials="M." surname="Elkins"/>
	<author fullname="D. Del Torto" initials="D." surname="Del Torto"/>
	<author fullname="R. Levien" initials="R." surname="Levien"/>
	<author fullname="T. Roessler" initials="T." surname="Roessler"/>
	<date month="August" year="2001"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document describes how the OpenPGP Message Format can be used to p
	rovide privacy and authentication using the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension
	s (MIME) security content types described in RFC 1847. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3156"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3156"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC2047">
	<front>
	<title>MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) Part Three: Message Head
	er Extensions for Non-ASCII Text</title>
	<author fullname="K. Moore" initials="K." surname="Moore"/>
	<date month="November" year="1996"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This particular document is the third document in the series. It descri
	bes extensions to RFC 822 to allow non-US-ASCII text data in Internet mail heade
	r fields. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2047"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2047"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC7929">
	<front>
	<title>DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Bindings for OpenPG
	P</title>
	<author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." surname="Wouters"/>
	<date month="August" year="2016"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>OpenPGP is a message format for email (and file) encryption that lacks
	a standardized lookup mechanism to securely obtain OpenPGP public keys. DNS-Base
	d Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) is a method for publishing public keys
	in DNS. This document specifies a DANE method for publishing and locating OpenP
	GP public keys in DNS for a specific email address using a new OPENPGPKEY DNS re
	source record. Security is provided via Secure DNS, however the OPENPGPKEY recor
	d is not a replacement for verification of authenticity via the "web of trust" o
	r manual verification. The OPENPGPKEY record can be used to encrypt an email tha
	t would otherwise have to be sent unencrypted.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7929"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7929"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC8162">
	<front>
	<title>Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names for S/MI
	ME</title>
	<author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
	<author fullname="J. Schlyter" initials="J." surname="Schlyter"/>
	<date month="May" year="2017"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document describes how to use secure DNS to associate an S/MIME us
	er's certificate with the intended domain name, similar to the way that DNS-Base
	d Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), RFC 6698, does for TLS.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8162"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8162"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC5890">
	<front>
	<title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions a
	nd Document Framework</title>
	<author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
	<date month="August" year="2010"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document is one of a collection that, together, describe the proto
	col and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Domain Names for Appli
	cations (IDNA), superseding the earlier version. It describes the document colle
	ction and provides definitions and other material that are common to the set. [S
	TANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC5891">
	<front>
	<title>Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Protocol</titl
	e>
	<author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
	<date month="August" year="2010"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document is the revised protocol definition for Internationalized
	Domain Names (IDNs). The rationale for changes, the relationship to the older sp
	ecification, and important terminology are provided in other documents. This doc
	ument specifies the protocol mechanism, called Internationalized Domain Names in
	Applications (IDNA), for registering and looking up IDNs in a way that does not
	require changes to the DNS itself. IDNA is only meant for processing domain nam
	es, not free text. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5891"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5891"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC1035">
	<front>
	<title>Domain names - implementation and specification</title>
	<author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
	<date month="November" year="1987"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This RFC is the revised specification of the protocol and format used i
	n the implementation of the Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-883. This memo
	documents the details of the domain name client - server communication.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1035"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1035"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC8617">
	<front>
	<title>The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) Protocol</title>
	<author fullname="K. Andersen" initials="K." surname="Andersen"/>
	<author fullname="B. Long" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Long"/>
	<author fullname="S. Blank" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Blank"/>
	<author fullname="M. Kucherawy" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Kuchera
	wy"/>
	<date month="July" year="2019"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) protocol provides an authenticat
	ed "chain of custody" for a message, allowing each entity that handles the messa
	ge to see what entities handled it before and what the message's authentication
	assessment was at each step in the handling.</t>
	<t>ARC allows Internet Mail Handlers to attach assertions of message authe
	ntication assessment to individual messages. As messages traverse ARC-enabled In
	ternet Mail Handlers, additional ARC assertions can be attached to messages to f
	orm ordered sets of ARC assertions that represent the authentication assessment
	at each step of the message-handling paths.</t>
	<t>ARC-enabled Internet Mail Handlers can process sets of ARC assertions t
	o inform message disposition decisions, identify Internet Mail Handlers that mig
	ht break existing authentication mechanisms, and convey original authentication
	assessments across trust boundaries.</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8617"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8617"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC4021">
	<front>
	<title>Registration of Mail and MIME Header Fields</title>
	<author fullname="G. Klyne" initials="G." surname="Klyne"/>
	<author fullname="J. Palme" initials="J." surname="Palme"/>
	<date month="March" year="2005"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document defines the initial IANA registration for permanent mail
	and MIME message header fields, per RFC 3864. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4021"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4021"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC9216">
	<front>
	<title>S/MIME Example Keys and Certificates</title>
	<author fullname="D. K. Gillmor" initials="D. K." role="editor" surname="Gil
	lmor"/>
	<date month="April" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>The S/MIME development community benefits from sharing samples of signe
	d or encrypted data. This document facilitates such collaboration by defining a
	small set of X.509v3 certificates and keys for use when generating such samples.
	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9216"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9216"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC5751">
	<front>
	<title>Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Mes
	sage Specification</title>
	<author fullname="B. Ramsdell" initials="B." surname="Ramsdell"/>
	<author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
	<date month="January" year="2010"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document defines Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/M
	IME) version 3.2. S/MIME provides a consistent way to send and receive secure MI
	ME data. Digital signatures provide authentication, message integrity, and non-r
	epudiation with proof of origin. Encryption provides data confidentiality. Compr
	ession can be used to reduce data size. This document obsoletes RFC 3851. [STAND
	ARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5751"/>
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5751"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="RFC3851">
	<front>
	<title>Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Mes
	sage Specification</title>
	<author fullname="B. Ramsdell" initials="B." role="editor" surname="Ramsdell
	"/>
	<date month="July" year="2004"/>
	<abstract>
	<t>This document defines Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/M
	IME) version 3.1. S/MIME provides a consistent way to send and receive secure MI
	ME data. Digital signatures provide authentication, message integrity, and non-r
	epudiation with proof of origin. Encryption provides data confidentiality. Compr
	ession can be used to reduce data size. This document obsoletes RFC 2633. [STAND
	ARDS-TRACK]</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>	</front>

	<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3851"/>	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-autocrypt-lamps-protected-heade
	<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3851"/>	rs-03"/>
	</reference>

	<reference anchor="I-D.pep-general">
	<front>
	<title>pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Privacy by Default</title>
	<author fullname="Volker Birk" initials="V." surname="Birk">
	<organization>pEp Foundation</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Hernâni Marques" initials="H." surname="Marques">
	<organization>pEp Foundation</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Bernie Hoeneisen" initials="B." surname="Hoeneisen">
	<organization>pEp Foundation</organization>
	</author>
	<date day="16" month="December" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t> The pretty Easy privacy (pEp) model and protocols describe a set o
	f
	conventions for the automation of operations traditionally seen as
	barriers to the use and deployment of secure, privacy-preserving end-
	to-end messaging. These include, but are not limited to, key
	management, key discovery, and private key handling (including peer-
	to-peer synchronization of private keys and other user data across
	devices). Human Rights-enabling principles like data minimization,
	end-to-end and interoperability are explicit design goals. For the
	goal of usable privacy, pEp introduces means to verify communication
	between peers and proposes a trust-rating system to denote secure
	types of communications and signal the privacy level available on a
	per-user and per-message level. Significantly, the pEp protocols
	build on already available security formats and message transports
	(e.g., PGP/MIME with email), and are written with the intent to be
	interoperable with already widely-deployed systems in order to ease
	adoption and implementation. This document outlines the general
	design choices and principles of pEp.

	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-pep-general-02"/>

	</reference>

	<reference anchor="I-D.pep-email">
	<front>
	<title>pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Email Formats and Protocols</title>
	<author fullname="Hernâni Marques" initials="H." surname="Marques">
	<organization>pEp Foundation</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Bernie Hoeneisen" initials="B." surname="Hoeneisen">
	<organization>pEp Foundation</organization>
	</author>
	<date day="16" month="December" year="2022"/>
	<abstract>
	<t> The proposed pretty Easy privacy (pEp) protocols for email are bas
	ed
	upon already existing email and encryption formats (such as PGP/MIME)
	and designed to allow for easily implementable and interoperable
	opportunistic encryption. The protocols range from key distribution,
	secret key synchronization between own devices, to mechanisms of
	metadata and content protection. The metadata and content protection
	is achieved by moving the whole message (not only the body part) into
	the PGP/MIME encrypted part. The proposed pEp Email Formats not only
	achieve simple forms of metadata protection (like subject
	encryption), but also allow for sending email messages through a
	mixnet. Such enhanced forms of metadata protection are explicitly
	discussed within the scope of this document.

	The purpose of pEp for email is to simplify and automate operations
	in order to make usage of email encryption viable for a wider range
	of Internet users, with the goal of achieving widespread
	implementation of data confidentiality and privacy practices in the
	real world.

	The proposed operations and formats are targeted towards
	Opportunistic Security scenarios and are already implemented in
	several applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp).

	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-pep-email-02"/>

	</reference>

	<reference anchor="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers">
	<front>
	<title>Protected Headers for Cryptographic E-mail</title>
	<author fullname="Bjarni Rúnar Einarsson" initials="B. R." surname="Einars
	son">
	<organization>Mailpile ehf</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname=""juga"" initials="" surname=""juga""
	>
	<organization>Independent</organization>
	</author>
	<author fullname="Daniel Kahn Gillmor" initials="D. K." surname="Gillmor">
	<organization>American Civil Liberties Union</organization>
	</author>
	<date day="20" month="December" year="2019"/>
	<abstract>
	<t> This document describes a common strategy to extend the end-to-end
	cryptographic protections provided by PGP/MIME, etc. to protect
	message headers in addition to message bodies. In addition to
	protecting the authenticity and integrity of headers via signatures,
	it also describes how to preserve the confidentiality of the Subject
	header.

	</t>
	</abstract>
	</front>
	<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-autocrypt-lamps-protected-head
	ers-02"/>

	</reference>	</reference>

		</references>
	</references>	</references>


	<?line 1917?>	<section anchor="pseudocode-listings">
		<name>Table of Pseudocode Listings</name>
	<section anchor="pseudocode-listings"><name>Table of Pseudocode Listings</name>	<t>This document contains guidance with pseudocode descriptions.

	<t>This document contains guidance with pseudocode descriptions.
	Each algorithm is listed here for easy reference.</t>	Each algorithm is listed here for easy reference.</t>

		<table>
	<texttable title="Table of Pseudocode Listings">	<name>Table of Pseudocode Listings</name>
	<ttcol align='left'>Method Name</ttcol>	<thead>
	<ttcol align='left'>Description</ttcol>	<tr>
	<ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>	<th align="left">Method Name</th>
	<c><iref item="HeaderSetsFromMessage"/><xref target="headersetsfrommessage	<th align="left">Description</th>
	" format="none">HeaderSetsFromMessage</xref></c>	<th align="left">Reference</th>
	<c>Derive "outer" and "protected" sets of Header Fields from a given messa	</tr>
	ge</c>	</thead>
	<c><xref target="headersetsfrommessage"/></c>	<tbody>
	<c><iref item="HeaderFieldProtection"/><xref target="headerfieldprotection	<tr>
	" format="none">HeaderFieldProtection</xref></c>	<td align="left">
	<c>Calculate cryptographic protections for a Header Field in a given messa	<iref item="HeaderSetsFromMessage"/><xref target="headersetsfromme
	ge</c>	ssage" format="none">HeaderSetsFromMessage</xref></td>
	<c><xref target="headerfieldprotection"/></c>	<td align="left">Derive "outer" and "protected" sets of Header Field
	<c><iref item="ReferenceHCP"/><xref target="referencehcp" format="none">Re	s from a given message</td>
	ferenceHCP</xref></c>	<td align="left">
	<c>Produce an ephemeral <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentia	<xref target="headersetsfrommessage"/></td>
	lity-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> to use when responding to a given message<	</tr>
	/c>	<tr>
	<c><xref target="referencehcp"/></c>	<td align="left">
	<c><iref item="ComposeNoHeaderProtection"/><xref target="composenoheaderpr	<iref item="HeaderFieldProtection"/><xref target="headerfieldprote
	otection" format="none">ComposeNoHeaderProtection</xref></c>	ction" format="none">HeaderFieldProtection</xref></td>
	<c>Legacy message composition with end-to-end cryptographic protections (b	<td align="left">Calculate cryptographic protections for a Header Fi
	ut no header protection)</c>	eld in a given message</td>
	<c><xref target="composenoheaderprotection"/></c>	<td align="left">
	<c><iref item="Compose"/><xref target="compose-algorithm" format="none">Co	<xref target="headerfieldprotection"/></td>
	mpose</xref></c>	</tr>
	<c><iref item="Compose"/><xref target="compose-algorithm" format="none">Co	<tr>
	mpose</xref> a message with end-to-end cryptographic protections including heade	<td align="left">
	r protection</c>	<iref item="ReferenceHCP"/><xref target="referencehcp" format="non
	<c><xref target="compose-algorithm"/></c>	e">ReferenceHCP</xref></td>
	</texttable>	<td align="left">Produce an ephemeral <iref item="HCP"/><xref target
		="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> to use when responding
	</section>	to a given message</td>
	<section anchor="possible-problems-with-legacy-muas"><name>Possible Problems wit	<td align="left">
	h Legacy MUAs</name>	<xref target="referencehcp"/></td>
		</tr>
	<t>When an e-mail message with end-to-end cryptographic protection is received b	<tr>
	y a mail user agent, the user might experience many different possible problemat	<td align="left">
	ic interactions.	<iref item="ComposeNoHeaderProtection"/><xref target="composenohea
		derprotection" format="none">ComposeNoHeaderProtection</xref></td>
		<td align="left">Legacy message composition with end-to-end cryptogr
		aphic protections (but no header protection)</td>
		<td align="left">
		<xref target="composenoheaderprotection"/></td>
		</tr>
		<tr>
		<td align="left">
		<iref item="Compose"/><xref target="compose-algorithm" format="non
		e">Compose</xref></td>
		<td align="left">
		<iref item="Compose"/><xref target="compose-algorithm" format="non
		e">Compose</xref> a message with end-to-end cryptographic protections including
		header protection</td>
		<td align="left">
		<xref target="compose-algorithm"/></td>
		</tr>
		</tbody>
		</table>
		</section>
		<section anchor="possible-problems-with-legacy-muas">
		<name>Possible Problems with Legacy MUAs</name>
		<t>When an email message with end-to-end cryptographic protection is recei
		ved by a mail user agent, the user might experience many different possible prob
		lematic interactions.
	A message with Header Protection may introduce new forms of user experience fail ure.</t>	A message with Header Protection may introduce new forms of user experience fail ure.</t>

		<t>In this section, the authors enumerate different kinds of failures we h
	<t>In this section, the authors enumerate different kinds of failures we have ob	ave observed when reviewing, rendering, and replying to messages with different
	served when reviewing, rendering, and replying to messages with different forms	forms of Header Protection in different Legacy MUAs.
	of Header Protection in different Legacy MUAs.
	Different Legacy MUAs demonstrate different subsets of these problems.</t>	Different Legacy MUAs demonstrate different subsets of these problems.</t>

		<t>A conformant MUA would not exhibit any of these problems.
	<t>A conformant MUA would not exhibit any of these problems.
	An implementer updating their Legacy MUA to be compliant with this specification should consider these concerns and try to avoid them.</t>	An implementer updating their Legacy MUA to be compliant with this specification should consider these concerns and try to avoid them.</t>

		<t>Recall that "protected" refers to the "inner" values, e.g., the real <t
	<t>Recall that "protected" refers to the "inner" values, e.g., the real <spanx s	t>Subject</tt>, and "unprotected" refers to the "outer" values, e.g., the dummy
	tyle="verb">Subject</spanx>, and "unprotected" refers to the "outer" values, e.g	<tt>Subject</tt>.</t>
	., the dummy <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>.</t>	<section anchor="problems-viewing-messages-in-a-list-view">
		<name>Problems Viewing Messages in a List View</name>
	<section anchor="problems-viewing-messages-in-a-list-view"><name>Problems Viewin	<ul spacing="normal">
	g Messages in a List View</name>	<li>
		<t>Unprotected <tt>Subject</tt>, <tt>Date</tt>, <tt>From</tt>, and <
	<t><list style="symbols">	tt>To</tt> Header Fields are visible (instead of being replaced by protected val
	<t>Unprotected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Date</	ues)</t>
	spanx>, <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> Header	</li>
	Fields are visible (instead of being replaced by protected values)</t>	<li>
	<t>Threading is not visible</t>	<t>Threading is not visible</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
		</ul>
	</section>	</section>
	<section anchor="problems-when-rendering-a-message"><name>Problems when Renderin	<section anchor="problems-when-rendering-a-message">
	g a Message</name>	<name>Problems When Rendering a Message</name>
		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>Unprotected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> is visible</t>	<t>Unprotected <tt>Subject</tt> is visible</t>
	<t>Protected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> (on its own) is visible in th	</li>
	e body</t>	<li>
	<t>Protected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">Date</sp	<t>Protected <tt>Subject</tt> (on its own) is visible in the body</t
	anx>, <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">To</spanx> Heade	>
	r Fields visible in the body</t>	</li>
	<t>User interaction needed to view whole message</t>	<li>
	<t>User interaction needed to view message body</t>	<t>Protected <tt>Subject</tt>, <tt>Date</tt>, <tt>From</tt>, and <tt
	<t>User interaction needed to view protected subject</t>	>To</tt> Header Fields are visible in the body</t>
	<t>Impossible to view protected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx></t>	</li>
	<t>Nuisance alarms during user interaction</t>	<li>
	<t>Impossible to view message body</t>	<t>User interaction needed to view the whole message</t>
	<t>Appears as a forwarded message</t>	</li>
	<t>Appears as an attachment</t>	<li>
	<t>Security indicators not visible</t>	<t>User interaction needed to view the message body</t>
	<t>Security indicators do not identify protection status of Header Fields</t>	</li>
	<t>User has multiple different methods to reply (e.g., reply to outer, reply t	<li>
	o inner)</t>	<t>User interaction needed to view the protected <tt>Subject</tt></t
	<t>User sees English "Subject:" in body despite message itself being in non-En	>
	glish</t>	</li>
	<t>Security indicators do not identify protection status of Header Fields</t>	<li>
	<t>Header Fields in body render with local Header Field names (e.g., showing "	<t>Impossible to view the protected <tt>Subject</tt></t>
	Betreff" instead of "Subject") and dates (TZ, locale)</t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
		<t>Nuisance alarms during user interaction</t>
	</section>	</li>
	<section anchor="problems-when-replying-to-a-message"><name>Problems when Replyi	<li>
	ng to a Message</name>	<t>Impossible to view the message body</t>
		</li>
	<t>Note that the use case here is:</t>	<li>
		<t>Appears as a forwarded message</t>
	<t><list style="symbols">	</li>
	<t>User views message, to the point where they can read it</t>	<li>
	<t>User then replies to message, and they are shown a message composition wind	<t>Appears as an attachment</t>
	ow, which has some UI elements</t>	</li>
	<t>If the MUA has multiple different methods to reply to a message, each way m	<li>
	ay need to be evaluated separately</t>	<t>Security indicators not visible</t>
	</list></t>	</li>
		<li>
	<t>This section also uses the shorthand UI:x to mean "the UI element that the us	<t>Security indicators do not identify the protection status of Head
	er can edit that they think of as x."</t>	er Fields</t>
		</li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>Unprotected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> is in UI:subject (instead o	<t>User has multiple different methods to reply (e.g., reply to oute
	f the protected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>)</t>	r, reply to inner)</t>
	<t>Protected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> is quoted in UI:body (from Le	</li>
	gacy Display Element)</t>	<li>
	<t>Protected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> leaks when the reply is seria	<t>User sees English "Subject:" in body despite message itself being
	lised into MIME</t>	in non-English</t>
	<t>Protected <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> is not anywhere in UI</t>	</li>
	<t>Message body is <em>not</em> visible/quoted in UI:body</t>	<li>
	<t>User cannot reply while viewing protected message</t>	<t>Security indicators do not identify the protection status of Head
	<t>Reply is not encrypted by default (but is for legacy signed-and-encrypted m	er Fields</t>
	essages without Header Protection)</t>	</li>
	<t>Unprotected <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">Reply-T	<li>
	o</spanx> Header Field is in UI:To (instead of the protected <spanx style="verb"	<t>Header Fields in the body render with local Header Field names (e
	>From</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">Reply-To</spanx> Header Field)</t>	.g., showing "Betreff" instead of "Subject") and dates (TZ, locale)</t>
	<t>User's locale (lang, TZ) leaks in quoted body</t>	</li>
	<t>Header Fields not protected (and in particular, <spanx style="verb">Subject	</ul>
	</spanx> is not obscured) by default</t>	</section>
	</list></t>	<section anchor="problems-when-replying-to-a-message">
		<name>Problems When Replying to a Message</name>
	</section>	<t>Note that the use case here is:</t>
	</section>	<ul spacing="normal">
	<section anchor="test-vectors"><name>Test Vectors</name>	<li>
		<t>User views a message, to the point where they can read it</t>
	<t>This section contains sample messages using the specification defined above.	</li>
		<li>
		<t>User then replies to the message, and they are shown a message co
		mposition window, which has some UI elements</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>If the MUA has multiple different methods to reply to a message,
		each way may need to be evaluated separately</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>This section also uses the shorthand UI:x to mean "the UI element tha
		t the user can edit that they think of as x".</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>Unprotected <tt>Subject</tt> is in UI:subject (instead of the pro
		tected <tt>Subject</tt>)</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Protected <tt>Subject</tt> is quoted in UI:body (from Legacy Disp
		lay Element)</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Protected <tt>Subject</tt> leaks when the reply is serialized int
		o MIME</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Protected <tt>Subject</tt> is not anywhere in UI</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Message body is <em>not</em> visible/quoted in UI:body</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>User cannot reply while viewing protected message</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Reply is not encrypted by default (but is for legacy signed-and-e
		ncrypted messages without Header Protection)</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Unprotected <tt>From</tt> or <tt>Reply-To</tt> Header Field is in
		UI:To (instead of the protected <tt>From</tt> or <tt>Reply-To</tt> Header Field
		)</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>User's locale (lang, TZ) leaks in quoted body</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Header Fields not protected (and in particular, <tt>Subject</tt>
		is not obscured) by default</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="test-vectors">
		<name>Test Vectors</name>
		<t>This section contains sample messages using the specification defined a
		bove.
	Each sample contains a MIME object, a textual and diagrammatic view of its struc ture, and examples of how an MUA might render it.</t>	Each sample contains a MIME object, a textual and diagrammatic view of its struc ture, and examples of how an MUA might render it.</t>

		<t>The cryptographic protections used in this document use the S/MIME stan
	<t>The cryptographic protections used in this document use the S/MIME standard,	dard, and keying material and certificates come from <xref target="RFC9216"/>.</
	and keying material and certificates come from <xref target="RFC9216"/>.</t>	t>
		<t>These messages should be accessible to any IMAP client at <tt>imap://bo
	<t>These messages should be accessible to any IMAP client at <spanx style="verb"	b@header-protection.cmrg.net/</tt> (any password should authenticate to this rea
	>imap://bob@header-protection.cmrg.net/</spanx> (any password should authenticat	d-only IMAP mailbox).</t>
	e to this read-only IMAP mailbox).</t>	<t>Copies of these test vectors can also be downloaded separately at <eref
		target="https://header-protection.cmrg.net" brackets="angle"/>.</t>
	<t>You can also download copies of these test vectors separately at <spanx style	<t>If any of the messages downloaded differ from those offered here, this
	="verb">https://header-protection.cmrg.net</spanx>.</t>	document is the canonical source.</t>
		<section anchor="baseline-messages">
	<t>If any of the messages downloaded differ from those offered here, this docume	<name>Baseline Messages</name>
	nt is the canonical source.</t>	<t>These messages offer no header protection at all and can be used as a
		baseline.
	<section anchor="baseline-messages"><name>Baseline Messages</name>

	<t>These messages offer no header protection at all, and can be used as a baseli
	ne.
	They are provided in this document as a counterexample.	They are provided in this document as a counterexample.
	An MUA implementer can use these messages to verify that the reported cryptograp hic summary of the message indicates no header protection.</t>	An MUA implementer can use these messages to verify that the reported cryptograp hic summary of the message indicates no header protection.</t>

		<section anchor="no-crypto">
	<section anchor="no-crypto"><name>No Cryptographic Protections Over a Simple Mes	<name>No Cryptographic Protections over a Simple Message</name>
	sage</name>	<t>This message uses no cryptographic protection at all. Its body is
		a text/plain message.</t>
	<t>This message uses no cryptographic protection at all. Its body is a text/pla	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	in message.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴text/plain 152 bytes	└─╴text/plain 152 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="no-crypto.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="no-crypto.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: no-crypto	Subject: no-crypto
	Message-ID: <no-crypto@example>	Message-ID: <no-crypto@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:00:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:00:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	This is the	This is the
	no-crypto	no-crypto
	message.	message.

	This message uses no cryptographic protection at all. Its body	This message uses no cryptographic protection at all. Its body
	is a text/plain message.	is a text/plain message.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-one-part">
	<section anchor="smime-one-part"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Over a Simp	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Simple Message, No Header P
	le Message, No Header Protection</name>	rotection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The pa
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The payload is a	yload is a text/plain message. It uses no header protection.</t>
	text/plain message. It uses no header protection.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 3856 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 3856 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 206 bytes	└─╴text/plain 206 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"
	Subject: smime-one-part	Subject: smime-one-part
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:01:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:01:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 2991 ¶	skipping to change at line 2884 ¶
	UyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6a	UyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6a
	qdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq	qdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq
	hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUwMTAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgrhyFjywc	hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUwMTAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgrhyFjywc
	FLYzlCbb/xsgb5+a0sgYLUg094upq1ZXLWswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEABOi5	FLYzlCbb/xsgb5+a0sgYLUg094upq1ZXLWswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEABOi5
	kcjRmMF4LK94svcfl92padnfUTSyjJtrIf6R6C7xy87VzsmPOPCmHgZOmTCuvY2D	kcjRmMF4LK94svcfl92padnfUTSyjJtrIf6R6C7xy87VzsmPOPCmHgZOmTCuvY2D
	iKuMId6WPVdjuRUaW6xkgYtgYjPDhy80NY0a9wXEQtjn448G0UHdM21cJyu9LTAg	iKuMId6WPVdjuRUaW6xkgYtgYjPDhy80NY0a9wXEQtjn448G0UHdM21cJyu9LTAg
	orSzcT2pwEuGzNdsHW8LB5GtJKYct3RS0+jlbSr7WpZFY1mUrwpsm2r8za2KoOcy	orSzcT2pwEuGzNdsHW8LB5GtJKYct3RS0+jlbSr7WpZFY1mUrwpsm2r8za2KoOcy
	t/E7Qz/8hT4HU52Na7pS1ZnxrasLr5prSjDSSKs4QK3ncJR8jhF9by0pDCoYgswy	t/E7Qz/8hT4HU52Na7pS1ZnxrasLr5prSjDSSKs4QK3ncJR8jhF9by0pDCoYgswy
	zYaeJt0N+8uv7ab/kBaE3wfZlipMSFRJIlh+QeXCkIHo5fW5bn/REZHxMMdMfdPh	zYaeJt0N+8uv7ab/kBaE3wfZlipMSFRJIlh+QeXCkIHo5fW5bn/REZHxMMdMfdPh
	bqYT1i46156CSOqyxA==	bqYT1i46156CSOqyxA==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-simple-message-no
	<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-simple-message-no-header-pr	-header-protection-unwrapped">
	otection-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Over a Simple Message, N	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Simple Message, No Header
	o Header Protection, Unwrapped</name>	Protection, Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part.unwrapped.eml
		"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part.unwrapped.eml"><!
	[CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

	This is the	This is the
	smime-one-part	smime-one-part
	message.	message.

	This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The	This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The
	payload is a text/plain message. It uses no header protection.	payload is a text/plain message. It uses no header protection.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-multipart">
	<section anchor="smime-multipart"><name>S/MIME Signed-only multipart/signed Over	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only multipart/signed over a Simple Message, No He
	a Simple Message, No Header Protection</name>	ader Protection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature (multipart	(multipart/signed). The payload is a text/plain message. It uses no header prot
	/signed). The payload is a text/plain message. It uses no header protection.</t	ection.</t>
	>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└┬╴multipart/signed 4187 bytes	└┬╴multipart/signed 4187 bytes
	├─╴text/plain 224 bytes	├─╴text/plain 224 bytes
	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/signed;	Content-Type: multipart/signed;
	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="253";	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="253";
	micalg="sha-256"	micalg="sha-256"
	Subject: smime-multipart	Subject: smime-multipart
	Message-ID: <smime-multipart@example>	Message-ID: <smime-multipart@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:02:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:02:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 3118 ¶	skipping to change at line 3004 ¶
	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNTAyMDJa	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNTAyMDJa
	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCAB+IATfw3+2kO9hwjUYxzW+Z12sfFp2dTb1pmXGS+7	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCAB+IATfw3+2kO9hwjUYxzW+Z12sfFp2dTb1pmXGS+7
	DzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQANJdfU8DtOpINW4FeIWpdexndYvHYy7jFg5ICy	DzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQANJdfU8DtOpINW4FeIWpdexndYvHYy7jFg5ICy
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	OjyGnuiEJJbRG2UUZZWMyJW2g8OZRAGZjYgEgvbVflmxqRjFRaeLGUorHaHoxk40	OjyGnuiEJJbRG2UUZZWMyJW2g8OZRAGZjYgEgvbVflmxqRjFRaeLGUorHaHoxk40
	LomKSVRTUG11eEhmRmxIY4wKhwc0U9PKjCQFrhu3t1ZkGSfPn9jvdNTJkg85WUpk	LomKSVRTUG11eEhmRmxIY4wKhwc0U9PKjCQFrhu3t1ZkGSfPn9jvdNTJkg85WUpk
	WqmOyrup6DH4Gb84By+0IMk3vflrOyAw3kbsj6Ij+zymAlH61YypnAvddFBIuZPL	WqmOyrup6DH4Gb84By+0IMk3vflrOyAw3kbsj6Ij+zymAlH61YypnAvddFBIuZPL
	2LYdIHPLmq8KGrzcgjkjP+Y58hf9U+6gp0KPuS8DAGOvxYs0	2LYdIHPLmq8KGrzcgjkjP+Y58hf9U+6gp0KPuS8DAGOvxYs0

	--253--	--253--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Simp	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, No Header Pro
	le Message, No Header Protection</name>	tection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses no header
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses no header protectio	protection.</t>
	n.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6720 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6720 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 3960 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 3960 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 241 bytes	└─╴text/plain 241 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc.eml"><![CDATA
		[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: smime-signed-enc	Subject: smime-signed-enc
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:03:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:03:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 3252 ¶	skipping to change at line 3133 ¶
	dIZQkGYe3KJhMvHvkA40IEjGljU95Bx+bFoojWUaMUI4wlhhz0bppZF/bkENLhGq	dIZQkGYe3KJhMvHvkA40IEjGljU95Bx+bFoojWUaMUI4wlhhz0bppZF/bkENLhGq
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	RVZ0xXALDuEEuUJLjlSrwRVOx5drsqLoClAeH1Li/ZFm+I6qA2pVKrxohwndGimR	RVZ0xXALDuEEuUJLjlSrwRVOx5drsqLoClAeH1Li/ZFm+I6qA2pVKrxohwndGimR
	3FVKgLzC1srGGXsIGqoq5ueeN2ZTIQ6OyJh/ERLFd0uEeVCv7UIBRwQ9WrNaaFY1	3FVKgLzC1srGGXsIGqoq5ueeN2ZTIQ6OyJh/ERLFd0uEeVCv7UIBRwQ9WrNaaFY1
	1OtoJc+0XZ617xSFoKWnyA==	1OtoJc+0XZ617xSFoKWnyA==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-no-h
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-no-header-prot	eader-protection-decrypted">
	ection-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Simple Message, No He	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, No Header P
	ader Protection, Decrypted</name>	rotection, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc.decrypted.e
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc.decrypted.eml">	ml"><![CDATA[
	<![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIILPAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIILLTCCCykCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggFlBgkq	MIILPAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIILLTCCCykCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggFlBgkq
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	skipping to change at line 3323 ¶	skipping to change at line 3202 ¶
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	237ni7VR/Rz/uz3TnheOsBk7H/AEmKIaPBnJj8wFoc6E8Vtusy5ZIrhX6YEq6e3A	237ni7VR/Rz/uz3TnheOsBk7H/AEmKIaPBnJj8wFoc6E8Vtusy5ZIrhX6YEq6e3A
	YIJ01cm+cNWBa7kORT2pyKZ3yF2IIcoqyEfw/QkPkh6KM5hKSOUhvbQRPdKOv5u+	YIJ01cm+cNWBa7kORT2pyKZ3yF2IIcoqyEfw/QkPkh6KM5hKSOUhvbQRPdKOv5u+
	r/KmOuAbX04XzLZY+RYFdPG/grj+YxeJEgZlUfLgx8pJET9J0RkTImNh1zVVU+r4	r/KmOuAbX04XzLZY+RYFdPG/grj+YxeJEgZlUfLgx8pJET9J0RkTImNh1zVVU+r4

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-no-h
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-no-header-prot	eader-protection-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	ection-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Simple	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, No Header P
	Message, No Header Protection, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	rotection, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc.decrypted.u
		nwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc.decrypted.unwra
	pped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

	This is the	This is the
	smime-signed-enc	smime-signed-enc
	message.	message.

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses no header protection.	message. It uses no header protection.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="no-crypto-complex">
	<section anchor="no-crypto-complex"><name>No Cryptographic Protections Over a Co	<name>No Cryptographic Protections over a Complex Message</name>
	mplex Message</name>	<t>This message uses no cryptographic protection at all. Its body is
		a multipart/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment.</t>
	<t>This message uses no cryptographic protection at all. Its body is a multipar	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	t/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1402 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1402 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 794 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 794 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 206 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 206 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 304 bytes	│└─╴text/html 304 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="no-crypto-complex.eml"><![CDAT
		A[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="no-crypto-complex.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="e68"	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="e68"
	Subject: no-crypto-complex	Subject: no-crypto-complex
	Message-ID: <no-crypto-complex@example>	Message-ID: <no-crypto-complex@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:00:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:00:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	--e68	--e68

	skipping to change at line 3422 ¶	skipping to change at line 3294 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--e68--	--e68--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-one-part-complex">
	<section anchor="smime-one-part-complex"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Ove	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Complex Message, No Header
	r a Complex Message, No Header Protection</name>	Protection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The pa
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The payload is a	yload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment. It
	multipart/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment. It uses no h	uses no header protection.</t>
	eader protection.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5253 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5253 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1288 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1288 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 882 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 882 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 260 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 260 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 355 bytes	│└─╴text/html 355 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex.eml"><!
		[CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex.eml"><![C
	DATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"
	Subject: smime-one-part-complex	Subject: smime-one-part-complex
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:01:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:01:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 3535 ¶	skipping to change at line 3402 ¶
	UyBXRzExMC8GA1UEAxMoU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1	UyBXRzExMC8GA1UEAxMoU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1
	dGhvcml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkq	dGhvcml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkq
	hkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzAx	hkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzAx
	MDJaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDw/DGldVr1aM/U2iIYH8C6YHSKLUihv8FIEUZC	MDJaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDw/DGldVr1aM/U2iIYH8C6YHSKLUihv8FIEUZC
	JPECvDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQA/sn8ReNdvJH8O3Ejzs7eF6tBy6DYD5dFE	JPECvDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQA/sn8ReNdvJH8O3Ejzs7eF6tBy6DYD5dFE
	aLVxB6o3G6qHcupmwvHvL6zouALUoh+zkYRxuWNcPQGfbUqXoAC2cQ6ejwtz3Qnm	aLVxB6o3G6qHcupmwvHvL6zouALUoh+zkYRxuWNcPQGfbUqXoAC2cQ6ejwtz3Qnm
	4L6amZZQC3NnwFfytOrIvGrMdT1M/39igmep2ZUq9BQS7vq0mYQzSgkGm148yOfI	4L6amZZQC3NnwFfytOrIvGrMdT1M/39igmep2ZUq9BQS7vq0mYQzSgkGm148yOfI
	QDeuJZGcw1EcFZuFUZPX4J9kvUu5twvDQoPnTitPVGJ9C2lB6PRkYjKW7JAmNtBL	QDeuJZGcw1EcFZuFUZPX4J9kvUu5twvDQoPnTitPVGJ9C2lB6PRkYjKW7JAmNtBL
	qRbwZbtOjbrhAszzkRG5P8jR+35FIkG6abSF8hwYix0fJokUn3YnU7G6pRM7DSGg	qRbwZbtOjbrhAszzkRG5P8jR+35FIkG6abSF8hwYix0fJokUn3YnU7G6pRM7DSGg
	S9MtDUy34GTkdUQ7OXFlLa5kpQfUFBbQ5qflKUvIrBsYX6qjWAVs	S9MtDUy34GTkdUQ7OXFlLa5kpQfUFBbQ5qflKUvIrBsYX6qjWAVs

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-complex-message-n
	<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-complex-message-no-header-p	o-header-protection-unwrapped">
	rotection-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Over a Complex Message,	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Complex Message, No Heade
	No Header Protection, Unwrapped</name>	r Protection, Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex.unwra
		pped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex.unwrapped
	.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="533"	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="533"

	--533	--533
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="931"	Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="931"

	--931	--931
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0

	skipping to change at line 3591 ¶	skipping to change at line 3456 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--533--	--533--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-multipart-complex">
	<section anchor="smime-multipart-complex"><name>S/MIME Signed-only multipart/sig	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only multipart/signed over a Complex Message, No H
	ned Over a Complex Message, No Header Protection</name>	eader Protection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature (multipart	(multipart/signed). The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inli
	/signed). The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline image/p	ne image/png attachment. It uses no header protection.</t>
	ng attachment. It uses no header protection.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└┬╴multipart/signed 5230 bytes	└┬╴multipart/signed 5230 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/mixed 1344 bytes	├┬╴multipart/mixed 1344 bytes
	│├┬╴multipart/alternative 938 bytes	│├┬╴multipart/alternative 938 bytes
	││├─╴text/plain 278 bytes	││├─╴text/plain 278 bytes
	││└─╴text/html 376 bytes	││└─╴text/html 376 bytes
	│└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes	│└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes
	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-complex.eml"><
		![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-complex.eml"><![
	CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/signed;	Content-Type: multipart/signed;
	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="4e5";	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="4e5";
	micalg="sha-256"	micalg="sha-256"
	Subject: smime-multipart-complex	Subject: smime-multipart-complex
	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-complex@example>	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-complex@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:02:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:02:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 3737 ¶	skipping to change at line 3597 ¶
	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzAyMDJa	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzAyMDJa
	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDQTcb+2QaMhBSlslOnLpojyHSnq4gNzFYU45gwqAHj	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDQTcb+2QaMhBSlslOnLpojyHSnq4gNzFYU45gwqAHj
	7jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQCYM1/HD0Ka4aZwwLS4xMGoyFzGn5G2C3ph0jKS	7jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQCYM1/HD0Ka4aZwwLS4xMGoyFzGn5G2C3ph0jKS
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	3w6gm+bTL4NDNWwXXSn5wfm9Ru05b3eAEv9pADPZ2TKZPxzrfe4wPNzArgYwdn3k	3w6gm+bTL4NDNWwXXSn5wfm9Ru05b3eAEv9pADPZ2TKZPxzrfe4wPNzArgYwdn3k
	6NdLvgw4mZmSSiOyOlfKo3cgo4rZuN6CeLCgqZ0GjIJS43v+	6NdLvgw4mZmSSiOyOlfKo3cgo4rZuN6CeLCgqZ0GjIJS43v+

	--4e5--	--4e5--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Ove	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, No Header Pr
	r a Complex Message, No Header Protection</name>	otection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	inline image/png attachment. It uses no header protection.</t>
	age/png attachment. It uses no header protection.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8710 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8710 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5434 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5434 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1356 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1356 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 950 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 950 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 295 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 295 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 390 bytes	│└─╴text/html 390 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex.eml">
		<![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex.eml"><!
	[CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:03:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:03:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 3905 ¶	skipping to change at line 3760 ¶
	cKwLe/UamiqdfPOVQeeN/BkXXaqr2EPDKUSeaShDrui+VKTvgKbJDbImWJjdhjQd	cKwLe/UamiqdfPOVQeeN/BkXXaqr2EPDKUSeaShDrui+VKTvgKbJDbImWJjdhjQd
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	vtvsfFtuDu5BALHyKAlf67WbdKfFYqfktnmR2rPXa5U/3WWiS6cOLly6h+cseQvS	vtvsfFtuDu5BALHyKAlf67WbdKfFYqfktnmR2rPXa5U/3WWiS6cOLly6h+cseQvS
	bPn77hbn6y2tRQOIMstJ7pBIlim6m/duKc7PZz1u/tANP/gKkHzthMyAErEOPmqM	bPn77hbn6y2tRQOIMstJ7pBIlim6m/duKc7PZz1u/tANP/gKkHzthMyAErEOPmqM
	Plfvt8ju0UpwGpiF1T1E3SRodx5/q8NV6TSKANWeKN7nahusiB5CVO2EclhjATXR	Plfvt8ju0UpwGpiF1T1E3SRodx5/q8NV6TSKANWeKN7nahusiB5CVO2EclhjATXR
	XmPo08kyxwYYK7P+oBOXsE2gM/uZy3If5hIEfmxxJ+5F19cNiotTQwJM7Jmbag1O	XmPo08kyxwYYK7P+oBOXsE2gM/uZy3If5hIEfmxxJ+5F19cNiotTQwJM7Jmbag1O
	MtW7IWC7g+sDYln9L8hCxnCjoH331ss7c3470XB9pTy8EBnRdX5IRW9QuoRcMcZw	MtW7IWC7g+sDYln9L8hCxnCjoH331ss7c3470XB9pTy8EBnRdX5IRW9QuoRcMcZw

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-no-
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-no-header-pro	header-protection-decrypted">
	tection-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Complex Message, No	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, No Header
	Header Protection, Decrypted</name>	Protection, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex.dec
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex.decrypt	rypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	ed.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIPaQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIPWjCCD1YCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggWSBgkq	MIIPaQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIPWjCCD1YCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggWSBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggWDBIIFf01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVR5cGU6	hkiG9w0BBwGgggWDBIIFf01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVR5cGU6
	IG11bHRpcGFydC9taXhlZDsgYm91bmRhcnk9IjUwOCINCg0KLS01MDgNCk1JTUUt	IG11bHRpcGFydC9taXhlZDsgYm91bmRhcnk9IjUwOCINCg0KLS01MDgNCk1JTUUt
	VmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVR5cGU6IG11bHRpcGFydC9hbHRlcm5hdGl2	VmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVR5cGU6IG11bHRpcGFydC9hbHRlcm5hdGl2
	ZTsgYm91bmRhcnk9IjgwNCINCg0KLS04MDQNCkNvbnRlbnQtVHlwZTogdGV4dC9w	ZTsgYm91bmRhcnk9IjgwNCINCg0KLS04MDQNCkNvbnRlbnQtVHlwZTogdGV4dC9w
	bGFpbjsgY2hhcnNldD0idXMtYXNjaWkiDQpNSU1FLVZlcnNpb246IDEuMA0KQ29u	bGFpbjsgY2hhcnNldD0idXMtYXNjaWkiDQpNSU1FLVZlcnNpb246IDEuMA0KQ29u

	skipping to change at line 3999 ¶	skipping to change at line 3852 ¶
	UyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6a	UyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6a
	qdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq	qdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq
	hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTcwMzAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgXYQxbGVS	hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTcwMzAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgXYQxbGVS
	YbD1RRyrYjMaj8vm0wJceMeGDm9qv/JsQlgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAbtxK	YbD1RRyrYjMaj8vm0wJceMeGDm9qv/JsQlgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAbtxK
	BK0ie88UC9KGR0/nHIWpXJOnN1/tXtEWsLoypwYiw8XKgcN8zgZ06RikcGX12ijW	BK0ie88UC9KGR0/nHIWpXJOnN1/tXtEWsLoypwYiw8XKgcN8zgZ06RikcGX12ijW
	Gz2wgA2yIRfnzWBvS6zmBc9r37klP8uhB0GgPrPFTtq+GeLn9hUApYQTb20HlSKM	Gz2wgA2yIRfnzWBvS6zmBc9r37klP8uhB0GgPrPFTtq+GeLn9hUApYQTb20HlSKM
	e34oCU7qv0lYFfN0sDlwxkha1X3AAg4QFcUrnLJRkYFWDH6XvxsHNiLznwsF/+B1	e34oCU7qv0lYFfN0sDlwxkha1X3AAg4QFcUrnLJRkYFWDH6XvxsHNiLznwsF/+B1
	uNiPIi7rhKgG3oLYu4H8qGolM5H+gyl7+h4t8hUHZVTxZ6QyTO0K+D2JO8aazcor	uNiPIi7rhKgG3oLYu4H8qGolM5H+gyl7+h4t8hUHZVTxZ6QyTO0K+D2JO8aazcor
	PgJsa85BUfcx0JXsixcqtLzTAfsPOAQBl1CUHEied1qX6nlMb2gCxP6psFEXPRGM	PgJsa85BUfcx0JXsixcqtLzTAfsPOAQBl1CUHEied1qX6nlMb2gCxP6psFEXPRGM
	rxSLzwv5QtKJCaDfYw==	rxSLzwv5QtKJCaDfYw==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-no-
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-no-header-pro	header-protection-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	tection-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Comple	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, No Header
	x Message, No Header Protection, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	Protection, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex.dec
		rypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex.decrypt
	ed.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="508"	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="508"

	--508	--508
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="804"	Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="804"

	--804	--804
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0

	skipping to change at line 4058 ¶	skipping to change at line 3909 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--508--	--508--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="signed-only-messages">
	<section anchor="signed-only-messages"><name>Signed-only Messages</name>	<name>Signed-Only Messages</name>
		<t>These messages are signed-only, using different schemes of header pro
	<t>These messages are signed-only, using different schemes of header protection	tection and different S/MIME structures.
	and different S/MIME structure.	They use no <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="hea
	The use no <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-conf	der-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> b
	identiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> because t	ecause the HCP is only relevant when a message is encrypted.</t>
	he hcp is only relevant when a message is encrypted.</t>


	<section anchor="smime-one-part-hp"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Over a S	<!--[rfced] What does "the draft" refer to in the sentence below?
	imple Message, Header Protection</name>	Should this be updated to "the draft message"? Note that there are
		other occurrences like the example listed below that are used throughout
		the appendices of this document.


	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The payload is a	Original:
	text/plain message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft.</t>	It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft.


	<t>It has the following structure:</t>	Perhaps:
		It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft message.
		-->


	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[	<section anchor="smime-one-part-hp">
		<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Simple Message, Header Prot
		ection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The pa
		yload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the dra
		ft.</t>
		<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4189 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4189 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 233 bytes	└─╴text/plain 233 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-hp.eml"><![CDAT
		A[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-hp.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"
	Subject: smime-one-part-hp	Subject: smime-one-part-hp
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:06:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:06:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 4158 ¶	skipping to change at line 4016 ¶
	bGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/Qqmi	bGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/Qqmi
	XDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0B	XDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0B
	BwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MDYwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIE	BwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MDYwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIE
	IHBk91pcJj0zJrTyROHOdfUnQMoctIHVb6WXTpS3gYxlMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA	IHBk91pcJj0zJrTyROHOdfUnQMoctIHVb6WXTpS3gYxlMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA
	BIIBABWhy/yIy9RLS3OdZZTlUNChBhzNHjpSSoL3v0JmzOHeYJVblzBgpyPU33Tu	BIIBABWhy/yIy9RLS3OdZZTlUNChBhzNHjpSSoL3v0JmzOHeYJVblzBgpyPU33Tu
	JALxlGuGp4ybO16yQREHMXNFZJkrqWcIAMZG/4tG7WIHXm0AGIcxl8BKKEpn8t1m	JALxlGuGp4ybO16yQREHMXNFZJkrqWcIAMZG/4tG7WIHXm0AGIcxl8BKKEpn8t1m
	kiOO/NWzFY9TW1pYd/+CC7Q8Asc+S2Nd269HGrFFpL36r74Gt2xJDxn11N3coBh3	kiOO/NWzFY9TW1pYd/+CC7Q8Asc+S2Nd269HGrFFpL36r74Gt2xJDxn11N3coBh3
	khaFt+p5GkqqrNUtfGeo0ifF+66x/oW9A/AtNE+iKwx7mEtukOhBgTXgyr3bi+ev	khaFt+p5GkqqrNUtfGeo0ifF+66x/oW9A/AtNE+iKwx7mEtukOhBgTXgyr3bi+ev
	sEQzWYVLyVS7TCsCM5A1LxHZHv5gVcX1EMTZi7rRaNKKEmUcA9vbJYBSOWlmR/o4	sEQzWYVLyVS7TCsCM5A1LxHZHv5gVcX1EMTZi7rRaNKKEmUcA9vbJYBSOWlmR/o4
	FeLYNUvUvFXvV9YCb/0R0pgp9Aw=	FeLYNUvUvFXvV9YCb/0R0pgp9Aw=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-simple-message-he
	<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-simple-message-header-prote	ader-protection-unwrapped">
	ction-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Over a Simple Message, Head	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Simple Message, Header Pr
	er Protection, Unwrapped</name>	otection, Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-hp.unwrapped.
		eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-hp.unwrapped.eml"
	><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-one-part-hp	Subject: smime-one-part-hp
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:06:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:06:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; hp="clear"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; hp="clear"


	skipping to change at line 4186 ¶	skipping to change at line 4042 ¶
	smime-one-part-hp	smime-one-part-hp
	message.	message.

	This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The	This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The
	payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protection	payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protection
	scheme from the draft.	scheme from the draft.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-multipart-hp">
	<section anchor="smime-multipart-hp"><name>S/MIME Signed-only multipart/signed O	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only multipart/signed over a Simple Message, Heade
	ver a Simple Message, Header Protection</name>	r Protection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature (multipart	(multipart/signed). The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Pro
	/signed). The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protection sc	tection scheme from the draft.</t>
	heme from the draft.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└┬╴multipart/signed 4435 bytes	└┬╴multipart/signed 4435 bytes
	├─╴text/plain 250 bytes	├─╴text/plain 250 bytes
	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-hp.eml"><![CDA
		TA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-hp.eml"><![CDATA
	[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/signed;	Content-Type: multipart/signed;
	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="78f";	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="78f";
	micalg="sha-256"	micalg="sha-256"
	Subject: smime-multipart-hp	Subject: smime-multipart-hp
	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:07:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:07:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 4298 ¶	skipping to change at line 4149 ¶
	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNTA3MDJa	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNTA3MDJa
	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCAIw1Q7hUXhrDaz3lXMFP0A3q3nvlhWh9ejLg/g9kjk	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCAIw1Q7hUXhrDaz3lXMFP0A3q3nvlhWh9ejLg/g9kjk
	vDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQAcl0M6ZwFAzFvsP+/siWSN0EM0YWxuOzvCmSWC	vDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQAcl0M6ZwFAzFvsP+/siWSN0EM0YWxuOzvCmSWC
	0QwnAQ/dSwXcKMcej0wWMKTDTQSYBUjxFVE0chcK6FMH2gHDVb/PztWrSECmvh6F	0QwnAQ/dSwXcKMcej0wWMKTDTQSYBUjxFVE0chcK6FMH2gHDVb/PztWrSECmvh6F
	utJ2SRxs0uGrFkee3hR0kowuOu9pDXasLtWP2MnB5pSMWX5QMpya1UxYcbIoaUOx	utJ2SRxs0uGrFkee3hR0kowuOu9pDXasLtWP2MnB5pSMWX5QMpya1UxYcbIoaUOx
	Jeu5zjbYf/Oo2tINvZHP+r+wxQZ7qTaEzviQ+IV0KoJanfU3Qd/giS6MuySwozwP	Jeu5zjbYf/Oo2tINvZHP+r+wxQZ7qTaEzviQ+IV0KoJanfU3Qd/giS6MuySwozwP
	r3E7YAy3O9dZT7zL6AR5CsC1I0coo7X1PRNnBXXLMEcR/v5cXniGV+GNf8xYaiGA	r3E7YAy3O9dZT7zL6AR5CsC1I0coo7X1PRNnBXXLMEcR/v5cXniGV+GNf8xYaiGA
	iT9IwijZa6psfTSFjzUWTIc0jGx3GcLZr+BIm+MEBCSRzDum	iT9IwijZa6psfTSFjzUWTIc0jGx3GcLZr+BIm+MEBCSRzDum

	--78f--	--78f--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-one-part-complex-hp">
	<section anchor="smime-one-part-complex-hp"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	Over a Complex Message, Header Protection</name>	tection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The pa
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The payload is a	yload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment. It
	multipart/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment. It uses the	uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft.</t>
	Header Protection scheme from the draft.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5647 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5647 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1570 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1570 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 934 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 934 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 287 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 287 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 382 bytes	│└─╴text/html 382 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-hp.eml"
		><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-hp.eml"><
	![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"
	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-hp	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-hp
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:06:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:06:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 4417 ¶	skipping to change at line 4263 ¶
	TVBTIFdHMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24g	TVBTIFdHMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24g
	QXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgG	QXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgG
	CSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3	CSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3
	MDYwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIGbRm8jphDRUXRWIk4vxhAup+YZsmtrednWv	MDYwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIGbRm8jphDRUXRWIk4vxhAup+YZsmtrednWv
	3iPoigWSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAEHG833PIy7iky9Ok2pN22fjSF6xtjlt	3iPoigWSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAEHG833PIy7iky9Ok2pN22fjSF6xtjlt
	h1Pi4Eh9PSjQ5Rdrsv9pJFFsBhSLOXv+O8fwYfS1rUrgwsCVMO64zz5MT1Kj4Y4Z	h1Pi4Eh9PSjQ5Rdrsv9pJFFsBhSLOXv+O8fwYfS1rUrgwsCVMO64zz5MT1Kj4Y4Z
	a6ztE9weXTlciQydOWER6lV1BDP4GwUaz+BBCoKKB0DTHq+nPNo97XtTCUfo55Vz	a6ztE9weXTlciQydOWER6lV1BDP4GwUaz+BBCoKKB0DTHq+nPNo97XtTCUfo55Vz
	55vmNXxqWQ952hzw+qxxTxKzdYApFd9cZYzvV4otZgtvZDu3sn6GWFCtVpN4+6TR	55vmNXxqWQ952hzw+qxxTxKzdYApFd9cZYzvV4otZgtvZDu3sn6GWFCtVpN4+6TR
	xClE93q+LZwvJyXFRFWHcKqpUfQ16ZAomBadrJ1RU3BmRXnC6DAI/J/yhm7OegdN	xClE93q+LZwvJyXFRFWHcKqpUfQ16ZAomBadrJ1RU3BmRXnC6DAI/J/yhm7OegdN
	0Or/+EuyWAzp0r/GCsSGXt2owaAkGPuZf6kPc0mLhb/VFdeY16wy9J0=	0Or/+EuyWAzp0r/GCsSGXt2owaAkGPuZf6kPc0mLhb/VFdeY16wy9J0=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-complex-message-h
	<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-complex-message-header-prot	eader-protection-unwrapped">
	ection-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Over a Complex Message, He	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Complex Message, Header P
	ader Protection, Unwrapped</name>	rotection, Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-hp.un
		wrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-hp.unwrap
	ped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-hp	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-hp
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:06:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:06:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="e2e"; hp="clear"	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="e2e"; hp="clear"

	--e2e	--e2e

	skipping to change at line 4481 ¶	skipping to change at line 4325 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--e2e--	--e2e--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-multipart-complex-hp">
	<section anchor="smime-multipart-complex-hp"><name>S/MIME Signed-only multipart/	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only multipart/signed over a Complex Message, Head
	signed Over a Complex Message, Header Protection</name>	er Protection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature (multipart	(multipart/signed). The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inli
	/signed). The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline image/p	ne image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft.</t
	ng attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft.</t>	>
		<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└┬╴multipart/signed 5520 bytes	└┬╴multipart/signed 5520 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/mixed 1628 bytes	├┬╴multipart/mixed 1628 bytes
	│├┬╴multipart/alternative 990 bytes	│├┬╴multipart/alternative 990 bytes
	││├─╴text/plain 304 bytes	││├─╴text/plain 304 bytes
	││└─╴text/html 402 bytes	││└─╴text/html 402 bytes
	│└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes	│└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes
	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-complex-hp.eml
		"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-complex-hp.eml">
	<![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/signed;	Content-Type: multipart/signed;
	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="ba4";	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="ba4";
	micalg="sha-256"	micalg="sha-256"
	Subject: smime-multipart-complex-hp	Subject: smime-multipart-complex-hp
	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-complex-hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-complex-hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:07:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:07:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 4633 ¶	skipping to change at line 4472 ¶
	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzA3MDJa	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzA3MDJa
	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDKNV54rM1AYevevF+c3DI/JjX14STIx3nsp5B95mHf	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDKNV54rM1AYevevF+c3DI/JjX14STIx3nsp5B95mHf
	gTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQBWQxNUY6IG27ju4XS4aApRfPoBUjk6m7uUMIQF	gTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQBWQxNUY6IG27ju4XS4aApRfPoBUjk6m7uUMIQF
	/VC9EpXLvWRkn6B9k7L9MMrMJPRKR03oCzimaPjTKH3JKTxdj0gWtb2eELmIaRWY	/VC9EpXLvWRkn6B9k7L9MMrMJPRKR03oCzimaPjTKH3JKTxdj0gWtb2eELmIaRWY
	nOTaAK/3/h2dqMbPXYXgmWRQPsgFs42m6zWF4CH3YpurTvQC5gB0PSEPF0BOHdcm	nOTaAK/3/h2dqMbPXYXgmWRQPsgFs42m6zWF4CH3YpurTvQC5gB0PSEPF0BOHdcm
	77bRs4AcPf1mfGThUG3YUNXuJ99BKb3Zz3lQiTohvhti9eHRYAMXL/XdP7TLiGVm	77bRs4AcPf1mfGThUG3YUNXuJ99BKb3Zz3lQiTohvhti9eHRYAMXL/XdP7TLiGVm
	Ee7uoUREekXvLmj8C6B3z8fiTfiWlqENU7J2BkrVF0KgW5X9ANwhekNROEx6X05R	Ee7uoUREekXvLmj8C6B3z8fiTfiWlqENU7J2BkrVF0KgW5X9ANwhekNROEx6X05R
	NVcBYNKNxCxuKMbHcE47Ytt8AuV4NoDWk2yumc8T6sM0Wkue	NVcBYNKNxCxuKMbHcE47Ytt8AuV4NoDWk2yumc8T6sM0Wkue

	--ba4--	--ba4--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp">
	<section anchor="smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp"><name>S/MIME Signed-only sign	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC
	edData Over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC 8551 Header Protection</name>	8551 Header Protection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The pa
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 signedData. The payload is a	yload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment. It
	multipart/alternative message with an inline image/png attachment. It uses the	uses the legacy RFC 8551 header protection (<iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref targe
	legacy RFC 8551 header protection (<iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551	t="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>) scheme.</t>
	HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>) scheme.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5696 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5696 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴message/rfc822 1660 bytes	└┬╴message/rfc822 1660 bytes
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1612 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1612 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 974 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 974 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 296 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 296 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 394 bytes	│└─╴text/html 394 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551
		hp.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp
	.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"
	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:26:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:26:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 4754 ¶	skipping to change at line 4588 ¶
	VQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3	VQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3
	QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzEL	QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzEL
	BgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3MjYwMlowLwYJKoZI	BgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3MjYwMlowLwYJKoZI
	hvcNAQkEMSIEIPo6cfj2PNIuP7W8SRv7KpxepLUu9zPgalLeN0BNuSo/MA0GCSqG	hvcNAQkEMSIEIPo6cfj2PNIuP7W8SRv7KpxepLUu9zPgalLeN0BNuSo/MA0GCSqG
	SIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAIB0l2cJSO2iAJg5nB/+gal+wZn3hOPlWW6n8YQ957q/TxIj	SIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAIB0l2cJSO2iAJg5nB/+gal+wZn3hOPlWW6n8YQ957q/TxIj
	Iny59ctj4CokVaRb3uAm50r1TpK1h1x/hse1MsZgWQ0ew+omUQQkJg3RLZ9R8wsv	Iny59ctj4CokVaRb3uAm50r1TpK1h1x/hse1MsZgWQ0ew+omUQQkJg3RLZ9R8wsv
	Ol8SN5WMNdiNSRNC9a3MFtSVPEOCt90XdQdQ2kqeRkL/fthatcF8gI+p4+pOP2+U	Ol8SN5WMNdiNSRNC9a3MFtSVPEOCt90XdQdQ2kqeRkL/fthatcF8gI+p4+pOP2+U
	dOfnKCjP9nPobyBcXkljv0pRriu7snqQi1O0I1aqd4VwocIm8YV65la0/9522f6e	dOfnKCjP9nPobyBcXkljv0pRriu7snqQi1O0I1aqd4VwocIm8YV65la0/9522f6e
	/4Zi30oBLuIz1+pT2z6frPzUJfd6UbGtSiAwRHyfIJHZ2PAYt94iMv7U0VmK3GmJ	/4Zi30oBLuIz1+pT2z6frPzUJfd6UbGtSiAwRHyfIJHZ2PAYt94iMv7U0VmK3GmJ
	TkzFm1if4dpFLofdkEtUX8Is+DPf+/ZB1MvrrQk=	TkzFm1if4dpFLofdkEtUX8Is+DPf+/ZB1MvrrQk=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-complex-message-l
	<section anchor="smime-signed-only-signeddata-over-a-complex-message-legacy-rfc-	egacy-rfc-8551-header-protection-unwrapped">
	8551-header-protection-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed-only signedData Over a Com	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only signedData over a Complex Message, Legacy R
	plex Message, Legacy RFC 8551 Header Protection, Unwrapped</name>	FC 8551 Header Protection, Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The S/MIME signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-rfc85
		51hp.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp
	.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: message/rfc822	Content-Type: message/rfc822

	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="e68"	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="e68"
	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp	Subject: smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp
	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-one-part-complex-rfc8551hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:26:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:26:02 -0500

	skipping to change at line 4821 ¶	skipping to change at line 4653 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--e68--	--e68--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551hp">
	<section anchor="smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551hp"><name>S/MIME Signed-only mul	<name>S/MIME Signed-Only multipart/signed over a Complex Message, Lega
	tipart/signed Over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC 8551 Header Protection</name>	cy RFC 8551 Header Protection</name>
		<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature
	<t>This is a signed-only S/MIME message via PKCS#7 detached signature (multipart	(multipart/signed). The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inli
	/signed). The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline image/p	ne image/png attachment. It uses the legacy RFC 8551 header protection (<iref it
	ng attachment. It uses the legacy RFC 8551 header protection (<iref item="RFC855	em="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>) scheme.
	1HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>) scheme.</t>	</t>
		<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└┬╴multipart/signed 5624 bytes	└┬╴multipart/signed 5624 bytes
	├┬╴message/rfc822 1718 bytes	├┬╴message/rfc822 1718 bytes
	│└┬╴multipart/mixed 1670 bytes	│└┬╴multipart/mixed 1670 bytes
	│ ├┬╴multipart/alternative 1030 bytes	│ ├┬╴multipart/alternative 1030 bytes
	│ │├─╴text/plain 324 bytes	│ │├─╴text/plain 324 bytes
	│ │└─╴text/html 422 bytes	│ │└─╴text/html 422 bytes
	│ └─╴image/png inline 232 bytes	│ └─╴image/png inline 232 bytes
	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-signature [smime.p7s] 3429 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-complex-rfc855
		1hp.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551h
	p.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/signed;	Content-Type: multipart/signed;
	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="a61";	protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; boundary="a61";
	micalg="sha-256"	micalg="sha-256"
	Subject: smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551hp	Subject: smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551hp
	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551hp@example>	Message-ID: <smime-multipart-complex-rfc8551hp@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:27:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:27:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 4979 ¶	skipping to change at line 4806 ¶
	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzI3MDJa	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzI3MDJa
	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCAYyptCVBhIbjLhlQOKunV/81vEiJSGLmos08/AoumM	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCAYyptCVBhIbjLhlQOKunV/81vEiJSGLmos08/AoumM
	FzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQCSBglwkJFZNTXSwtDjldQxDo4n3twmJl9VyZSO	FzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQCSBglwkJFZNTXSwtDjldQxDo4n3twmJl9VyZSO
	AlO0EiVW2+9Tqu06G+mTSePraLq4L2BvutQ1rKW9jVXJXJ8klx3Y8aY6TGvJ5/RH	AlO0EiVW2+9Tqu06G+mTSePraLq4L2BvutQ1rKW9jVXJXJ8klx3Y8aY6TGvJ5/RH
	3GpwQPjfjauEVAplxnIeLdtUbwJJvaColBr6bPHUibtvXS14JqfHvEu7uTgHlxpv	3GpwQPjfjauEVAplxnIeLdtUbwJJvaColBr6bPHUibtvXS14JqfHvEu7uTgHlxpv
	KFZ/VEXf+Lx62gINfpie22d6UC3Nxif6EwPEDLmIjOYILjfMf9McQ2KzAPr6t6x/	KFZ/VEXf+Lx62gINfpie22d6UC3Nxif6EwPEDLmIjOYILjfMf9McQ2KzAPr6t6x/
	hrz6NDG3LeTeLegQ4+onLotaBFsa0QPat0nSFjcaH8j9hFb4RB4avMbT1/5nRR6/	hrz6NDG3LeTeLegQ4+onLotaBFsa0QPat0nSFjcaH8j9hFb4RB4avMbT1/5nRR6/
	B49YO28fRuAztMvesvs4M8kW6DAJjYj2fFAgT87CdWErzM7r	B49YO28fRuAztMvesvs4M8kW6DAJjYj2fFAgT87CdWErzM7r

	--a61--	--a61--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="signed-and-encrypted-messages">
	<section anchor="signed-and-encrypted-messages"><name>Signed-and-Encrypted Messa	<name>Signed-and-Encrypted Messages</name>
	ges</name>	<t>These messages are signed and encrypted.

	<t>These messages are signed and encrypted.
	They use PKCS#7 signedData inside envelopedData, with different header protectio n schemes and different Header Confidentiality Policies.</t>	They use PKCS#7 signedData inside envelopedData, with different header protectio n schemes and different Header Confidentiality Policies.</t>

		<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Protec
	Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline</name>	tion with hcp_baseline</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Conf
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentialit	identiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">
	y Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Con	Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>
	fidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7825 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7825 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4786 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4786 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 329 bytes	└─╴text/plain 329 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline.e
		ml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline.eml
	"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:09:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:09:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 5136 ¶	skipping to change at line 4957 ¶
	PcL0faa1xbpEUTfWv6Vviq9VCVkc5q/wxdL1irkqLNR5Ht8PyZUjCH9GsVntgPu+	PcL0faa1xbpEUTfWv6Vviq9VCVkc5q/wxdL1irkqLNR5Ht8PyZUjCH9GsVntgPu+
	UDswKkNICxi0rUppHp0Nzr7HRH1Y76htABrX+wyFVtA6ttwbm8nNqSVof7wb0pYa	UDswKkNICxi0rUppHp0Nzr7HRH1Y76htABrX+wyFVtA6ttwbm8nNqSVof7wb0pYa
	cHYMfJDCVJvCLCLy/sePxzwGbH8bW/Va4ebVQfNBgS49ATHNbv2HfjROYqgWAINJ	cHYMfJDCVJvCLCLy/sePxzwGbH8bW/Va4ebVQfNBgS49ATHNbv2HfjROYqgWAINJ
	l8L3IqyUROBveA+3+a0wEZ/kJnlIJppNGqIhuS7SiKUBXN+lHvxoGAfeJFN8uQ2B	l8L3IqyUROBveA+3+a0wEZ/kJnlIJppNGqIhuS7SiKUBXN+lHvxoGAfeJFN8uQ2B
	C5KuodUGgcTbVsxkVDweTfBdS8bG06OIAklSXvgE614E146DNKKlqD3nc8xDCzbN	C5KuodUGgcTbVsxkVDweTfBdS8bG06OIAklSXvgE614E146DNKKlqD3nc8xDCzbN
	+YZ9VjShMxepn6pJ06xOKW54NVTa3zy/R+HZ+/WixdzkAcn8gog93ybxg/9PhAi4	+YZ9VjShMxepn6pJ06xOKW54NVTa3zy/R+HZ+/WixdzkAcn8gog93ybxg/9PhAi4
	VauRPmbhrasLdiZwGyQ65shkUaJMwkjY+BpTK40M5KUV4yLr0ddkzbmKWo4Q50FY	VauRPmbhrasLdiZwGyQ65shkUaJMwkjY+BpTK40M5KUV4yLr0ddkzbmKWo4Q50FY
	NMc2AtCg1A8e9ziRU4Y2MD8abcs5S8rOKk5/R7o5gJGNHjlHpn9Xz+7fTpqtYqIf	NMc2AtCg1A8e9ziRU4Y2MD8abcs5S8rOKk5/R7o5gJGNHjlHpn9Xz+7fTpqtYqIf
	UY+YJhE+LyJW2uu8Gu1tTe05BSdy13E367FpALD0ZTeQHQWKmAckvwjsQ29YcKFM	UY+YJhE+LyJW2uu8Gu1tTe05BSdy13E367FpALD0ZTeQHQWKmAckvwjsQ29YcKFM
	n5+AmwDhDdpWKXih4nxFgQ==	n5+AmwDhDdpWKXih4nxFgQ==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted">
	ion-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Simple	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>	ection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline.dec	.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	rypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIINkgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIINgzCCDX8CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggO7Bgkq	MIINkgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIINgzCCDX8CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggO7Bgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggOsBIIDqE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggOsBIIDqE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LWJhc2VsaW5lDQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1ocC1iYXNl	LWJhc2VsaW5lDQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1ocC1iYXNl
	bGluZUBleGFtcGxlPg0KRnJvbTogQWxpY2UgPGFsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+	bGluZUBleGFtcGxlPg0KRnJvbTogQWxpY2UgPGFsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+
	DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NCkRhdGU6IFNhdCwgMjAgRmVi	DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NCkRhdGU6IFNhdCwgMjAgRmVi

	skipping to change at line 5220 ¶	skipping to change at line 5039 ¶
	bXBsZSBMQU1QUyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9C	bXBsZSBMQU1QUyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9C
	qaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3	qaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3
	DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUwOTAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQx	DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUwOTAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQx
	IgQgX3dswDsmGjwXzejaB+kh8kzNOiNjkHpEtBXbJ8gjT5UwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB	IgQgX3dswDsmGjwXzejaB+kh8kzNOiNjkHpEtBXbJ8gjT5UwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB
	BQAEggEASC6sf2ioO3Y7yVOzy/6sbjR6suLfigryPkvaOvuh1aHCP/I071/j3LYL	BQAEggEASC6sf2ioO3Y7yVOzy/6sbjR6suLfigryPkvaOvuh1aHCP/I071/j3LYL
	nER9aCGoEFXzxXzI1aiTjwlQp+Fg6qNz8avFRbSvecUpAsbihlRbbOSirvNwW6F4	nER9aCGoEFXzxXzI1aiTjwlQp+Fg6qNz8avFRbSvecUpAsbihlRbbOSirvNwW6F4
	McP6cbA4UR6M52M4mE8buxvDtwf6caf8gwtx9XbZy9a/FSr1YqQoB9ebotZDadDy	McP6cbA4UR6M52M4mE8buxvDtwf6caf8gwtx9XbZy9a/FSr1YqQoB9ebotZDadDy
	sh0hjzMTjvHbq6DTPytem6Dy7rBP7F32Z1SHNC1Wc2MaW4NKejRxubh4kKpopRvk	sh0hjzMTjvHbq6DTPytem6Dy7rBP7F32Z1SHNC1Wc2MaW4NKejRxubh4kKpopRvk
	diHHADbm6WUwa3IsgU65HV7X/BkE4vQcYsWzYjqyA3WjpZZWlYus023kqug5sHX5	diHHADbm6WUwa3IsgU65HV7X/BkE4vQcYsWzYjqyA3WjpZZWlYus023kqug5sHX5
	G5uhNtW6SURCQjN+d6PNa182OqCW3w==	G5uhNtW6SURCQjN+d6PNa182OqCW3w==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	ion-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwrap	ection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	ped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline.dec
	rypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:09:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:09:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>

	skipping to change at line 5256 ¶	skipping to change at line 5073 ¶
	message.	message.

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy.	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy"><name>S/MIME Signed and En	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Protec
	crypted Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Dis	tion with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	play)</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Conf
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	identiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentialit	Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	y Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Con	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	fidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8085 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8085 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4968 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4968 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 414 bytes	└─╴text/plain 414 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-l
		egacy.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-leg
	acy.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:10:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:10:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 5412 ¶	skipping to change at line 5224 ¶
	WhVik6d6oJaGviNjcZaw4C5kuZ5bKHUCiMLv05uAtQOOyPiddgfZXymBoKCjndge	WhVik6d6oJaGviNjcZaw4C5kuZ5bKHUCiMLv05uAtQOOyPiddgfZXymBoKCjndge
	MNRBo4MxXU9cYHzi0umhauiw9I3UG4HAKH75L+1DFf1wbbgu165dCSIo2wVTIgOt	MNRBo4MxXU9cYHzi0umhauiw9I3UG4HAKH75L+1DFf1wbbgu165dCSIo2wVTIgOt
	zr3Y03kTJJidclkYzP7o2d80EMGftQQ4uGyEtowWJbEn0yWhss35Vs3Fyy10mwGM	zr3Y03kTJJidclkYzP7o2d80EMGftQQ4uGyEtowWJbEn0yWhss35Vs3Fyy10mwGM
	pncS4Tc1dVGyddkDXyAZ1JvfFzsXnoX+38R5lI25aYHAbfij582/hv48FU1I3XoB	pncS4Tc1dVGyddkDXyAZ1JvfFzsXnoX+38R5lI25aYHAbfij582/hv48FU1I3XoB
	WXR/gIKr/hQ2cFLwHsiJlGRw6smfBGOzk/x4JhG7sCR2E0QmM9CYzmyhZAKXORaX	WXR/gIKr/hQ2cFLwHsiJlGRw6smfBGOzk/x4JhG7sCR2E0QmM9CYzmyhZAKXORaX
	Ur75d8x99mIJdEO4uu4avHvaRouG6D9tPJWYIRioVDTPD1AU6qirN32hOupGwcz7	Ur75d8x99mIJdEO4uu4avHvaRouG6D9tPJWYIRioVDTPD1AU6qirN32hOupGwcz7
	t8q70Jbv/tDpcLmLNX5VxsQzUfjpsGGvuz/Eq77raPG/TByissRMTjUuFv4BxS0x	t8q70Jbv/tDpcLmLNX5VxsQzUfjpsGGvuz/Eq77raPG/TByissRMTjUuFv4BxS0x
	wh//p9l2sJA4FWCA+Sr5YLFublQqRF1C3Vv0h2YEEz+sFA44u4VMmcCrwGBoJob1	wh//p9l2sJA4FWCA+Sr5YLFublQqRF1C3Vv0h2YEEz+sFA44u4VMmcCrwGBoJob1
	4we46RXwzH3K7gRV/1tv2QB9pK4G8KxsbHXNV5RwVJ6xXI6JRvIJru3/w4nRPnrA	4we46RXwzH3K7gRV/1tv2QB9pK4G8KxsbHXNV5RwVJ6xXI6JRvIJru3/w4nRPnrA
	lRXXfx7senJDd2tXmXvYkA==	lRXXfx7senJDd2tXmXvYkA==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted">
	ion-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display),	ection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	Decrypted</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
		-legacy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-leg
	acy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIOFwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIOCDCCDgQCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggRABgkq	MIIOFwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIOCDCCDgQCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggRABgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggQxBIIELU1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggQxBIIELU1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LWJhc2VsaW5lLWxlZ2FjeQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMt	LWJhc2VsaW5lLWxlZ2FjeQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMt
	aHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVnYWN5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VA	aHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVnYWN5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VA
	c21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0	c21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0

	skipping to change at line 5499 ¶	skipping to change at line 5309 ¶
	UlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnX	UlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnX
	MAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZI	MAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZI
	hvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MTAwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIBmb56ZODWgP	hvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MTAwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIBmb56ZODWgP
	A1SVa8da67RsNicfHZ2zJVUWYLTKrF07MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAAou3+Ck	A1SVa8da67RsNicfHZ2zJVUWYLTKrF07MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAAou3+Ck
	FB6wTfWUVq1ABIBF3AFS+wBR2+mDSQKXxlVCnt/cfY07qKDX2YsVkj1uXq3I1Ptw	FB6wTfWUVq1ABIBF3AFS+wBR2+mDSQKXxlVCnt/cfY07qKDX2YsVkj1uXq3I1Ptw
	6RHEtqtbY3iwAqB5pzgfcw7qZHDpRMMEwobNLzHBdSZwW+ljkQ3LvDAZao5c+Cmt	6RHEtqtbY3iwAqB5pzgfcw7qZHDpRMMEwobNLzHBdSZwW+ljkQ3LvDAZao5c+Cmt
	gSUCdnQ9Kvzdkl+xgtJQnjGGGNBiiWDb7NkZhlHYesV7QKNHTP+qP+awE1ZMrOP3	gSUCdnQ9Kvzdkl+xgtJQnjGGGNBiiWDb7NkZhlHYesV7QKNHTP+qP+awE1ZMrOP3
	qBgIS1UH9nSNSmOfyTprD8MWoUKPkzFI1YUyPByE/QKjdV245YvYuZjz0cqn4VvV	qBgIS1UH9nSNSmOfyTprD8MWoUKPkzFI1YUyPByE/QKjdV245YvYuZjz0cqn4VvV
	2Y6t9DI4EmJJhay+P4EJwiggTjH9mJeeXIHyKpyELVSC5KCaIghQpTHV/pIH+fNs	2Y6t9DI4EmJJhay+P4EJwiggTjH9mJeeXIHyKpyELVSC5KCaIghQpTHV/pIH+fNs
	WxxyPU2C+RwECSI=	WxxyPU2C+RwECSI=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	ion-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	and Encrypted Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ Leg	ection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	acy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	-legacy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-leg
	acy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:10:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:10:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer:	HP-Outer:

	skipping to change at line 5540 ¶	skipping to change at line 5348 ¶

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy with a	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy with a
	"Legacy Display" part.	"Legacy Display" part.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Protec
	a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy</name>	tion with hcp_shy</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confident
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Pol	iality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Heade
	icy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confiden	r Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>
	tiality Policy</xref>.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7760 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7760 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4732 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 4732 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 319 bytes	└─╴text/plain 319 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy.eml"><
		![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy.eml"><![
	CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:12:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:12:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 5691 ¶	skipping to change at line 5494 ¶
	lprC6izOj7CUE+UyPUBDn1nIqWRclShIyUIvkGkvsqCPRseMR/K0ObLk7PgHuq7G	lprC6izOj7CUE+UyPUBDn1nIqWRclShIyUIvkGkvsqCPRseMR/K0ObLk7PgHuq7G
	VfDTvOyeMGVjrJUPxsydbA9zF6GzTmT6PWNfsLlr4wX38CQkKQzG/8IEGvYQ6xWT	VfDTvOyeMGVjrJUPxsydbA9zF6GzTmT6PWNfsLlr4wX38CQkKQzG/8IEGvYQ6xWT
	kADeNyrFvVVE0diZgyCcybjTAI1LGj8n36DQBmfpYp1w6T/EyrznwS7PtRftaTm6	kADeNyrFvVVE0diZgyCcybjTAI1LGj8n36DQBmfpYp1w6T/EyrznwS7PtRftaTm6
	bI3eXQqnO+I1HCR6+1gqcS70LK+bX+Cw0sNzLaUy66XVm7/CxYJrohRkNRxTGkHy	bI3eXQqnO+I1HCR6+1gqcS70LK+bX+Cw0sNzLaUy66XVm7/CxYJrohRkNRxTGkHy
	cqFFL/wBx1TK/jhARfxm4kWkW7Fsmo5t/ZRAv6jMAlYMjHdBF20HKMNDhZWtf/bC	cqFFL/wBx1TK/jhARfxm4kWkW7Fsmo5t/ZRAv6jMAlYMjHdBF20HKMNDhZWtf/bC
	mEV4/BERSfbHB60aM6ZXWUzBlf486ffAvxsQy5qGjQ/yJIwAMN84qHZvqoA3NwIs	mEV4/BERSfbHB60aM6ZXWUzBlf486ffAvxsQy5qGjQ/yJIwAMN84qHZvqoA3NwIs
	JThbTIFM0Xtux76AITxAYIhtB07ChxXrXC/owJ35oFve+sq1HQGh0fQIGTgTtv60	JThbTIFM0Xtux76AITxAYIhtB07ChxXrXC/owJ35oFve+sq1HQGh0fQIGTgTtv60
	tq82T7KLO6ervK1UVL6oxHkt/xbr3c6wu4wd2Vh+Kk3xn3wp7ShpT6sopk4GCdBv	tq82T7KLO6ervK1UVL6oxHkt/xbr3c6wu4wd2Vh+Kk3xn3wp7ShpT6sopk4GCdBv
	mxxbUu50F7e7tlc/sxvCIU1ObwiF6WOJH+7RUJEGmWpvt7eGFZSo/h8oLjnxxvmK	mxxbUu50F7e7tlc/sxvCIU1ObwiF6WOJH+7RUJEGmWpvt7eGFZSo/h8oLjnxxvmK
	Qyus5nGIIWDZgKWYxxIGpQ==	Qyus5nGIIWDZgKWYxxIGpQ==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted">
	ion-with-hcpshy-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Simple Messa	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	ge, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>	ection with hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy.decr
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy.decrypte	ypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	d.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIINawYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIINXDCCDVgCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggOUBgkq	MIINawYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIINXDCCDVgCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggOUBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggOFBIIDgU1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggOFBIIDgU1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LXNoeQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMtaHAtc2h5QGV4YW1w	LXNoeQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMtaHAtc2h5QGV4YW1w
	bGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2Ig	bGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2Ig
	PGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBGZWIgMjAyMSAxMDox	PGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBGZWIgMjAyMSAxMDox

	skipping to change at line 5774 ¶	skipping to change at line 5575 ¶
	BgNVBAMTKFNhbXBsZSBMQU1QUyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkC	BgNVBAMTKFNhbXBsZSBMQU1QUyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkC
	EzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkD	EzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkD
	MQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUxMjAyWjAvBgkq	MQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUxMjAyWjAvBgkq
	hkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgL6N313auMszx5Byu+sPmUUoQvZ6glyBIgh0k1qycdmUwDQYJ	hkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgL6N313auMszx5Byu+sPmUUoQvZ6glyBIgh0k1qycdmUwDQYJ
	KoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAmHzQqLkVTKl8TKMaeYFFuU9fLrHZbg3aZ5eP+Zt3OkIN	KoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAmHzQqLkVTKl8TKMaeYFFuU9fLrHZbg3aZ5eP+Zt3OkIN
	ErSsCBXE2V0u7yCmxk/PdfkTzOoSI9PW/seA5dd/W6yrCVX7EhqWWQx1vA+s+jtx	ErSsCBXE2V0u7yCmxk/PdfkTzOoSI9PW/seA5dd/W6yrCVX7EhqWWQx1vA+s+jtx
	oZ+Fh5a1GO9W7XmcQBvpjJQL0hyt78UzZt+CL0K5E5oueKj9CxCBkuKlgzzvwtpX	oZ+Fh5a1GO9W7XmcQBvpjJQL0hyt78UzZt+CL0K5E5oueKj9CxCBkuKlgzzvwtpX
	CAK6iYUzwGRWkxqdBaClu1xi2OCEzu5mbpAUY8ra26hGGaExYIZRVbwNZ5uGjfCI	CAK6iYUzwGRWkxqdBaClu1xi2OCEzu5mbpAUY8ra26hGGaExYIZRVbwNZ5uGjfCI
	lsrsd5wFdxQbcWOF/M5QIjbed1Gz862IZxaOA/fRY126jdeJyG2VKdD/3XglLNx4	lsrsd5wFdxQbcWOF/M5QIjbed1Gz862IZxaOA/fRY126jdeJyG2VKdD/3XglLNx4
	+6kU9F3BYb7itpwqnkY3MiKxLuofNQVx/ZQ1m9arww==	+6kU9F3BYb7itpwqnkY3MiKxLuofNQVx/ZQ1m9arww==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	ion-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	ection with hcp_shy, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
		<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy.decr
		ypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy.decrypte
	d.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:12:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:12:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>

	skipping to change at line 5810 ¶	skipping to change at line 5609 ¶
	message.	message.

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy.	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypt	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Protec
	ed Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display)</nam	tion with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	e>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confident
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	iality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Heade
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Pol	r Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	icy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confiden	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	tiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8170 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8170 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5046 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5046 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 502 bytes	└─╴text/plain 502 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy
		.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy.e
	ml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:13:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:13:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 5967 ¶	skipping to change at line 5761 ¶
	HQHjNSzIa8APRIxE5jVMvzOfyvc6KtPLLgbOmvLmgyDC9rUVAuceVO9oyLS1MsCV	HQHjNSzIa8APRIxE5jVMvzOfyvc6KtPLLgbOmvLmgyDC9rUVAuceVO9oyLS1MsCV
	g3j4RmMIswPdagpYELQcwuek5e5ffD5bidL2Xn5BOXkMK7N2S1lXlmWn215NZG55	g3j4RmMIswPdagpYELQcwuek5e5ffD5bidL2Xn5BOXkMK7N2S1lXlmWn215NZG55
	PoIAeXjgNDjdMmCXSt/frUvTsFOPtcCA2JAcI/e2dsyAF3iIRvPpDPRfUsvEzSQe	PoIAeXjgNDjdMmCXSt/frUvTsFOPtcCA2JAcI/e2dsyAF3iIRvPpDPRfUsvEzSQe
	gB6OEFYkDOqcG7Lk9Hx5d78ZpJst+XViQAIDlgLHBpPuwkIvh9OOdeP/XKLH/1lJ	gB6OEFYkDOqcG7Lk9Hx5d78ZpJst+XViQAIDlgLHBpPuwkIvh9OOdeP/XKLH/1lJ
	yOQ9mQCfuTx6rBtj2216o2L92OKFI27F/Ns4Lcir5VX0/6hrNe4/BlkAnexKnOgs	yOQ9mQCfuTx6rBtj2216o2L92OKFI27F/Ns4Lcir5VX0/6hrNe4/BlkAnexKnOgs
	Ok3hIuQnB6C9Z2vtWt1P0lnsemX+AhIJPtgRs6aGhMUnIwtvb8aZwFsS8WvaA6PG	Ok3hIuQnB6C9Z2vtWt1P0lnsemX+AhIJPtgRs6aGhMUnIwtvb8aZwFsS8WvaA6PG
	uLKBUfuv5V+mjt5vNNlnkaaF9bMGQVk9NmK6mgkqmjmoaXP+8MbKHJ7cf2Kt1Bpc	uLKBUfuv5V+mjt5vNNlnkaaF9bMGQVk9NmK6mgkqmjmoaXP+8MbKHJ7cf2Kt1Bpc
	PJ8uPBQ302Qv3PjpFk/YYdi3tmmvaxbOlDkNCJ87xjN7Tlgd5jmBZRCDzxDBmbOs	PJ8uPBQ302Qv3PjpFk/YYdi3tmmvaxbOlDkNCJ87xjN7Tlgd5jmBZRCDzxDBmbOs
	1USxLB1yDN/k4soKAKL/Ze6rVusjC+GJ02TcWFQkS5eQjxoHNKIkU4fMDggw1vzJ	1USxLB1yDN/k4soKAKL/Ze6rVusjC+GJ02TcWFQkS5eQjxoHNKIkU4fMDggw1vzJ
	m5kyP5p5DST0+cko42Ae0yjn05T75MdYP0/l/I8YBes=	m5kyP5p5DST0+cko42Ae0yjn05T75MdYP0/l/I8YBes=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted">
	ion-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted<	ection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	/name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-lega
		cy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy.d
	ecrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIOUAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIOQTCCDj0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggR5Bgkq	MIIOUAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIOQTCCDj0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggR5Bgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggRqBIIEZk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggRqBIIEZk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LXNoeS1sZWdhY3kNCk1lc3NhZ2UtSUQ6IDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhwLXNo	LXNoeS1sZWdhY3kNCk1lc3NhZ2UtSUQ6IDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhwLXNo
	eS1sZWdhY3lAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFt	eS1sZWdhY3lAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFt
	cGxlPg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIw	cGxlPg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIw

	skipping to change at line 6055 ¶	skipping to change at line 5847 ¶
	bGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/Qqmi	bGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/Qqmi
	XDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0B	XDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0B
	BwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MTMwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIE	BwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MTMwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIE
	INdmPheiziYcbAwKeKaDpmuOQFmVMdAqPn4+xeOFjp3NMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA	INdmPheiziYcbAwKeKaDpmuOQFmVMdAqPn4+xeOFjp3NMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA
	BIIBAD0aQzYiNU8AycDkBbQVbuAjHzerZmO27QlIZ47Cw9QfNcJ3w40RJAohR487	BIIBAD0aQzYiNU8AycDkBbQVbuAjHzerZmO27QlIZ47Cw9QfNcJ3w40RJAohR487
	1NpkFskR79WY6aHuiLxClWV0Jw/iuieAFfBZ8Z9t2hOt+F93M+9v1eoLzrgA7YZG	1NpkFskR79WY6aHuiLxClWV0Jw/iuieAFfBZ8Z9t2hOt+F93M+9v1eoLzrgA7YZG
	itp6r5zToKCdwNOc2futk/+dutbrTqYlFI8nnjLNqegBiGMMzVfateMc2fVnIVN+	itp6r5zToKCdwNOc2futk/+dutbrTqYlFI8nnjLNqegBiGMMzVfateMc2fVnIVN+
	7/4fyA8ASzseEis/HQTN7sEjw0pUCvU4JvQy2klVYsaTZO4bdKXW86DHEWjoiweF	7/4fyA8ASzseEis/HQTN7sEjw0pUCvU4JvQy2klVYsaTZO4bdKXW86DHEWjoiweF
	liiKSueA3WB1jeJRse2/g33dL+5++UUtQLY3kdknM78705WOaFg03V57abGCp2r+	liiKSueA3WB1jeJRse2/g33dL+5++UUtQLY3kdknM78705WOaFg03V57abGCp2r+
	bgcHQNhfe0MXoJHKqYrnG++22tA=	bgcHQNhfe0MXoJHKqYrnG++22tA=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-head
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-simple-message-header-protect	er-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	ion-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Simple Message, Header Prot
	Encrypted Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Displa	ection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	y), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-lega
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	cy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy.d
	ecrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:13:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:13:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 6098 ¶	skipping to change at line 5888 ¶

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy with a "Legacy	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy with a "Legacy
	Display" part.	Display" part.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply"><name>S/MIME Signed and Enc	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Header
	rypted Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline</name>	Protection with hcp_baseline</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Conf
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentialit	identiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">
	y Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Con	Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>
	fidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8300 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8300 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5136 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5136 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 335 bytes	└─╴text/plain 335 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-r
		eply.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-rep
	ly.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:15:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:15:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>

	skipping to change at line 6259 ¶	skipping to change at line 6044 ¶
	BAhaHwg47t/5F7I1m7CpkdlXuI+ByZiYaCtAZbkYElVYPpNLzvFmblwqA7UjPrL5	BAhaHwg47t/5F7I1m7CpkdlXuI+ByZiYaCtAZbkYElVYPpNLzvFmblwqA7UjPrL5
	RzA9qsqEXuJBLqP13d0iciEa3AexWFU9om+lDNHc8bIoZfxk3wW4BITDoM7CwO9k	RzA9qsqEXuJBLqP13d0iciEa3AexWFU9om+lDNHc8bIoZfxk3wW4BITDoM7CwO9k
	M3mPHTwIU0zwauzqgWkBS7XNWGuFdyphRf8Oos9nlDfZr5hnQsRDKwusMxQQMpyK	M3mPHTwIU0zwauzqgWkBS7XNWGuFdyphRf8Oos9nlDfZr5hnQsRDKwusMxQQMpyK
	aamXq/Yhcr2flUZ9hffQwVffGlLT/4h4WhKrDcYlO4XwY85AOB+9MouvPIgUt5Pa	aamXq/Yhcr2flUZ9hffQwVffGlLT/4h4WhKrDcYlO4XwY85AOB+9MouvPIgUt5Pa
	fyWG4tqcFy5DSKTiGpoO4Y5N51tQqnO0X6j8fd4DuI/WkMfib+84Os+ZnfQ4BM+b	fyWG4tqcFy5DSKTiGpoO4Y5N51tQqnO0X6j8fd4DuI/WkMfib+84Os+ZnfQ4BM+b
	AnGWAqHzU2mwg1vSR1nBoLNERKLnsTUM8OX0qkhqo4hxCjdh+Dc7gqbCNVtUfBbe	AnGWAqHzU2mwg1vSR1nBoLNERKLnsTUM8OX0qkhqo4hxCjdh+Dc7gqbCNVtUfBbe
	fqdfr1EdJoe+GEdrT8J3NVl1AYzS3t3zTQdQ5yNzrP0kVyOUIbiyd5MpNBxLquLS	fqdfr1EdJoe+GEdrT8J3NVl1AYzS3t3zTQdQ5yNzrP0kVyOUIbiyd5MpNBxLquLS
	TwpOTnEcj+46IC6cXcIeVmTWtEmnGvGcQHdw95waGV0BrpAyPjyEfZ48ubfY7i6x	TwpOTnEcj+46IC6cXcIeVmTWtEmnGvGcQHdw95waGV0BrpAyPjyEfZ48ubfY7i6x
	eSC4YX5vzM0DEfkz8tXrEkA0PHbOvuEJgJE0iX52fYc4vnMquiEY4GDIc7WRJ62H	eSC4YX5vzM0DEfkz8tXrEkA0PHbOvuEJgJE0iX52fYc4vnMquiEY4GDIc7WRJ62H
	j4nVpvjAa34DWgZ+RgQCXF95kSztyoSAL3Jnq1fQOZ8=	j4nVpvjAa34DWgZ+RgQCXF95kSztyoSAL3Jnq1fQOZ8=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted">
	rotection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Reply Ov	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	er a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>	r Protection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-rep	-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	ly.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIOkgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIOgzCCDn8CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggS7Bgkq	MIIOkgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIOgzCCDn8CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggS7Bgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggSsBIIEqE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggSsBIIEqE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LWJhc2VsaW5lLXJlcGx5DQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1o	LWJhc2VsaW5lLXJlcGx5DQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1o
	cC1iYXNlbGluZS1yZXBseUBleGFtcGxlPg0KRnJvbTogQWxpY2UgPGFsaWNlQHNt	cC1iYXNlbGluZS1yZXBseUBleGFtcGxlPg0KRnJvbTogQWxpY2UgPGFsaWNlQHNt
	aW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NCkRhdGU6	aW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NCkRhdGU6

	skipping to change at line 6348 ¶	skipping to change at line 6131 ¶
	IFdHMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0	IFdHMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0
	aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqG	aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqG
	SIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MTUw	SIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE1MTUw
	MlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIKHPvLfnw9dsDhrKZlaFW3+cbW6ewBQ6mkp22q7y	MlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIKHPvLfnw9dsDhrKZlaFW3+cbW6ewBQ6mkp22q7y
	BhI9MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAH3cRn5LOa7nqW8Z/czFCRpkU6j2e8xqaw7/	BhI9MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAH3cRn5LOa7nqW8Z/czFCRpkU6j2e8xqaw7/
	eCh6GvC4emq/eAgKhqpbhw+QwEOYZCMmTe7GFb/eSl82QjB+zYaR+pGgVhBH57Zp	eCh6GvC4emq/eAgKhqpbhw+QwEOYZCMmTe7GFb/eSl82QjB+zYaR+pGgVhBH57Zp
	IOtobnzbOEsgzmUKakI2iaAuQBtOxMPqDRTRjMPLMhc6ddIRBqNeDpC3hm+sOXrj	IOtobnzbOEsgzmUKakI2iaAuQBtOxMPqDRTRjMPLMhc6ddIRBqNeDpC3hm+sOXrj
	r8rQAMDBJTck7psP72DTyDWDeVPw7BRMSnxz7FwSbW1CXFeiJ6mWhZ0Va1YgDpJK	r8rQAMDBJTck7psP72DTyDWDeVPw7BRMSnxz7FwSbW1CXFeiJ6mWhZ0Va1YgDpJK
	Ic2uW2Tq/ob8jTjnPrVIQhq0ZxKOiWsHTMfzxRnH3xyYt/c/huuoDtcf9P3j9GWa	Ic2uW2Tq/ob8jTjnPrVIQhq0ZxKOiWsHTMfzxRnH3xyYt/c/huuoDtcf9P3j9GWa
	a23tU+PDSpfcpG5MJPe9DBzExWII7Z50Om8g6tZETD0+pOjNTAg=	a23tU+PDSpfcpG5MJPe9DBzExWII7Z50Om8g6tZETD0+pOjNTAg=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	rotection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encr	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	ypted Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decrypte	r Protection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	d and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-rep
	ly.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:15:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:15:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>
	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline@example>

	skipping to change at line 6389 ¶	skipping to change at line 6170 ¶
	message.	message.

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy.	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply"><name>S/MIME Signed	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Header
	and Encrypted Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (	Protection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	+ Legacy Display)</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Conf
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	identiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentialit	Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	y Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Con	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	fidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8625 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8625 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5368 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5368 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 426 bytes	└─╴text/plain 426 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-l
		egacy-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-leg
	acy-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:16:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:16:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 6555 ¶	skipping to change at line 6331 ¶
	1Q8k6PKznMicR0M8cummltrtNcwk13470zy0VCisjIq4j7YLfSkUH2Wo+3WgHdpN	1Q8k6PKznMicR0M8cummltrtNcwk13470zy0VCisjIq4j7YLfSkUH2Wo+3WgHdpN
	wUAsTXpE2HR9Amg17uOU7qBqBkCC4nbArddaw9d/Jv6IxfsGx5kyDK1X8Nkalqvh	wUAsTXpE2HR9Amg17uOU7qBqBkCC4nbArddaw9d/Jv6IxfsGx5kyDK1X8Nkalqvh
	wT59cOw3GXzOeS3eIfvu5RO9o+d2mfRH+77sRkvPIXOkM/bDwZH3cPtT+YEveqOK	wT59cOw3GXzOeS3eIfvu5RO9o+d2mfRH+77sRkvPIXOkM/bDwZH3cPtT+YEveqOK
	8RJTDQeLMqSX7lo1+VC+975x2Wsv1z1LBpWiw68tXLj4De9Pp8O5BXnfBS80vJFY	8RJTDQeLMqSX7lo1+VC+975x2Wsv1z1LBpWiw68tXLj4De9Pp8O5BXnfBS80vJFY
	JMBtAg6MIVIQyblv+QxnYX09CGCxjqjka1PehmYpafcP10OUfU5tSqJb4kB7MyUj	JMBtAg6MIVIQyblv+QxnYX09CGCxjqjka1PehmYpafcP10OUfU5tSqJb4kB7MyUj
	NRn6yYcJXJBAt1lMRGlLDkUTN/mswR5Bzy4NnzThZb62sUZ23xwKJVOoApexfBVK	NRn6yYcJXJBAt1lMRGlLDkUTN/mswR5Bzy4NnzThZb62sUZ23xwKJVOoApexfBVK
	rJRaeuUaDx1upyGfMEVuIlmCT1aYIXBb3f/W2zK5219f2dbAFU0goYTKJoohBzGL	rJRaeuUaDx1upyGfMEVuIlmCT1aYIXBb3f/W2zK5219f2dbAFU0goYTKJoohBzGL
	tJ3/dO5jLgje9H1AgZS22UVUI+FQo8uG8ApPJgts3AW91fjohjzzYCp7T/zR7x4h	tJ3/dO5jLgje9H1AgZS22UVUI+FQo8uG8ApPJgts3AW91fjohjzzYCp7T/zR7x4h
	UERWGfMG2fHYje5/QuyobVCKt8QfG2DhvSIMDPBY7KHO7bXJdEmUwb/aSeggmDCp	UERWGfMG2fHYje5/QuyobVCKt8QfG2DhvSIMDPBY7KHO7bXJdEmUwb/aSeggmDCp
	LHK2foRU983nLGdDrp2q4TWCoMGVSmOwBasUjVHiUA8=	LHK2foRU983nLGdDrp2q4TWCoMGVSmOwBasUjVHiUA8=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted">
	rotection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Enc	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	rypted Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ Legac	r Protection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	y Display), Decrypted</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
		-legacy-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-leg
	acy-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIPOwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIPLDCCDygCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggVkBgkq	MIIPOwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIPLDCCDygCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggVkBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggVVBIIFUU1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggVVBIIFUU1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LWJhc2VsaW5lLWxlZ2FjeS1yZXBseQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25l	LWJhc2VsaW5lLWxlZ2FjeS1yZXBseQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25l
	ZC1lbmMtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVnYWN5LXJlcGx5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBB	ZC1lbmMtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVnYWN5LXJlcGx5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBB
	bGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5l	bGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5l

	skipping to change at line 6648 ¶	skipping to change at line 6422 ¶
	TVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phq	TVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phq
	zpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwG	zpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwG
	CSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNTE2MDJaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDlm+B5	CSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNTE2MDJaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDlm+B5
	0QBs78N2wRl0kf1Exib4redr1foUWvF3vmcyCTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQBc	0QBs78N2wRl0kf1Exib4redr1foUWvF3vmcyCTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQBc
	m0fLRAACOYr8JymCYS4CYBWzMuTqh1DOat4MTroQLeNXvV8NijRWYdbHFcL1hrdy	m0fLRAACOYr8JymCYS4CYBWzMuTqh1DOat4MTroQLeNXvV8NijRWYdbHFcL1hrdy
	uLBoqHTkv29eG3Lp5+Ah+uYLcPeamzoxWgfiLgPBaFSQU8ZyxPqVRj2xLq2EqG16	uLBoqHTkv29eG3Lp5+Ah+uYLcPeamzoxWgfiLgPBaFSQU8ZyxPqVRj2xLq2EqG16
	IW5DfieHgVN0bv9P+gmRdKdzG8+hiZcZXBm2aJtN8oifP/ahgTzePiBiHK4Qvecy	IW5DfieHgVN0bv9P+gmRdKdzG8+hiZcZXBm2aJtN8oifP/ahgTzePiBiHK4Qvecy
	q+Cr1gFwVlT+1t/2MO1tGqif6R14NCmUaHzeOvzEpJs1HlE8W7yUjBdrS3my9KW1	q+Cr1gFwVlT+1t/2MO1tGqif6R14NCmUaHzeOvzEpJs1HlE8W7yUjBdrS3my9KW1
	fAv+chp5rIXeSrZGTg7ZhNLcq/uq1H9IpgnYvRXN/f6WhggdVUZ5BJwPqbNcCJFl	fAv+chp5rIXeSrZGTg7ZhNLcq/uq1H9IpgnYvRXN/f6WhggdVUZ5BJwPqbNcCJFl
	zAP8CJk3IK1fzZulSebk	zAP8CJk3IK1fzZulSebk

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	rotection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	Signed and Encrypted Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_bas	r Protection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name
	eline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	>
		<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline
		-legacy-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-leg
	acy-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:16:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:16:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>
	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-baseline-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 6695 ¶	skipping to change at line 6467 ¶

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy with a	with the hcp_baseline Header Confidentiality Policy with a
	"Legacy Display" part.	"Legacy Display" part.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypte	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Header
	d Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy</name>	Protection with hcp_shy</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confident
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Pol	iality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Heade
	icy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confiden	r Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>
	tiality Policy</xref>.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8190 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8190 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5054 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5054 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 325 bytes	└─╴text/plain 325 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply.
		eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply.em
	l"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:18:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:18:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>

	skipping to change at line 6854 ¶	skipping to change at line 6621 ¶
	kb9o2JKJmBKTHOPHFOI/dDXfm4kbHvn6T1y70Vke3ORySdHxxTXoEEchkJ65rT01	kb9o2JKJmBKTHOPHFOI/dDXfm4kbHvn6T1y70Vke3ORySdHxxTXoEEchkJ65rT01
	gJ/cA7EJSIzJ4DpcUlKk+HBVmvl0HX63NSTBEEfWrsWdoEUAktVHmTTMfxnvrtoh	gJ/cA7EJSIzJ4DpcUlKk+HBVmvl0HX63NSTBEEfWrsWdoEUAktVHmTTMfxnvrtoh
	LPnNUdEXJae+0kE+EyEWce9MbSPjsNFddHAdNpxthy04hbvQx6/YrUrk0BHGtzDI	LPnNUdEXJae+0kE+EyEWce9MbSPjsNFddHAdNpxthy04hbvQx6/YrUrk0BHGtzDI
	lIdeatVgxlIb6XS3UzfS/DqHx6+FCGZ75ZYM5/IwlYXkNzXXibin6xqAL3UFAGob	lIdeatVgxlIb6XS3UzfS/DqHx6+FCGZ75ZYM5/IwlYXkNzXXibin6xqAL3UFAGob
	kGeAoKE1bo4d4TJdoYafa+9KxU8DH8fQvMrfFBtS9327I4qWFv4fzPG81opU/+d9	kGeAoKE1bo4d4TJdoYafa+9KxU8DH8fQvMrfFBtS9327I4qWFv4fzPG81opU/+d9
	kkKOvewfx99h4aMfflT0Y1bs8/mLMABnZiiyPdE4ZDIwoicqGsQgO1u/dRD7pHWt	kkKOvewfx99h4aMfflT0Y1bs8/mLMABnZiiyPdE4ZDIwoicqGsQgO1u/dRD7pHWt
	J9Hv77iPBZMmURHGiRkK0hBxYlRGUFZm/6/Y/aX4vG/1K+A8l2ksWdLpqXRQpcuD	J9Hv77iPBZMmURHGiRkK0hBxYlRGUFZm/6/Y/aX4vG/1K+A8l2ksWdLpqXRQpcuD
	kqIBlcn++x8pyWyY1STAOF9w1IFp5wBHH1fy07yNBDj/xKMufz9j6hrYWQV8bjWV	kqIBlcn++x8pyWyY1STAOF9w1IFp5wBHH1fy07yNBDj/xKMufz9j6hrYWQV8bjWV
	TK3cb8Ar2Qr80TrUUCjyu+d+37kcsi2uMDkiRD/avJbLPwePFTuJZe7nZYdA1A2s	TK3cb8Ar2Qr80TrUUCjyu+d+37kcsi2uMDkiRD/avJbLPwePFTuJZe7nZYdA1A2s
	hxnJyBasTI4iMlxH11JYuMGHouu24u5BbCILf654lR+BIQ1d2ogA41eHPlZ7x3H7	hxnJyBasTI4iMlxH11JYuMGHouu24u5BbCILf654lR+BIQ1d2ogA41eHPlZ7x3H7

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted">
	rotection-with-hcpshy-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Reply Over a	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>	r Protection with hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-repl
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply.de	y.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	crypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIOVQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIORjCCDkICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggR+Bgkq	MIIOVQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIORjCCDkICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggR+Bgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggRvBIIEa01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggRvBIIEa01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LXNoeS1yZXBseQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMtaHAtc2h5	LXNoeS1yZXBseQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMtaHAtc2h5
	LXJlcGx5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBs	LXJlcGx5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBs
	ZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBG	ZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBG

	skipping to change at line 6942 ¶	skipping to change at line 6707 ¶
	KFNhbXBsZSBMQU1QUyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXnt	KFNhbXBsZSBMQU1QUyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXnt
	dX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqG	dX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqG
	SIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUxODAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0B	SIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTUxODAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0B
	CQQxIgQgMahPfXeRTJKDWjCE/0llScBMuyD7DptAxoKsAmAzBdgwDQYJKoZIhvcN	CQQxIgQgMahPfXeRTJKDWjCE/0llScBMuyD7DptAxoKsAmAzBdgwDQYJKoZIhvcN
	AQEBBQAEggEASJuMfoErHP+bowktPN/yJIltnTlZUibkbJxhHPhR5EgNnn3JyMoW	AQEBBQAEggEASJuMfoErHP+bowktPN/yJIltnTlZUibkbJxhHPhR5EgNnn3JyMoW
	l0yP6nJyH3sBQ2/CIBkmMSXmg+A0PFv3w40fUtX2oKVzT5TKnNsIDtv2Z7J5JRI3	l0yP6nJyH3sBQ2/CIBkmMSXmg+A0PFv3w40fUtX2oKVzT5TKnNsIDtv2Z7J5JRI3
	TbATMRmw8VItmPGFCJsD9nXRc4cEgvrvojXSfv6bWp5hCO+8WNadiiGZNdoZduiL	TbATMRmw8VItmPGFCJsD9nXRc4cEgvrvojXSfv6bWp5hCO+8WNadiiGZNdoZduiL
	rWNSwO9nQSxuNkqNo+wwaXF9Rynh1ZcazsVopBB4s5XuJ/Zcbbsaci1w34ywNCHw	rWNSwO9nQSxuNkqNo+wwaXF9Rynh1ZcazsVopBB4s5XuJ/Zcbbsaci1w34ywNCHw
	5xx9Cgj+6+yUsFp33P2YVgdfK4beyoOZK27Rm9e7Mpi6QxUi+BCR/8DB9svZBwob	5xx9Cgj+6+yUsFp33P2YVgdfK4beyoOZK27Rm9e7Mpi6QxUi+BCR/8DB9svZBwob
	K7iaKJzRBDxl4Qt/m6VHxtvkTXjkOOD+7g==	K7iaKJzRBDxl4Qt/m6VHxtvkTXjkOOD+7g==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	rotection-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted and Unwr	r Protection with hcp_shy, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	apped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-repl
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	y.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply.de
	crypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:18:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:18:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>
	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy@example>

	skipping to change at line 6982 ¶	skipping to change at line 6745 ¶
	message.	message.

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy.	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply"><name>S/MIME Signed and E	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Header
	ncrypted Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy D	Protection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	isplay)</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Heade
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	r Protection scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confident
	nd signedData. The payload is a text/plain message. It uses the Header Protecti	iality Policy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Heade
	on scheme from the draft with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Pol	r Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	icy"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confiden	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	tiality Policy</xref> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8690 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 8690 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5418 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 5418 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└─╴text/plain 514 bytes	└─╴text/plain 514 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy
		-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-r
	eply.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:19:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 15:19:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 7149 ¶	skipping to change at line 6907 ¶
	r7Cp3Z7TW2emivxYYCk7airndOWeIdZrwxoACNTQ+6IeD0LSet6iMP2EiLRRgfOB	r7Cp3Z7TW2emivxYYCk7airndOWeIdZrwxoACNTQ+6IeD0LSet6iMP2EiLRRgfOB
	2eU6X7yMWvTwRYbByybrKpqsM2moy4IpMS+DgaThSVxVHf3RbFvIXPUmhRCFFkS4	2eU6X7yMWvTwRYbByybrKpqsM2moy4IpMS+DgaThSVxVHf3RbFvIXPUmhRCFFkS4
	lmmm2czKN9wUaBLKcmeynBpRaunt9n0uFyWJgSbekqw3cet82vu9MOPSmM2h36UV	lmmm2czKN9wUaBLKcmeynBpRaunt9n0uFyWJgSbekqw3cet82vu9MOPSmM2h36UV
	WgJDktehhr/gi23ON4kavEwGngVIvlq+Emm0SuUmKacqdaOmATxUhL92IA93L9pm	WgJDktehhr/gi23ON4kavEwGngVIvlq+Emm0SuUmKacqdaOmATxUhL92IA93L9pm
	RvT6xARWsy0DrG/r362C6PDwp1fsTOQju6LkhFAOAvqDPKk+HOIjgBtkynHUPGwv	RvT6xARWsy0DrG/r362C6PDwp1fsTOQju6LkhFAOAvqDPKk+HOIjgBtkynHUPGwv
	8EN9Gx2SWwDJahAjPoz2t9kByC7PdG9qyGAAAEU6G/wXjshmzgw3jdw/PRmfSdNs	8EN9Gx2SWwDJahAjPoz2t9kByC7PdG9qyGAAAEU6G/wXjshmzgw3jdw/PRmfSdNs
	gbky/4GGewNl06WC9c+6qN4ldDff+m83ABgWonCuamerjlaIFFbfBJEGX/CBz7GQ	gbky/4GGewNl06WC9c+6qN4ldDff+m83ABgWonCuamerjlaIFFbfBJEGX/CBz7GQ
	QpfxuAEbhi11UloM77povWS5Cl8e0GSD2t2mt7E0aLgMT+L2TZXQx8lZmN8sWQq7	QpfxuAEbhi11UloM77povWS5Cl8e0GSD2t2mt7E0aLgMT+L2TZXQx8lZmN8sWQq7
	cP6aK8FpkDhidLIc9fneWucvMH5BKXx8em3ug4Bl8MUABR4K03ebuTLfDH+FGkD0	cP6aK8FpkDhidLIc9fneWucvMH5BKXx8em3ug4Bl8MUABR4K03ebuTLfDH+FGkD0
	HNeqqUVBSzDveFdaylcw2HkJpm8D9BoC3Y0n/WMW5VE=	HNeqqUVBSzDveFdaylcw2HkJpm8D9BoC3Y0n/WMW5VE=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted">
	rotection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypte	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	d Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display)	r Protection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	, Decrypted</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-lega
		cy-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-r
	eply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIPXgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIPTzCCD0sCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggWHBgkq	MIIPXgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIPTzCCD0sCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggWHBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggV4BIIFdE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z	hkiG9w0BBwGgggV4BIIFdE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVRyYW5z
	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw	ZmVyLUVuY29kaW5nOiA3Yml0DQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWhw
	LXNoeS1sZWdhY3ktcmVwbHkNCk1lc3NhZ2UtSUQ6IDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5j	LXNoeS1sZWdhY3ktcmVwbHkNCk1lc3NhZ2UtSUQ6IDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5j
	LWhwLXNoeS1sZWdhY3ktcmVwbHlAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGlj	LWhwLXNoeS1sZWdhY3ktcmVwbHlAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGlj
	ZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpE	ZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpE

	skipping to change at line 7243 ¶	skipping to change at line 6999 ¶
	ZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFl	ZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFl
	AwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X	AwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X
	DTIxMDIyMDE1MTkwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIDUClbNj9mKYodH3vCGfNVpZ	DTIxMDIyMDE1MTkwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIDUClbNj9mKYodH3vCGfNVpZ
	jSSWg3QZ6u/dLxbyfbvEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHqRG2dp61WFSKrkBcj7	jSSWg3QZ6u/dLxbyfbvEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHqRG2dp61WFSKrkBcj7
	sVy7SmsllIQUOl3EO23T5h4PcL8PjggAJi/GHWaEsGviQEdS0QAbljEnzd2wjgn0	sVy7SmsllIQUOl3EO23T5h4PcL8PjggAJi/GHWaEsGviQEdS0QAbljEnzd2wjgn0
	QDtLBAfpQtQR0byQGTzpg7y9Lt5WnuxQaZxsBPvENqeYSFesUVlW1JrJGXcqLH7U	QDtLBAfpQtQR0byQGTzpg7y9Lt5WnuxQaZxsBPvENqeYSFesUVlW1JrJGXcqLH7U
	cu1+bdDLEe0p2ITtazvmgJ5NvoHkucBk1v8fwW6uliGJCZC0Gf9WJDP1qay2Jexy	cu1+bdDLEe0p2ITtazvmgJ5NvoHkucBk1v8fwW6uliGJCZC0Gf9WJDP1qay2Jexy
	/TUzmr2Egnxq71WlAVql2kfUOfZkgALFRzhaHtonrST83I1sLK9ZxB8ZX8vJX56v	/TUzmr2Egnxq71WlAVql2kfUOfZkgALFRzhaHtonrST83I1sLK9ZxB8ZX8vJX56v
	5hHRzhuQQyAVgOeVz7skKIb5ODfBHqJ1vEzvCjf72BgQLYGEzR6hmPXW1Ml4vXtV	5hHRzhuQQyAVgOeVz7skKIb5ODfBHqJ1vEzvCjf72BgQLYGEzR6hmPXW1Ml4vXtV
	lIw=	lIw=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-messag
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-simple-message-header-p	e-header-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	rotection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signe	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Simple Message, Heade
	d and Encrypted Reply Over a Simple Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ L	r Protection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	egacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-lega
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	cy-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-r
	eply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit	Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply	Subject: smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:19:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 10:19:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>
	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>	References: <smime-signed-enc-hp-shy-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 7291 ¶	skipping to change at line 7045 ¶

	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7	This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7
	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain	envelopedData around signedData. The payload is a text/plain
	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft	message. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft
	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy with a "Legacy	with the hcp_shy Header Confidentiality Policy with a "Legacy
	Display" part.	Display" part.

	--	--
	Alice	Alice
	alice@smime.example	alice@smime.example

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline"><name>S/MIME Signed and E	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Prote
	ncrypted Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline</name>	ction with hcp_baseline</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	t with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target
	hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-c	="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xr
	onfidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>	ef>.</t>
		<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10035 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10035 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6412 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6412 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2054 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2054 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1124 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1124 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 383 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 383 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 478 bytes	│└─╴text/html 478 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-ba
		seline.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:09:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:09:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 7481 ¶	skipping to change at line 7230 ¶
	u/kW8TwMOBveXstkJUm8TBhX5TDEFtg+Y+tyDNb4n4xwpuishLd/pMck6LNK3fO3	u/kW8TwMOBveXstkJUm8TBhX5TDEFtg+Y+tyDNb4n4xwpuishLd/pMck6LNK3fO3
	cOaqQssUWkpjJSzSeedcA4oonnq833DXP6SPF1ksXlArsDVWB4atlFRqbaUKKrpv	cOaqQssUWkpjJSzSeedcA4oonnq833DXP6SPF1ksXlArsDVWB4atlFRqbaUKKrpv
	Hinhb+MUjANUW+TcAEznbTyHFvEuNCIX7WU7SlOglcrEjJzGnJZC24+l0KzxF3ed	Hinhb+MUjANUW+TcAEznbTyHFvEuNCIX7WU7SlOglcrEjJzGnJZC24+l0KzxF3ed
	7PndgDslLmJc4ExhALrKGFw57Muvy1UNd4f6W7AEraj/54FIoZzDRH+R/owcjuiK	7PndgDslLmJc4ExhALrKGFw57Muvy1UNd4f6W7AEraj/54FIoZzDRH+R/owcjuiK
	Pza8vs8W8792ds1ewGcLs+B1g+l79IbO0+zR4eio1f+6kSsRf+EucrH4RF+lU+ba	Pza8vs8W8792ds1ewGcLs+B1g+l79IbO0+zR4eio1f+6kSsRf+EucrH4RF+lU+ba
	w56nBq1EMoBJFuzPrLdAOD9vRVwi8cmKYYf/VgriDvZxqsDsdjC81fUEesG8/iVS	w56nBq1EMoBJFuzPrLdAOD9vRVwi8cmKYYf/VgriDvZxqsDsdjC81fUEesG8/iVS
	axpAOFhCp8oUQZVg8yRsR7x/m0EjFWZPu9JZwAge76HhwpSu+yg55m5ndeXEy55p	axpAOFhCp8oUQZVg8yRsR7x/m0EjFWZPu9JZwAge76HhwpSu+yg55m5ndeXEy55p
	ss6t9jHwuFu7F8q75xTTVE+jBZomyxfYQV0qFvvelF86Hrc+FTobS2AzPRzhwj+p	ss6t9jHwuFu7F8q75xTTVE+jBZomyxfYQV0qFvvelF86Hrc+FTobS2AzPRzhwj+p
	Wfh8ORVoQaHb/BuAREB/xXCLhzDsirqoUKDcVATLnBUvZIawptgC1OjIaAX3Xgn0	Wfh8ORVoQaHb/BuAREB/xXCLhzDsirqoUKDcVATLnBUvZIawptgC1OjIaAX3Xgn0
	VQXDSeABdtUDVBgI67OgFw==	VQXDSeABdtUDVBgI67OgFw==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted">
	tion-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Comple	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	x Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>	tection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base	baseline.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	line.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIISMQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIISIjCCEh4CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwgghaBgkq	MIISMQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIISIjCCEh4CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwgghaBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGggghLBIIIR01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGggghLBIIIR01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUNCk1lc3NhZ2UtSUQ6IDxz	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUNCk1lc3NhZ2UtSUQ6IDxz
	bWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmVAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZy	bWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmVAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZy
	b206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNt	b206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNt
	aW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZlYiAyMDIxIDEyOjA5OjAyIC0w	aW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZlYiAyMDIxIDEyOjA5OjAyIC0w

	skipping to change at line 7590 ¶	skipping to change at line 7337 ¶
	cnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCG	cnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCG
	SAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkF	SAFlAwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkF
	MQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3MDkwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIFPOmRBiI1gpSbRbrEhT	MQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3MDkwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIFPOmRBiI1gpSbRbrEhT
	xW8uQ+V/G/cmOB6495mnsKVeMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBADgh7UBYrX+esUzQ	xW8uQ+V/G/cmOB6495mnsKVeMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBADgh7UBYrX+esUzQ
	I9zNqk4LnbgdQoUdeJtdY2Jvyl6dlV8cfIFNgng8IluuuJI48a5yJwYG3060AkvF	I9zNqk4LnbgdQoUdeJtdY2Jvyl6dlV8cfIFNgng8IluuuJI48a5yJwYG3060AkvF
	JC/hq7sSBCLzNVb9UioTixGi+4nGB2iRb7TKsfamuyh5Zdjg4OrN8N1H4rwUQ1K4	JC/hq7sSBCLzNVb9UioTixGi+4nGB2iRb7TKsfamuyh5Zdjg4OrN8N1H4rwUQ1K4
	Sis2TCi5/TSc+UYG7rH+YyIRSeVxNCII3rEA8E+dDRg6R5bqOTHxInQbBvG9q19e	Sis2TCi5/TSc+UYG7rH+YyIRSeVxNCII3rEA8E+dDRg6R5bqOTHxInQbBvG9q19e
	pelntJeSxvRSOSYwcoNGXenZ6S7eqfB3iln65d0gURSV7hPSfZwh1QSZa47egE7V	pelntJeSxvRSOSYwcoNGXenZ6S7eqfB3iln65d0gURSV7hPSfZwh1QSZa47egE7V
	9Dgce5pbZYQgeB27mLBCpsgRgYKbQ/+NBPBexT6Kxixd4sND++AZ6kUie+AvUpXo	9Dgce5pbZYQgeB27mLBCpsgRgYKbQ/+NBPBexT6Kxixd4sND++AZ6kUie+AvUpXo
	+kGun/Q=	+kGun/Q=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	tion-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwr	tection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	apped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	baseline.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:09:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:09:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer:	HP-Outer:
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>

	skipping to change at line 7664 ¶	skipping to change at line 7409 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--e03--	--e03--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy"><name>S/MIME Signe	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Prote
	d and Encrypted Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ L	ction with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	egacy Display)</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	t with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xr
	hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-c	ef> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	onfidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	"Legacy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10640 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10640 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6856 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6856 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2367 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2367 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1415 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1415 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 476 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 476 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 636 bytes	│└─╴text/html 636 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-ba
		seline-legacy.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-legacy.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:10:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:10:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 7864 ¶	skipping to change at line 7604 ¶
	BysnpeELKcGGHjdUovPTWk7v/ewl/dJ1dVgEiRsnSU7G4bMhR1OY3lRER902wjLm	BysnpeELKcGGHjdUovPTWk7v/ewl/dJ1dVgEiRsnSU7G4bMhR1OY3lRER902wjLm
	6zdOuNbd7LrTimhtu6lWIFtSgrJpPNKpDTgjGn5X8R8MuAFJFibkS4uMbL1Fty32	6zdOuNbd7LrTimhtu6lWIFtSgrJpPNKpDTgjGn5X8R8MuAFJFibkS4uMbL1Fty32
	bESHzoLqSLRgWgLpZQjmrTyvOgvYyauKjZYslBnVqjd+oBq9JUgxh7xKsG+z2KQo	bESHzoLqSLRgWgLpZQjmrTyvOgvYyauKjZYslBnVqjd+oBq9JUgxh7xKsG+z2KQo
	V4QC4M3z0ppx76fYMETfOMjp9Pm8KyuhEHXIbAXoVE1rer2m1ptaJGZF7wUJAqEL	V4QC4M3z0ppx76fYMETfOMjp9Pm8KyuhEHXIbAXoVE1rer2m1ptaJGZF7wUJAqEL
	uJiKSztN5S5sFe+a87BsIlDWkCLZRuDb04aO+ndSd343yK9CMfYKbknZXtC/cAVd	uJiKSztN5S5sFe+a87BsIlDWkCLZRuDb04aO+ndSd343yK9CMfYKbknZXtC/cAVd
	2cwFAg+qix+351gdmGd5L8tQC9V4FO3uy0JQU90g0Twq0nE45fvLj0J4rnivuQkD	2cwFAg+qix+351gdmGd5L8tQC9V4FO3uy0JQU90g0Twq0nE45fvLj0J4rnivuQkD
	NMypJdswmGcd8TWFdb8kQMtZPNWuupbV5w1lF3ibGEhGqtO+4/gu1ua3jg+cHI3o	NMypJdswmGcd8TWFdb8kQMtZPNWuupbV5w1lF3ibGEhGqtO+4/gu1ua3jg+cHI3o
	oKBzUuvYGLXrbrYnPE1b3HQXvxDVd8m/+KLDNiwyQ7UT676iJn7ARCYZCwP/D3g6	oKBzUuvYGLXrbrYnPE1b3HQXvxDVd8m/+KLDNiwyQ7UT676iJn7ARCYZCwP/D3g6
	zMc3NXJkUZ8KFOHqokaaJ3jleLoMi6JB23bhiv/RRJuYk+TCwX7uBKF8fnt+E802	zMc3NXJkUZ8KFOHqokaaJ3jleLoMi6JB23bhiv/RRJuYk+TCwX7uBKF8fnt+E802
	YOhbKcnThdDUreGM2QrsjZeHZQ6qgIkLUedro8EsPI8=	YOhbKcnThdDUreGM2QrsjZeHZQ6qgIkLUedro8EsPI8=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted">
	tion-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypte	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	d Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display)	tection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	, Decrypted</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
		baseline-legacy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-legacy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIITdQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIITZjCCE2ICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggmeBgkq	MIITdQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIITZjCCE2ICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggmeBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggmPBIIJi01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGgggmPBIIJi01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVnYWN5DQpNZXNzYWdl	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVnYWN5DQpNZXNzYWdl
	LUlEOg0KIDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVn	LUlEOg0KIDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGVn
	YWN5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4N	YWN5QGV4YW1wbGU+DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4N
	ClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBGZWIg	ClRvOiBCb2IgPGJvYkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBGZWIg

	skipping to change at line 7979 ¶	skipping to change at line 7717 ¶
	TVBTIFdHMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24g	TVBTIFdHMTEwLwYDVQQDEyhTYW1wbGUgTEFNUFMgUlNBIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24g
	QXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgG	QXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaBpMBgG
	CSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3	CSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIxMDIyMDE3
	MTAwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIDe7/NLwTkHNon7IR1M1xiObMU+8qMIZ1No5	MTAwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIDe7/NLwTkHNon7IR1M1xiObMU+8qMIZ1No5
	ANcjz5C9MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBABi/HvXTe3Z+LaltuFv57ZaUvY6kegwe	ANcjz5C9MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBABi/HvXTe3Z+LaltuFv57ZaUvY6kegwe
	OGiZ5UPa5FBpQxoE/1vp8xG+UVIUnpdV/1THKPjKFr6bZZff1/4u4NFeBYwI9yg+	OGiZ5UPa5FBpQxoE/1vp8xG+UVIUnpdV/1THKPjKFr6bZZff1/4u4NFeBYwI9yg+
	tK1cYz+B2cscX6FDAGjUr/6QxMOwd+ol7bnlzJJDrXvv8B5AOdHFosyOrDSrvn2k	tK1cYz+B2cscX6FDAGjUr/6QxMOwd+ol7bnlzJJDrXvv8B5AOdHFosyOrDSrvn2k
	Pzc6ush4JvS3aee5QFEgtd1bQx9fx3t/QhBsn5kGMC+3FzvKtmAYUlz0unqvk4HV	Pzc6ush4JvS3aee5QFEgtd1bQx9fx3t/QhBsn5kGMC+3FzvKtmAYUlz0unqvk4HV
	I40Goh/Fm3uzNxwTQ3/rzE7ws1Qkrp0VlBxVGgUa4dZ1VXVIizkRz1PRtis66F73	I40Goh/Fm3uzNxwTQ3/rzE7ws1Qkrp0VlBxVGgUa4dZ1VXVIizkRz1PRtis66F73
	EXJlygf9Btm/TJDUivXGr7fCI2i+njByX9vqUf/0UANsPevCy0HQWCY=	EXJlygf9Btm/TJDUivXGr7fCI2i+njByX9vqUf/0UANsPevCy0HQWCY=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	tion-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signe	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	d and Encrypted Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ L	tection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	egacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	baseline-legacy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-legacy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:10:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:10:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer: Message-ID:	HP-Outer: Message-ID:

	skipping to change at line 8064 ¶	skipping to change at line 7800 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--308--	--308--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encryp	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Prote
	ted Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy</name>	ction with hcp_shy</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	t with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="hea
	hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confid	der-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.<
	entiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>	/t>
		<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 9925 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 9925 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6342 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6342 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2003 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2003 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1104 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1104 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 373 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 373 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 468 bytes	│└─╴text/html 468 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-sh
		y.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy.
	eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:12:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:12:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 8252 ¶	skipping to change at line 7983 ¶
	x8uzVRuOsCSgLpo9Ljgp56ly2vEr7gDSWgqIit0cVIwXZlUcOzzaVrDWtDDfmXYF	x8uzVRuOsCSgLpo9Ljgp56ly2vEr7gDSWgqIit0cVIwXZlUcOzzaVrDWtDDfmXYF
	stpjIHk4BsJGwoqJN8Gf9IGV6Pi6DlpUtifBcDEpCoBt7wkMUCHp/Bjq5lEsTtZA	stpjIHk4BsJGwoqJN8Gf9IGV6Pi6DlpUtifBcDEpCoBt7wkMUCHp/Bjq5lEsTtZA
	86yRqNOZKLuyW7tqDfOPYQUsUpbAM4E8hrN84EDgLYMCg6AC/Qs3H/wDO7cJ4LCk	86yRqNOZKLuyW7tqDfOPYQUsUpbAM4E8hrN84EDgLYMCg6AC/Qs3H/wDO7cJ4LCk
	M5Hph06hiyehanuMCtUVyvyfSb1hWY5LELyr9UKLYHXMdCRm6SI4lhkcD/yd7YRc	M5Hph06hiyehanuMCtUVyvyfSb1hWY5LELyr9UKLYHXMdCRm6SI4lhkcD/yd7YRc
	8xXJwFVSBSXcuRFQD8ViGo84HNNw45Oa/kcT0tfJLNDk2psDgMICjWkiZDcOJ0fF	8xXJwFVSBSXcuRFQD8ViGo84HNNw45Oa/kcT0tfJLNDk2psDgMICjWkiZDcOJ0fF
	ExXO65SCDaVSK2a2hScuhLb4o87nkHPTtmCwse92gYQlgEJqhAUCe4tupS3Tlced	ExXO65SCDaVSK2a2hScuhLb4o87nkHPTtmCwse92gYQlgEJqhAUCe4tupS3Tlced
	rYx5p0TRq0a4saxyQw3KOkvCYb00vr3e5ywj+I7FJmdT/3FRepXHAdJgeymSmelh	rYx5p0TRq0a4saxyQw3KOkvCYb00vr3e5ywj+I7FJmdT/3FRepXHAdJgeymSmelh
	MUnQVvRetUv+tbsHk96DXjMHUfvCArWcjf4NfuweEud6JAtmIxZhmBFTlg/j+oB7	MUnQVvRetUv+tbsHk96DXjMHUfvCArWcjf4NfuweEud6JAtmIxZhmBFTlg/j+oB7
	L3+nunA6/dDrIlBNCCQ/WWW3STpAhFC7jBCzIZMJMwyP7tRk6KL+PptfMMWD2rJy	L3+nunA6/dDrIlBNCCQ/WWW3STpAhFC7jBCzIZMJMwyP7tRk6KL+PptfMMWD2rJy
	QpFXwNDVCKOca+JCuhJ3lhlfjrexPJKD5/hhqGdKqc8=	QpFXwNDVCKOca+JCuhJ3lhlfjrexPJKD5/hhqGdKqc8=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted">
	tion-with-hcpshy-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over a Complex Mes	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	sage, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>	tection with hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy.	shy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIR/gYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIR7zCCEesCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwgggnBgkq	MIIR/gYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIR7zCCEesCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwgggnBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGggggYBIIIFE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGggggYBIIIFE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5DQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8c21pbWUt	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5DQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8c21pbWUt
	c2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLXNoeUBleGFtcGxlPg0KRnJvbTogQWxpY2Ug	c2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLXNoeUBleGFtcGxlPg0KRnJvbTogQWxpY2Ug
	PGFsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBs	PGFsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBs
	ZT4NCkRhdGU6IFNhdCwgMjAgRmViIDIwMjEgMTI6MTI6MDIgLTA1MDANClVzZXIt	ZT4NCkRhdGU6IFNhdCwgMjAgRmViIDIwMjEgMTI6MTI6MDIgLTA1MDANClVzZXIt

	skipping to change at line 8360 ¶	skipping to change at line 8089 ¶
	ZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFl	ZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5AhM3QQV57XV/QqmiXDr0+GrOmqnXMAsGCWCGSAFl
	AwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X	AwQCAaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X
	DTIxMDIyMDE3MTIwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIOk6rjm9vW4yAFhPqraTwTSM	DTIxMDIyMDE3MTIwMlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIOk6rjm9vW4yAFhPqraTwTSM
	poDXdAk+kSVCc47Smx1DMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAAURi5oouLYIh9YruNpF	poDXdAk+kSVCc47Smx1DMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAAURi5oouLYIh9YruNpF
	Se6sDsPTGmIcZsDjQ/MZV55S4pmhVBQu4SoVZDVM9KHKxqfBbj+aTs1Cyas8R88h	Se6sDsPTGmIcZsDjQ/MZV55S4pmhVBQu4SoVZDVM9KHKxqfBbj+aTs1Cyas8R88h
	cWqd8xhiU9ufoC7p6qEMVIyMvyppeupRyjQWUCH+2XtQ5sAVmr+F+l/Valuj7JZw	cWqd8xhiU9ufoC7p6qEMVIyMvyppeupRyjQWUCH+2XtQ5sAVmr+F+l/Valuj7JZw
	JU8XS84oinCF6uApu7eucGblt8t7ek7j3JXoFVE7g8a/O1JKg4ezNV2RduQeNXLT	JU8XS84oinCF6uApu7eucGblt8t7ek7j3JXoFVE7g8a/O1JKg4ezNV2RduQeNXLT
	m/lBVIfeiiOsmgmJa5RTgbgAakJtdo3odHj0cI31eANSbQlE3XENz2E9L8JWxYNP	m/lBVIfeiiOsmgmJa5RTgbgAakJtdo3odHj0cI31eANSbQlE3XENz2E9L8JWxYNP
	bBceEhIvu2AOtV2PYCBfrVp0WTVwWHorm8GG/DyvsAsa6eGJI55hA8VeBg170gT5	bBceEhIvu2AOtV2PYCBfrVp0WTVwWHorm8GG/DyvsAsa6eGJI55hA8VeBg170gT5
	nzc=	nzc=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	tion-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Over	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted and Unwrapped</nam	tection with hcp_shy, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	e>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	shy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy.
	decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:12:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:12:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>
	HP-Outer: From: alice@smime.example	HP-Outer: From: alice@smime.example

	skipping to change at line 8433 ¶	skipping to change at line 8160 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--1fa--	--1fa--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy"><name>S/MIME Signed and	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Prote
	Encrypted Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Disp	ction with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	lay)</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	t with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="hea
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	der-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> w
	hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confid	ith a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	entiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Leg	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	acy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10920 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10920 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7072 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7072 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2519 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2519 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1597 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1597 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 564 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 564 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 736 bytes	│└─╴text/html 736 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-sh
		y-legacy.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	legacy.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:13:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:13:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0


	skipping to change at line 8636 ¶	skipping to change at line 8358 ¶
	3q2Yerkjrz+/Lnbc+XJgtNYErzK00b2Yl+wSivCvgs2CZwHAWagb40ycaJcp1rGs	3q2Yerkjrz+/Lnbc+XJgtNYErzK00b2Yl+wSivCvgs2CZwHAWagb40ycaJcp1rGs
	SHSAyMEe3+9g2Xd9Y5UyhPCePnIFtfvThUUWDMBbl4NkTZhci2Q+NGhwSfd//i/q	SHSAyMEe3+9g2Xd9Y5UyhPCePnIFtfvThUUWDMBbl4NkTZhci2Q+NGhwSfd//i/q
	0dCdTZHj3ucJsNkCtfW7DtIykpy6Vld5smayE1zu5WjE2EzfumQHHqkOrfCNBBbi	0dCdTZHj3ucJsNkCtfW7DtIykpy6Vld5smayE1zu5WjE2EzfumQHHqkOrfCNBBbi
	plJwXI0WLdVCJrSAUoOTlZbE22r4tJnar1DA+V3Jep/VPZ1mNxa5Dh0fseI4h63q	plJwXI0WLdVCJrSAUoOTlZbE22r4tJnar1DA+V3Jep/VPZ1mNxa5Dh0fseI4h63q
	eudtLO5NBMLMQxz762u9uB0y1vuFmKOX0VWz2aXZ6jHmN0z4zuwrqbS6yHYqEX3Z	eudtLO5NBMLMQxz762u9uB0y1vuFmKOX0VWz2aXZ6jHmN0z4zuwrqbS6yHYqEX3Z
	4NzaoFOD7eRJbH92yFb1owGjPsb7QcRykQfBhmiIHeNJUoja5xZdk9M7vX5ygB8w	4NzaoFOD7eRJbH92yFb1owGjPsb7QcRykQfBhmiIHeNJUoja5xZdk9M7vX5ygB8w
	AIk33yHYWOumHHFeSPvHlTTsNvLel422gDyiDO0fXmJfGAsauqcX11jNB7RI+HM3	AIk33yHYWOumHHFeSPvHlTTsNvLel422gDyiDO0fXmJfGAsauqcX11jNB7RI+HM3
	HnXNeubb3y3aA1bl1djZxngAwOQ1Sr9aLobmpbL/zsKrFXG7/fiz2DmachOLJL97	HnXNeubb3y3aA1bl1djZxngAwOQ1Sr9aLobmpbL/zsKrFXG7/fiz2DmachOLJL97
	PU1j9MTspdH8VtBXX1KFyOSQKBRoGtYmG/OK5gilSXSSevz84KJiZw1ReIMXCa77	PU1j9MTspdH8VtBXX1KFyOSQKBRoGtYmG/OK5gilSXSSevz84KJiZw1ReIMXCa77
	8Qxgzs7bIccDSBVzfzxjFADQxFY2jm+g8mr5b17byqO5wiNlLaGyneQeGMsI6H4Q	8Qxgzs7bIccDSBVzfzxjFADQxFY2jm+g8mr5b17byqO5wiNlLaGyneQeGMsI6H4Q

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted">
	tion-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Ove	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	r a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypte	tection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	d</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
		shy-legacy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	legacy.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIUEgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIUAzCCE/8CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggo7Bgkq	MIIUEgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIUAzCCE/8CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggo7Bgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggosBIIKKE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGgggosBIIKKE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5LWxlZ2FjeQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDog	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5LWxlZ2FjeQ0KTWVzc2FnZS1JRDog
	PHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMtY29tcGxleC1ocC1zaHktbGVnYWN5QGV4YW1wbGU+	PHNtaW1lLXNpZ25lZC1lbmMtY29tcGxleC1ocC1zaHktbGVnYWN5QGV4YW1wbGU+
	DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJv	DQpGcm9tOiBBbGljZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NClRvOiBCb2IgPGJv
	YkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBGZWIgMjAyMSAxMjoxMzow	YkBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KRGF0ZTogU2F0LCAyMCBGZWIgMjAyMSAxMjoxMzow

	skipping to change at line 8755 ¶	skipping to change at line 8475 ¶
	ZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglg	ZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglg
	hkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJ	hkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJ
	BTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzEzMDJaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCBllHSf7b+HyaqXmEwT	BTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzEzMDJaMC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCBllHSf7b+HyaqXmEwT
	DQLFcyd845Y683fln5KaB6NJmjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQCRRSDM+MtNb5av	DQLFcyd845Y683fln5KaB6NJmjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQCRRSDM+MtNb5av
	W1U6o2LxrDXrrIy7lb8Vw1D3gHSgEaeZ3ZvZ6OefQPh4OkHNy/oescj+rKZzcLHB	W1U6o2LxrDXrrIy7lb8Vw1D3gHSgEaeZ3ZvZ6OefQPh4OkHNy/oescj+rKZzcLHB
	s3RZ9Tnybr7p3kawIEFv1DW3aiyXQ49gQyPHn2Nwi6hK7Gn5d7rjSFuzprWYACg7	s3RZ9Tnybr7p3kawIEFv1DW3aiyXQ49gQyPHn2Nwi6hK7Gn5d7rjSFuzprWYACg7
	hAVWBd4/prAE1mNMR4DOOXoPYZn+ggJb/oaagcbdEy3WrznO2n6TW6Eb7bBoUT4t	hAVWBd4/prAE1mNMR4DOOXoPYZn+ggJb/oaagcbdEy3WrznO2n6TW6Eb7bBoUT4t
	IrZRWxPrdP30T7N1eHMmCDNGSXt/fC9rgcRLz+cj+1czfU1Gf+qIxg05HyrVMrkL	IrZRWxPrdP30T7N1eHMmCDNGSXt/fC9rgcRLz+cj+1czfU1Gf+qIxg05HyrVMrkL
	+XiCEoOck2+pbpz5WFPcmnRXLgH2FMlSNWU5RwbRu5YZejoKBiUZNlUmlA08d5JV	+XiCEoOck2+pbpz5WFPcmnRXLgH2FMlSNWU5RwbRu5YZejoKBiUZNlUmlA08d5JV
	U3Zqnl/G	U3Zqnl/G

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-hea
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-header-protec	der-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	tion-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Header Pro
	Encrypted Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Disp	tection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	lay), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	shy-legacy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	legacy.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:13:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:13:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer:	HP-Outer:
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 8845 ¶	skipping to change at line 8563 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--cd5--	--cd5--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply"><name>S/MIME Signed	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Header
	and Encrypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline	Protection with hcp_baseline</name>
	</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	t with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xr
	hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-c	ef>.</t>
	onfidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10575 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10575 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6820 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6820 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2345 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2345 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1136 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1136 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 389 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 389 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 484 bytes	│└─╴text/html 484 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-ba
		seline-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:15:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:15:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>

	skipping to change at line 9045 ¶	skipping to change at line 8758 ¶
	AV7phEbm4W0BSBdNJmnzLQipGKzszyTd4XlgaXB2HqxFlWbKWJdAdHkFK8faN4SK	AV7phEbm4W0BSBdNJmnzLQipGKzszyTd4XlgaXB2HqxFlWbKWJdAdHkFK8faN4SK
	ztxxOBngAlBMdPtxEi4tev7S93SFKoqMwY18vHlLOHi/oFpaWMjJsE4uxdqvtz/x	ztxxOBngAlBMdPtxEi4tev7S93SFKoqMwY18vHlLOHi/oFpaWMjJsE4uxdqvtz/x
	aeZMmgstD1ZYRykBqGzjm8cMeoQawJ9HF6AkNFPo9+AsgXCuPNhutGZuCv3vAWTg	aeZMmgstD1ZYRykBqGzjm8cMeoQawJ9HF6AkNFPo9+AsgXCuPNhutGZuCv3vAWTg
	yXAiMHDuzahSggfr7r2ixkDUxD12/5RSeSDvCkeCWsjBKVpyzoWn2QksAMBoETyN	yXAiMHDuzahSggfr7r2ixkDUxD12/5RSeSDvCkeCWsjBKVpyzoWn2QksAMBoETyN
	F2gcjouX2Cp+OkOQV0e8Y6zIOWE/SGUkFkUDRJUSA8gkpfXWDPV8MN6rAMULWUGP	F2gcjouX2Cp+OkOQV0e8Y6zIOWE/SGUkFkUDRJUSA8gkpfXWDPV8MN6rAMULWUGP
	jYcRtabSgnlXKn6VivRiBlGXvp7iOXpsoGtMwof9hUcoo/HYMAvdsd5anaIZU8tA	jYcRtabSgnlXKn6VivRiBlGXvp7iOXpsoGtMwof9hUcoo/HYMAvdsd5anaIZU8tA
	g+c+8OHky2OJ5mzUWmk1CcBIWO9yyAHsy7ivSVzJtxDuTrQAuuH92MZgyvGnoioM	g+c+8OHky2OJ5mzUWmk1CcBIWO9yyAHsy7ivSVzJtxDuTrQAuuH92MZgyvGnoioM
	uaKOwNzrmhAAhBruv0XpMd/RBIu5+e8EM+fIuYwwwYDWIpn9vMbkKiBv4h5PQ8+T	uaKOwNzrmhAAhBruv0XpMd/RBIu5+e8EM+fIuYwwwYDWIpn9vMbkKiBv4h5PQ8+T
	cunAwgNdg0qVFeZ96Gu1sIHttbexEvSADg9fplx7TG+DZgSrDkxhnJ80a0hZhZ2F	cunAwgNdg0qVFeZ96Gu1sIHttbexEvSADg9fplx7TG+DZgSrDkxhnJ80a0hZhZ2F
	CYJJrvEcQn+/ItTftmmV5tpG2r/LCufYFL26h0RXdD8=	CYJJrvEcQn+/ItTftmmV5tpG2r/LCufYFL26h0RXdD8=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted">
	protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Reply O	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	ver a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>	er Protection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base	baseline-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	line-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIITWQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIITSjCCE0YCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggmCBgkq	MIITWQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIITSjCCE0YCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggmCBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGggglzBIIJb01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGggglzBIIJb01JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtcmVwbHkNCk1lc3NhZ2Ut	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtcmVwbHkNCk1lc3NhZ2Ut
	SUQ6IDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtcmVwbHlA	SUQ6IDxzbWltZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtcmVwbHlA
	ZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KVG86	ZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlPg0KVG86
	IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZlYiAyMDIx	IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZlYiAyMDIx

	skipping to change at line 9160 ¶	skipping to change at line 8871 ¶
	UyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6a	UyBSU0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6a
	qdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq	qdcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkq
	hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTcxNTAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgzz6zrLzs	hkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTcxNTAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgzz6zrLzs
	Pn86IlgrGm7Fheev5QucTU+VJZWxIIrBFk8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEASITl	Pn86IlgrGm7Fheev5QucTU+VJZWxIIrBFk8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEASITl
	JnQGy7Cb5U6BdSMX3mnksCOX8mvaxy3o0QqNUbUGhNNPKI0LIWOdjHUL2Eq8+99Y	JnQGy7Cb5U6BdSMX3mnksCOX8mvaxy3o0QqNUbUGhNNPKI0LIWOdjHUL2Eq8+99Y
	2+WvVn3ZkAJ7KF/89ja3u4NTiwu30wWsd7DL7t1z8DJBK6JuyaY4xtohUPVa2gL2	2+WvVn3ZkAJ7KF/89ja3u4NTiwu30wWsd7DL7t1z8DJBK6JuyaY4xtohUPVa2gL2
	1atPowCt0X5RF7lmihqZnDGGUAzjfLpVsFnyIVAL3QG4/vW609d+aeO+ccdwzzUh	1atPowCt0X5RF7lmihqZnDGGUAzjfLpVsFnyIVAL3QG4/vW609d+aeO+ccdwzzUh
	lE03h3qpHK9wX5pWBNZCfdmjdXUFacU+fMe1mG9I8A1HMY09zj+rNz3onoIHJWJ2	lE03h3qpHK9wX5pWBNZCfdmjdXUFacU+fMe1mG9I8A1HMY09zj+rNz3onoIHJWJ2
	FBWS2tqK2eW8yCf/LSq9M5k86VbTjPjvjPz8FqupzugC5sUAx2JMUfUOq4A9hW+j	FBWS2tqK2eW8yCf/LSq9M5k86VbTjPjvjPz8FqupzugC5sUAx2JMUfUOq4A9hW+j
	g8PEOcwaEeYOMdSeKw==	g8PEOcwaEeYOMdSeKw==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Enc	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	rypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline, Decryp	er Protection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	ted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	baseline-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:15:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:15:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>
	References: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>	References: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline@example>
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]

	skipping to change at line 9240 ¶	skipping to change at line 8949 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--b2f--	--b2f--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl"><name>S/MIME Sign	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Header
	ed and Encrypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseli	Protection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	ne (+ Legacy Display)</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	t with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xr
	hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-c	ef> with a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	onfidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	"Legacy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 11205 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 11205 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7278 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7278 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2666 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2666 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1419 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1419 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 478 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 478 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 638 bytes	│└─╴text/html 638 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-ba
		seline-lgc-rpl.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-lgc-rpl.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl@example>	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:16:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:16:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 9453 ¶	skipping to change at line 9157 ¶
	NBr1VhambZliGNjAF7gS+AoyZdSFHvjyUZ8dx0Tw4qEGvUparsp2MKHqmF0+29Ty	NBr1VhambZliGNjAF7gS+AoyZdSFHvjyUZ8dx0Tw4qEGvUparsp2MKHqmF0+29Ty
	GkOgetOL6bcoW29PkhnodKSscod7sk4C70hJBJ7RrJNlA5YuwrWzokeD3rjEzqlj	GkOgetOL6bcoW29PkhnodKSscod7sk4C70hJBJ7RrJNlA5YuwrWzokeD3rjEzqlj
	dmRN2m9DQnXNeHKsxEsCkgIeLZVsrCxMVONTCrdfQnKnzZDgtoI4EYFfEElN6qQ7	dmRN2m9DQnXNeHKsxEsCkgIeLZVsrCxMVONTCrdfQnKnzZDgtoI4EYFfEElN6qQ7
	v8LtiJyqtmYSPU3c3xb+zsWtElso+HfHELrwsY8ge485xBwtGTGKZtCcxsKtj97X	v8LtiJyqtmYSPU3c3xb+zsWtElso+HfHELrwsY8ge485xBwtGTGKZtCcxsKtj97X
	gb/4pfvziajCLU/MWnE4fzQXPjXk8NEQRdk+EsgoCOxnTPShAnW+MDN143ndDN+J	gb/4pfvziajCLU/MWnE4fzQXPjXk8NEQRdk+EsgoCOxnTPShAnW+MDN143ndDN+J
	+BuTpFVF/duO+Vobv3N+3dH+Qd1qhui+q7R+ojXyp516X0IZCKr6211hAGgI7i+y	+BuTpFVF/duO+Vobv3N+3dH+Qd1qhui+q7R+ojXyp516X0IZCKr6211hAGgI7i+y
	Z2RGCHIF3AA3ncH/An0X0RHgQi7ZIoSGDoHR2v0blOXDBNlzRXXiVEUGu1XuBp/o	Z2RGCHIF3AA3ncH/An0X0RHgQi7ZIoSGDoHR2v0blOXDBNlzRXXiVEUGu1XuBp/o
	BDnnXqcLT2Nng2tgdu6XvbIfgdr15/zrwKEAbG3yJa2iGsotgdiu1DgU7lfktlPq	BDnnXqcLT2Nng2tgdu6XvbIfgdr15/zrwKEAbG3yJa2iGsotgdiu1DgU7lfktlPq
	ftTzg2nvDkTGT86AsTQNM2ClARtAmQnul5v/Oo926jCr+471rEXfN6Gm6zkwwoAG	ftTzg2nvDkTGT86AsTQNM2ClARtAmQnul5v/Oo926jCr+471rEXfN6Gm6zkwwoAG
	ZyE19pnIaF/p7tczePNgug==	ZyE19pnIaF/p7tczePNgug==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted">
	protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and En	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	crypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_baseline (+ Leg	er Protection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	acy Display), Decrypted</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
		baseline-lgc-rpl.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-lgc-rpl.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIUpgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIUlzCCFJMCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggrPBgkq	MIIUpgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIUlzCCFJMCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggrPBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggrABIIKvE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGgggrABIIKvE1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGdjLXJwbA0KTWVzc2Fn	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtYmFzZWxpbmUtbGdjLXJwbA0KTWVzc2Fn
	ZS1JRDoNCiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLWJhc2VsaW5lLWxn	ZS1JRDoNCiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLWJhc2VsaW5lLWxn
	Yy1ycGxAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxl	Yy1ycGxAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxl
	Pg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZl	Pg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZl

	skipping to change at line 9575 ¶	skipping to change at line 9277 ¶
	U0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcw	U0EgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcw
	CwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG	CwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG
	9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTcxNjAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQg4f753q+skjOT	9w0BCQUxDxcNMjEwMjIwMTcxNjAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQg4f753q+skjOT
	bEsl5q6WUySCAbgxotWkN7Ci2/Q7J9cwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAiUGuCHAe	bEsl5q6WUySCAbgxotWkN7Ci2/Q7J9cwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAiUGuCHAe
	JkzXXnkH3k8yFGtEkkMscuC0JOPwqnxHzILBDYt9udpeParT/drO0VgRKxCQ0mxT	JkzXXnkH3k8yFGtEkkMscuC0JOPwqnxHzILBDYt9udpeParT/drO0VgRKxCQ0mxT
	sz0D65erzo+ZXfuXC5+Q4hzqdNkQhC8Vi7H2NL8KLsBrXNLZtG82xco08fTKTWVq	sz0D65erzo+ZXfuXC5+Q4hzqdNkQhC8Vi7H2NL8KLsBrXNLZtG82xco08fTKTWVq
	c2HwuAPL0+Yh+fTfqrr5oRnJvPVkTxl97KxTA1YNQh/s+Uuacumnmr/3iuHwjubd	c2HwuAPL0+Yh+fTfqrr5oRnJvPVkTxl97KxTA1YNQh/s+Uuacumnmr/3iuHwjubd
	+iesA8wZ9RWsmeg4FGUzaVrTRIHj8p6YQQYJcOomV9GuRbjUzMVTL/fOB0G6Jho1	+iesA8wZ9RWsmeg4FGUzaVrTRIHj8p6YQQYJcOomV9GuRbjUzMVTL/fOB0G6Jho1
	aq6nGVcsoVTMIrH8nJv54eHQtWtYFBJI855oDbkIS4DxH0wR5121BayRN7MgC6q+	aq6nGVcsoVTMIrH8nJv54eHQtWtYFBJI855oDbkIS4DxH0wR5121BayRN7MgC6q+
	H+cJTAZUD2IF7Q==	H+cJTAZUD2IF7Q==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	protection-with-hcpbaseline-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	Signed and Encrypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_b	er Protection with hcp_baseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</nam
	aseline (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	e>
		<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
		baseline-lgc-rpl.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-base
	line-lgc-rpl.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl@example>	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-lgc-rpl@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:16:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:16:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To:	In-Reply-To:
	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy@example>	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-baseline-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 9668 ¶	skipping to change at line 9368 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--63c--	--63c--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply"><name>S/MIME Signed and	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Header
	Encrypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy</name>	Protection with hcp_shy</name>
		<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	t with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="hea
	hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confid	der-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.<
	entiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t>	/t>
		<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	<t>It has the following structure:</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10445 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 10445 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6716 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6716 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2273 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2273 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1116 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1116 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 379 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 379 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 474 bytes	│└─╴text/html 474 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-sh
		y-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:18:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:18:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>

	skipping to change at line 9866 ¶	skipping to change at line 9561 ¶
	+Dq4AptNdZliJTVrkKKw0buQJMrcUvWKKxkUC9/N5DeNVV7yVuyVBUOk1Q9Zub8X	+Dq4AptNdZliJTVrkKKw0buQJMrcUvWKKxkUC9/N5DeNVV7yVuyVBUOk1Q9Zub8X
	SNFkFDZ4I+CfQDrN9YedY+lAMjcmiYIDn9s2RmYnGgAVlYweN7y8hE36sNAxDUKq	SNFkFDZ4I+CfQDrN9YedY+lAMjcmiYIDn9s2RmYnGgAVlYweN7y8hE36sNAxDUKq
	AEgC8bJrTAy7axaqj2m8c/F1nXzmKBn1+Q4zSW8oeNjvfSpfS5ZeljHnyHrZrUN5	AEgC8bJrTAy7axaqj2m8c/F1nXzmKBn1+Q4zSW8oeNjvfSpfS5ZeljHnyHrZrUN5
	fVyet/3gok33Qqh58j2kXSVgWJrtbsIk1x5Zu2Q+QeUmMykA2ltAe//NbcRm5NzW	fVyet/3gok33Qqh58j2kXSVgWJrtbsIk1x5Zu2Q+QeUmMykA2ltAe//NbcRm5NzW
	fdAyOP3IIvpwp6wOrtDxyBeDDmPS6Jkthp/3A9CmD7jewnt2D3f9OG1jlZI1nvvi	fdAyOP3IIvpwp6wOrtDxyBeDDmPS6Jkthp/3A9CmD7jewnt2D3f9OG1jlZI1nvvi
	VxqKkC+yHGxYKC1kdvZnkoVPS5sGA3STRxzWgfzZOrnvyNjKneokJY2CMA89A8wm	VxqKkC+yHGxYKC1kdvZnkoVPS5sGA3STRxzWgfzZOrnvyNjKneokJY2CMA89A8wm
	cdAbA8WTxoLo7ObjelYiyPgB5BWUqWvRbrVUYS6lrgLToUIfVSS/beNyjwwmjHgR	cdAbA8WTxoLo7ObjelYiyPgB5BWUqWvRbrVUYS6lrgLToUIfVSS/beNyjwwmjHgR
	C3a2iQQ74kYyMr1iBj9K0cUeyVSBHOMvwG5Xv0Phovz6waVZdSWOcxjDslz+Ghg/	C3a2iQQ74kYyMr1iBj9K0cUeyVSBHOMvwG5Xv0Phovz6waVZdSWOcxjDslz+Ghg/
	c74x37hFQSAiIUt9ZzrE569QNP6wcGe/S0MxL5MG6bqu5BH8MGrBeQ0IPRCwXFwI	c74x37hFQSAiIUt9ZzrE569QNP6wcGe/S0MxL5MG6bqu5BH8MGrBeQ0IPRCwXFwI
	+Hvwh/mIF5Uc0hssRDYNn9YxYA0jCLsjpxjMcDJCMUA=	+Hvwh/mIF5Uc0hssRDYNn9YxYA0jCLsjpxjMcDJCMUA=

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted">
	protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted Reply Over a	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>	er Protection with hcp_shy, Decrypted</name>
		<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-	shy-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIITEAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIITATCCEv0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggk5Bgkq	MIITEAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIITATCCEv0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggk5Bgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggkqBIIJJk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGgggkqBIIJJk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5LXJlcGx5DQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5LXJlcGx5DQpNZXNzYWdlLUlEOiA8
	c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLXNoeS1yZXBseUBleGFtcGxlPg0K	c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLXNoeS1yZXBseUBleGFtcGxlPg0K
	RnJvbTogQWxpY2UgPGFsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JA	RnJvbTogQWxpY2UgPGFsaWNlQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpUbzogQm9iIDxib2JA
	c21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NCkRhdGU6IFNhdCwgMjAgRmViIDIwMjEgMTI6MTg6MDIg	c21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4NCkRhdGU6IFNhdCwgMjAgRmViIDIwMjEgMTI6MTg6MDIg

	skipping to change at line 9979 ¶	skipping to change at line 9672 ¶
	RzExMC8GA1UEAxMoU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhv	RzExMC8GA1UEAxMoU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhv
	cml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG	cml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG
	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzE4MDJa	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzE4MDJa
	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCD0vcxZnCjxaOpfz5cIo9Maa0SVODPCXLJlV2Wbq4Z6	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCD0vcxZnCjxaOpfz5cIo9Maa0SVODPCXLJlV2Wbq4Z6
	7zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQB3m6q708hB5tmuz6jzSJ+nCR7C0BRbfKypEnSP	7zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQB3m6q708hB5tmuz6jzSJ+nCR7C0BRbfKypEnSP
	k2tdLaOAJWrHqljSd4klEJWy3x2SvLL9q+rSbmIWpK34PWVL1E7gbbJIBjfpoIUo	k2tdLaOAJWrHqljSd4klEJWy3x2SvLL9q+rSbmIWpK34PWVL1E7gbbJIBjfpoIUo
	+YMSIkhKFaKfUgulEi0zQG/HgnMENl6CDXa5ZrbW53SEpNpYgchUcqpg6Z0yOB07	+YMSIkhKFaKfUgulEi0zQG/HgnMENl6CDXa5ZrbW53SEpNpYgchUcqpg6Z0yOB07
	oH7YOqF2111RRSzsjNMMDAm/1LvOFBR+nUERAhHvq1dpGpNuvbtAh4itWLLbDLlR	oH7YOqF2111RRSzsjNMMDAm/1LvOFBR+nUERAhHvq1dpGpNuvbtAh4itWLLbDLlR
	gIvrihHbqaUhf4VDQNg4MWjdHGATgPHNAb4hpfaxHxGEv+NYB/65VQWKGKMZujqk	gIvrihHbqaUhf4VDQNg4MWjdHGATgPHNAb4hpfaxHxGEv+NYB/65VQWKGKMZujqk
	aLH9nVThiAlEOyirAA7VlmvlUQgBem0pjh6ixnwK9HfPb7pG	aLH9nVThiAlEOyirAA7VlmvlUQgBem0pjh6ixnwK9HfPb7pG

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	protection-with-hcpshy-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypte	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	d Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy, Decrypted and Un	er Protection with hcp_shy, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	wrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	shy-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply
	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply@example>	Message-ID: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:18:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:18:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>
	References: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>	References: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy@example>
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]

	skipping to change at line 10057 ¶	skipping to change at line 9748 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--46f--	--46f--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply">
	<section anchor="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply"><name>S/MIME Sign	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Header
	ed and Encrypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+	Protection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display)</name>
	Legacy Display)</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	inline image/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draf
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	t with the hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="hea
	age/png attachment. It uses the Header Protection scheme from the draft with the	der-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> w
	hcp_shy <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="header-confid	ith a "Legacy Display" part.</t>
	entiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> with a "Leg	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	acy Display" part.</t>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 11505 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 11505 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7508 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 7508 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2832 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 2832 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1621 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1621 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 576 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 576 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 748 bytes	│└─╴text/html 748 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 236 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-sh
		y-legacy-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	legacy-reply.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>
	From: alice@smime.example	From: alice@smime.example
	To: bob@smime.example	To: bob@smime.example
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:19:02 +0000	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:19:02 +0000
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 10272 ¶	skipping to change at line 9958 ¶
	3eZo3Nm+bwWzJzlo4yogzlTgH0SGnxyoibzOXzMqFgLkVbWvqTnw9UZASvoLAyrS	3eZo3Nm+bwWzJzlo4yogzlTgH0SGnxyoibzOXzMqFgLkVbWvqTnw9UZASvoLAyrS
	SFctnufOoPlH9JrL+mfoU83prsRDMmOqudzyi5/xWh4IvamvvQsq5+3xsQr1duA+	SFctnufOoPlH9JrL+mfoU83prsRDMmOqudzyi5/xWh4IvamvvQsq5+3xsQr1duA+
	W/HeZ8jx5hgO5UfexS5hAcgNs4Wz2NVCCl9fProSuYh9Caoz2PwlK87c/MliEqWc	W/HeZ8jx5hgO5UfexS5hAcgNs4Wz2NVCCl9fProSuYh9Caoz2PwlK87c/MliEqWc
	jZ5oSk0+zwLXTp3xpv4MHwDzHwqV6Sdg+cOUtl6wlZp0vJVxPD5tljBU9EW2vjfF	jZ5oSk0+zwLXTp3xpv4MHwDzHwqV6Sdg+cOUtl6wlZp0vJVxPD5tljBU9EW2vjfF
	Iq19LN50RLPQ7RpfCtJAIYUAuYGz0mwd66Q71d39Wx56wHA9TqQBTzNqI0CK6/mX	Iq19LN50RLPQ7RpfCtJAIYUAuYGz0mwd66Q71d39Wx56wHA9TqQBTzNqI0CK6/mX
	sRZKrMvLBTdHKk4Capu6ehFJgUt3Oifib6DWV6v5HUG14Dt4z8Bj9a3R66NBLWlR	sRZKrMvLBTdHKk4Capu6ehFJgUt3Oifib6DWV6v5HUG14Dt4z8Bj9a3R66NBLWlR
	K+2PoBYdd942K9XlMGBn3LJl4ALdvIcPBWj3GF+uGyuVe7wBlSx9CflX2WSI5YSg	K+2PoBYdd942K9XlMGBn3LJl4ALdvIcPBWj3GF+uGyuVe7wBlSx9CflX2WSI5YSg
	UDSpg+5kGBqjvtMlI8+4lfWZWKxub8YY4IMzkQxJcbvfqIwwjrevtIArQbtPlZDG	UDSpg+5kGBqjvtMlI8+4lfWZWKxub8YY4IMzkQxJcbvfqIwwjrevtIArQbtPlZDG
	q5zPmbmEot+ceJepsSmSeiEXJoDQJgbl6ZodjzNaAzLdOcGZI+qvi9m1S95VDfVG	q5zPmbmEot+ceJepsSmSeiEXJoDQJgbl6ZodjzNaAzLdOcGZI+qvi9m1S95VDfVG
	qrLl6hDxECQwnHKXwGrH6Qt4lftSzDHOnWKRERbiAgu9JPEuek4MY4C3u6dteyC+	qrLl6hDxECQwnHKXwGrH6Qt4lftSzDHOnWKRERbiAgu9JPEuek4MY4C3u6dteyC+

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted">
	protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypt	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	ed Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+ Legacy Displa	er Protection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted</name>
	y), Decrypted</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
		shy-legacy-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	legacy-reply.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIVUAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIVQTCCFT0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggt5Bgkq	MIIVUAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIVQTCCFT0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggt5Bgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggtqBIILZk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	hkiG9w0BBwGgggtqBIILZk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5LWxlZ2FjeS1yZXBseQ0KTWVzc2Fn	ZS1zaWduZWQtZW5jLWNvbXBsZXgtaHAtc2h5LWxlZ2FjeS1yZXBseQ0KTWVzc2Fn
	ZS1JRDoNCiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLXNoeS1sZWdhY3kt	ZS1JRDoNCiA8c21pbWUtc2lnbmVkLWVuYy1jb21wbGV4LWhwLXNoeS1sZWdhY3kt
	cmVwbHlAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxl	cmVwbHlAZXhhbXBsZT4NCkZyb206IEFsaWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxl
	Pg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZl	Pg0KVG86IEJvYiA8Ym9iQHNtaW1lLmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRlOiBTYXQsIDIwIEZl

	skipping to change at line 10397 ¶	skipping to change at line 10081 ¶
	RzExMC8GA1UEAxMoU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhv	RzExMC8GA1UEAxMoU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIFJTQSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhv
	cml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG	cml0eQITN0EFee11f0Kpolw69Phqzpqp1zALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBgkqhkiG
	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzE5MDJa	9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yMTAyMjAxNzE5MDJa
	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDmeJ6lsrSkjN4AZBIkFqDsd0GBqHEAIhAZzSPkodWm	MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCDmeJ6lsrSkjN4AZBIkFqDsd0GBqHEAIhAZzSPkodWm
	CTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQA8+6A0jm2WrDdfvFYh0OQ4Rpy+6ofiRnx5jI8I	CTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQA8+6A0jm2WrDdfvFYh0OQ4Rpy+6ofiRnx5jI8I
	a0iD6U77+KS/1W9c4rm5Sk2ElE7gZb/XL5D7l9X5aoiuF6KgyPrzNCL4G3Zz9zLY	a0iD6U77+KS/1W9c4rm5Sk2ElE7gZb/XL5D7l9X5aoiuF6KgyPrzNCL4G3Zz9zLY
	1l+7Cc+VsR8HcY9mgI5U34bmT1xZCHk3V+hTSUn+zE2XV5khxX0E5OxGzkrSz39Y	1l+7Cc+VsR8HcY9mgI5U34bmT1xZCHk3V+hTSUn+zE2XV5khxX0E5OxGzkrSz39Y
	TReERGZGPPXorUIc/MPPKVNE0uhlVUY3WVp9oECnYOBnZ8Ed91rzJWH9hbvUq+jx	TReERGZGPPXorUIc/MPPKVNE0uhlVUY3WVp9oECnYOBnZ8Ed91rzJWH9hbvUq+jx
	22s5mbPGSi5napgEIr/vv66CuCSBK9oqUG4/dyd/hvLVgtZ3knoxn8VPXUgf8Yw6	22s5mbPGSi5napgEIr/vv66CuCSBK9oqUG4/dyd/hvLVgtZ3knoxn8VPXUgf8Yw6
	my5/oStqcO3Q9Sd176LsZ4Otgc4kG789qHAlTax4HGqU3bAi	my5/oStqcO3Q9Sd176LsZ4Otgc4kG789qHAlTax4HGqU3bAi

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-messa
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-reply-over-a-complex-message-header-	ge-header-protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	protection-with-hcpshy-legacy-display-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Sign	<name>S/MIME Signed-and-Encrypted Reply over a Complex Message, Head
	ed and Encrypted Reply Over a Complex Message, Header Protection With hcp_shy (+	er Protection with hcp_shy (+ Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	Legacy Display), Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	shy-legacy-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-
	legacy-reply.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply	Subject: smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>	<smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy-reply@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:19:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:19:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0
	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>	In-Reply-To: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>
	References: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>	References: <smime-signed-enc-complex-hp-shy-legacy@example>

	skipping to change at line 10494 ¶	skipping to change at line 10176 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--d37--	--d37--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline">
	<section anchor="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline"><name>S/MIME Signe	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC 8
	d and Encrypted Over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC 8551 Header Protection With h	551 Header Protection with hcp_baseline</name>
	cp_baseline</name>	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelope
		dData around signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an
	<t>This is a signed-and-encrypted S/MIME message using PKCS#7 envelopedData arou	inline image/png attachment. It uses the legacy RFC 8551 header protection (<ir
	nd signedData. The payload is a multipart/alternative message with an inline im	ef item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>) sc
	age/png attachment. It uses the legacy RFC 8551 header protection (<iref item="R	heme with the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref tar
	FC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref>) scheme with	get="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy<
	the hcp_baseline <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="heade	/xref>.</t>
	r-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref>.</t	<t>It has the following structure:</t>
	>	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[

	<t>It has the following structure:</t>

	<figure><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 9580 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 9580 bytes
	↧ (decrypts to)	↧ (decrypts to)
	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6082 bytes	└─╴application/pkcs7-mime [smime.p7m] 6082 bytes
	⇩ (unwraps to)	⇩ (unwraps to)
	└┬╴message/rfc822 1876 bytes	└┬╴message/rfc822 1876 bytes
	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1828 bytes	└┬╴multipart/mixed 1828 bytes
	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1166 bytes	├┬╴multipart/alternative 1166 bytes
	│├─╴text/plain 392 bytes	│├─╴text/plain 392 bytes
	│└─╴text/html 490 bytes	│└─╴text/html 490 bytes
	└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes	└─╴image/png inline 232 bytes

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Its contents are:</t>
	<t>Its contents are:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc85
		51hp-baseline.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551
	hp-baseline.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline@example>	<smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>
	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:28:02 -0500	Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 12:28:02 -0500
	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0	User-Agent: Sample MUA Version 1.0

	skipping to change at line 10679 ¶	skipping to change at line 10356 ¶
	xAmFAXgfuNc18ZkVtSLPjJ418cSe+VOlQ3WH2Os2N3PP6UqR7hlgymJeisV80C0N	xAmFAXgfuNc18ZkVtSLPjJ418cSe+VOlQ3WH2Os2N3PP6UqR7hlgymJeisV80C0N
	kuu0AYauvHf6mDPhbsvdtTLQUY9cQ991c1XFB3NZwZa1GL9BtYpLU9xsd4k+qyzI	kuu0AYauvHf6mDPhbsvdtTLQUY9cQ991c1XFB3NZwZa1GL9BtYpLU9xsd4k+qyzI
	5zW1UEG0B265+FhYBMz12KRvjfTMegaMCqo3WKG0p/HfdGRFXzYScZCDKe/n7pDW	5zW1UEG0B265+FhYBMz12KRvjfTMegaMCqo3WKG0p/HfdGRFXzYScZCDKe/n7pDW
	45+PhVyrxqQpsdyxTHb0qetjbYM/OlydenM47tvb9D+UIpRjYLmk3RCMKfbAd6nE	45+PhVyrxqQpsdyxTHb0qetjbYM/OlydenM47tvb9D+UIpRjYLmk3RCMKfbAd6nE
	ctVLhUHswCMx4lnVRdIXuIc4yQrquAVPvlfzBVIxDeemkf2kmrA1P5aYZniflr7i	ctVLhUHswCMx4lnVRdIXuIc4yQrquAVPvlfzBVIxDeemkf2kmrA1P5aYZniflr7i
	SRG+XntvfKyyKqr09A605hOz8GyDSOIDRq5SykbeuUZd2MkhMHiqn3pkgWxfFADH	SRG+XntvfKyyKqr09A605hOz8GyDSOIDRq5SykbeuUZd2MkhMHiqn3pkgWxfFADH
	rptkhjQytcY4j8Znqg8O70da9J4G4sbILV5OgKaTt/7okM+rQ8ikzR9UJsAAgewn	rptkhjQytcY4j8Znqg8O70da9J4G4sbILV5OgKaTt/7okM+rQ8ikzR9UJsAAgewn
	DrnutsyrGrSmz7wIFkexxWnM6NZYMcJpdy0KXuctfBWIQs+ZyYrsd4pH3MP/hc+1	DrnutsyrGrSmz7wIFkexxWnM6NZYMcJpdy0KXuctfBWIQs+ZyYrsd4pH3MP/hc+1
	t2W57Gm57dXBh0lqxDnaGFGVBlYioWj/v1s0EoaVUM+XCYEsRKge45drULGh0qAZ	t2W57Gm57dXBh0lqxDnaGFGVBlYioWj/v1s0EoaVUM+XCYEsRKge45drULGh0qAZ
	sG1/1VBptLyt3UY3jh1tUw==	sG1/1VBptLyt3UY3jh1tUw==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-leg
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-legacy-rfc-85	acy-rfc-8551-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted">
	51-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted"><name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypt	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC
	ed Over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC 8551 Header Protection With hcp_baseline,	8551 Header Protection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted</name>
	Decrypted</name>	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:
		</t>
	<t>The S/MIME enveloped-data layer unwraps to this signed-data part:</t>	<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc
		8551hp-baseline.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551
	hp-baseline.decrypted.eml"><![CDATA[
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="signed-data"	smime-type="signed-data"

	MIIRQAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIRMTCCES0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggdpBgkq	MIIRQAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIRMTCCES0CAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggdpBgkq
	hkiG9w0BBwGgggdaBIIHVk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVR5cGU6	hkiG9w0BBwGgggdaBIIHVk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wDQpDb250ZW50LVR5cGU6
	IG1lc3NhZ2UvcmZjODIyDQoNCk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wCkNvbnRlbnQtVHlw	IG1lc3NhZ2UvcmZjODIyDQoNCk1JTUUtVmVyc2lvbjogMS4wCkNvbnRlbnQtVHlw
	ZTogbXVsdGlwYXJ0L21peGVkOyBib3VuZGFyeT0iMjY2IgpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt	ZTogbXVsdGlwYXJ0L21peGVkOyBib3VuZGFyeT0iMjY2IgpTdWJqZWN0OiBzbWlt
	ZS1lbmMtc2lnbmVkLWNvbXBsZXgtcmZjODU1MWhwLWJhc2VsaW5lCk1lc3NhZ2Ut	ZS1lbmMtc2lnbmVkLWNvbXBsZXgtcmZjODU1MWhwLWJhc2VsaW5lCk1lc3NhZ2Ut
	SUQ6CiA8c21pbWUtZW5jLXNpZ25lZC1jb21wbGV4LXJmYzg1NTFocC1iYXNlbGlu	SUQ6CiA8c21pbWUtZW5jLXNpZ25lZC1jb21wbGV4LXJmYzg1NTFocC1iYXNlbGlu

	skipping to change at line 10783 ¶	skipping to change at line 10458 ¶
	dGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZI	dGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkCEzdBBXntdX9CqaJcOvT4as6aqdcwCwYJYIZI
	AWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUx	AWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUx
	DxcNMjEwMjIwMTcyODAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgzbXAB7rXfNs26yYOHvuE	DxcNMjEwMjIwMTcyODAyWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgzbXAB7rXfNs26yYOHvuE
	D4KQ9RzsSF5fL55lZZY7AjgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAAs1y7DQLS7S+Vh2b	D4KQ9RzsSF5fL55lZZY7AjgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAAs1y7DQLS7S+Vh2b
	Ju5W9UwkHp6lUk/F7mJE80FRc8K6z8pcSn4xTrlCaLgL7azQ0o/iNQEh2EVJqdy6	Ju5W9UwkHp6lUk/F7mJE80FRc8K6z8pcSn4xTrlCaLgL7azQ0o/iNQEh2EVJqdy6
	huwwtlaeiPa2gXwIHCKcLGhA2bW3/R+sEsJZi7FryqTakOZ9eXcYRXoPWv6ncf+I	huwwtlaeiPa2gXwIHCKcLGhA2bW3/R+sEsJZi7FryqTakOZ9eXcYRXoPWv6ncf+I
	eA7jlQX3Z4Ln5pP9p+Uw7H1oroH2Y4e0yAqIMtYXnS+GKALTtbxTa1p2Y9dsHQLS	eA7jlQX3Z4Ln5pP9p+Uw7H1oroH2Y4e0yAqIMtYXnS+GKALTtbxTa1p2Y9dsHQLS
	2cXbfUsU2zc5bstgKXZyTkjuKJ8ivbYJ2ttk79AOMosWkDBmgzKTTS/0HptfO9SD	2cXbfUsU2zc5bstgKXZyTkjuKJ8ivbYJ2ttk79AOMosWkDBmgzKTTS/0HptfO9SD
	mX58BvQt6GHQZ4TR2NVDvq3z+/CAlzsR5xmNH1C+uDH99ORoy3w6CHmv4aTTmRM9	mX58BvQt6GHQZ4TR2NVDvq3z+/CAlzsR5xmNH1C+uDH99ORoy3w6CHmv4aTTmRM9
	S+uZXg==	S+uZXg==

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-leg
	<section anchor="smime-signed-and-encrypted-over-a-complex-message-legacy-rfc-85	acy-rfc-8551-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped">
	51-header-protection-with-hcpbaseline-decrypted-and-unwrapped"><name>S/MIME Sign	<name>S/MIME Signed and Encrypted over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC
	ed and Encrypted Over a Complex Message, Legacy RFC 8551 Header Protection With	8551 Header Protection with hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>
	hcp_baseline, Decrypted and Unwrapped</name>	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>
		<sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc
	<t>The inner signed-data layer unwraps to:</t>	8551hp-baseline.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[

	<figure><sourcecode type="message/rfc822" name="smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551
	hp-baseline.decrypted.unwrapped.eml"><![CDATA[
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: message/rfc822	Content-Type: message/rfc822

	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="266"	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="266"
	Subject: smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline	Subject: smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline
	Message-ID:	Message-ID:
	<smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline@example>	<smime-enc-signed-complex-rfc8551hp-baseline@example>
	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>	From: Alice <alice@smime.example>
	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>	To: Bob <bob@smime.example>

	skipping to change at line 10856 ¶	skipping to change at line 10529 ¶
	Content-Type: image/png	Content-Type: image/png
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Disposition: inline	Content-Disposition: inline

	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABQAAAAUCAYAAACNiR0NAAAAcElEQVR42uVTOxbA
	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ	MAgS739nO3TpRw20dqpbfARQEjOywiwYnCtkDKnbcLk66sqlT+zt9cidkE+6KwkZ
	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli	sgrzfcqVMpL2jo0447gYDpeArk+OnJHkIhAfTPRicihAf5YJrw7vjv0ZWRWM/uli
	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==	vdPf1QZ2kDD9xppd8wAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

	--266--	--266--

	]]></sourcecode></figure>	]]></sourcecode>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="compose-examples">
	<section anchor="compose-examples"><name>Composition Examples</name>	<name>Composition Examples</name>
		<t>This section offers step-by-step examples of message composition.</t>
	<t>This section offers step-by-step examples of message composition.</t>	<section anchor="compose-example">
		<name>New Message Composition</name>
	<section anchor="compose-example"><name>New message composition</name>	<t>A typical MUA composition interface offers the user a place to indica
		te the message recipients, subject, and body.
	<t>A typical MUA composition interface offers the user a place to indicate the m
	essage recipients, the subject, and the body.
	Consider a composition window filled out by the user like so:</t>	Consider a composition window filled out by the user like so:</t>

		<figure anchor="example-compose-interface">
	<figure title="Example Message Composition Interface" anchor="example-compose-in	<name>Example Message Composition Interface</name>
	terface"><artset><artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" ve	<artset>
	rsion="1.1" height="336" width="472" viewBox="0 0 472 336" class="diagram" text-	<artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version=
	anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">	"1.1" height="336" width="472" viewBox="0 0 472 336" class="diagram" text-anchor
	<path d="M 8,48 L 8,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">
	<path d="M 96,64 L 96,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,48 L 8,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 368,64 L 368,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,64 L 96,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 448,96 L 448,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 368,64 L 368,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 464,48 L 464,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 448,96 L 448,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 24,32 L 448,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 464,48 L 464,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 408,48 L 432,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 24,32 L 448,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,64 L 368,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 408,48 L 432,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 408,80 L 432,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,64 L 368,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,96 L 448,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 408,80 L 432,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,128 L 448,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,96 L 448,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 8,144 L 464,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,128 L 448,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 8,320 L 464,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,144 L 464,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 24,32 C 15.16936,32 8,39.16936 8,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,320 L 464,320" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 448,32 C 456.83064,32 464,39.16936 464,48" fill="none" stroke="black"	<path d="M 24,32 C 15.16936,32 8,39.16936 8,48" fill="none" stro
	/>	ke="black"/>
	<path d="M 408,48 C 399.16936,48 392,55.16936 392,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	<path d="M 448,32 C 456.83064,32 464,39.16936 464,48" fill="none
	/>	" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 432,48 C 440.83064,48 448,55.16936 448,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	<path d="M 408,48 C 399.16936,48 392,55.16936 392,64" fill="none
	/>	" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 408,80 C 399.16936,80 392,72.83064 392,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	<path d="M 432,48 C 440.83064,48 448,55.16936 448,64" fill="none
	/>	" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 432,80 C 440.83064,80 448,72.83064 448,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	<path d="M 408,80 C 399.16936,80 392,72.83064 392,64" fill="none
	/>	" stroke="black"/>
	<g class="text">	<path d="M 432,80 C 440.83064,80 448,72.83064 448,64" fill="none
	<text x="184" y="52">Composing</text>	" stroke="black"/>
	<text x="240" y="52">New</text>	<g class="text">
	<text x="288" y="52">Message</text>	<text x="184" y="52">Composing</text>
	<text x="420" y="68">Send</text>	<text x="240" y="52">New</text>
	<text x="72" y="84">To:</text>	<text x="288" y="52">Message</text>
	<text x="128" y="84">Alice</text>	<text x="420" y="68">Send</text>
	<text x="232" y="84"><alice@example.net></text>	<text x="72" y="84">To:</text>
	<text x="52" y="116">Subject:</text>	<text x="128" y="84">Alice</text>
	<text x="140" y="116">Handling</text>	<text x="232" y="84"><alice@example.net></text>
	<text x="192" y="116">the</text>	<text x="52" y="116">Subject:</text>
	<text x="232" y="116">Jones</text>	<text x="140" y="116">Handling</text>
	<text x="292" y="116">contract</text>	<text x="192" y="116">the</text>
	<text x="44" y="164">Please</text>	<text x="232" y="116">Jones</text>
	<text x="100" y="164">review</text>	<text x="292" y="116">contract</text>
	<text x="144" y="164">and</text>	<text x="44" y="164">Please</text>
	<text x="192" y="164">approve</text>	<text x="100" y="164">review</text>
	<text x="236" y="164">or</text>	<text x="144" y="164">and</text>
	<text x="280" y="164">decline</text>	<text x="192" y="164">approve</text>
	<text x="324" y="164">by</text>	<text x="236" y="164">or</text>
	<text x="376" y="164">Thursday,</text>	<text x="280" y="164">decline</text>
	<text x="436" y="164">it's</text>	<text x="324" y="164">by</text>
	<text x="56" y="180">critical!</text>	<text x="376" y="164">Thursday,</text>
	<text x="48" y="212">Thanks,</text>	<text x="436" y="164">it's</text>
	<text x="32" y="228">Bob</text>	<text x="56" y="180">critical!</text>
	<text x="28" y="260">--</text>	<text x="48" y="212">Thanks,</text>
	<text x="32" y="276">Bob</text>	<text x="32" y="228">Bob</text>
	<text x="84" y="276">Gonzalez</text>	<text x="28" y="260">--</text>
	<text x="40" y="292">ACME,</text>	<text x="32" y="276">Bob</text>
	<text x="84" y="292">Inc.</text>	<text x="84" y="276">Gonzalez</text>
	</g>	<text x="40" y="292">ACME,</text>
	</svg>	<text x="84" y="292">Inc.</text>
	</artwork><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[	</g>
		</svg>
		</artwork>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	.------------------------------------------------------.	.------------------------------------------------------.
	\| Composing New Message .----. \|	\| Composing New Message .----. \|
	\| +---------------------------------+ \| Send \| \|	\| +---------------------------------+ \| Send \| \|
	\| To: \| Alice <alice@example.net> \| '----' \|	\| To: \| Alice <alice@example.net> \| '----' \|
	\| +---------------------------------+---------+ \|	\| +---------------------------------+---------+ \|
	\| Subject: \| Handling the Jones contract \| \|	\| Subject: \| Handling the Jones contract \| \|
	\| +-------------------------------------------+ \|	\| +-------------------------------------------+ \|
	+--------------------------------------------------------+	+--------------------------------------------------------+
	\| Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's \|	\| Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's \|
	\| critical! \|	\| critical! \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	\| Thanks, \|	\| Thanks, \|
	\| Bob \|	\| Bob \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	\| -- \|	\| -- \|
	\| Bob Gonzalez \|	\| Bob Gonzalez \|
	\| ACME, Inc. \|	\| ACME, Inc. \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	+--------------------------------------------------------+	+--------------------------------------------------------+

	]]></artwork></artset></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</artset>
	<t>When Bob clicks "Send", his MUA generates values for <spanx style="verb">Mess	</figure>
	age-ID</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">Date</	<t>When Bob clicks "Send", his MUA generates values for the <tt>Message-
	spanx> Header Fields, and converts the message body into the appropriate format.	ID</tt>, <tt>From</tt>, and <tt>Date</tt> Header Fields and converts the message
	</t>	body into the appropriate format.</t>
		<section anchor="compose-example-unprotected">
	<section anchor="compose-example-unprotected"><name>Unprotected message</name>	<name>Unprotected Message</name>
		<t>The resulting message would look something like this if it was sent
	<t>The resulting message would look something like this if it was sent without c	without cryptographic protections:</t>
	ryptographic protections:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500
	From: Bob <bob@example.net>	From: Bob <bob@example.net>
	To: Alice <alice@example.net>	To: Alice <alice@example.net>
	Subject: Handling the Jones contract	Subject: Handling the Jones contract
	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0

	Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's critical!	Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's critical!

	Thanks,	Thanks,
	Bob	Bob

	--	--
	Bob Gonzalez	Bob Gonzalez
	ACME, Inc.	ACME, Inc.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="encrypted-with-hcpbaseline-and-legacy-display">
	<section anchor="encrypted-with-hcpbaseline-and-legacy-display"><name>Encrypted	<name>Encrypted with <tt>hcp_baseline</tt> and Legacy Display</name>
	with <spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx> and Legacy Display</name>	<t>Now consider the message to be generated if it is to be cryptograph
		ically signed and encrypted, using <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confid
	<t>Now consider the message to be generated if it is to be cryptographically sig	entiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> <tt>hcp_baseline</tt>, and the <tt>le
	ned and encrypted, using <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-	gacy</tt> variable is set.</t>
	policy" format="none">HCP</xref> <spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>, and t	<t>For each Header Field, Bob's MUA passes its name and value through
	he <spanx style="verb">legacy</spanx> variable is set.</t>	<tt>hcp_baseline</tt>.

	<t>For each Header Field, Bob's MUA passes its name and value through <spanx sty
	le="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>.
	This returns the same value for every Header Field, except that:</t>	This returns the same value for every Header Field, except that:</t>

		<t><tt>hcp_baseline</tt>("<tt>Subject</tt>", "<tt>Handling the Jones c
	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>("<spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx>	ontract</tt>") yields "<tt>[...]</tt>".</t>
	", "<spanx style="verb">Handling the Jones contract</spanx>") yields "<spanx sty	<section anchor="compose-example-payload">
	le="verb">[...]</spanx>".</t>	<name>Cryptographic Payload</name>
		<t>The Cryptographic Payload that will be signed and then encrypted
	<section anchor="compose-example-payload"><name>Cryptographic Payload</name>	is very similar to the unprotected message in <xref target="compose-example-unpr
		otected"/>.
	<t>The Cryptographic Payload that will be signed and then encrypted is very simi
	lar to the unprotected message in <xref target="compose-example-unprotected"/>.
	Note the addition of:</t>	Note the addition of:</t>

		<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t>The <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx> parameter for the <spanx style=	<t>the <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> parameter for the <tt>Content-Type</
	"verb">Content-Type</spanx></t>	tt></t>
	<t>The appropriate <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field for <span	</li>
	x style="verb">Subject</spanx></t>	<li>
	<t>The <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"</spanx> parameter for the <sp	<t>the appropriate <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field for <tt>Subjec
	anx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx></t>	t</tt></t>
	<t>The Legacy Display Element (the simple pseudo-header and its trailing newli	</li>
	ne) in the Main Body Part.</t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t>the <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> parameter for the <tt>Cont
		ent-Type</tt></t>
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	</li>
		<li>
		<t>the Legacy Display Element (the simple pseudo-header and its
		trailing newline) in the Main Body Part</t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500
	From: Bob <bob@example.net>	From: Bob <bob@example.net>
	To: Alice <alice@example.net>	To: Alice <alice@example.net>
	Subject: Handling the Jones contract	Subject: Handling the Jones contract
	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";
	hp="cipher"	hp="cipher"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	HP-Outer: Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500	HP-Outer: Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500
	HP-Outer: From: Bob <bob@example.net>	HP-Outer: From: Bob <bob@example.net>

	skipping to change at line 11017 ¶	skipping to change at line 10692 ¶
	Subject: Handling the Jones contract	Subject: Handling the Jones contract

	Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's critical!	Please review and approve or decline by Thursday, it's critical!

	Thanks,	Thanks,
	Bob	Bob

	--	--
	Bob Gonzalez	Bob Gonzalez
	ACME, Inc.	ACME, Inc.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="external-header-section">
	<section anchor="external-header-section"><name>External Header Section</name>	<name>External Header Section</name>
		<t>The Cryptographic Payload from <xref target="compose-example-payl
	<t>The Cryptographic Payload from <xref target="compose-example-payload"/> is th	oad"/> is then wrapped in the appropriate Cryptographic Layers.
	en wrapped in the appropriate Cryptographic Layers.	For this example using S/MIME, it is wrapped in an <tt>application/pkcs7-mime; s
	For this example, using S/MIME, it is wrapped in an <spanx style="verb">applicat	mime-type="signed-data"</tt> layer, which is in turn wrapped in an <tt>applicati
	ion/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"</spanx> layer, which is in turn wrapped	on/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"</tt> layer.</t>
	in an <spanx style="verb">application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"</	<t>Then, an external Header Section is applied to the outer MIME obj
	spanx> layer.</t>	ect, which looks like this:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	<t>Then an external Header Section is applied to the outer MIME object, which lo
	oks like this:</t>

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500
	From: Bob <bob@example.net>	From: Bob <bob@example.net>
	To: Alice <alice@example.net>	To: Alice <alice@example.net>
	Subject: [...]	Subject: [...]
	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Note that the <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field has been obscured app
	<t>Note that the <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header Field has been obscu	ropriately by <tt>hcp_baseline</tt>.
	red appropriately by <spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>.	The output of the CMS enveloping operation is base64 encoded and forms the body
	The output of the CMS enveloping operation is base64-encoded and forms the body	of the message.</t>
	of the message.</t>	</section>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="reply-example">
	</section>	<name>Composing a Reply</name>
	<section anchor="reply-example"><name>Composing a Reply</name>	<t>Next, we consider a typical MUA reply interface, where we see Alice r
		eplying to Bob's message from <xref target="compose-example"/>.</t>
	<t>Next we consider a typical MUA reply interface, where we see Alice replying t	<t>When Alice clicks "Reply" to Bob's signed-and-encrypted message with
	o Bob's message from <xref target="compose-example"/>.</t>	Header Protection, she might see something like this:</t>
		<figure anchor="example-reply-interface-initial">
	<t>When Alice clicks "Reply" to Bob's signed-and-encrypted message with Header P	<name>Example Message Reply Interface (Unedited)</name>
	rotection, she might see something like this:</t>	<artset>
		<artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version=
	<figure title="Example Message Reply Interface (unedited)" anchor="example-reply	"1.1" height="432" width="488" viewBox="0 0 488 432" class="diagram" text-anchor
	-interface-initial"><artset><artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2	="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">
	000/svg" version="1.1" height="432" width="488" viewBox="0 0 488 432" class="dia	<path d="M 8,48 L 8,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	gram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">	<path d="M 96,64 L 96,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 8,48 L 8,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 384,64 L 384,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,64 L 96,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 464,96 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 384,64 L 384,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 480,48 L 480,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 464,96 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 24,32 L 464,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 480,48 L 480,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 424,48 L 448,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 24,32 L 464,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,64 L 384,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 424,48 L 448,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 424,80 L 448,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,64 L 384,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,96 L 464,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 424,80 L 448,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,128 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,96 L 464,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,144 L 480,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,128 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,416 L 480,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 8,144 L 480,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 24,32 C 15.16936,32 8,39.16936 8,48" fill="none" stro
	<path d="M 8,416 L 480,416" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	ke="black"/>
	<path d="M 24,32 C 15.16936,32 8,39.16936 8,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 464,32 C 472.83064,32 480,39.16936 480,48" fill="none
	<path d="M 464,32 C 472.83064,32 480,39.16936 480,48" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 424,48 C 415.16936,48 408,55.16936 408,64" fill="none
	<path d="M 424,48 C 415.16936,48 408,55.16936 408,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 448,48 C 456.83064,48 464,55.16936 464,64" fill="none
	<path d="M 448,48 C 456.83064,48 464,55.16936 464,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 424,80 C 415.16936,80 408,72.83064 408,64" fill="none
	<path d="M 424,80 C 415.16936,80 408,72.83064 408,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 448,80 C 456.83064,80 464,72.83064 464,64" fill="none
	<path d="M 448,80 C 456.83064,80 464,72.83064 464,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<g class="text">
	<g class="text">	<text x="60" y="52">Replying</text>
	<text x="60" y="52">Replying</text>	<text x="108" y="52">to</text>
	<text x="108" y="52">to</text>	<text x="136" y="52">Bob</text>
	<text x="136" y="52">Bob</text>	<text x="196" y="52">("Handling</text>
	<text x="196" y="52">("Handling</text>	<text x="256" y="52">the</text>
	<text x="256" y="52">the</text>	<text x="296" y="52">Jones</text>
	<text x="296" y="52">Jones</text>	<text x="364" y="52">Contract")</text>
	<text x="364" y="52">Contract")</text>	<text x="436" y="68">Send</text>
	<text x="436" y="68">Send</text>	<text x="72" y="84">To:</text>
	<text x="72" y="84">To:</text>	<text x="120" y="84">Bob</text>
	<text x="120" y="84">Bob</text>	<text x="208" y="84"><bob@example.net></text>
	<text x="208" y="84"><bob@example.net></text>	<text x="52" y="116">Subject:</text>
	<text x="52" y="116">Subject:</text>	<text x="120" y="116">Re:</text>
	<text x="120" y="116">Re:</text>	<text x="172" y="116">Handling</text>
	<text x="172" y="116">Handling</text>	<text x="224" y="116">the</text>
	<text x="224" y="116">the</text>	<text x="264" y="116">Jones</text>
	<text x="264" y="116">Jones</text>	<text x="324" y="116">contract</text>
	<text x="324" y="116">contract</text>	<text x="28" y="164">On</text>
	<text x="28" y="164">On</text>	<text x="60" y="164">Wed,</text>
	<text x="60" y="164">Wed,</text>	<text x="92" y="164">11</text>
	<text x="92" y="164">11</text>	<text x="120" y="164">Jan</text>
	<text x="120" y="164">Jan</text>	<text x="156" y="164">2023</text>
	<text x="156" y="164">2023</text>	<text x="212" y="164">16:08:43</text>
	<text x="212" y="164">16:08:43</text>	<text x="276" y="164">-0500,</text>
	<text x="276" y="164">-0500,</text>	<text x="320" y="164">Bob</text>
	<text x="320" y="164">Bob</text>	<text x="364" y="164">wrote:</text>
	<text x="364" y="164">wrote:</text>	<text x="24" y="196">></text>
	<text x="24" y="196">></text>	<text x="60" y="196">Please</text>
	<text x="60" y="196">Please</text>	<text x="116" y="196">review</text>
	<text x="116" y="196">review</text>	<text x="160" y="196">and</text>
	<text x="160" y="196">and</text>	<text x="208" y="196">approve</text>
	<text x="208" y="196">approve</text>	<text x="252" y="196">or</text>
	<text x="252" y="196">or</text>	<text x="296" y="196">decline</text>
	<text x="296" y="196">decline</text>	<text x="340" y="196">by</text>
	<text x="340" y="196">by</text>	<text x="392" y="196">Thursday,</text>
	<text x="392" y="196">Thursday,</text>	<text x="24" y="212">></text>
	<text x="24" y="212">></text>	<text x="52" y="212">it's</text>
	<text x="52" y="212">it's</text>	<text x="112" y="212">critical!</text>
	<text x="112" y="212">critical!</text>	<text x="24" y="228">></text>
	<text x="24" y="228">></text>	<text x="24" y="244">></text>
	<text x="24" y="244">></text>	<text x="64" y="244">Thanks,</text>
	<text x="64" y="244">Thanks,</text>	<text x="24" y="260">></text>
	<text x="24" y="260">></text>	<text x="48" y="260">Bob</text>
	<text x="48" y="260">Bob</text>	<text x="24" y="276">></text>
	<text x="24" y="276">></text>	<text x="24" y="292">></text>
	<text x="24" y="292">></text>	<text x="44" y="292">--</text>
	<text x="44" y="292">--</text>	<text x="24" y="308">></text>
	<text x="24" y="308">></text>	<text x="48" y="308">Bob</text>
	<text x="48" y="308">Bob</text>	<text x="100" y="308">Gonzalez</text>
	<text x="100" y="308">Gonzalez</text>	<text x="24" y="324">></text>
	<text x="24" y="324">></text>	<text x="56" y="324">ACME,</text>
	<text x="56" y="324">ACME,</text>	<text x="100" y="324">Inc.</text>
	<text x="100" y="324">Inc.</text>	<text x="28" y="356">--</text>
	<text x="28" y="356">--</text>	<text x="40" y="372">Alice</text>
	<text x="40" y="372">Alice</text>	<text x="96" y="372">Jenkins</text>
	<text x="96" y="372">Jenkins</text>	<text x="40" y="388">ACME,</text>
	<text x="40" y="388">ACME,</text>	<text x="84" y="388">Inc.</text>
	<text x="84" y="388">Inc.</text>	</g>
	</g>	</svg>
	</svg>	</artwork>
	</artwork><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[	<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	.--------------------------------------------------------.	.--------------------------------------------------------.
	\| Replying to Bob ("Handling the Jones Contract") .----. \|	\| Replying to Bob ("Handling the Jones Contract") .----. \|
	\| +-----------------------------------+ \| Send \| \|	\| +-----------------------------------+ \| Send \| \|
	\| To: \| Bob <bob@example.net> \| '----' \|	\| To: \| Bob <bob@example.net> \| '----' \|
	\| +-----------------------------------+---------+ \|	\| +-----------------------------------+---------+ \|
	\| Subject: \| Re: Handling the Jones contract \| \|	\| Subject: \| Re: Handling the Jones contract \| \|
	\| +---------------------------------------------+ \|	\| +---------------------------------------------+ \|
	+----------------------------------------------------------+	+----------------------------------------------------------+
	\| On Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500, Bob wrote: \|	\| On Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500, Bob wrote: \|
	\| \|	\| \|

	skipping to change at line 11157 ¶	skipping to change at line 10829 ¶
	\| > \|	\| > \|
	\| > -- \|	\| > -- \|
	\| > Bob Gonzalez \|	\| > Bob Gonzalez \|
	\| > ACME, Inc. \|	\| > ACME, Inc. \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	\| -- \|	\| -- \|
	\| Alice Jenkins \|	\| Alice Jenkins \|
	\| ACME, Inc. \|	\| ACME, Inc. \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	+----------------------------------------------------------+	+----------------------------------------------------------+

	]]></artwork></artset></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</artset>
	<t>Note that because Alice's MUA is aware of Header Protection, it knows what th	</figure>
	e correct <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> header is, even though it was obsc	<t>Note that because Alice's MUA is aware of Header Protection, it knows
	ured.	what the correct <tt>Subject</tt> header is, even though it was obscured.
	It also knows to avoid including the Legacy Display Element in the quoted/attrib uted text that it includes in the draft reply.</t>	It also knows to avoid including the Legacy Display Element in the quoted/attrib uted text that it includes in the draft reply.</t>

		<t>Once Alice has edited the reply message, it might look something like
	<t>Once Alice has edited the reply message, it might look something like this:</	this:</t>
	t>	<figure anchor="example-reply-interface">
		<name>Example Message Reply Interface (Edited)</name>
	<figure title="Example Message Reply Interface (edited)" anchor="example-reply-i	<artset>
	nterface"><artset><artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" v	<artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version=
	ersion="1.1" height="400" width="488" viewBox="0 0 488 400" class="diagram" text	"1.1" height="400" width="488" viewBox="0 0 488 400" class="diagram" text-anchor
	-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">	="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px">
	<path d="M 8,48 L 8,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,48 L 8,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,64 L 96,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,64 L 96,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 384,64 L 384,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 384,64 L 384,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 464,96 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 464,96 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 480,48 L 480,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 480,48 L 480,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 24,32 L 464,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 24,32 L 464,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 424,48 L 448,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 424,48 L 448,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,64 L 384,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,64 L 384,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 424,80 L 448,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 424,80 L 448,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,96 L 464,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,96 L 464,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 96,128 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 96,128 L 464,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 8,144 L 480,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,144 L 480,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 8,384 L 480,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 8,384 L 480,384" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
	<path d="M 24,32 C 15.16936,32 8,39.16936 8,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>	<path d="M 24,32 C 15.16936,32 8,39.16936 8,48" fill="none" stro
	<path d="M 464,32 C 472.83064,32 480,39.16936 480,48" fill="none" stroke="black"	ke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 464,32 C 472.83064,32 480,39.16936 480,48" fill="none
	<path d="M 424,48 C 415.16936,48 408,55.16936 408,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 424,48 C 415.16936,48 408,55.16936 408,64" fill="none
	<path d="M 448,48 C 456.83064,48 464,55.16936 464,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 448,48 C 456.83064,48 464,55.16936 464,64" fill="none
	<path d="M 424,80 C 415.16936,80 408,72.83064 408,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 424,80 C 415.16936,80 408,72.83064 408,64" fill="none
	<path d="M 448,80 C 456.83064,80 464,72.83064 464,64" fill="none" stroke="black"	" stroke="black"/>
	/>	<path d="M 448,80 C 456.83064,80 464,72.83064 464,64" fill="none
	<g class="text">	" stroke="black"/>
	<text x="60" y="52">Replying</text>	<g class="text">
	<text x="108" y="52">to</text>	<text x="60" y="52">Replying</text>
	<text x="136" y="52">Bob</text>	<text x="108" y="52">to</text>
	<text x="196" y="52">("Handling</text>	<text x="136" y="52">Bob</text>
	<text x="256" y="52">the</text>	<text x="196" y="52">("Handling</text>
	<text x="296" y="52">Jones</text>	<text x="256" y="52">the</text>
	<text x="364" y="52">Contract")</text>	<text x="296" y="52">Jones</text>
	<text x="436" y="68">Send</text>	<text x="364" y="52">Contract")</text>
	<text x="72" y="84">To:</text>	<text x="436" y="68">Send</text>
	<text x="120" y="84">Bob</text>	<text x="72" y="84">To:</text>
	<text x="208" y="84"><bob@example.net></text>	<text x="120" y="84">Bob</text>
	<text x="52" y="116">Subject:</text>	<text x="208" y="84"><bob@example.net></text>
	<text x="120" y="116">Re:</text>	<text x="52" y="116">Subject:</text>
	<text x="172" y="116">Handling</text>	<text x="120" y="116">Re:</text>
	<text x="224" y="116">the</text>	<text x="172" y="116">Handling</text>
	<text x="264" y="116">Jones</text>	<text x="224" y="116">the</text>
	<text x="324" y="116">contract</text>	<text x="264" y="116">Jones</text>
	<text x="28" y="164">On</text>	<text x="324" y="116">contract</text>
	<text x="60" y="164">Wed,</text>	<text x="28" y="164">On</text>
	<text x="92" y="164">11</text>	<text x="60" y="164">Wed,</text>
	<text x="120" y="164">Jan</text>	<text x="92" y="164">11</text>
	<text x="156" y="164">2023</text>	<text x="120" y="164">Jan</text>
	<text x="212" y="164">16:08:43</text>	<text x="156" y="164">2023</text>
	<text x="276" y="164">-0500,</text>	<text x="212" y="164">16:08:43</text>
	<text x="320" y="164">Bob</text>	<text x="276" y="164">-0500,</text>
	<text x="364" y="164">wrote:</text>	<text x="320" y="164">Bob</text>
	<text x="24" y="196">></text>	<text x="364" y="164">wrote:</text>
	<text x="60" y="196">Please</text>	<text x="24" y="196">></text>
	<text x="116" y="196">review</text>	<text x="60" y="196">Please</text>
	<text x="160" y="196">and</text>	<text x="116" y="196">review</text>
	<text x="208" y="196">approve</text>	<text x="160" y="196">and</text>
	<text x="252" y="196">or</text>	<text x="208" y="196">approve</text>
	<text x="296" y="196">decline</text>	<text x="252" y="196">or</text>
	<text x="340" y="196">by</text>	<text x="296" y="196">decline</text>
	<text x="392" y="196">Thursday,</text>	<text x="340" y="196">by</text>
	<text x="24" y="212">></text>	<text x="392" y="196">Thursday,</text>
	<text x="52" y="212">it's</text>	<text x="24" y="212">></text>
	<text x="112" y="212">critical!</text>	<text x="52" y="212">it's</text>
	<text x="36" y="244">I'll</text>	<text x="112" y="212">critical!</text>
	<text x="72" y="244">get</text>	<text x="36" y="244">I'll</text>
	<text x="112" y="244">right</text>	<text x="72" y="244">get</text>
	<text x="148" y="244">on</text>	<text x="112" y="244">right</text>
	<text x="176" y="244">it,</text>	<text x="148" y="244">on</text>
	<text x="212" y="244">Bob!</text>	<text x="176" y="244">it,</text>
	<text x="52" y="276">Regards,</text>	<text x="212" y="244">Bob!</text>
	<text x="40" y="292">Alice</text>	<text x="52" y="276">Regards,</text>
	<text x="28" y="324">--</text>	<text x="40" y="292">Alice</text>
	<text x="40" y="340">Alice</text>	<text x="28" y="324">--</text>
	<text x="96" y="340">Jenkins</text>	<text x="40" y="340">Alice</text>
	<text x="40" y="356">ACME,</text>	<text x="96" y="340">Jenkins</text>
	<text x="84" y="356">Inc.</text>	<text x="40" y="356">ACME,</text>
	</g>	<text x="84" y="356">Inc.</text>
	</svg>	</g>
	</artwork><artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[	</svg>
		</artwork>
		<artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
	.--------------------------------------------------------.	.--------------------------------------------------------.
	\| Replying to Bob ("Handling the Jones Contract") .----. \|	\| Replying to Bob ("Handling the Jones Contract") .----. \|
	\| +-----------------------------------+ \| Send \| \|	\| +-----------------------------------+ \| Send \| \|
	\| To: \| Bob <bob@example.net> \| '----' \|	\| To: \| Bob <bob@example.net> \| '----' \|
	\| +-----------------------------------+---------+ \|	\| +-----------------------------------+---------+ \|
	\| Subject: \| Re: Handling the Jones contract \| \|	\| Subject: \| Re: Handling the Jones contract \| \|
	\| +---------------------------------------------+ \|	\| +---------------------------------------------+ \|
	+----------------------------------------------------------+	+----------------------------------------------------------+
	\| On Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500, Bob wrote: \|	\| On Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500, Bob wrote: \|
	\| \|	\| \|

	skipping to change at line 11262 ¶	skipping to change at line 10937 ¶
	\| I'll get right on it, Bob! \|	\| I'll get right on it, Bob! \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	\| Regards, \|	\| Regards, \|
	\| Alice \|	\| Alice \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	\| -- \|	\| -- \|
	\| Alice Jenkins \|	\| Alice Jenkins \|
	\| ACME, Inc. \|	\| ACME, Inc. \|
	\| \|	\| \|
	+----------------------------------------------------------+	+----------------------------------------------------------+

	]]></artwork></artset></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</artset>
	<t>When Alice clicks "Send", the MUA generates values for <spanx style="verb">Me	</figure>
	ssage-ID</spanx>, <spanx style="verb">From</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">Date	<t>When Alice clicks "Send", the MUA generates values for the <tt>Messag
	</spanx> Header Fields, populates the <spanx style="verb">In-Reply-To</spanx>, a	e-ID</tt>, <tt>From</tt>, and <tt>Date</tt> Header Fields, populates the <tt>In-
	nd <spanx style="verb">References</spanx> Header Fields, and also converts the r	Reply-To</tt> and <tt>References</tt> Header Fields, and also converts the reply
	eply body into the appropriate format.</t>	body into the appropriate format.</t>
		<section anchor="reply-example-unprotected">
	<section anchor="reply-example-unprotected"><name>Unprotected message</name>	<name>Unprotected Message</name>
		<t>The resulting message would look something like this if it were to
	<t>The resulting message would look something like this if it were to be sent wi	be sent without any cryptographic protections:</t>
	thout any cryptographic protections:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:48:22 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:48:22 -0500
	From: Alice <alice@example.net>	From: Alice <alice@example.net>
	To: Bob <bob@example.net>	To: Bob <bob@example.net>
	Subject: Re: Handling the Jones contract	Subject: Re: Handling the Jones contract
	Message-ID: <20230111T214822Z.5678@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T214822Z.5678@lhp.example>
	In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0


	skipping to change at line 11294 ¶	skipping to change at line 10968 ¶
	> it's critical!	> it's critical!

	I'll get right on it, Bob!	I'll get right on it, Bob!

	Regards,	Regards,
	Alice	Alice

	--	--
	Alice Jenkins	Alice Jenkins
	ACME, Inc.	ACME, Inc.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Of course, this would leak not only the contents of Alice's message
	<t>Of course, this would leak not only the contents of Alice's message, but also	but also the contents of Bob's initial message, as well as the <tt>Subject</tt>
	the contents of Bob's initial message, as well as the <spanx style="verb">Subje	Header Field!
	ct</spanx> Header Field!
	So Alice's MUA won't do that; it is going to create a signed-and-encrypted messa ge to submit to the network.</t>	So Alice's MUA won't do that; it is going to create a signed-and-encrypted messa ge to submit to the network.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="encrypted-with-hcpnoconfidentiality-and-legacy-display"
	<section anchor="encrypted-with-hcpnoconfidentiality-and-legacy-display"><name>E	>
	ncrypted with <spanx style="verb">hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx> and Legacy Disp	<name>Encrypted with <tt>hcp_no_confidentiality</tt> and Legacy Displa
	lay</name>	y</name>
		<t>This example assumes that Alice's MUA uses <tt>hcp_no_confidentiali
	<t>This example assumes that Alice's MUA uses <spanx style="verb">hcp_no_confide	ty</tt>, not <tt>hcp_baseline</tt>.
	ntiality</spanx>, not <spanx style="verb">hcp_baseline</spanx>.
	That is, by default, it does not obscure or remove any Header Fields, even when encrypting.</t>	That is, by default, it does not obscure or remove any Header Fields, even when encrypting.</t>

		<t>However, it follows the guidance in <xref target="avoid-leak"/> and
	<t>However, it follows the guidance in <xref target="avoid-leak"/>, and will mak	will make use of the <tt>HP-Outer</tt> field in the Cryptographic Payload of Bo
	e use of the <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> field in the Cryptographic Pay	b's original message (<xref target="compose-example-payload"/>) to determine wha
	load of Bob's original message (<xref target="compose-example-payload"/>) to det	t to obscure.</t>
	ermine what to obscure.</t>	<t>When crafting the Cryptographic Payload, its baseline <iref item="H
		CP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> (<tt>
	<t>When crafting the Cryptographic Payload, its baseline <iref item="HCP"/><xref	hcp_no_confidentiality</tt>) leaves each field untouched.
	target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> (<spanx style="	To uphold the confidentiality of the sender's values when replying, the MUA exec
	verb">hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx>) leaves each field untouched.	utes the following steps (for brevity, only <tt>Subject</tt> and <tt>Message-ID<
	To uphold the confidentiality of the sender's values when replying, the MUA exec	/tt>/<tt>In-Reply-To</tt> are shown):</t>
	utes the following steps (for brevity only <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> a	<ul spacing="normal">
	nd <spanx style="verb">Message-ID</spanx>/<spanx style="verb">In-Reply-To</spanx	<li>
	> are shown):</t>	<t>Extract the referenced Header Fields (see <xref target="extract
		ing-headers"/>):
	<t><list style="symbols">	</t>
	<t>Extract the referenced header fields (see <xref target="extracting-headers"	<ul spacing="normal">
	/>):	<li>
	<list style="symbols">	<t><tt>refouter</tt> contains:
	<t><spanx style="verb">refouter</spanx> contains:	</t>
	<list style="symbols">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><spanx style="verb">Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500</spanx></	<li>
	t>	<t><tt>Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500</tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">From: Bob <bob@example.net></spanx></t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">To: Alice <alice@example.net></spanx></t>	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">Subject: [...]</spanx></t>	<t><tt>From: Bob <bob@example.net></tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.examp	</li>
	le></spanx></t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t><tt>To: Alice <alice@example.net></tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">refprotected</spanx> contains:	</li>
	<list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500</spanx></	<t><tt>Subject: [...]</tt></t>
	t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">From: Bob <bob@example.net></spanx></t>	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">To: Alice <alice@example.net></spanx></t>	<t><tt>Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example&g
	<t><spanx style="verb">Subject: Handling the Jones contract</spanx></t	t;</tt></t>
	>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.examp	</ul>
	le></spanx></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t><tt>refprotected</tt> contains:
	<t>Apply the response function:	</t>
	<list style="symbols">	<ul spacing="normal">
	<t><spanx style="verb">respond(refouter)</spanx> contains:	<li>
	<list style="symbols">	<t><tt>Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:08:43 -0500</tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">From: Alice <alice@example.net></spanx></	</li>
	t>	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">To: Bob <bob@example.net></spanx></t>	<t><tt>From: Bob <bob@example.net></tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">Subject: Re: [...]</spanx></t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.exam	<li>
	ple></spanx></t>	<t><tt>To: Alice <alice@example.net></tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.examp	</li>
	le></spanx></t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t><tt>Subject: Handling the Jones contract</tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">respond(refprotected)</spanx> contains:	</li>
	<list style="symbols">	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">From: Alice <alice@example.net></spanx></	<t><tt>Message-ID: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example&g
	t>	t;</tt></t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">To: Bob <bob@example.net></spanx></t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">Subject: Re: Handling the Jones contract</spanx	</ul>
	></t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.exam	</ul>
	ple></spanx></t>	</li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.examp	<li>
	le></spanx></t>	<t>Apply the response function:
	</list></t>	</t>
	</list></t>	<ul spacing="normal">
	<t>Compute the ephemeral <spanx style="verb">response_hcp</spanx> (see <xref t	<li>
	arget="avoid-leak"/>):	<t><tt>respond(refouter)</tt> contains:
	<list style="symbols">	</t>
	<t>Note that all headers except <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> are th	<ul spacing="normal">
	e same.</t>	<li>
	<t><spanx style="verb">confmap</spanx> contains only <spanx style="verb">(	<t><tt>From: Alice <alice@example.net></tt></t>
	"Subject", "Re: Handling the Jones contract") -> "Re: [...]"</spanx></t>	</li>
	</list></t>	<li>
	</list></t>	<t><tt>To: Bob <bob@example.net></tt></t>
		</li>
	<t>Thus all Header Fields that were <spanx style="verb">signed</spanx> are passe	<li>
	d through untouched.	<t><tt>Subject: Re: [...]</tt></t>
	The reply's <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> is obscured as <spanx style="ver	</li>
	b">Subject: Re: [...]</spanx> if and only if the user does not edit the subject	<li>
	line from that initially proposed by the MUA's reply interface.	<t><tt>In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example&
	If the user edits the subject line, e.g., to <spanx style="verb">Subject: Re: Ha	gt;</tt></t>
	ndling the Jones contract ASAP</spanx>, the <spanx style="verb">response_hcp</sp	</li>
	anx> will <em>not</em> obscure it, and instead pass it through in the clear.</t>	<li>
		<t><tt>References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example&g
	<t>For stronger header confidentiality, the replying MUA should use a reasonable	t;</tt></t>
	<iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HC	</li>
	P</xref> (not <spanx style="verb">hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx>).	</ul>
	Also recall that the local <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentialit	</li>
	y-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> is applied first, and that <spanx style="verb	<li>
	">response_hcp</spanx> is only applied to what is left unchanged by the local <i	<t><tt>respond(refprotected)</tt> contains:
	ref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</	</t>
	xref>.</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<section anchor="reply-example-payload"><name>Cryptographic Payload</name>	<t><tt>From: Alice <alice@example.net></tt></t>
		</li>
	<t>Consequently, the Cryptographic Payload for Alice's reply looks like this:</t	<li>
	>	<t><tt>To: Bob <bob@example.net></tt></t>
		</li>
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	<li>
		<t><tt>Subject: Re: Handling the Jones contract</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example&
		gt;</tt></t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example&g
		t;</tt></t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		</li>
		</ul>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t>Compute the ephemeral <tt>response_hcp</tt> (see <xref target="
		avoid-leak"/>):
		</t>
		<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
		<t>Note that all headers except <tt>Subject</tt> are the same.
		</t>
		</li>
		<li>
		<t><tt>confmap</tt> contains only <tt>("Subject", "Re: Handlin
		g the Jones contract") -> "Re: [...]"</tt></t>
		</li>
		</ul>
		</li>
		</ul>
		<t>Thus, all Header Fields that were <tt>signed</tt> are passed throug
		h untouched.
		The reply's <tt>Subject</tt> is obscured as <tt>Subject: Re: [...]</tt> if and o
		nly if the user does not edit the Subject line from that initially proposed by t
		he MUA's reply interface.
		If the user edits the Subject line, e.g., to <tt>Subject: Re: Handling the Jones
		contract ASAP</tt>, the <tt>response_hcp</tt> will <em>not</em> obscure it and
		instead pass it through in the clear.</t>
		<t>For stronger header confidentiality, the replying MUA should use a
		reasonable <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format
		="none">HCP</xref> (not <tt>hcp_no_confidentiality</tt>).
		Also recall that the local <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentialit
		y-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> is applied first and that <tt>response_hcp</t
		t> is only applied to what is left unchanged by the local <iref item="HCP"/><xre
		f target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>.</t>
		<section anchor="reply-example-payload">
		<name>Cryptographic Payload</name>
		<t>Consequently, the Cryptographic Payload for Alice's reply looks l
		ike this:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:48:22 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:48:22 -0500
	From: Alice <alice@example.net>	From: Alice <alice@example.net>
	To: Bob <bob@example.net>	To: Bob <bob@example.net>
	Subject: Re: Handling the Jones contract	Subject: Re: Handling the Jones contract
	Message-ID: <20230111T214822Z.5678@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T214822Z.5678@lhp.example>
	In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";
	hp="cipher"	hp="cipher"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0

	skipping to change at line 11401 ¶	skipping to change at line 11131 ¶
	> it's critical!	> it's critical!

	I'll get right on it, Bob!	I'll get right on it, Bob!

	Regards,	Regards,
	Alice	Alice

	--	--
	Alice Jenkins	Alice Jenkins
	ACME, Inc.	ACME, Inc.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Note the following features:</t>
	<t>Note the following features:</t>	<ul spacing="normal">
		<li>
	<t><list style="symbols">	<t>the <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> parameter to <tt>Content-Type</tt></
	<t>the <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx> parameter to <spanx style="verb	t>
	">Content-Type</spanx></t>	</li>
	<t>the appropriate <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> Header Field for <span	<li>
	x style="verb">Subject</spanx>,</t>	<t>the appropriate <tt>HP-Outer</tt> Header Field for <tt>Subjec
	<t>the <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"</spanx> parameter for the <sp	t</tt></t>
	anx style="verb">Content-Type</spanx></t>	</li>
	<t>the Legacy Display Element (the simple pseudo-header and its trailing newli	<li>
	ne) in the Main Body Part.</t>	<t>the <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> parameter for the <tt>Cont
	</list></t>	ent-Type</tt></t>
		</li>
	</section>	<li>
	<section anchor="external-header-section-1"><name>External Header Section</name>	<t>the Legacy Display Element (the simple pseudo-header and its
		trailing newline) in the Main Body Part</t>
	<t>The Cryptographic Payload from <xref target="reply-example-payload"/> is then	</li>
	wrapped in the appropriate Cryptographic Layers.	</ul>
	For this example, using S/MIME, it is wrapped in an <spanx style="verb">applicat	</section>
	ion/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"</spanx> layer, which is in turn wrapped	<section anchor="external-header-section-1">
	in an <spanx style="verb">application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"</	<name>External Header Section</name>
	spanx> layer.</t>	<t>The Cryptographic Payload from <xref target="reply-example-payloa
		d"/> is then wrapped in the appropriate Cryptographic Layers.
	<t>Then an external Header Section is applied to the outer MIME object, which lo	For this example using S/MIME, it is wrapped in an <tt>application/pkcs7-mime; s
	oks like this:</t>	mime-type="signed-data"</tt> layer, which is in turn wrapped in an <tt>applicati
		on/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"</tt> layer.</t>
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[	<t>Then, an external Header Section is applied to the outer MIME obj
		ect, which looks like this:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:48:22 -0500	Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 16:48:22 -0500
	From: Alice <alice@example.net>	From: Alice <alice@example.net>
	To: Bob <bob@example.net>	To: Bob <bob@example.net>
	Subject: Re: [...]	Subject: Re: [...]
	Message-ID: <20230111T214822Z.5678@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <20230111T214822Z.5678@lhp.example>
	In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	In-Reply-To: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>	References: <20230111T210843Z.1234@lhp.example>
	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64	Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";	Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";
	smime-type="enveloped-data"	smime-type="enveloped-data"
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>Note that the <tt>Subject</tt> Header Field has been obscured app
	<t>Note that the <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx> Header Field has been obscu	ropriately even though <tt>hcp_no_confidentiality</tt> would not have touched it
	red appropriately even though <spanx style="verb">hcp_no_confidentiality</spanx>	by default.
	would not have touched it by default.	The output of the CMS enveloping operation is base64 encoded and forms the body
	The output of the CMS enveloping operation is base64-encoded and forms the body	of the message.</t>
	of the message.</t>	</section>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="rendering-examples">
	</section>	<name>Rendering Examples</name>
	<section anchor="rendering-examples"><name>Rendering Examples</name>	<t>This section offers example Cryptographic Payloads (the content within
		the Cryptographic Envelope) that contain Legacy Display Elements.</t>
	<t>This section offers example Cryptographic Payloads (the content within the Cr	<section anchor="example-legacy-display-plain">
	yptographic Envelope) that contain Legacy Display Elements.</t>	<name>Example text/plain Cryptographic Payload with Legacy Display Eleme
		nts</name>
	<section anchor="example-legacy-display-plain"><name>Example text/plain Cryptogr	<t>Here is a simple one-part Cryptographic Payload (Header Section and b
	aphic Payload with Legacy Display Elements</name>	ody) of a message that includes Legacy Display Elements:</t>
		<artwork><![CDATA[
	<t>Here is a simple one-part Cryptographic Payload (Header Section and body) of
	a message that includes Legacy Display Elements:</t>

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500	Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500
	From: Alice <alice@example.net>	From: Alice <alice@example.net>
	To: Bob <bob@example.net>	To: Bob <bob@example.net>
	Subject: Dinner plans	Subject: Dinner plans
	Message-ID: <text-plain-legacy-display@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <text-plain-legacy-display@lhp.example>
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";	Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";
	hp="cipher"	hp="cipher"
	HP-Outer: Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500	HP-Outer: Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500
	HP-Outer: From: Alice <alice@example.net>	HP-Outer: From: Alice <alice@example.net>
	HP-Outer: To: Bob <bob@example.net>	HP-Outer: To: Bob <bob@example.net>
	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]	HP-Outer: Subject: [...]
	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <text-plain-legacy-display@lhp.example>	HP-Outer: Message-ID: <text-plain-legacy-display@lhp.example>

	Subject: Dinner plans	Subject: Dinner plans

	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park
	from there.	from there.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>A compatible MUA will recognize the <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> pa
	<t>A compatible MUA will recognize the <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"	rameter and render the body of the message as:</t>
	</spanx> parameter and render the body of the message as:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park
	from there.	from there.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>A legacy decryption-capable MUA that is unaware of this mechanism wil
	<t>A legacy decryption-capable MUA that is unaware of this mechanism will ignore	l ignore the <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> parameter and instead render the bod
	the <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"</spanx> parameter and instead ren	y including the Legacy Display Elements:</t>
	der the body including the Legacy Display Elements:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Subject: Dinner plans	Subject: Dinner plans

	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park
	from there.	from there.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="example-legacy-display-html">
	<section anchor="example-legacy-display-html"><name>Example text/html Cryptograp	<name>Example text/html Cryptographic Payload with Legacy Display Elemen
	hic Payload with Legacy Display Elements</name>	ts</name>
		<t>Here is a modern one-part Cryptographic Payload (Header Section and b
	<t>Here is a modern one-part Cryptographic Payload (Header Section and body) of	ody) of a message that includes Legacy Display Elements:</t>
	a message that includes Legacy Display Elements:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500	Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500
	From: Alice <alice@example.net>	From: Alice <alice@example.net>
	To: Bob <bob@example.net>	To: Bob <bob@example.net>
	Subject: Dinner plans	Subject: Dinner plans
	Message-ID: <text-html-legacy-display@lhp.example>	Message-ID: <text-html-legacy-display@lhp.example>
	MIME-Version: 1.0	MIME-Version: 1.0
	Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";	Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"; hp-legacy-display="1";
	hp="cipher"	hp="cipher"
	HP-Outer: Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500	HP-Outer: Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 20:40:48 -0500
	HP-Outer: From: Alice <alice@example.net>	HP-Outer: From: Alice <alice@example.net>

	skipping to change at line 11516 ¶	skipping to change at line 11239 ¶
	<html><head><title></title></head><body>	<html><head><title></title></head><body>
	<div class="header-protection-legacy-display">	<div class="header-protection-legacy-display">
	<pre>Subject: Dinner plans</pre>	<pre>Subject: Dinner plans</pre>
	</div>	</div>
	<p>	<p>
	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park
	from there.	from there.
	</p>	</p>
	</body>	</body>
	</html>	</html>

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>A compatible MUA will recognize the <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> pa
	<t>A compatible MUA will recognize the <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"	rameter and mask out the Legacy Display <tt>div</tt>, rendering the body of the
	</spanx> parameter and mask out the Legacy Display <spanx style="verb">div</span	message as a simple paragraph:</t>
	x>, rendering the body of the message as a simple paragraph:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park
	from there.	from there.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>A legacy decryption-capable MUA that is unaware of this mechanism wil
	<t>A legacy decryption-capable MUA that is unaware of this mechanism will ignore	l ignore the <tt>hp-legacy-display="1"</tt> parameter and instead render the bod
	the <spanx style="verb">hp-legacy-display="1"</spanx> parameter and instead ren	y including the Legacy Display Elements:</t>
	der the body including the Legacy Display Elements:</t>	<artwork><![CDATA[

	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	Subject: Dinner plans	Subject: Dinner plans

	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park	Let's meet at Rama's Roti Shop at 8pm and go to the park
	from there.	from there.

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		</section>
	</section>	</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="other-schemes">
	<section anchor="other-schemes"><name>Other Header Protection Schemes</name>	<name>Other Header Protection Schemes</name>
		<t>Other Header Protection schemes have been proposed in the past.
	<t>Other Header Protection schemes have been proposed in the past.	However, those typically have drawbacks such as sparse implementation, known pro
	However, those typically have drawbacks such as sparse implementation, known pro	blems with legacy interoperability (in particular with rendering), lack of clear
	blems with legacy interoperability (in particular with rendering), lack of clear	signaling of sender intent, and/or incomplete cryptographic protections.
	signalling of sender intent, and/or incomplete cryptographic protections.
	This section lists such schemes known at the time of the publication of this doc ument out of historical interest.</t>	This section lists such schemes known at the time of the publication of this doc ument out of historical interest.</t>

		<section anchor="original-rfc-8551-header-protection">
	<section anchor="original-rfc-8551-header-protection"><name>Original RFC 8551 He	<name>Original RFC 8551 Header Protection</name>
	ader Protection</name>	<t>S/MIME <xref target="RFC8551"/> (as well as its predecessors <xref ta
		rget="RFC5751"/> and <xref target="RFC3851"/>) defined a form of cryptographic H
	<t>S/MIME <xref target="RFC8551"/> (as well as its predecessors <xref target="RF	eader Protection that has never reached wide adoption and has significant drawba
	C5751"/> and <xref target="RFC3851"/>) defined a form of cryptographic Header Pr	cks compared to the mechanism in this document.
	otection that has never reached wide adoption, and has significant drawbacks com
	pared to the mechanism in this draft.
	See <xref target="rfc8551-problems"/> for more discussion of the differences and <xref target="RFC8551HP"/> for guidance on how to handle such a message.</t>	See <xref target="rfc8551-problems"/> for more discussion of the differences and <xref target="RFC8551HP"/> for guidance on how to handle such a message.</t>

		</section>
	</section>	<section anchor="pretty-easy-privacy-pep">
	<section anchor="pretty-easy-privacy-pep"><name>Pretty Easy Privacy (pEp)</name>	<name>Pretty Easy Privacy (pEp)</name>
		<t>The pretty Easy privacy (pEp) <xref target="I-D.pep-general"/> projec
	<t>The pEp (pretty Easy privacy) <xref target="I-D.pep-general"/> project specif	t specifies two different MIME schemes that include Header Protection for Signed
	ies two different MIME schemes that include Header Protection for Signed-and-Enc	-and-Encrypted email messages in <xref target="I-D.pep-email"/>:
	rypted e-mail messages in <xref target="I-D.pep-email"/>:
	One scheme -- referred as pEp Email Format 1 (PEF-1) -- is generated towards MUA s not known to be pEp-capable, while the other scheme -- referred as PEF-2 -- is used between MUAs discovered to be compatible with pEp.	One scheme -- referred as pEp Email Format 1 (PEF-1) -- is generated towards MUA s not known to be pEp-capable, while the other scheme -- referred as PEF-2 -- is used between MUAs discovered to be compatible with pEp.
	Signed-only messages are not recommended in pEp.</t>	Signed-only messages are not recommended in pEp.</t>

		<t>Although the PEF-2 scheme is only meant to be used between PEF-2-comp
	<t>Although the PEF-2 scheme is only meant to be used between PEF-2 compatible M	atible MUAs, PEF-2 messages may end up at MUAs unaware of PEF-2 (in which case,
	UAs, PEF-2 messages may end up at MUAs unaware of PEF-2 (in which case they typi	they typically render badly).
	cally render badly).	This is due to signaling mechanism limitations.</t>
	This is due to signalling mechanism limitations.</t>	<t>As the PEF-2 scheme is an enhanced variant of the <iref item="RFC8551
		HP"/><xref target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> scheme (with an add
	<t>As the PEF-2 scheme is an enhanced variant of the <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xr	itional MIME Layer), it is similar to the <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="
	ef target="RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> scheme (with an additional	RFC8551HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> scheme (see <xref target="RFC8551HP"/>
	MIME Layer), it is similar to the <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC8551H	).
	P" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> scheme (see <xref target="RFC8551HP"/>).
	The basic PEF-2 MIME structure looks as follows:</t>	The basic PEF-2 MIME structure looks as follows:</t>

		<artwork><![CDATA[
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
	A └┬╴multipart/encrypted [Outer Message]	A └┬╴multipart/encrypted [Outer Message]
	B ├─╴application/pgp-encrypted	B ├─╴application/pgp-encrypted
	C └─╴application/octet-stream inline [Cryptographic Payload]	C └─╴application/octet-stream inline [Cryptographic Payload]
	D ↧ (decrypts to)	D ↧ (decrypts to)
	E └┬╴multipart/mixed	E └┬╴multipart/mixed
	F ├─╴text/plain	F ├─╴text/plain
	G ├┬╴message/rfc822	G ├┬╴message/rfc822
	H │└─╴[Inner Message]	H │└─╴[Inner Message]
	I └─╴application/pgp-keys	I └─╴application/pgp-keys

	]]></artwork></figure>	]]></artwork>
		<t>The MIME structure at part <tt>H</tt> contains the Inner Message to b
		e rendered to the user.</t>
		<t>It is possible for a normal MUA to accidentally produce a message tha
		t happens to have the same MIME structure as used for PEF-2 messages.
		Therefore, a PEF-2 message cannot be identified by the MIME structure alone.</t>
		<t>The lack of a mechanism comparable to <tt>HP-Outer</tt> (see <xref ta
		rget="hp-outer"/>) makes it impossible for the recipient of a PEF-2 message to s
		afely determine which Header Fields are confidential or not while forwarding or
		replying to a message (see <xref target="replying"/>).</t>
		<t>Note: As this document is not normative for PEF-2 messages, it does n
		ot provide any guidance for handling them.
		Please see <xref target="I-D.pep-email"/> for more guidance.</t>
		</section>
		<section anchor="draft-autocrypt-protected-headers">
		<name>Protected Email Headers</name>
		<t><xref target="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers"/> describes a sc
		heme similar to the Header Protection scheme specified in this document.
		However, instead of adding Legacy Display Elements to existing MIME parts (see <
		xref target="ld-text-plain"/>), <xref target="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-head
		ers"/> suggests injecting a new MIME element "Legacy Display Part", thus modifyi
		ng the MIME structure of the Cryptographic Payload.
		These modified Cryptographic Payloads cause significant rendering problems on so
		me common Legacy MUAs.</t>
		<t>The lack of a mechanism comparable to <tt>hp="cipher"</tt> and <tt>hp
		="clear"</tt> (see <xref target="hp-parameter"/>) means the recipient of an encr
		ypted message as described in <xref target="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-header
		s"/> cannot be cryptographically certain whether the sender intended for the mes
		sage to be confidential or not.
		The lack of a mechanism comparable to <tt>HP-Outer</tt> (see <xref target="hp-ou
		ter"/>) makes it impossible for the recipient of an encrypted message as describ
		ed in <xref target="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers"/> to safely determine
		which Header Fields are confidential or not while forwarding or replying to a m
		essage (see <xref target="replying"/>).</t>
		</section>
		</section>
		<section anchor="acknowledgments" numbered="false">
		<name>Acknowledgements</name>


	<t>The MIME structure at part <spanx style="verb">H</spanx> contains the Inner M	<!--[rfced] FYI - We alphabetized the names listed in the Acknowledgements
	essage to be rendered to the user.</t>	section. We believe that was the intent as only two were out of order. Let us
		know if you prefer the original order.
		-->


	<t>It is possible for a normal MUA to accidentally produce a message that happen	<t><contact fullname="Alexander Krotov"/> identified the risk of
	s to have the same MIME structure as used for PEF-2 messages.	<tt>From</tt> address spoofing (see <xref target="from-addr-spoofing"/>)
	Therefore, a PEF-2 message cannot be identified by MIME structure alone.</t>	and helped provide guidance to MUAs.</t>
		<t><contact fullname="Thore Göbel"/> identified significant gaps in
		earlier draft versions of this document and proposed concrete, substantial
		improvements. Thanks to his contributions, the document is clearer, and
		the protocols described herein are more useful.</t>
		<t>Additionally, the authors would like to thank the following people
		who have provided helpful comments and suggestions for this document:
		<contact fullname="Berna Alp"/>, <contact fullname="Bernhard
		E. Reiter"/>, <contact fullname="Bron Gondwana"/>, <contact
		fullname="Carl Wallace"/>, <contact fullname="Claudio Luck"/>, <contact
		fullname="Daniel Huigens"/>, <contact fullname="David Wilson"/>,
		<contact fullname="Éric Vyncke"/>, <contact fullname="Hernani
		Marques"/>, <contact fullname="juga"/>, <contact fullname="Kelly
		Bristol"/>, <contact fullname="Krista Bennett"/>, <contact fullname="Lars
		Rohwedder"/>, <contact fullname="Michael StJohns"/>, <contact
		fullname="Nicolas Lidzborski"/>, <contact fullname="Orie Steele"/>,
		<contact fullname="Paul Wouters"/>, <contact fullname="Peter Yee"/>,
		<contact fullname="Phillip Tao"/>, <contact fullname="Robert
		Williams"/>, <contact fullname="Rohan Mahy"/>, <contact fullname="Roman
		Danyliw"/>, <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Sofia
		Balicka"/>, <contact fullname="Steve Kille"/>, <contact fullname="Volker
		Birk"/>, <contact fullname="Warren Kumari"/>, and <contact fullname="Wei
		Chuang"/>.</t>
		</section>
		</back>


	<t>The lack of a mechanism comparable to <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> (s ee <xref target="hp-outer"/>) makes it impossible for the recipient of a PEF-2 m essage to safely determine which Header Fields are confidential or not, while fo rwarding or replying to a message (see <xref target="replying"/>).</t>	<!-- [rfced] We have some questions/comments regarding artwork and sourcecode:


	<t>Note: As this document is not normative for PEF-2 messages, it does not provi	a) Please review each artwork element and let us know if any should be marked
	de any guidance for handling them.	as sourcecode (or another element) instead.
	Please see <xref target="I-D.pep-email"/> for more guidance.</t>


	</section>	b) Some artwork elements are marked as type "ascii-art" while others are
	<section anchor="draft-autocrypt-protected-headers"><name>"draft-autocrypt" Prot	not. Please review and let us know if there are any artwork elements you would
	ected Headers</name>	like to have marked as "ascii-art".


	<t><xref target="I-D.autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers"/> describes a scheme sim	c) Since the sourcecode type "text/x-hcp" is not part of the list at
	ilar to the Header Protection scheme specified in this document.	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types>,
	However, instead of adding Legacy Display Elements to existing MIME parts (see <	may we update to sourcecode type "pseudocode"? Note that it is also
	xref target="ld-text-plain"/>), "draft-autocrypt" injects a new MIME element "Le	acceptable to leave the "type" attribute not set.
	gacy Display Part", thus modifying the MIME structure of the Cryptographic Paylo	-->
	ad.
	These modified Cryptographic Payloads cause significant rendering problems on so
	me common Legacy MUAs.</t>


	<t>The lack of a mechanism comparable to <spanx style="verb">hp="cipher"</spanx>	<!-- [rfced] In the html and pdf outputs, the text enclosed in <tt> is output
	and <spanx style="verb">hp="clear"</spanx> (see <xref target="hp-parameter"/>)	in fixed-width font. In the txt output, there are no changes to the font,
	means the recipient of an encrypted "draft-autocrypt" message cannot be cryptogr	and the quotation marks have been removed.
	aphically certain whether the sender intended for the message to be confidential
	or not.
	The lack of a mechanism comparable to <spanx style="verb">HP-Outer</spanx> (see
	<xref target="hp-outer"/>) makes it impossible for the recipient of an encrypted
	"draft-autocrypt" to safely determine which Header Fields are confidential or n
	ot, while forwarding or replying to a message (see <xref target="replying"/>).</
	t>


	</section>	In the html and pdf outputs, the text enclosed in <em> is output in
	</section>	italics. In the txt output, the text enclosed in <em> appears with an
	<section anchor="document-changelog"><name>Document Changelog</name>	underscore before and after.


	<t>[[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]</t>	Please review carefully and let us know if the output is acceptable or if any
		updates are needed.


	<t><list style="symbols">	Additionally, we note variances with <tt>, for example, Bcc'ed vs.
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-25 <list style="symbols">	<tt>Bcc</tt>'ed. Please review let us know if any updates are needed
	<t>Address editorial clarifications from IESG review</t>	for consistency.
	<t>Update acknowledgements</t>	-->
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-24 <list style="symbols">
	<t>Deal with <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> spoofing risk: when inner an
	d outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> differ with no valid signature, render
	outer <spanx style="verb">From</spanx> and warn</t>
	<t>Add test vectors to show historical 8551HP variants</t>
	<t>clarify PEF-2 and draft-autocrypt commentary</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-23 <list style="symbols">
	<t>normalize on "signed-and-encrypted" across the document</t>
	<t>replace <spanx style="verb">hcp_strong</spanx> with <spanx style="verb"
	>hcp_shy</spanx></t>
	<t>Remove "Wrapped Message" scheme</t>
	<t>Rename "Injected Headers" to "Header Protection"</t>
	<t>Add guidance about From Header Field spoofing risk</t>
	<t>offer guidance on handling <iref item="RFC8551HP"/><xref target="RFC855
	1HP" format="none">RFC8551HP</xref> messages when received</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-22 <list style="symbols">
	<t>Reorganize document for better readability.</t>
	<t>Add more details about problems with draft-autocrypt.</t>
	<t>Rename <spanx style="verb">hcp_minimal</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">h
	cp_baseline</spanx>: in addition to obscuring <spanx style="verb">Subject</spanx
	>, it now removes other Informational Header Fields <spanx style="verb">Comments
	</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">Keywords</spanx>.</t>
	<t>Add an example message up front for easier explainability.</t>
	<t>Unwrap sample message test vectors.</t>
	<t>Name pseudocode algorithms, number steps.</t>
	<t>Reply guidance also applies to forwarded messages.</t>
	<t><spanx style="verb">hcp_strong</spanx>: stop rewriting <spanx style="ve
	rb">Message-Id</spanx>.</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-21 <list style="symbols">
	<t>HP-Outer mechanism replaces HP-Removed and HP-Obscured.
	This enables the recipient to easily calculate the sender's actions around heade
	r confidentiality.</t>
	<t>Replace Content-Type parameter <spanx style="verb">protected-headers=</
	spanx> with <spanx style="verb">hp=</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">hp-scheme=</
	spanx>.
	The presence of <spanx style="verb">hp=</spanx> indicates that the sender used H
	eader Protection according to this document, and the value indicates whether the
	sender tried to encrypt and sign the message or just sign it.
	<spanx style="verb">hp-scheme="wrapped"</spanx> advises the recipient that they
	should look for the protected Header Fields in subtly different place.</t>
	<t>Provide a clear algorithm for reasonably safe handling of confidential
	headers during Reply and Forward operations.</t>
	<t>Do not register the example <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-conf
	identiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> <spanx style="verb">hcp_hide_cc</sp
	anx>, rename to <spanx style="verb">hcp_example_hide_cc</spanx></t>
	<t>Rename <spanx style="verb">hcp_null</spanx> to <spanx style="verb">hcp_
	no_confidentiality</spanx></t>
	<t>Provide a clear algorithm for the recipient to compute the protection s
	tate of each Header Field.</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-20 <list style="symbols">
	<t>clarify IANA guidance about registration policy and designated expert r
	eview</t>
	<t>emphasize that Content-Type parameter hp-legacy-display=1 belongs on al
	l main body parts with a legacy display element</t>
	<t>clean up/normalize pseudocode variable names and text (no algorithm cha
	nges)</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-19 <list style="symbols">
	<t>improve text, capitalize defined terms, fix typos</t>
	<t>Clean up from AD review:</t>
	<t>updates RFC 8551 explicitly</t>
	<t>add "Legacy Signed Message" and "Ordinary User" explicitly to terms</t>
	<t>tighten up SHOULDs/MUSTs for conformant MUAs</t>
	<t>expand references to other relevant Security Considerations</t>
	<t>drop nudge about non-existent Content-Type Parameters registry</t>
	<t>clarify IANA notes to align with table columns</t>
	<t>explicitly request <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiali
	ty-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> registry</t>
	<t>add references to other header protections schemes, but move all of the
	m to appendix</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-18 <list style="symbols">
	<t>only allow US-ASCII as modified output of <iref item="HCP"/><xref targe
	t="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>, adjusted ABNF to mat
	ch</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-17 <list style="symbols">
	<t>More edits from WGLC:</t>
	<t>clean up definition of "Header Field"</t>
	<t>note leakage of encrypted recipient hints</t>
	<t>clarify explanation of LDE generation</t>
	<t>clarify how some obscured headers might not actually be private</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-16 <list style="symbols">
	<t>correct variable names in message composition algorithms</t>
	<t>make text more readable</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-15 <list style="symbols">
	<t>include clarifications, typos, etc from comments received during WGLC</
	t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-14 <list style="symbols">
	<t>provide section references for draft-ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance</t>
	<t>encouarge a future IANA named <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-co
	nfidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> registry if <iref item="HCP"/><xr
	ef target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref> development t
	akes off</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-13 <list style="symbols">
	<t>Retitle from "Header Protection for S/MIME" to "Header Protection for C
	ryptographically Protected E-mail"</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-12 <list style="symbols">
	<t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> produce HP-Obscured and HP-Removed when generating
	encrypted messages with non-null <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confiden
	tiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref></t>
	<t>Wrapped Message: move from forwarded=no to protected-headers=wrapped</t
	>
	<t>Wrapped Message: recommend Content-Disposition: inline</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-11 <list style="symbols">
	<t>Remove most of the Bcc text (transferred general discussion to e2e-mail
	-guidance)</t>
	<t>Fix bug in algorithm for generating HP-Obscured and HP-Removed</t>
	<t>More detail about handling Reply messages</t>
	<t>Considerations around handling risky Legacy Display Elements</t>
	<t>Narrative descriptions of some worked examples</t>
	<t>Describe potential leaks to recipients</t>
	<t>Clarify debugging/troubleshooting UX affordances</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-10 <list style="symbols">
	<t>Clarify that <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-pol
	icy" format="none">HCP</xref> doesn't apply to Structural Header Fields</t>
	<t>Drop out-of-date "Open Issues" section</t>
	<t>Brief commentary on UI of messages with intermediate/mixed protections<
	/t>
	<t>Deprecation prospects for messages without protected headers</t>
	<t>Describe generating replies to encrypted messages with stronger <iref i
	tem="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref>
	</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-09 <list style="symbols">
	<t>clarify terminology</t>
	<t>add privacy and security considerations</t>
	<t>clarify <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header-confidentiality-policy"
	format="none">HCP</xref> examples and baselines</t>
	<t>recommend hcp_minimal as default <iref item="HCP"/><xref target="header
	-confidentiality-policy" format="none">HCP</xref></t>
	<t>add HP-Obscured and HP-Removed (avoids reasoning about differences
	between outside and inside the Cryptographic Envelope)</t>
	<t>regenerated test vectors</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-08 <list style="symbols">
	<t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> compose injected headers, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> compos
	e wrapped messages</t>
	<t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> parse both schemes</t>
	<t>cleanup and restructure document</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-07 <list style="symbols">
	<t>move from legacy display MIME part to legacy display elements within ma
	in body part</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-06 <list style="symbols">
	<t>document observed problems with legacy MUAs</t>
	<t>avoid duplicated outer Message-IDs in hcp_strong test vectors</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-05 <list style="symbols">
	<t>fix multipart/signed wrapped test vectors</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-04 <list style="symbols">
	<t>add test vectors</t>
	<t>add "problems with Injected Messages" subsection</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-03 <list style="symbols">
	<t>dkg takes over from Bernie as primary author</t>
	<t>Add Usability section</t>
	<t>describe two distinct formats "Wrapped Message" and "Injected Headers"<
	/t>
	<t>Introduce <iref item="Header Confidentiality Policy"/><xref target="hea
	der-confidentiality-policy" format="none">Header Confidentiality Policy</xref> m
	odel</t>
	<t>Overhaul message composition guidance</t>
	<t>Simplify document creation workflow, move public face to gitlab</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-02 <list style="symbols">
	<t>editorial changes / improve language</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-01 <list style="symbols">
	<t>Add DKG as co-author</t>
	<t>Partial Rewrite of Abstract and Introduction [HB/AM/DKG]</t>
	<t>Adding definitions for Cryptographic Layer, Cryptographic
	Payload, and Cryptographic Envelope (reference to
	<xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-e2e-mail-guidance"/>) [DKG]</t>
	<t>Enhanced MITM Definition to include Machine- /
	Meddler-in-the-middle [HB]</t>
	<t>Relaxed definition of Original message, which may not be of type
	"message/rfc822" [HB]</t>
	<t>Move "memory hole" option to the Appendix (on request by Chair to
	only maintain one option in the specification) [HB]</t>
	<t>Updated Scope of Protection Levels according to WG discussion
	during IETF-108 [HB]</t>
	<t>Obfuscation recommendation only for Subject and Message-Id and
	distinguish between Encrypted and Unencrypted Messages [HB]</t>
	<t>Removed (commented out) Header Field Flow Figure (it appeared to
	be confusing as is was) [HB]</t>
	</list></t>
	<t>draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-00 <list style="symbols">
	<t>Initial version (text partially taken over from
	draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-requirements</t>
	</list></t>
	</list></t>


	<!-- LocalWords: utf docname ipr wg toc sortrefs symrefs Gillmor TW	<!--[rfced] We note that the figures in the sections and appendices
	-->	listed below are either misaligned slightly and/or have broken
	<!-- LocalWords: Kahn Hoeneisen Oberer Graben Winterthur uri Alexey	lines in the PDF output (the html and txt outputs display correctly).
	-->	To avoid this issue, please let us know if replacing/redrawing
	<!-- LocalWords: Isode Middlesex DKIM DMARC cleartext DomainKeys ld	the non-ASCII characters with ASCII characters is possible
	-->	(this is commonly done for structure in YANG trees; see
	<!-- LocalWords: Crypto crypto origbody origheaders hcp pseudocode	Section 5 of RFC 9731 as an example). Or if you have a
	-->	different solution for a fix, please let us know.
	<!-- LocalWords: ldlist bodypart newheaders newval pre renderer decrypts
	-->
	<!-- LocalWords: affordances subpart's stylesheet FIXME Berna juga
	-->
	<!-- LocalWords: Bernhard Reiter Rohwedder Housley Balicka Kille TZ
	-->
	<!-- LocalWords: Volker Chuang Betreff signenc UI lang IMAP md bcc
	-->
	<!-- LocalWords: Roti Changelog dkg gitlab newbody
	-->


	</section>	Misaligned:
		Section 1.9
		Section 4.5.1
		Section 4.5.2
		Section 4.10.1
		Appendices C.3.1-C.3.8


	</back>	Broken Lines :
		Appendix C.1.3
		Appendix C.1.5
		Appendix C.1.6
		Appendix C.1.7
		Appendix C.1.8
		Appendix C.2.2
		Appendix C.2.3
		Appendix C.2.4
		Appendix C.2.5
		Appendix C.2.6
		Appendices C.3.9-C.3.17
		-->


	<!-- ##markdown-source:	<!-- [rfced] Please review whether any of the notes in this document
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	rJgCbYVrejhNviuzIsuBpM2SHgIZ5ln0Fa1n+3iLN+lPsL/B5J/DuuCS/aZK	used throughout the document. Would you like to use the expansion
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	e3SSKBlssy2eN86HyC5c3uk0eZati/xteWVWd7rO3mX78Bta3NMadjb5vlmG	for consistency as recommended in the Web Portion of the Style Guide
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		e) FYI - We updated the document to reflect the forms on the right for
		consistency with the RFC Series and companion document. Please let us
		know of any objections.

		e-mail -> email
		electronic email -> email
		-->

		<!--[rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online
		Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
		and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature typically
		result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.

		For example, please consider whether the following should be updated:
		- dummy
		- man in the middle
		- whitespace

		In addition, please consider whether "traditional" should be updated for clarity
		.
		While the NIST website
		<https://web.archive.org/web/20250203031433/https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir
		/2021/NIST.IR.8366.pdf>
		indicates that this term is potentially biased, it is also ambiguous.
		"Traditional" is a subjective term, as it is not the same for everyone.
	-->	-->

	</rfc>	</rfc>

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